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TELEOLOGY AND ITS LIMITS IN ARISTOTLE AND KANT 
Thomas C. Marré, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2018 
Aristotle was a realist about natural teleology, Kant an anti-realist. My dissertation explains why 
each accorded it the epistemic and ontological status that he did. I articulate and defend novel 
conceptions of the problems they were addressing and their solutions to them. 
 Aristotle’s natural teleology constitutes an essential part of his solution to a larger 
problem: how is motion or change possible? Motion had been thought by some to be unlimited 
and, therefore, unknowable. If there is to be a science of natural motion, then, motion must have 
limits. The telos was one such limit. Aristotle often glosses telos with limit, and this association 
is consistent with prior usage. It was, in fact, one of the three standardly recognized limits, 
together with beginning and middle—archē and meson. All three figure in Aristotle’s account of 
natural motion. The archē is the efficient cause, and the meson is that by which the archē brings 
about some telos. So understood, the telos has a natural relation to the possibility of motion: it 
serves as a limit in virtue of which motion is intelligible. 
 Kant’s teleology is intimately related to disputes about universals and our empirical 
classifications of things. Central to my account is the category of community. Our discursive 
intellects require that we approach nature as if it were ordered into a system of genera and 
species. In such a system, the species are parts of the genus and stand together in community 
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under it, thereby constituting a whole. Similarly, an organism or natural end possesses the form 
of a system and its parts stand together in community under a common or communal ground. 
They too constitute a whole. But as with nature’s kinds, we can only approach an organism as if 
its parts formed a real whole: their communal ground is simple and so not to be met with in 
space. They possess, in other words, a noumenal ground. Consequently, organisms can be 
explained neither teleologically nor mechanistically, and teleology itself can never be accorded 
genuinely scientific status. Natural ends can be understood only on analogy with ourselves. 
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How is it possible that someone with knowledge of the 
beginning should be ignorant of the end? 
—Lady Philosophy 
Boethius, Consolatione 1.vi.27ff  
Miraculously, a plant twists itself out of a rock’s cleft; clinging to 
the harsh bluffs, living organization maintains itself in the midst of 
desolation; the formative drive [Trieb der Bildung] leaps from it 
like the spark hidden in the stone.  1
 —W. von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, v. 3, p.115 
 in Reill (2005).1
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NOTES ON SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS 
In what follows, I use the translations mentioned in the bibliography, sometimes modified using 
the editions mentioned in the same. Quite generally, I have for the sake of clarity made 
translations consistent in their renderings of telos, apeiron, archē, Gemeinschaft, and 
gemeinschaftlich. 
For references to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, I use the standard A/B citations. References to 
other works by Kant are by volume and page number to the standard Akademie Ausgabe, (1902-
present, Kants  gesammelte  Schriften, edited by the Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. 
Reimer, later De Gruyter). References to Aristotle include book, chapter, and Bekker numbers.
For the works of Aristotle, I use the following abbreviations: 
APo. Analytica Posteriora
APr. Analytica Priora
DC de Caelo
DA de Anima
DM de Motu Animalium
EE Ethica Eudemia
NE Ethica Nicomachea
GA de Generatione Animalium
GC de Generatione et Corruptione
HA Historia Animalium
Meta. Metaphysica
PA de Partibus Animalium
Phys. Physica
Po. Poetica
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For the works of Kant, I use the following abbreviations:
KrV Critique of Pure Reason
KpV Critique of Practical Reason
KU Critique of the Power of Judgment
JL Jäsche Logic
DW Dohna-Wundlacken Logic
VL Vienna Logic
BL Blomberg Logic
HL Heschel Logic
MMr Metaphysics Mrongovius
CTJ Critique of Teleological Judgment
EE First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment
A Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
P What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz 
and Wolff?
MAN Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
RM Of the Different Races of Human Beings
TP On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy
RH Review of J.G. Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity, 
parts 1 & 2
G Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
MS Metaphysics of Morals
!xiii
I Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim
LR Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion
R Reflections
ML2  Metaphysics L2 
For all other historical references, I use these abbrevations:
Thomas Aquinas
ST Summa Theologica
SCG Summa Contra Gentiles
De Ente De Ente et Essentia
Sent. Scriptum super Sententiis
De Hebd. De Hebdomadibus
Francisco Suárez
DM Metaphysical Disputations
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
NE  New Essays on Human Understanding
PE Philosophical Essays (eds.) Ariew and Garber, Hackett: 1989.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 In what follows I undertake an exercise in what might be called comparative 
philosophical anatomy. In particular, I undertake to compare and contrast the views of Aristotle 
and Kant on the status of natural teleology, i.e. the thought that nature or natural things do what 
they do with an eye towards some end or goal. Aristotle was a realist about natural teleology, 
Kant an anti-realist, and the aim of this dissertation is to understand why each accorded it the 
epistemic and ontological status that he did. One might explain the differences between them by 
highlighting the role of the changing conception of nature in the 17th century, when the tide 
turned against Aristotelianism. That story is by now familiar and some reference to it is very 
nearly standard in introductions to the topic of natural teleology.  1
 But though there is no small truth in such an explanation, it is complicated by the 
emergence of naturalistic theories of function and purpose over the last fifty years. Generally 
taking their cue from the work done by Larry Wright in the 1970s, these theories deny that 
functions or purposes need to be grounded in the intention of some agent. And neither would 
they seem to depend on any particularly Aristotelian theses, e.g. about inner principles of motion 
or the distinction between act and potency. Consequently, insofar as they avoid the problems 
traditionally thought to belong to teleology and to hang free of the metaphysics on which 
teleology has long been thought to depend, one can wonder why Kant (among others) could not 
 For recapitulations of this familiar story, cf. e.g. Shapin (1996) and Dear (2006). For introductions to the 1
topic that frame the issue in these terms, cf. e.g. Perlman (2009) and (2004), Davies (2003), Hassing (ed.) 
(1997), Buller (ed.) (1999), Gilson (1984), Woodfield (1976), von Wright (1971).
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have accorded biology a greater scientific status than he did.  Had he seen his way to something 2
like contemporary accounts of functions, then while biology would still have fallen far short of 
physics, it need not have been any more problematic than, say, chemistry. Otherwise put, if we 
are not to say that Kant was simply blinded by a certain conception of what teleology was, or by 
a certain conception of design, one can wonder what prevented him from finding his way to a 
metaphysically acceptable account of purpose or function, even within in the confines of the 
critical philosophy.  And in this, at least, Aristotle seems far more modern, for many have seen in 3
Aristotle an account of function and purpose very similar to those on offer today.  Thus, 4
whatever we might say about some of his other metaphysical commitments, Aristotle seems to 
give us a picture of teleology and functional explanation recognizably scientific and free of the 
mysteries thought by so many to beset teleological explanation. For that reason, one might think, 
a charitable interpretation of Aristotle on this score is easier to come by than it is for Kant. 
  There are, however, dissenters. One of the most prominent challenges to the family of 
teleological views mentioned above has held that, in fact, they do depend for their cogency on 
illicit appeals to the intentions of some agent, and others have criticized their naturalistic 
 Zuckert (2007), interestingly, says that Kant’s analysis of purposive relations ‘resembles’ Wright’s, 2
though she does not explain how (fn. 46, 117). She also says nothing about how they might differ. Wright 
is a realist about teleology, and nothing in his account—if inserted into the critical philosophy—would 
seem to require the kind of anti-realism to which Kant ultimately subscribes. Kreines (2006), by contrast, 
argues that Kant’s account is ‘fundamentally incompatible’ with Wright’s.
 Cf. McFarland (1970), ch. 6: ‘Contemporary biologists are able to ask what purpose is served by a part 3
of an organism without assuming that it was designed […] But Kant does not seem to have been able to 
make a distinction between designed and undesigned function.’
 Cf. e.g. Sedley (2007; 2010), Furley (1996), Gotthelf (2012), Depew (2008), and more besides. Whether 4
explicitly or not, those mentioned all ascribe to Aristotle a view of function or purpose which is in the 
broad family of views originating with Wright. Gotthelf thinks that, faced with the resources of modern 
chemistry, Aristotle would have dispensed with a specific dunamis guiding generation and retreated to 
something quite like Wright’s, but these details are discussed in chapter 3.
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credentials on similar grounds.  But what is more, Peter McLaughlin has suggested in his work 5
on contemporary accounts of functions that being essentially stipulative, such views miss out on 
what is philosophically interesting about biological systems, namely their holism. This holism 
cannot be accounted for without greater metaphysical resources than many have allowed: ‘a bit 
of Aristotle [is needed] to reconstruct our functional attributions […] That is going to be the 
metaphysical price.’  But McLaughlin does not in fact advocate paying that price, concluding 6
only that ‘many biologists are, in the end, closet Kantians in the sense that, while they adhere to 
strictly reductionistic explanatory mechanisms…they tend to prefer a somewhat holistic 
description of the phenomena to be explained.’  Thus, while Aristotelian descriptions accurately 7
capture the phenomena to be explained, the imagined cost of teleological explanation is not 
something biologists are thought to be willing to pay, and so they are functionally Kantians even 
if not avowedly so. Other contemporary writers on the topic have struck a similar chord: a 
Kantian approach to teleology allows us to use teleological descriptions heuristically while we 
search for underlying mechanisms.  8
 The dissertation to follow examines the nature and status of teleology in Aristotle and 
Kant against this background. By looking at both together and examining why they diverge as 
they do, we can make clear certain governing assumptions in their thought and what motivates 
them. At the same time, examining the metaphysical issues at play and the differences they make 
 Cummins (1975); Davies (2001) and (2009). For details, cf. chapter 3. Cummins’ view of functions is 5
often described by others as ‘eliminativist’ or ‘anti-teleological.’ Kreines (2006) argues that Cummins’ 
view is similarly incompatible with Kant’s. 
 McLaughlin (2001), 14. 6
 Ibid., 213.7
 Lewens (2007).8
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to the status of teleology in Aristotle and Kant can help to illuminate contemporary discussions 
of functions and teleology, for as we have seen the metaphysical costs of teleology continue to be 
disputed. But it is a further aim of this study to determine the sense or extent to which Aristotle 
and Kant can be said to be addressing the same issues—to determine, in other words, the 
diachronic unity of the idea of teleology itself. There is indeed no small disagreement as to what 
teleology is, and thus what it is to give a teleological explanation of something, and it has already 
been alleged that the contemporary accounts of teleology mentioned above would not have 
counted as teleology at all for the medievals. In addition, it is by now a familiar fact that the 
mind-body problem is not a perennial one, but one arising out of particular philosophical 
presuppositions.  We might then expect that the same will be true of any so-called ‘problem’ of 9
teleology. With an eye to that further aim, then, the study that follows consists of historical 
reconstructions, not rational ones. It does not, in other words, consist in a ‘conversation with the 
re-educated dead,’ to borrow Rorty’s phrase, but in two case studies which attend closely to the 
conceptual contexts in which Aristotle and Kant were thinking.  On their basis, we can examine 10
what prior commitments shape and constrain the conceptual possibilities for each just as 
previous developmental commitments constrain the possibilities for future developments in 
organisms. 
 Cf. Pasnau (2001), Matson (1966), King (2007).9
 Rorty (1984), 52, in Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner (eds.) (1984). 10
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1.1 ARISTOTLE 
 In the first two chapters I articulate and defend a novel conception of Aristotle’s 
teleology. Though it is common enough to think that for Aristotle ‘goal-directedness is a basic 
fact of living nature’ simply because for Aristotle teleology is a basic fact of living nature, I 
argue that goal-directedness forms no part of Aristotle’s conception of teleology.  I argue instead 11
that Aristotle’s natural teleology constitutes an essential part of his solution to a larger problem in 
ancient Greek philosophy: how is motion or change possible? Motion had been thought by some 
to be infinite or unlimited because divisible without limit. For Aristotle, to lack limit means to 
lack form, and for that reason, the unlimited is (as such) unknowable—it is formless. This 
means, however, that motion would seem to be unknowable. And because Aristotle defines 
nature in terms of motion, nature too would seem to be unknowable. Reformulated in these 
terms, the problem is now this: knowledge of nature requires knowledge of natural motion, but 
motion seems to be unlimited or formless and thus unknowable. Aristotle’s conception of 
teleology, I argue, is designed to meet just this problem. Seeing how, though, requires that we 
understand the vocabulary in which he frames that conception in a radically new way. 
 Both ancient and contemporary commentators have taken the ‘telos’ in ‘teleology’ to 
mean something like ‘goal’ or ‘aim.’ As a result, its connection to the possibility of motion is 
obscure. I argue, however, that telos in fact means ‘end’ in the very concrete sense of ‘limit.’ 
Aristotle often glosses telos with limit, and this association is consistent with prior usage in both 
philosophical and non-philosophical contexts as far back as Homer. The telos was, in fact, one of 
 Gotthelf (2012), 392.11
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three standardly recognized limits, together with beginning and middle—archē and meson. All 
three show up in important ways in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. But so understood, the telos 
has a natural relation to the possibility of motion: it serves as a limit in virtue of which motion 
has form and is, therefore, intelligible. The telos is in fact the outer bound of a motion, i.e. the 
point at which it ends. House-building ends with the house, maturation with adulthood. Without 
such an end or limit, motion would be unlimited and unknowable—it would lack form.  
 By itself, the above account would suggest that even death is an end or telos because 
death is an outer-bound, that beyond which there is nothing. But Aristotle is clear that death is 
not an end or limit. For that reason, the account given needs to be supplemented, and so I go on 
to argue that death cannot be an end because it is a privation. Because the species or form of a 
motion is determined by its end-state, any given motion is only as intelligible as its end state. 
And so because death is a privation, any motion leading to death is understood only derivatively, 
just as the doctor has knowledge primarily and essentially of health, but only accidentally of its 
privation, i.e. sickness. Thus, motions towards form and, indeed, the good are accorded a 
distinctive priority because only such motions are strictly speaking intelligible. Although there is 
a metaphorical sense in which death is an end, Aristotle thinks if a motion is to be intelligible in 
virtue of its end and limit, that limit must be some form. Only form, in other words, can play the 
role of a telos in natural motion if motion is to be and be knowable in the strictest sense. 
 I then turn in the following chapter to the relation between the final and efficient causes, 
together with the nature of functions, e.g. of the eye to see. I argue that if we understand the telos 
as I have proposed, namely as an end in the concrete sense of a limit, and if we further appreciate 
the fact the telos constituted one of three standardly recognized limits, together with archē and 
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meson, then the path to understanding how and why Aristotle thinks efficient and final causes are 
essentially correlative—why, in other words, efficient causes are by their nature directed on ends
—becomes available. Aristotle’s preferred way of identifying the ‘efficient’ cause is not as the 
aition poiētikon, which occurs in later commentators, but as the archē tēs kinēseōs, i.e. the 
beginning, source, or origin of motion. Understood concretely, every motion has a beginning and 
end, and the ‘efficient’ and ‘final’ causes stand to one another as the left and the right. Motion 
from the archē is by that very fact motion toward some telos in the same way that motion from 
the left is by that very fact motion toward the right. I argue for this claim first by examining 
Aristotle’s notion of chance not only in the Physics, which has received a great deal of attention, 
but elsewhere as well. But second, the correlative character of efficient and final causes can be 
seen in Aristotle’s account of the analogical or proportional character of the four causes. 
 Finally, I turn to an account of biological functions. The literature surrounding functions 
has sometimes exhibited an excessively nominalist bent, and that bent is in evidence in the 
literature on Aristotle as well. But it ignores an important point made by Wright himself, namely 
that natural function ascriptions should be understood in terms of generics. We need not, in other 
words, concern ourselves with a criterion for ascribing functions to token individuals but with 
the metaphysical grounds for generic ascriptions, e.g. ‘the liver is for filtering blood.’ Those 
grounds are intimately related to what we have seen thus far: a part (taken generically) is for the 
sake of some activity insofar as it typically or customarily mediates between some user and that 
activity. Otherwise put, the parts of an animal body constitute the mesa by which its archē or 
soul customarily brings about its telos.  
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1.2 KANT 
 In chapters 3 and 4, I turn to Kant and articulate and defend a novel conception of his 
natural teleology. I argue that Kant’s treatment of teleology is intimately related to medieval and 
early modern disputes about universals and the reality of our empirical classifications of things. 
Central to my account is the category of community, which has been largely neglected in the 
literature on Kant’s teleology. Discursive intellects like ours, Kant says, require that we approach 
nature as if it were ordered into a system of genera and species. In such a system, species stand 
in community under their genus. They are, in fact, the parts of the genus and together they form a 
whole. The medievals had said the same, and when they disputed about the reality of universals, 
i.e. common forms, they were also disputing whether or not the community (communitas) of a 
given form was real or simply effected by the intellect. Kant side-steps the dispute, saying only 
that our intellects are such that we must act as if nature were ordered into relations of 
community.  
 I then argue that in delineating nature’s communities—its genera and species—it is not 
enough that things share similar marks or characteristics. Rather, Kant thinks they must stand in 
a causal community. In the biological realm, this causal community is grounded in the 
reproductive capacity possessed by every member of a species, and this is in evidence in Kant’s 
essays on the human races. Accepting that there are different races, Kant argues that they 
together constitute a single human species because they all possess the capacity to produce fertile 
offspring with one another. For that reason, Kant thinks, they constitute a real causal community, 
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indeed a Zeugungssystem or system of generation with each other, and they do so in virtue of 
their shared or common generative power.  
 Natural ends should be conceived in the same way. Something like an oak is said to 
possess the form of a system and its parts are all said to issue from a common or communal 
ground. This communal ground is responsible for the distinctive unity of a natural end: all the 
parts share in it and stand in community with one another because of it. I argue that this 
communal ground is nothing other than the power of nutrition, which Kant identifies with the 
power of generation. That is, one and the same power which binds the different human races into 
a system of generation and thus their biological community one with another binds the parts of 
each individual into a system of nutrition. The parts of a natural end are for the sake of the whole 
insofar as each is but a partial expression of it. And as in the case of genus and species, so here 
we can only approach organisms as if their parts formed a real whole in virtue of a common 
ground. 
 If in chapter 3 I articulate how Kant conceives of natural ends, in chapter 4 I explain why 
Kant thinks we cannot have any knowledge of them. I argue that what makes natural ends 
remarkable is their possession of features thought otherwise to belong only to persons. Natural 
ends such as an oak are, as it were, natural persons, which is for Kant something of a 
contradiction in terms. But we can make sense of the thought by again looking at the tradition 
prior to Kant. In that tradition, the unity and identity of living things had often been treated 
together with persons, e.g. in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Therein Locke 
gives an account of personal identity for which he is justly famous, but he also treats of the 
synchronic and diachronic identity of plants and animals, and his treatment of these latter 
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parallels the treatment he gives of the former. And Leibniz, in both his response to Locke and in 
other works argues that our conception of the unity of natural substances is to be modeled on the 
‘I’ or ‘me,’ i.e. the conception we have of ourselves upon reflection: the I is that by which we 
understand the soul or substantial form in other things. But what is more, we can see by looking 
at St. Thomas that this thought was really quite traditional. The person or individual substance of 
a rational nature was conceived of as substance in the highest sense and thus as ‘the most perfect 
[substance] in all of nature.’ As a consequence, persons were that which other substances could 
only be said to approximate, being by nature less perfect or complete than persons.  
 On this basis, I then turn to Kant’s account of our theoretical knowledge of persons or 
rational souls in first Critique. Insofar as our grasp of non-rational substances such as plants and 
animals is to be modeled on or to approximate the grasp we have of persons, theoretical 
constraints on our grasp of the latter would plausibly also constrain our theoretical grasp of the 
former. And this is what we find. Kant argues that we can have no theoretical knowledge of our 
rational self or soul because we do not appear to ourselves in outer intuition. We do not appear to 
ourselves in outer intuition because the soul is simple, and nothing simple is to be met with in 
space. As a result, we cannot know about the rational soul what the rationalists had thought we 
could, namely that it is imperishable, immortal, etc.. More important still, the simplicity of the 
rational soul means that thinking beings as such never appear in intuition. Consequently, the 
representation of anything outside ourselves as a thinking being—and so, therefore, as a person
—requires a ‘transference’ of our own consciousness to it. 
 But what was proscribed by theoretical reason becomes essential to practical reason. 
Those features of the soul or self which the rationalists thought they could derive through 
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concepts become, in other words, postulates of pure practical reason in its consciousness of the 
demands of the moral law. The soul is on this basis presumed to persist through any and every 
change, including death, and thus to be immortal. Only on the basis of practical reason, in other 
words, can we take ourselves to be ultimate subjects of change and so as more than the merely 
logical subject of our thinking. At the same time, we necessarily conceive of ourselves as free, 
i.e. as capable of initiating causal sequences. Indeed, so foreign is the concept of freedom or self-
activity to theoretical reason that its theoretical possibility only arises as a question posed to it by 
practical reason. Finally, the idea of a real community of substances grounded in something other 
than their collocation in a common or shared space can only be had by our conception of the 
moral community of persons. 
 Natural ends, however, are not in fact persons and we do not represent them as such. As 
natural, they are instead objects of theoretical reason. But they are remarkable precisely because 
they are theoretical objects which nonetheless evince some of the features thought to belong to 
persons. For this reason, they stand uncomfortably between theoretical and practical reason. 
Consequently, I argue that what we ‘transfer’ to natural ends is made available only by the 
conscious exercise of that power which Kant says ‘mediates’ between theoretical and practical 
reason—the power of judgment. In particular, we transfer the ‘feeling of life’ which constitutes 
an essential part of our appreciation of the beautiful. This feeling arises out of the free and 
spontaneous activity of our powers and is characterized by a unity and reciprocity among them. 
It is a felt unity of our subject, and indeed that in virtue of which we are conscious of our 
animality, i.e. the unity of our rational and sensible faculties. At the same time, the experience of 
beauty depends on what Kant calls a common sense (Gemeinsinn), by means of which we put 
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ourselves ‘into the position of everyone else’ (KU 5:294). And that is just to say that the feeling 
of life found in aesthetic experience constitutively involves reference to others with that same 
feeling, i.e. to a community of others animated by the same feeling of life. While not yet the 
moral community of persons or rational substances which is the object of practical reason, 
neither is it merely the community of bodies in one and the same space. 
 I then argue that the reason we cannot have theoretical knowledge of natural ends is the 
same reason we cannot have theoretical knowledge of persons: their ultimate grounds are simple, 
and so not to be met with in space. Some of Kant’s notes from 1780s say precisely this, but what 
is more, in the Critique of Teleological Judgment, Kant says we should understand natural ends 
such as oaks on analogy with life, but in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant 
argues that natural science treats of objects only insofar as they are lifeless. To treat something as 
lifeless is to treat it as an aggregate of matter in space. Because life depends on an inner causal 
principle, living things cannot be accounted for simply in virtue of the causal relations of their 
parts in space. That is to say, if something is to be subject to mechanical explanation, what is so 
explained is caused by something external to it. But because living things are possessed of an 
inner causal principle, they are caused to act not by something external to them, but by 
themselves, and so they are mechanically inexplicable. And this is confirmed by neglected 
passages in the Critique of Teleological Judgment. 
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1.3 CONCLUSION 
 I conclude with a substantive discussion of the differences in Aristotle and Kant on the 
status of natural teleology, in light of what has come before. In Aristotelian fashion, I suggest 
that while there are certain ways in which they were addressing the same problem, there are 
others in which they were not. First, their teleological vocabulary is not immediately inter-
translatable. While Zweck is sometimes used in translations of Aristotle, Kant uses Zweck in 
ways which would be unthinkable to Aristotle. Thus, Kant will say that an end or Zweck is the 
matter of choice, or that ends stand together in a system. But Aristotle could never say that a 
telos is the matter of anything because it is only ever the source of form, never bound into a 
unity, only ever binding into a unity. Second, the contexts out of which their accounts of 
teleology arise are sufficiently different as to suggest that they were responding to different 
issues. Thus, for Kant, our ignorance of natural ends is shaped largely by Kant’s doctrine of the 
ideality of space and time, together with the distinction between phenomena and noumena, the 
purpose of which is largely to avoid Spinozism. In that respect, at least, some of the features of 
Kant’s account which make it distinctive from Aristotle’s have more to do with doctrines 
developed in response to quite different issues for which there is no obvious analogue in 
Aristotle. Our ignorance of natural ends has less to do with teleology, per se, and more to do with 
the (traditional) simplicity of soul or form together with the ideality of space and time.   
 In other respects, however, their views have a great deal more in common, and are shaped 
among other things by their differing attitudes towards our grasp of natural kinds. For both 
Aristotle and Kant, our grasp of ends is quite dependent on our grasp of natural kinds, and our 
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knowledge of natural kinds is had by induction. But Aristotle and Kant differ on the status of 
induction, with Kant calling it in places a ‘crutch for human understanding’ and an under-
developed field of logic. Inductive judgments for Kant are mere ‘presumptions’ or 
‘presuppositions’ by which we take to be true of all what we know to be true only of some. 
Whether rightly or wrongly, Aristotle has no such qualms, and thinks our knowledge of natural 
kinds is very nearly as robust as any other. Part of the reason, I suggest, is that Aristotle thinks 
inductive judgments are articulated in generics, which means that their truth conditions are non-
quantifiable. As a consequence, induction is not the numbers game that it later becomes—it was 
never a requirement for Aristotle that one examine every instance of a kind in order to determine 
what belongs essentially to that kind. 
 I thus conclude with the thought that their conceptions of teleology, while bearing family 
resemblances to each other, are not easily isolable from the larger contexts in which they 
thought. And so while parallels can be drawn, the holism which characterizes the thought of both 
resists reduction into independent parts. 
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For just as the Pythagoreans say, the whole 
and the all are defined by the number three, 
for beginning, middle, and end give the 
number of the whole, and their number is 
the triad. Wherefore taking it from nature, as 
if it were one of her laws, we use this 
number even in the worship of the gods.  1
—de Caelo, I.1. 
2.0 TELOS KAI PERAS  
 Influenced in part by the development of robust accounts of biological functions and 
perhaps broadly-speaking naturalist sensibilities, many recent accounts of Aristotle’s teleology 
argue that Aristotle was a realist and an empiricist about final causes, in some senses of those 
terms.  There are of course exceptions, but the general trend has been, sensibly enough, to 2
ground interpretations of Aristotle’s teleology in the study of his narrower biological works, 
which examine precisely those natural beings which most clearly exhibit final causality, namely 
 καθάπερ γάρ φασι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὥρισται. τελευτὴ γὰρ καὶ µέσον και 1
ἀρχὴ τὸν ἀριθµὸν ἔχει τὸν τοῦ παντός, ταῦτα δὲ τὸν τῆς τριάδος.  διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφοτὲς ὥσπερ 
νόµους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἁγιστείας χρώµεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ ἀριθµῷ τούτῳ.
 E.g. Leunissen (2010); Johnson (2006); Bradie and Miller (1999); Depew (2008); Cameron (2002); 2
Cooper (1987); Balme (1987); Gotthelf (1976).  Cooper, it should be noted, refers to a ‘recent tendency’ 
to emphasize the strictly epistemological side of Aristotle’s teleology—what it helps us explain—citing in 
particular Nussbaum (1978) and Sorabji (1983). Kahn (1985) also notes such emphases and cites the 
same. On the general point, cf. also Bolton (1991), who, though he does not talk about teleology in 
particular, argues against an influential view articulated by Owen (1961), which claims that Aristotle’s 
method in the Physics is more properly ‘philosophical’ and ‘a priori’ than ‘scientific.’ I agree instead with 
Waterlow (1982) that ‘to Aristotle the notion of intrinsic direction is of logical, not merely teleological, 
significance; or we might say rather that the teleology is grounded on the logic.’ As I shall argue, this is 
true in an even profounder way than Waterlow appreciated.
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animals.  His teleology is then taken to be grounded in his sober scientific practice, and indeed 3
‘scientific’ as opposed to merely ‘philosophical,’ often enough serves as a mark of praise for 
Aristotle and his theory of teleology, to the extent that ‘scientific’ means to have good, non-
speculative and therefore generally empirical reasons for holding that, e.g., nature does nothing 
in vain. Precisely what a final cause is, however, differs with each account, and so despite 
general agreement about the ontological status of and epistemic grounds for our knowledge of 
final causes, disagreement on the specifics persists.  Few now follow what have been called the 4
‘heuristic’ or ‘anti-realist’ views articulated most notably by Wieland, Nussbaum, and Sorabji, 
which emphasize and perhaps even give priority to the epistemic necessity of teleological and 
functional ascriptions. Their views are sometimes mentioned only to be dismissed.      5
 Undue emphasis on Aristotle’s scientific respectability, however, risks neglecting the real 
import of his teleology, and the larger role it is intended to play.  That it is intended to play such 6
a role is signaled in a fact often noted in discussions of Aristotle’s teleology—the telos is a peras 
 Margaret Scharle complains in her (2008) that Aristotle’s teleology has been ‘widely misunderstood’ 3
because of an ‘excessively biological focus.’ She aims to correct that misunderstanding and argue that 
elemental activity is governed by final causality as well. In what follows, since I want to argue that 
teleology will necessarily apply to any intelligible change in nature, it stands to reason that it will apply to 
the elements as well, though I won’t discuss them in any detail.
 It is worth noting that there exists disagreement as to whether or not there is even a single account to be 4
given of Aristotle’s notion of ‘final cause.’ Leunissen (2010), e.g., argues for a distinction between 
primary and secondary teleology, and in that sense rejects any unified account.  Cameron (2002) describes 
what he takes to be a common strategy amongst Aristotle’s interpreters on the issue as the ‘divide and 
conquer’ strategy: isolate a favored notion of teleology and call the others that don’t fit that notion 
precisely somehow ‘derivative.’
 E.g., Cameron (2002), who ‘assume[s] mainstream scholarly opinion’ in rejecting their views. 5
 Kahn (1985) similarly highlights what he takes to be the historical distortion that results from failing to 6
recognize the importance of certain metaphysical claims for Aristotle’s teleology, though the claims he 
highlights are different from those I shall call attention to. That said, I can also agree with Kahn in 
claiming that there is nonetheless a certain autonomy to biological function and development.
N16
or limit—but the import of which seems to have been insufficiently appreciated.   Once we 7
understand the logical and metaphysical resonances such a claim carries and the import of limits 
generally, we will be in a position to see precisely why Aristotle thinks that teleology grounds the 
possibility of a science of nature, and indeed why it must extend to all of nature.  The telos was 8
standardly conceived of as a limit prior to Aristotle, and postulating a telos was a well-
recognized way of forestalling the claim that something was unlimited (apeiron). And since the 
apeiron was thought by some—not least of all Aristotle himself—to be unknowable (e.g., Phys. 
I.5; 187b7, Meta. α.2; 994b17-28), forestalling such a claim and identifying a thing’s limits 
constituted an essential philosophical task. Furthermore, the conceptual connections between 
telos, peras, and apeiron had no essential connection to motion or action, and to that extent the 
telos constituted a perfectly general principle of the being and intelligibility of things.  
 These conceptual connections, I argue, constitutes the defining features of Aristotle’s 
teleology.  Beginning with a world differentiated into sorts of things, Aristotle understands these 9
 Noted by Balme in his (1987), but also Johnson (2008), Leunissen (2010). Mirus (2004) and Hennig 7
(2009) perhaps make the most of this fact, and the account to follow is most similar to theirs. Neither 
Mirus nor Hennig, however, note the continuity between Aristotle and his predecessors on the importance 
of the limit, and though Hennig mentions it, neither he nor Mirus understand the teleological principle at 
the beginning of GA as I shall propose we should.
 Some will object that ‘the possibility of a science of nature’ has an unpalatable Kantian flavor, and so 8
misconstrues Aristotle’s interests and the problems he was facing. But the point can be made in fairly 
innocuous language: if the unlimited is as such unknowable, then any object of knowledge must be in 
some sense limited, i.e. possessed of limits. It will, in other words, be a necessary (though perhaps not 
sufficient) condition of knowledge or epistēmē that its object have limits, and it will be knowable 
precisely in virtue of them. In that way, the possibility of knowledge of nature rests nature being marked 
in some way or other by limits.
 On this basis, we can then identify two axes along which we should understand Aristotle’s teleology. As 9
form is opposed to both privation and matter, so the telos is opposed to both the apeiron and the archē of 
motion, or what is generally called ‘the efficient cause.’ As we shall see, even in the second case, 
Aristotle has in mind a very different understanding of the opposition between telos and efficient cause 
than we generally do, and that opposition cannot be understood without the one discussed in this chapter, 
any more than one could have the concept of ‘form’ without understanding its relation both to privation 
and to matter.
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sorts to constitute the ends and limits of motion, by which motions are counted and individuated. 
The telos, that is, helps to introduce number into nature because it helps to ground the unity of 
change or motion, i.e. to make a motion whole, complete, and one, thereby making motions 
countable. The telos plays this role precisely in virtue of being a limit for, as we shall see, there 
was thought to be an intimate connection between limit, unity, and number. At the same time, 
‘telos’ comes to have a more distinctive sense than it had had in Aristotle’s predecessors. Though 
it could mean ‘end’ and ‘limit’ in a quite general way, it comes (generally) to designate in 
Aristotle’s thought principally an end and limit of motion (or action): to call something a ‘telos’ 
is to identify the point of completion of a process, which is marked by the appearance of 
something we already know to be a piece of the natural furniture of the world.  That furniture is 10
given by the variety of natural forms, which punctuate motion—a continuous magnitude—by 
providing its beginning and end-points, its archai and tele.  So understood, not every last or 11
final thing will be a telos. That is to say, because it means principally ‘limit of motion or action’, 
 Further restrictions will, of course, need to be added for this conception to count as something 10
recognizably teleological, but I aim here in the introduction only to give a very general characterization of 
the view. Indeed, one might put the thesis this way: telos is to be understood primarily as limit, but that 
the essential features of the final cause are built around this understanding and precisely in virtue of it. In 
other words, for a variety of reasons to be examined, there are in Aristotle a number of constraints on the 
application of the term or what is to count as a telos understood as peras, deriving largely from his 
analysis of motion, his understanding of goodness, and the act/potency distinction, which give it many of 
the features ordinarily thought to belong to ‘goals’ and ‘teleological’ causation. These will be touched on 
in what follows.
 As we shall see, in some respects the account proposed will be similar in important respects to that put 11
forward by Gotthelf (1976; reprinted 2012), though the manner of approach will be very different. 
Gotthelf attempts to understand the ontological basis for Aristotle’s teleology, as I shall, but Gotthelf’s 
starting point is in stark contrast to my own. Gotthelf begins with the question ‘How would/does Aristotle 
respond to the problem of reduction in biology?’, while my own question is something more like ‘what 
standing philosophical problems, if any, does the telos concept, antecedently understood non-
teleologically, solve for Aristotle in the realm of natural philosophy?’ Gotthelf thinks Aristotle posed the 
problem of reduction, and so thinks he can avoid the charge of anachronism. I am less confident. I am, to 
that extent, in agreement with Meyer (1994). Nonetheless, I can agree with Gotthelf that the potential for 
form is an essential part of Aristotle’s teleology, that that potential is ‘irreducible’ as he affirms, and yet 
deny that Aristotle’s understanding of the telos or purposiveness has anything to do with the complexity 
or simplicity of biological processes.
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‘telos’ comes to have a whole host of connections to other concepts which it had not previously 
had, or which were merely accidental to its real sense. In particular, because every limit is a limit 
of something, whether of motion or of a plane figure, the essential character of the limit is 
determined by what it limits. In other (more Aristotelian) words, what it is to be the limit of 
motion will be different from what it is to be the limit of a figure, because motions and figures 
are different things. Thus, while retaining its primary meaning of ‘limit,’ ‘telos’ can come to have 
a distinctive sense insofar as it now designates one kind of limit in particular, for its sense is 
shaped by that of which it is the limit.  12
 This proposed reading can, I believe, provide us with a deflationary account of Aristotle’s 
teleology while at the same time situating the telos among some of the central metaphysical 
concepts in early Greek philosophy.  The language of limits provides Aristotle the vocabulary in 13
terms of which the problem is formulated and solved. Once we come to understand this 
vocabulary, we will understand why the difficulties afflicting later attempts to account for final 
causation can seem so irresolvable: the language in which it is now generally discussed does not 
permit the kinds of inferences which were available to Aristotle, given his own terminology. My 
goal is to understand that terminology anew, and to argue that when properly understood, many 
 The basic point here is consistent with Aristotle’s method quite generally, which is something of an 12
innovation and advance over his predecessors. No longer will ‘limit’ be spoken of univocally, but will, 
like so many other terms, be spoken of analogically or homonymously from case to case. In this, it will be 
like ‘good’ or ‘being,’ or perhaps ‘form.’ In part for this reason, Aristotle’s ‘teleology’ was unavailable to 
his predecessors, even if they understood the importance of limits and understood the telos to be a limit. 
On the analogical meaning of terms like ‘form’ or ‘source of motion’, cf. Crebullier (2000), who 
comments on Meta. Λ.4 and argues that the conception developed there is in response to Plato. More will 
be said of the analogical meaning of telos in particular in the next chapter.
 By ‘deflationary’, I mean just that the account attempts to make sense of Aristotle’s natural teleology 13
without appeal to minds, vitalistic powers, nisuses, etc.. The account is, however, still fundamentally 
ontological in character, unlike the accounts offered by Wieland, Nussbaum, and Sorabji, mentioned 
above. It is deflationary only relative to much of the discussion today. In Aristotle’s own context, the 
account is metaphysically robust.
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of the problems and difficulties long thought to belong to teleology disappear. The conceptual 
connections between the terms employed are quite distinct, and no commensurate set of terms is 
currently employed in discussions of teleology. As Rorty says, a philosophical problem is often 
‘a product of the unconscious adoption of assumptions built into the vocabulary in which the 
problem was stated.’  If that is right, then neither philosophical problems nor their proposed 14
solutions are to be grasped independently of the vocabularies in which they are formulated. And 
if there is a parallel between grasping the meaning of a word and seeing a Gestalt, then seeing 
Aristotle’s teleology as I propose we should requires something of a Gestalt shift. 
 I begin in §1 with a teleological principle articulated by Aristotle in the Generation of 
Animals and argue that it expresses a juxtaposition of concepts commonly accepted prior to 
Aristotle and, further, that that juxtaposition lacks of itself any ‘teleological’ import. The 
principle in question exhibits Aristotle’s broad agreement with Plato and the Pythagoreans on the 
importance of form and limit (which in fact often amount to the same thing). I then describe in 
§2 an impasse between two identifiable camps among Aristotle’s predecessors: those who, like 
Democritus and Empedocles, investigated nature but failed to appreciate the ontological and 
epistemic importance of limits, and those who, like Plato and the Pythagoreans, neglected the 
study of nature but, like Aristotle, insisted on the import of limits. In §3, I then explain why, in 
Aristotle’s terms, nature might have seemed beyond scientific understanding to his Platonico-
Pythagorean predecessors, and outline Aristotle’s own solution to the difficulty. In particular, 
motion presents a philosophical problem because it was thought to be divisible without limit and 
thus apeiros. Motion, in other words, seems to possess just that feature which would make it 
 Rorty (1981), xiii.14
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unintelligible and relegate it to the realm of non-being, as Plato and the Pythagoreans would have 
it. But an understanding of motion is necessary for an understanding of nature because the latter 
is, at least for Aristotle, defined in terms of the former. If motion is to be intelligible, then, it must 
have limits, and so I identify a sense in which motion, on Aristotle’s view, can be said to have 
limits, one of which is the telos.  
 The aim of §5 is to answer a natural objection: for all that has been said, death might still 
be counted an end. But Aristotle denies that death is an end, and so more needs to be said to 
understand exactly why. I argue that death or decay count as motions only derivatively, for 
Aristotle, because a motion is defined by its end-state, and so any given motion will only be as 
well defined as its corresponding end-state. Because the end-state of death or decay is non-being, 
motions leading to them will be ill-defined: one can only define what something is, not what 
something is not. Generative and degenerative motions exhibit the same relations of priority that 
Aristotle takes to obtain quite generally between opposites and our knowledge of them. 
Knowledge, Aristotle says, is primarily of form, but accidentally of privation: the doctor knows 
first and foremost the nature of health and how to bring it about, and only secondarily the nature 
of sickness.  
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 On this basis, I then argue that the teleological principle with which we began should be 
understood, broadly, as a logical and metaphysical principle.  Nature, strictly speaking, moves 15
in the direction of an end and form, rather than privation, because only motions proceeding to the 
former can be said to be and be known in the strict and proper sense. What is more, the principle 
in question should be understood in light of Aristotle’s repeated claim that pursuit and avoidance 
are to action what affirmation and denial are to (assertoric) speech: generation stands to decay as 
affirmation to denial.  If I am right, then one consequence of the account proposed will be that 16
Aristotle’s thought exhibits a hitherto unappreciated unity across the domains of thought, action, 
and nature, and that unity is explicable in terms of some central but neglected concepts of Greek 
philosophy prior to Aristotle. On this way of understanding, what stands in opposition to 
 Some work has been done on the status of Aristotle’s teleological principles generally, e.g. ‘nature does 15
nothing in vain.’ Cf. Lennox’ (1997) and chapter 4 of Leunissen (2010), which, she says, is heavily 
indebted to Lennox. The former is concerned in large part with the role of such principles in 
demonstration, and the latter with their role as ‘heuristics.’ My concern is principally with understanding 
a single principle, which shall serve as a point of entry into Aristotle’s understanding of teleology more 
generally. Most important, for my purposes, is that the principle in question be an indemonstrable 
starting-point necessarily assumed in natural inquiry. Neither Lennox nor Leunissen appear to disagree on 
this point. The principal difference between us, I suspect, is in the sense given to the idea that the 
principles are ‘empirical.’ Rather than enter into dispute over the conditions under which something is to 
be counted as ‘empirical,’ I’ll register my agreement with Lennox that the principle is arrived at through 
experience with nature, in some broad sense—it is certainly not innate or recognized through recollection. 
As Lennox notes, in at least one place Aristotle seems to suggest that we see (horomen) that nature does 
nothing in vain (Resp. 476a13). Nonetheless, I should like to say that the principle in question lies at the 
far edge, as it were, of empirical refutation for reasons that shall, I hope, become clear. 
 I would also suggest that teleology stands to intrinsic efficient causes and chance as essential to 16
accidental predication. Aristotle’s remark in Phys. II.5 is in this respect suggestive: ‘just as something can 
be in its own right or accidentally, so a cause may be a cause either in its own right or accidentally.’ This 
remark occurs, of course, in the preparation for the contrast between final causation and chance in II.8. If 
I am right, then there are two ‘logical’ analogues by reference to which Aristotle’s teleology should be 
understood: generation and decay as affirmation and denial, and intrinsic efficient causation and chance as 
essential and accidental predication. I defer discussion of the relation between final and efficient causes to 
the next chapter.
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‘teleological’ motion is decay or degenerative motion, not mechanism or mechanically caused 
motion.  17
 Before beginning, however, I want to mention—only to set aside for the purposes of this 
chapter—a possible concern, one which will only become more pressing as we proceed: the 
absence of purposive language in the account of the meaning and sense of telos in Aristotle. It is 
common enough to think of the telos as the goal or aim of an action or motion, that for the sake 
of which things are done and which is not done for the sake of anything else.  Cicero defines 18
finis in this way (Fin. 1.42; 3.26), and others have called this the ‘dominant’ sense of ‘end.’  But 19
little will be said about to hou heneka in what follows. As a result, one might worry that the 
characteristically ‘teleological’ character of Aristotle’s thought drops out, and that while what 
follows may say something important, it nonetheless fails to contribute to our understanding of 
Aristotle’s teleology. The concern is perhaps especially pressing because Aristotle himself clearly 
understands the telos as ‘that for the sake of which’ throughout his corpus, and so any treatment 
of his understanding of the telos must similarly treat the for-the-sake-of relation. All of that is 
true enough. But it is also true that in a number of places Aristotle very clearly identifies telos in 
 Insofar as (a) teleological motions are essentially generative, and insofar as (b) ‘being is better than 17
non-being’ for Aristotle, it is a further consequence of the view defended that all properly teleological 
motions are motions towards the better and the good.
 It is worth noting, however, that English ‘goal,’ according to the OED, comes from the older (14th c.) 18
gol, meaning ‘boundary, limit.’ Cf. also German Ziel.
 Allen (2014). Allen, far more than other recent commentators in the discipline, pays special attention to 19
the history of the term telos, but his researches are in the service of another aim, namely understanding 
the sense of the title of one of Cicero’s works, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum. Nonetheless, he 
distinguishes between dominant and basic senses of ‘end,’ the former being ‘that for the sake of which,’ 
the latter being the issue or outcome of some action or process. And this latter sense is said to ‘lie behind 
the sense of telos meaning that for the sake of which or goal’ (244). That is consistent with what I go on to 
say, though I argue that there is good reason not to think that telos generally means ‘goal’ in Aristotle, and 
that there are good textual and historical reasons for thinking that the sense of telos that does the heavy 
philosophical lifting, as it were, is the sense of ‘end’ qua ‘limit.’ 
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the sense of to hou heneka with telos as peras. Consequently, there is good reason to suppose 
that there are not two distinct senses of telos employed, and every reason to think they are the 
same: the telos kai peras is to hou heneka.  About to hou heneka more will be said later, and so 20
I simply beg the reader’s patience as I set the stage. All I will say at the moment is that 
Aristotle’s understanding of the ‘teleological’ aspect cannot in fact be grasped independently of 
the more basic line of thought articulated in this chapter. What I go on to say does, I think, 
capture or begin to capture some essential features of Aristotle’s understanding of the telos, even 
in paradigmatically teleological contexts. But it also lays the foundation for the next chapter, in 
which the ‘for the sake of’ relation will occupy a central place.   
2.1 IN THE BEGINNING: TELOS AND PERAS IN SOME PRESOCRATICS  21
 Near the beginning of Generation of Animals, Aristotle contrasts the unlimited (apeiron) 
with the end (telos), saying that nature flees the former and seeks the latter because the former is 
 Cf. DM 6, Meta. α.2, Meta. Δ.17.20
 It is of course the ever-present task of an historian to choose where to begin her narrative. Mine begins 21
with the Pre-Socratics. One could, however, have begun even earlier, indeed with Homer. There is some 
dispute about the the etymological origins of telos and its meanings in archaic literature. Cf. Onians 
(1951; 2011), Ambrose (1965), Holwerda (1963), Waanders (1983), and Beekes (2010). On the origins 
and archaic meanings of peirar (peras), cf. Bergren (1975) and Beekes (2010). I will note here only that 
telos had a connection with peirar from the very beginning. The terms occur in parallel phrases in Homer, 
e.g. polemoio peirar and polemou telos, which scholars have used in order to illuminate one or the other 
term. Furthermore, ancient lexicographers give peras as one of the six meanings of telos, while Eustathius 
identifies peras as the core meaning. On this cf. Waanders, 20. In his lexicon of Homeric Greek, Cunliffe 
refers the reader to peirar no less than three times in his entry on telos (and vice versa). To that extent, the 
connection we find between telos and peras in Aristotle is quite well attested and would appear to be quite 
fundamental to the ordinary understanding of the term. The point is all the more important given 
Aristotle’s attention to what is customarily said and meant, and his reluctance to depart too radically from 
ordinary speech. But whatever we might say about the archaic usage of the term, the more recent 
philosophic history will be sufficient for my purposes. 
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ateles or incomplete (GA 715b15-16). Quite understandably, one might here take Aristotle to be 
saying that nature seeks or pursues some goal or has some aim. That is, because seeking is a 
goal-directed activity, one might very naturally understand ‘telos’ here to mean something like 
‘goal’ or ‘aim.’ It would then be a ‘logical’ or ‘conceptual’ truth that nature seeks a telos, if 
indeed ‘seeking’ is what nature does. This would be less a fact about nature than about ‘seeking.’ 
If so, however, we should need to make sense of the corresponding claim that nature flees the 
apeiron, and that conceptual connection is more difficult to discern. The contrast drawn between 
a goal sought, the telos, and the unlimitedness avoided, the apeiron, is to that extent an 
unexpected one.  22
 We can avoid this puzzle if we put aside the customary understanding of telos. ‘Goal’ is 
of course an English word, but it has a semantic cousin in the Greek ‘skopos,’ meaning ‘mark’ or 
‘target,’ i.e. that at which one aims.  Aristotle has been said to use it interchangeably with telos, 23
and indeed he uses skopos in conjunction with telos in his ethical and political works with some 
frequency.  In addition, ancient commentators use skopos when treating of Aristotle’s natural 24
 Preuss (1975), 236, finds in this principle a ‘play on words.’ As we shall see, however, no such creative 22
or speculative explanation is needed if one simply understands the term as it had long been, i.e. as an end 
and limit. 
 The term is sometimes used in the context of archery (e.g. Od. 22.6; Aesch. Ag. 628), which has 23
historically provided a relatively stable metaphor for purposiveness. In his commentary on Physics II.8, 
for example, Aquinas says that ‘it must be pointed out that nature is among the number of causes which 
act for the sake of something. And this is important with reference to the problem of providence. For 
things which do not know the end do not tend toward the end unless they are directed by one who does 
know, as the arrow is directed by the archer. Hence if nature acts for an end, it is necessary that it be 
ordered by someone who is intelligent. This is the work of providence’ (Liber II, lectio 12).
 E.g. NE I.2; 1094a22-24; EE 1214b6-11; 1226b29. For claims that telos is roughly interchangeable with 24
skopos, cf. Annas (1995), 34; Alpers-Gölz (1976). Annas says that though Aristotle uses them 
interchangeably, this is unfortunate, for skopos suggests an object, the target, while the telos of something 
is not an object, but an activity of the agent. Alpers-Gölz says that the two terms are ‘nearly’ (fast) 
synonyms. The philosophical history of the terms is complex, and made especially so by the Stoics (the 
principal object of Alpers-Gölz’ study), who distinguished between them in their ethical theory. For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, we must put aside their post-Aristotelian trajectories.
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philosophy. Simplicius, for example, uses it in his commentary on the Physics, not least when 
discussing Physics II.8, where Aristotle famously defends the importance of teleology against the 
seemingly Darwinian views of Empedocles. Philoponus uses it as well, occasionally glossing 
telos as skopos quite explicitly.  And Alexander does likewise, explaining in his commentary on 25
Meta. A.3 that ‘even in things that come into being by nature the telos is a skopos, and the skopos 
exists before [generation begins].’  But while ancient commentators are quite willing to treat 26
telos and skopos as roughly synonymous in the natural works, or to elucidate the one in terms of 
the other, and some contemporary commentators to do the same when discussing Aristotle’s 
ethical thought, it has not been noticed that the term ‘skopos’ occurs exactly nowhere in the 
entirety of Aristotle’s own natural philosophic works—not once.  This fact is all the more 27
striking given that his natural philosophic writings are so much more voluminous than his ethical 
or political ones. And so, given the freedom with which he uses it in his ethical works and its 
complete absence from the natural ones, we might suppose that in the latter he avoided the term 
quite studiously. 
 If skopos is nowhere to be found in the entirety of Aristotle’s natural philosophic works, 
then if we wish to understand the sense of telos found therein, we might look instead at that term 
with which it is contrasted in the principle from GA above, ‘apeiron’ or ‘unlimited.’ By 
understanding nature in contrast with what is boundless or unlimited, Aristotle positions himself 
 Cf. e.g. 298, 4, where Philoponus explicates the four causes. He says of form that ‘as not yet existing 25
but being an aim [skopos] (for [nature] pursues this) it is an end’. At 310, 12-15, he explains that a 
monster, being contrary to nature, is not a skopos and so neither is it a telos.
 Comm. Meta. 22, 13-15.26
 I should add that, though it is used in the Metaphysics, it is absent from any relevant discussion of the 27
final cause. 
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within a pre-existing camp of Greek philosophy generally that stands in opposition to figures like 
Anaximander and Anaximenes, who identified the apeiron as the principle of all things. As the 
fons et origo of all of nature, the apeiron is perhaps a good candidate: one might think that what 
unites all the various things of nature is something not to be identified with any one of them. 
This stuff—Urstoff, as Barnes calls it—has been thought to be qualitatively and spatially 
undefined.  Anaximenes, said to be a student of Anaximander, posited something seemingly 28
more definite, air, as the principle, but this too was called apeiron—again, it seems, because of 
its spatial extension and perhaps also its relatively undefined qualities (147). And though coming 
at the matter from a very different perspective than the Ionians just mentioned, Melissus too 
thought Being unlimited (apeiron) (Phys. I.2), and this for two reasons.  First, as a good student 
of Parmenides, Melissus thought of Being as everlasting and ungenerated. But for that reason, 
Being cannot have either a beginning (archē) or an end (telos) (383). It must, therefore, be 
apeiron (382). Archē and telos would seem here to refer to the first and last moments of 
something’s being, and so the thought seems to be that if Being is to be everlasting and 
ungenerated, then it surely cannot have either of those. But second, Being must be unlimited 
because it is also, in good Parmenidean fashion, one, and if it were bounded or limited (peranei), 
it would be bounded by something else (384). Boundaries separate two things, or two parts of the 
same thing, but in either case this would be enough to violate Eleatic sacra doctrina. Thus, if 
Being were characterized by a beginning and end or limits, it would fail to meet at least two of 
 Given the paucity of information, precisely what Anaximander meant by the ‘apeiron’ is unsurprisingly 28
a matter of some dispute. That mentioned is one possible interpretation, and the details need not distract 
us from the main point, namely the ontological primacy of the apeiron, the indefinite or unlimited, 
whatever exactly that may come to. Cf. Barnes (1982); Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, (2004) (henceforth, 
‘KRS’; Huffman (1993), and McKirahan (2010). Citations of the Presocratics, with the exception of 
Philolaus, are taken from KRS (2004).   
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the essential attributes of being, according to the Eleatics, namely unity and eternity: ‘since, then, 
it did not come to be, and both is and always was and always will be, and has neither beginning 
(archē) nor end (teleutēn), Being is unlimited (apeiron)’ (381).  
 The same contrast can be found in the Philebus as well. Socrates says of those things 
‘susceptible of degrees’ that they admit of a more and a less (26d1-2) and have neither beginning 
(archē), middle (mesa), nor end (telos) (31a9). Being incomplete (ateles), they are unlimited 
(apeiron) (24b1-7).  For Socrates, like Melissus, then, the apeiron lacks both an archē and a 29
telos. The point seems not to have been a particularly controversial one, and the resonances with 
the slogan from Aristotle’s Generation of Animals and mentioned at the beginning are clear, 
despite the fact that nothing teleological is at issue. There is no mention of action or motion, 
seeking or avoiding. In these contexts there indeed appears to be little difference between telos 
and teleutē, the latter of which Aristotle rarely uses when speaking of teleology, and uses often in 
non-teleological contexts.  Both are limits and both can opposed to the apeiron. Melissus seems 30
to use them interchangeably, and it seems nothing would be lost from the point made in the 
Philebus by replacing telos with teleutē.  Indeed, what is evidently the same point is made 31
 Hennig (2009) cites the same, saying that Socrates, like Aristotle, established a close connection 29
between telos and peras. I am suggesting, by contrast, that the connection between telos and peras was 
not one that needed establishing because that connection was unproblematic and ready-to-hand, 
constituting one of the very oldest and most secure meanings of the term.
 Cameron (2002) cites, with no further comment, Po. 1450b23-25 as an example of a non-teleological 30
use of the notion of ‘end’ in Aristotle, presumably because there Aristotle uses teleutē, instead of telos. 
The suggestion is not without difficulties, however, because there Aristotle is discussing the limits of plot, 
which is in fact the mimesis of an action (praxis). As a result, and without more discussion, the example 
he cites may have more teleological overtones than he would like to admit. A less problematic choice 
might have been de Motu 8, 702a22-23, where Aristotle says that ‘a joint is that which is, on the one 
hand, the beginning of one thing and, on the other, the end of something else, as has been said.’ A similar 
remark is made in de Anima III.10.
 One also finds, with apparent indifference between the two, both biotoio teleutē (e.g. Il. VII. 104) and 31
telos biou (Oed. Col. 1721) to mean ‘death’ in non-philosophical literature.
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elsewhere in Plato’s corpus with teleutē instead. Thus in the second half of the Parmenides, he 
writes ‘the end (teleutē) and beginning (archē) are limits (peirata), so the One is unlimited 
(apeiron) if it has neither beginning nor end (teleutē)’ (137d). Later in the same dialogue, 
Parmenides says that the One was said to have parts, a beginning (archē), a middle (meson), and 
an end (teleutē), after which he says that ‘all these others are parts of some whole, but that it 
itself [the whole] has come to be one and whole at the same time as the end (teleutē). The end 
(teleutē), I take it, comes to be last (hustaton) (153c).’  
 One finds clear echoes of these thoughts in Aristotle. Indeed, ‘echo’ is an understatement. 
He, like the fictionalized Parmenides just quoted, asserts that ‘the end (telos) comes to be last 
(hustaton)’ in GA II.3 (736b4-5), and at the very beginning of De Caelo (quoted at the head of 
the chapter) he endorses a form of the preceding thought, which he attributes ultimately to the 
Pythagoreans and repeats in the Poetics: ‘a whole is something having a beginning, a middle, 
and end (teleutē)’ (1450b26-27).  What is more, Aristotle says in the Physics that ‘whole’ and 32
‘complete’ are ‘either utterly identical or very similar in nature, and nothing is complete unless it 
has an end (telos), and the end is a limit (peras)’ (Phys. III.6; 207a12-14). As a result, it would 
seem that having a beginning, middle, and end is enough to make something not only whole, but 
 In light of the above, some remarks scattered through Aristotle’s corpus take on additional significance. 32
He remarks in De Juventute, for example, that ‘there are three parts into which all complete animals are 
divided, one by which it takes in food, another by which waste is expelled, and the third mid-way (meson) 
between these’ (468a13-15). That the complete animals are divided into three parts in particular no longer 
seems mere chance. (Though it should be mentioned that a parallel passage in PA mentions only two 
parts: II.10; 655b28-31. He there fails to mention the meson.) Cf. also DA II. 4, where Aristotle says in his 
account of nutrition that there are three (tria) factors: the thing fed (the body), the food, and the feeding 
agent (soul). And cf. APo. A.10, where Aristotle says that ‘every demonstrative science is concerned with 
three things: ‘what it posits to exist…the so-called common axioms…and thirdly, the attributes.’ In 
addition, though I do not know what significance, if any, Aristotle would have attached to the parallel, it 
bears noting that the first plane figure—the triangle—consists of three sides, and the simplest syllogism 
consists of three terms. It seems likely, given the ‘trinitarianism’ of the tradition to which Aristotle 
adverts, that this fact would not have escaped his notice. Indeed, facts like these may very well have been 
thought of as evidence for the claim made in the passage from De Caelo above.
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also complete.  And for Aristotle as for those before him, all three are limits. For this reason, 33
Aristotle can even say, as he does in the De Anima, that demonstrations too have a beginning 
(archē) and end (telos) or conclusion (DA I.3; 407a27-28). And though there might be some 
(strained) sense in which the conclusion is the goal or aim of a demonstration, the point is really 
quite simple if we are mindful of the point I have been trying to call attention to: the word for 
‘conclusion’ is of course sum-PERAS-ma. The root notion, in other words, is that of limit, and 
the conclusion is the terminus of a demonstration, its final point or where it comes to an end. It is 
for that very straightforward reason a telos, and the reason why Aristotle can describe it as such. 
 Needless to say, the real Parmenides, who thought of Being as characterized first and 
foremost by limits, was concerned with similar issues.  In lengthy Fragment 8, he says that Being 
is  
whole, both single-limbed and steadfast, complete (teleion)...motionless in the 
limits (en peirasi) of mighty bonds....Necessity holds it in the bonds of a limit 
(peiratos), which constrains it round about, because it is decreed by divine law 
that Being shall not be without end (ateleutēton)...it is complete (tetelesmenon) on 
 ‘Complete’ here of course translates ‘teleion,’ which is also sometimes translated in English as ‘perfect’ 33
and in Latin as perfectum. On the basis of passages like these, we can understand why something is 
perfect or complete when it reaches its end: ’perfect’ just means ‘thoroughly done’ or ‘finished,’ in the 
sense that nothing is lacking, i.e. left out or undone, and so because the telos is the third of three parts 
making something whole, once one has reached it, one’s action is whole—lacking nothing—and therefore 
‘perfect’ in the sense described.
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every side...for in all directions equal to itself, it rests uniformly within its limits 
(en peirasi).  34
We saw above that for Melissus Being was apeiron and so had no telos or teleutē.  Here we find 
the same conjunction of ideas, but where Melissus denied Parmenides had affirmed: nature is 
limited and, by necessity—divine decree—it has some end (teleutē).  What is more, it would 35
seem that Parmenides thought Being immobile or changeless precisely because of its limits: 
‘motionless in the limits of mighty bonds.’ If, however, limits characterize Being and ‘the way of 
truth,’ i.e. the only way that can really be thought, the implicit suggestion that motion is as such 
without limits would mean that, for Parmenides, a science of nature, understood in terms of 
motion, is impossible. Insofar as motion is limitless, it is to that extent unintelligible and belongs 
more properly to the way of non-being, or at least to the route that mixes being with non-being, 
the way of mere opinion. The Way of Truth, that is, defines not only the essential characteristics 
of Being, but also the conditions that any object of knowledge, and perhaps even of thought in 
general, must meet. Parmenides’ project has for that reason been called a ‘critical metaphysics.’  36
 Onians (1951) has argued that both telos and peras were originally bonds or bands, ways of binding 34
things and thus of constraining them or compelling them in some way or other, and so with a sort of 
necessity. Both telos and peirar, he says, can have something like the force of fate (moira), the lot woven 
by the gods and placed upon human beings. Onians’ citations are numerous, and it would take us too far 
afield to discuss them, but the relation between them is especially salient and pronounced here. If Onians 
is right, the connections seen here between the concepts deployed would have been very nearly analytic. 
Indeed, Parmenides’ inversion of peirata and desmoi in the two phrases (‘limits of mighty bonds’ and ‘in 
the bonds of a limit’) is striking, given the postulated senses. Being is here wrapped all around by fetters 
or bonds, and so is constrained or held fast and motionless, under the power of necessity and fate. In 
addition, that Parmenides should understand Being as a ‘well-rounded sphere’ (eukuklon sphairēs) makes 
a certain kind of sense, if indeed Okeanos, the telēeis potamos, is, as Onians argues, the encircling river—
the river which forms a band around the earth.
 Aristotle clearly sides with Parmenides: ‘We have to conclude, therefore, that Parmenides has spoken 35
more rightly than Melissus, for the latter says that the whole is unlimited, the former that the whole is 
limited’ (Phys. III.6; 207a15-17).
 Cf. Mourelatos (2008), who uses the phrase ‘critical metaphysics’ (135); and Barnes (1982), who 36
argues, contra Owen, that ‘Parmenides’ starting-point is the possibility, not exactly of rational discourse, 
but scientific research’ (167), i.e. those properties ‘that must belong to every object of inquiry’ (175). Cf. 
also McKirahan (2010), 172. In saying this, of course, Barnes does not mean to align himself with Kant.     
N31
Among those conditions, it seems, are limitedness, completeness, and unity. For motion to 
become the object of a science, then, we would need to understand how it, too, could be limited, 
complete, and one. 
 Some in later antiquity counted Parmenides among the Pythagoreans, and Diogenes 
Laertius reports that Parmenides was a student of the Pythagoreans, or at least ‘associated with’ 
the Pythagorean Ameinias (D.L. IX. 21). Whatever we might think of that association, it is clear 
that the Pythagoreans too had placed a singular importance on the notion of limit, and indeed the 
other concepts to which Parmenides appeals. Aristotle reports in Metaphysics A that they had 
formulated a table of fundamental opposites in light of which all things were to be understood: 
Limit—Unlimited   Rest—Motion 
Odd—Even    Light—Darkness 
One—Many    Good—Bad  37
The left-hand term of any given pair possessed of course a certain priority, e.g. good over bad, 
one over many, rest over motion. ‘Limit’ was one of those opposites, and there is some reason to 
think that, for the Pythagoreans, the opposition between the limit and unlimited was the 
fundamental opposition, of which those between the one and the many and the good and the bad 
were but different manifestations.  And though the evidence for Pythagorean views is quite 38
scarce, we do have at least fragmentary evidence of a certain Philolaus, whom Kahn calls, with 
Huffman, the ‘clear precursor to Plato,’ at least as far as some of their cosmological principles 
 This is just a portion of the table Aristotle gives in Metaphysics A.5 (986a21-27), but the other 37
opposites can be safely omitted for my purposes.
 Cf. KRS (2004), 339; McKirahan (2010), 102; 107.38
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are concerned.  Diogenes Laertius, for example, reports second-hand that Philolaus’ book began 39
with the claim that ‘Nature in the world-order was fitted together both out of things which are 
unlimited (apeiron) and out of things which are limiting (perainontōn), both the world order as a 
whole, and all the things in it’ (D.L.VIII. 85). Elsewhere we get the report that ‘one cosmos is 
completed (apoteleitai) having been fitted together from opposites, constituted from limiters 
(perainonton) and unlimiteds (apeiron) according to Philolaus,’ and still elsewhere that ‘being is 
from limit and unlimited (ek peratos kai apeirou) as Plato says in the Philebus and Philolaus in 
On Nature….’  40
 Granting, then, their importance, we might wonder what exactly the limiters and 
unlimiteds were thought to be. Indeed, determining just what Philolaus meant by those two terms 
and what sorts of things played those roles is ‘the major problem’ in understanding him.  41
Barnes seems to think we are reduced to conjecture, but insists nonetheless that ‘conjecture is not 
difficult.’ The conjecture he thinks plausible and intuitive is that limiters are shapes of stuffs, e.g. 
the shape given to a mass of bronze or the configuration given to timber to make it a table, etc..  42
For this reason, Barnes says he is ‘prepared to credit Philolaus with the discovery of Aristotelian 
“form”’ and even sees fit to title his chapter on Philolaus, ‘Philolaus and the Formal Cause.’   A 43
slightly different view has been offered by Huffman, who thinks that limiters and unlimiteds are 
 Kahn (2001), 30. It’s also worth noting that some in later antiquity alleged that Plato’s Timaeus was 39
more or less plagiarized from Philolaus. Thankfully, we need not pause over the difficulties to be found in 
the fragments of Philolaus, and efforts to tackle those difficulties can be found elsewhere, e.g. Burkert 
(1972) and Huffman (1993). Burkert is taken to have established the authenticity of many of the 
fragments, which were formerly thought to be largely post-Aristotelian forgeries.  
 All fragments of Philolaus and their translation are taken from Huffman (1993).40
 Huffman (1993), 37.41
 Barnes (1982), 388.42
 Ibidem.43
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not just shapes and stuffs, but also boundaries and continua, and so we should take Philolaus to 
be claiming that the intelligibility of the world arises from setting boundaries along different 
continua. Differences aside, however, Huffman agrees largely with Barnes, saying that 
‘Philolaus’ adoption of limiters and unlimiteds as principles makes sense as precisely a 
development of Presocratic ideas which anticipates Aristotelian and Platonic distinctions in 
interesting ways,’ and that ‘Philolaus is approaching something akin to a distinction between 
form and matter.’  It is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle says at Meta A. 5 that the 44
Pythagoreans, in apparent contrast to his other predecessors, began to talk about the what-it-is 
and to give definitions, albeit superficially. They looked more to form than to matter, and 
Aristotle himself seems to have understood form in terms of limit. Thus, in his metaphysical 
lexicon (Meta. Δ.17), Aristotle lists form as a kind or species of limit in the entry on the latter: 
‘“limit” means...the substance of each thing, or the what-it-is-to-be of each thing, for this is said 
 Huffman (1993), 52. Onians (1951), toward the close of his discussion of the archaic meaning of telos, 44
and well before Barnes and Huffman, connects the original meaning of peirar or peras, which again he 
identifies as band or bond, through the Pythagoreans to the later notions of form and matter in Plato and 
Aristotle. He says that the Pythagoreans were the first to face consciously the problem of universals and 
explains that ‘its solution once again was spatial and its terms were Homer’s peirar and peirainō, namely 
to peras or to perainon, and that which receives this, apeiron; which terms Plato accepts and from which 
the Aristotelian φαµὲν τὸ µὲν περιέχον τοῦ εἴδους εἶναι, τὸ δὲ περιεχόµενον τῆς ὕλης [DC IV. 4] is not far 
removed.’ Onians also refers to Phys. IV.4, 211b12-14, where Aristotle (again) describes form (eidos) as a 
limit: ἔστι µὲν οὖν ἄµφω πέρατα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ µὲν εἶδος τοῦ πράγµατος, ὁ δὲ τόπος τοῦ 
περιέχοντος σώµατος’ [both then are limits, but not in the same way, form being the limit of the thing, 
place of the surrounding body].
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to be the limit of knowledge; and if of knowledge then of the thing also.’  And if in some places 45
he understands form in terms of limit, elsewhere he would appear to understand limit in terms of 
form. In the survey of his predecessors in Metaphysics A, he says that ‘Parmenides seems to 
conceive the One with respect to form (kata ton logon), but Melissus conceives of it with respect 
to matter (kata tēn hulēn); for which reason the former says that it is limited (peperasmenon) and 
the latter that it is unlimited (apeiron)’ (Meta. A.5).  To limit something is to give it shape, form, 46
and definition. 
 In light of these facts, it is worth returning to Plato’s Philebus, which I mentioned very 
briefly above and which has been thought, both recently and in antiquity, to be deeply indebted 
to Philolaus’ thought. The subject of the dialogue is, as it so often is, the best kind of life, and 
Socrates and Protarchus are trying to decide in particular whether that life is defined by pleasure 
or knowledge. Early on, however, the conversation runs aground on the problem of what might 
be called specious unities. All pleasures go by the single term ‘pleasure,’ and yet a myriad of 
seemingly incommensurate pleasures fall under that term. The problem affects Socrates’ position 
 It is worth noting also that the notion of limit had an epistemic import for Philolaus just as much as it 45
did for Parmenides, for the former too is interested in the conditions necessary for something to be 
knowable. He says, for example, that ‘there will be nothing to be known if everything is unlimited,’ and 
makes a distinction between divine knowledge, which is unavailable to us, and human knowledge. The 
knowledge of things available to us is made possible by the principles of limit and unlimited.  Cf. Barnes 
(1982): ‘Like Parmenides, Philolaus approached metaphysics from epistemology: Parmenides’ initial 
question was: what conditions must any object of scientific inquiry satisfy? Philolaus began by asking 
what things must be like if they are to be known; and the connection between being and knowledge 
remains prominent in the development of his ideas.’ Similarly, I take it that the connection between being 
and knowledge is prominent in the development of Aristotle’s ideas, and that there is enough material in 
his corpus which might be taken as a direct response to the question ‘what conditions must any object of 
scientific inquiry satisfy?’ It must, at least, be possessed of limits.  
 Cf. also Phys. IV.4, 211b12-14 (quoted in fn. 44 above), as well as Phys. III.6; 207a21-22, 27-30. In the 46
latter passage, Aristotle says that the unlimited is the matter of the complete magnitude, which is 
potentially whole, and then says that ‘the unlimited as such does not contain (periechei), but is contained 
(periechetai), wherefore it is unknowable, qua unlimited, for matter has no form. Consequently, it is clear 
that the unlimited is rather more to be considered a part than a whole, for the matter is a part of the whole, 
just as the bronze is of the bronze statue.’
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as well, since many quite different things fall under the heading of ‘knowledge.’ The problem is 
supposed to give rise to the question, ‘how exactly can the one be many and the many, one?’ 
Fortunately, there appears to be a solution, or rather a way or method (hodos) through the thicket 
of problems that this question generates for discourse in general. This way, Socrates says, is 
‘difficult to apply,’ but it has also ‘been responsible for bringing to light everything that has been 
discovered in the domain of any skill’ (technē). Indeed, it was  
a gift from the gods to men, thrown down from the gods in a blaze of light by 
some Prometheus. Our forefathers, superior beings to us as they lived closer to the 
gods, passed on this tradition, that those things which are from time to time said 
to be are made up of one and many, with limit (peras) and unlimitedness 
(apeirian) inherent in them.    47
After describing the method in greater detail, Socrates says that ‘this is the procedure for 
inquiring, learning, and teaching each other that the gods have handed on to us.’ There is no 
small measure of difficulty in determining precisely what the method is, but it seems to consist in 
resolving things of a single class into their elements (18c7), from which the otherwise unlimited 
number of members of that class can be derived or explained. So, for example, vocal sound is 
‘just a single thing...of unlimited variety,’ but we then distinguish, among other things, high and 
low pitch (17b). Socrates also mentions musical scales and notes that these provide the limits 
between the intervals and the grounds of our understanding. He continues by saying that ‘the 
 Limit and the unlimited here are glosses on the one and the many, and just a few lines later, it is the 47
one, to hen, that is immediately opposed to the apeiron. Also, of both interest and importance is the 
connection between limit, peras, and boundary, horos. At 17d1, in the context of an example which is 
supposed to illustrate the principles just provided, Socrates uses horos, without any apparent difference in 
sense from peras. Aristotle himself refers in Physics III to what is apparently the Pythagorean table of 
opposites, and says of the items in the one column that they are all aoristoi, where we might have 
expected apeiroi (Phys. III.2; 201b26). Indeed, in II.8, when discussing the ‘ox-progeny’ of Empedocles, 
he says that they were ‘incapable of reaching some horos and telos.’
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unlimited (apeiron) plurality of anything in any case leaves you with an indeterminate (apeiron) 
grasp of the subject’ (17e3-5). 
 The principles articulated clearly have a very definite epistemic character: all skills owe 
their discoveries to them, which, again, provide the ‘procedure for inquiring, learning, and 
teaching’ (16e3-4). Mere unlimitedness, as we just saw, leaves one with an undefined knowledge 
of the object since knowledge (and discovery) requires a limit, a peras or horos. As Philolaus had 
said, ‘there will be nothing that is going to know at all if everything is unlimited.’  If the limits 48
sought are what they were traditionally thought to be—the triad of beginning, middle, and end—
then the procedure for inquiring will consist in the search for those very things: the arche, meson, 
and telos/teleutē. But the limits in question serve more than a merely epistemic or heuristic 
function, for we see in both Philolaus and Plato the claim that things are essentially composites 
of limit and unlimitedness. That is, these are at the same time metaphysical principles (16c9-10, 
23c9-10), and these seem again to correspond to the combination of discrete units with a 
magnitude, as the musical examples suggest. The limits mark boundaries along continua.  The 49
epistemic or heuristic function of limits can thus be explained in terms of their metaphysical 
import: we know a thing by knowing its limits because a thing is constituted of limit and 
unlimitedness. Finally, we learn later that the limiting or determining elements in knowledge and 
things consists in whatever introduces number into them, by which they are made commensurate 
 Cf. also the remark in the Introduction to Arithmetic by the later Pythagorean, Nichomachus of Gerasa: 48
‘sciences are always sciences of limited things, and never of unlimiteds’ (trans. D’Ooge 1972), and 
compare that to Aristotle’s remark in the Posterior Analytics: ‘Qua unlimited, things are not knowable, 
but qua limited, they are’ (ἔστι δ᾽, ᾗ µὲν ἄπειρα, οὐκ ἐπιστητά, ᾗ δὲ πεπέρανται, ἐπιστητά) (APo. 86a5-7).
 If Aristotle’s thought is as continuous as I am trying to suggest, one might expect, if forms are limits, 49
that the many species of a genus, e.g. of animals, differ from each other by the more and the less. One 
might, that is, have some further reason to think that a view like the one advanced by Lennox (1980) 
should turn out to be the correct one. Meinwald (1998) makes a similar suggestion.
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and harmonious (25e1-3).  Philolaus had likewise claimed that ‘all the things that are known 50
have number, for it is not possible for anything at all either to be comprehended or known 
without this.’  The indeterminate class, on the other hand, consists of what is ‘susceptible of 51
degrees,’ those things that admit of a more and a less (26d1-2) and, as we noted earlier, have 
neither beginning (archē), middle (mesa), nor end (telos) (31a9). It is because they are 
incomplete or never-ending (ateles) that they are entirely unlimited (apeiron) (24b1-7).   
 Returning, then, to the passage from GA with which we began, we find there a classic 
teleological slogan: ‘nature always seeks a telos.’ This succinct formula might be said to 
encapsulate, if by no means explain, Aristotle’s ‘teleological’ view of the natural world. But the 
contrast expressed in the whole principle—nature flees the unlimited and seeks a telos because 
the unlimited is ateles—would have been familiar to those acquainted with disputes over the 
priority of limit and unlimited in the thought prior to him, because in opposing the telos to the 
apeiron, Aristotle is simply following established usage. The telos was one of the three limits 
making something whole or complete, and so Aristotle could invoke the telos to forestall the 
claim that nature is unlimited and, therefore, unknowable. But it can only really do this work if it 
is understood as ‘end’ in the sense of ‘limit.’ And though perhaps we do not find the notion of 
limit or boundary to be a particularly important or central philosophical notion, it is clear that 
some of the ancients did, and so understanding the telos as in the first instance a limit is not in 
any way to minimize its importance. Taking it to mean simply ‘goal’ or ‘aim’ simply obscures 
the philosophic history of the term and prejudices our understanding of Aristotle’s teleology. The 
 Cf. Aristotle’s claim that the principle of number, the one, is the principle of the knowable (Meta. Δ.6).50
 Fr. 4 in Huffman (1993).51
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term would have had profound philosophical importance among his contemporaries precisely 
because it meant in the first instance ‘end’ in the sense of ‘limit,’ not because it could also mean 
‘goal’ or ‘aim.’  Given the contrast Aristotle thinks it important to draw (in the context of the 52
generation of animals, no less) we might begin to suppose that the oppositions in light of which 
we ordinarily understand purposiveness are not Aristotle’s, and that Aristotle’s ‘teleology’ is, at 
least in part, intended as a response to questions and problems different from our own, even if the 
domain of objects to which it is said to apply most paradigmatically is largely the same. 
2.2 ARISTOTLE’S CRITICISM OF HIS PREDECESSORS  53
 If Aristotle can be said to agree with Plato and the Pythagoreans on the importance of 
limits, he disagrees with them on the prospects and methods of a science of nature. The latter 
‘having been brought up in [the study of mathematics], regarded the principles of mathematical 
objects as the principles of all things’ (Meta. A.5; 985b25-26). Even though they do try, to some 
extent, to give accounts of the sensible world—claiming that sensible things in fact are numbers
 It is worth noting again (fn. 48) Aristotle’s conjunction of horos and telos in II.8. That would have been 52
an opportune time to gloss telos as skopos, as some later commentators did, but instead he glosses telos 
with a synonym of peras, suggesting that it is the sense of telos as limit or boundary which is doing real 
philosophical work, even in this most teleological of all chapters. Aristotle is not trying to show us how to 
understand talk of ‘goals’ in a naturalistic way, because he simply does not think of the telos, at least 
primarily, as a goal.
 Lennox (2008) provides a compelling account of how Aristotle navigates between the materialist 53
theories of thinkers like Democritus and the excessively mathematical theories of Plato and the 
Pythagoreans, which is the theme of this section. Like Lennox, I think it is Aristotle’s understanding of 
natural substance in teleological terms that allows him to avoid the two opposing errors. I will go on to 
articulate that understanding in slightly different terms, though nothing said will conflict with the account 
he gives. As we shall see, Aristotle’s innovation is grounded on a distinctive appreciation of Platonic and 
Pythagorean insights.
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—the principles and elements they thought appropriate to explain it were ‘more foreign than 
those which the natural philosophers use’ and ultimately lacked the machinery necessary to 
understand motion or change (Meta. A. 8; 989b30).  Plato, on the other hand, subscribed to a 54
Heraclitean view of nature, and believed as a result that no science of it was possible. 
Consequently, the objects of knowledge, i.e. the Forms, must be distinct from the sensible things, 
because there can be no definition of what is always changing (Meta. A. 6). The problem, 
however, is that these Forms do not, in Aristotle’s eyes, contribute anything to our understanding 
of those things (Meta. A. 9):  
what do the Forms contribute to the eternal things among the sensibles or to those 
which are generated and destroyed? For they are not the causes of motion or of 
any other change in them […] Any chance thing may be or become like another 
thing without even being copied from it […] No thing which participates in 
something is generated unless there is a mover […]The whole inquiry into nature 
is discarded (991a9-11; a22-23; 991b4-5; 992a9).  
Because of the Heraclitean flux, Plato postulates separated Forms. Because of their separation, 
Aristotle thinks they cannot explain anything in the natural world. Forms, one might have 
thought, are supposed to account in some way for those sensible things participating in them. But 
if the relation between some particular and the Form(s) in which it comes to participate is not to 
be simply a brute fact, we must be able say why the thing comes to have the form it does. One 
needs perhaps to be able to identify some mover or archē from which the motion proceeds. In the 
absence of any such cause or explanation, there are no clear constraints on why a thing comes to 
have the shape or form it does, and so it would seem that any chance thing may be or become 
like any other.  
 Aristotle cites their disciplinary parochialism as the explanation, but we might also surmise that the 54
relative superficiality of their definitions permitted a rather promiscuous application of mathematical 
definitions to non-mathematical things. 
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 Aristotle is no more satisfied with the physiologoi, the investigators of nature, for these 
investigated only the material and efficient causes, and even then only as through a glass darkly: 
‘the thinkers up to the time of Empedocles appear to have touched upon two of the causes...the 
material cause and the moving cause, but lightly and not at all clearly, as untrained men box in 
fights’ (Meta. A.4; 985a11-13). All things were variously water, fire, or combinations of such 
basic elements, and though they investigated what matter is and how things come to be in matter, 
whether through strife or friendship or mind, they never moved on to the other two causes that 
Aristotle so clearly thinks are essential to any account of the natures of things (PA I.1; 
639b413-16), the formal and final causes.  People who talk only about wood can never tell us 55
what exactly a bed is or what we might ordinarily take to be its parts, such as the headboard and 
the footboard and whatever else there may be (PA I.1; 640b20-25). Thus, Aristotle thinks the 
physiologoi missed out on real investigation into the sorts of things that we ordinarily take to be 
paradigmatically natural beings, like sheep and goats. To the extent that his predecessors 
investigated such things, it was often only the stuff they are made of, and so they essentially 
eliminated all the differences between them: the difference between goat and lamb is scarcely 
relevant if one is only after the nature of fire. In so doing, they also failed to notice the 
importance of the distinction we make between what is really a hand and what merely looks like 
one (PA I.1; 640b35-641a1). Two things may possess the same outward shape or even be made of 
the same basic stuff, and yet one may be capable of moving in a way the other cannot. A real 
hand is able to do very definite things, to move and change in very specific ways. Because a real 
 He does say at Phys.194a18-20 that Empedocles and Democritus made some use of form, but only very 55
limited use. At PA 642a17, he says that Empedocles occasionally ‘stumbles upon’ the formal cause, as if 
forced by the truth itself.
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hand can act in ways a stone hand cannot, we say that the real hand has certain capacities or 
abilities, just as vision belongs to the eye and is said to be the form or soul of the eye itself. The 
failure of his predecessors, in this regard, seems to be due in no small measure to their ignorance 
of the formal cause—i.e., there was no ‘what it is to be’ or ‘defining of substantial being’ (PA I.1; 
642a24-27). Natural things are defined by what they characteristically do, how they act or move, 
and Aristotle only ascribes real advances in the practices of defining to the time of Socrates (PA 
I.1; 642a30). Even then, however, definitional inquiry was applied only to practical matters, i.e. 
the realm of virtue and politics, while interest in nature waned.  
 The dialectic we find between these two camps generates a certain problem, one all the 
more pressing if we keep in mind Aristotle’s own general insistence on form, suitably construed, 
and definition. Though Aristotle is not a Platonist, he certainly prioritizes form and thinks of 
material and efficient causation in terms of it: the matter of a thing is relative to its form, and it is 
in virtue of having the form that it does, being of the sort that it is, that an efficient cause causes 
what it does non-accidentally. In that sense, the importance of form cannot be over-stated. But 
Aristotle complains that those thinkers who most of all contributed to definition and employed 
the notion of form were least of all interested in or successful at natural inquiry. The 
Pythagoreans, as we saw, made the mistake of employing mathematical principles for all things, 
which are foreign to the subject matter of physics. Plato, by contrast, simply thought the sensible 
world unknowable, and he, or those who insist on the Forms, turn all philosophy into 
mathematics (Meta. A. 9; 992a33-b1). On the other hand, the physiologoi lacked the formal 
cause and the knowledge of definition that provides the cornerstone for scientific demonstration. 
Given Aristotle’s recognition of the importance of form, which is necessarily unmoved if it is to 
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be an object of knowledge, and his simultaneous insistence on the importance and possibility of a 
science of nature, which studies moving things, we must ask how one can reconcile these two 
camps and what such a reconciliation might contribute, if anything, to an understanding of the 
final cause.        
 Unfortunately, Aristotle is not as forthcoming about his solution as we might like. One 
might think that the problem can be resolved by the so-called ‘mixed sciences,’ which seem to 
incorporate both formal and material elements.  But as Lennox argues, this requires an 56
unpalatable ‘bifurcation’ in the study of nature between the physikos and the mathematician, 
where the one provides the hoti and the other the dia ti, the one the fact and the other the cause or 
reason why.  A genuinely single science of nature will require instead uniting the material and 57
formal aspects previously thought to belong to the physikos and mathematician, respectively. Part 
of what is lost in the mathematizing approach to nature is the thought that it belongs to natural 
objects as such to change or move, and any account of form which ignores this fact will fail to 
make the distinctive character of natural being perspicuous.  Natural things are dynamic—they 58
have dunameis—but to treat of something mathematically is to treat certain of its features as if 
they were independent of the bodies in which they are found, i.e. the bodies that actually do the 
moving or changing. Lennox argues that the reconciliation is a teleological one: the unity 
between formal and material explanation is achieved precisely through the purposive relation of 
matter to form, where the former comes to be and is for the sake of the latter. While this seems 
right, there is, however, nothing yet to dissuade us from thinking of the telos as a quasi-
 Cf. Lennox (2008) on this. 56
 Ibidem, 150, 160.57
 Ibid., 168-9.58
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intentional object on the part of non-conscious nature—the object of nature’s ‘seeking’. If then it 
is necessary to understand how form might enter into a unified, as opposed to a mixed, science of 
nature, and if nature is essentially characterized by motion, we might begin with an effort to 
understand how or in virtue of what form belongs to motion. 
2.3 KINĒSIS 
We saw earlier that Aristotle’s predecessors understood the telos to be a limit and that, as 
consequence, having a telos was incompatible with being unlimited. We have seen some 
evidence that Aristotle thought likewise, and we shall see still more in what follows. But we have 
also seen evidence that Aristotle understood limit to be a source of form, and understood 
unlimitedness to be a kind of matter. Importantly, motion was among those things thought to be 
unlimited and, therefore, to lack a telos. This would also mean, then, that motion was thought to 
lack form. When therefore in Physics II.1 Aristotle defines nature in terms of motion, he might 
seem to be saying that unlimitedness (and thus formlessness) belongs essentially to nature and 
natural things. If so, he would seem to be committed to the thought that natures or natural 
motions lack ends (telē). But as we have seen, he also thinks the unlimited is as such unknowable 
(e.g., Phys. I.5; 187b7, Meta. α.2; 994b17-28, APo. I.24; 86a5-6), which means anything 
knowable must possess limits and be knowable precisely in virtue of them. Consequently, 
knowledge of natural motions requires that they be limited or have limits in some sense or other, 
and this is as much as to say that they must have form. If we understand the problem Aristotle is 
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addressing in this way, then we can start to see how the telos might be essential to the possibility 
of a science of nature: motion is knowable precisely because it possesses a telos and limit. And 
because it possesses a telos and limit, it possesses form. Aristotle’s account of natural motion 
would then be ‘teleological’ in just that sense. In what follows, I outline Aristotle’s definition of 
motion and explain why motion had been thought to be unlimited. I then identify a sense in 
which, Aristotle thinks, motion has limits, one of which is the telos.  
In Phys. III.1, Aristotle defines change as the actuality (entelecheia) of what is in 
potential, insofar as it is in potential (Phys. 201a27-29, 201b3-4). Such a definition is far from 
transparent to be sure, but it will be sufficient for our purposes just to sketch the thought in broad 
outline.  Daniel Graham, in particular, urges us to pay close attention to the examples Aristotle 59
gives, which he says have suffered undue neglect.  Those examples all follow the same pattern: 60
in each case, motion is the V-ing of the V-able, where these are marked by a verbal adjective 
ending in -τός on the one side, and a verbal noun marked by -σις on the other. Thus, the actuality 
of the build-able is the process of build-ing, or of the alter-able the process of alter-ing. The 
verbal adjective and the verbal noun are both formed from the present stem, and Aristotle is clear 
 There is a significant literature on Aristotle’s account of motion, which I cannot here explore in any 59
great detail. Kosman’s (1969) has been singularly influential, and has found support in Waterlow (1982), 
and Gill (1984). There are, however, dissenters, e.g. Kostman (1987) and Graham (1988). More recently, 
cf. Anagnastapoulos (2010) and Charles (2015). Graham takes Kosman’s view to have become the 
standard reading and seeks to rebut what he calls simply ‘the Kosman view,’ only mentioning Waterlow 
and Gill as further iterations of the view he takes to be fundamentally flawed. The disagreements between 
Graham and Kosman are less significant than Graham takes them to be, however, which is not to say that 
there are no real disagreements. Part of the difficulty is the notion of ‘process’ operative in each, for 
Graham affirms, while Kosman denies, that Aristotle defines motion as a process. Though Graham thinks 
that motion is a process, it is not a ‘process of actualizing a potential,’ where that means the process of a 
motion coming into being, which is the error Kosman endeavors to correct (1969), 45. But Graham does 
deny that Aristotle’s definition depends upon the distinctions between first and second actuality found in 
De Anima. The conclusions I ultimately draw about Aristotle’s teleology are perfectly consistent with all 
the accounts of motion mentioned, though Graham’s lends a particular kind of support lacking in the 
others, as we shall see.
 Cf. Graham (1988).60
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in his use of the present when explicating the examples used: ‘whenever the buildable is in 
actuality, it is being built (oikodomeitai), and this is building (oikodomēsis)’ (201a17-18). The 
buildable, sitting idly in the brickyard, is merely buildable. The motion of building, on the other 
hand, i.e. the ongoing building itself, is the actuality of the buildable, precisely insofar as it is 
buildable. The actuality of the potential in question can be expressed by a verb of the ongoing 
action, e.g. is learning, is healing, is leaping, and the broader point is analogous to more familiar 
act-potency relations: the bricks in a house actually constitute a house, as its matter, but the 
bricks in the brickyard are potentially (the matter of) a house, becoming so only on the occasion 
of being suitably assembled. Similarly, the buildable is as such the matter of the corresponding 
motion, the actuality of which—the activity of building—arises only when set upon by a builder.     
Most essential for our purposes is the progressive aspect of the present stem and the 
terms built from it, i.e. the abstract ‘process’ nouns ending in -σις. It is for this reason that 
Graham says the definition of motion we find in III.1 is the definition of motion not as a state, 
but as a process. Graham cites his debt to Mourelatos (1978), who, with the help of work done 
by linguists and grammarians, had developed certain lines of thought suggested by Zeno Vendler 
and Anthony Kenny. Mourelatos had sought to delineate three different categories of verbal 
predication: process, event, and state. Linguists and grammarians had customarily distinguished 
between stative and processive predications (the latter sometimes called ‘eventive’, 
unfortunately), e.g. ‘Helen knows Greek’ and ‘Helen is learning Greek’.  Stative predications do 61
 Binnick (1991), 179, says ‘one difficulty with writings in this area is that there is a manifest 61
terminological confusion. The same term, for instance process or event, may be used in different ways by 
various authors….’ Tenny (2000) expresses the same frustration.
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not admit of progressive aspect, e.g. ‘Helen is knowing Greek’, whereas processive ones do.  In 62
addition, one cannot in the case of a processive predication infer to a statement in perfective 
aspect: that Helen has learned Greek by no means follows from ‘Helen is learning Greek.’ The 
same is not to be said of stative predications: if Helen loves her father, then she has loved her 
father—there is no durative or progressive sense of ‘love’ available here.  But while linguists 63
have customarily distinguished between stative and eventive verbal predications, under which 
uses of progressive verb forms are generally classed, Mourelatos thinks processes need to be 
marked out as a category distinct from events.  While processes are marked by ‘progressive’ or 64
‘imperfective’ aspect, events are marked by ‘perfective’ aspect: ‘Jim is building the house’ vs. 
‘Jim built the house.’   65
Aristotle himself is often concerned to draw the distinctions among verbal predications 
just described, and those distinctions have been taken to be manifestations of more fundamental 
 There are a variety of further features that mark the difference between stative and non-stative verbs or 62
verb predications, e.g. only non-statives can occur in an imperative: ‘Push the cart’ but not ‘Know the 
answer.’ Cf. Binnick (1991) and Lakoff (1966). Graham (1980) argues that energeiai in Aristotle 
correspond with state predications. There he aims to elucidate the infamous passage in Θ.6, where 
Aristotle distinguishes between energeiai and kinēseis. For more recent work on this, cf. Beere (2009) and 
Burnyeat (2008), who like Graham draw attention to the important features of the Greek perfect and so 
the linguistic nuances involved in the passage. 
 Beere (2009) and Burnyeat (2008) argue that the present and the perfect in such cases are mutually 63
entailing.
 E.g. Sihler (1995), 445, who classifies statements in progressive aspect under ‘events’, along with those 64
eventive forms identified by Mourelatos, namely achievements and developments.
 Cf. again Binnick (1991) for a variety of expressions thought to differentiate events from processes. 65
E.g. process predications take the expression for x time, while event predications will take in x time: ‘John 
walked for an hour’ vs. *‘John walked in an hour.’ 
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features of language and thought.  In particular, the difference in aspect between process and 66
event predications has been thought to correspond to the nominal distinction between mass- and 
count-nouns, respectively.  Count-nouns are of course those nouns which can be modified by 67
adverbs like ‘many,’ ‘few’, ‘several,’ etc. One can have several cats, or few cats, seven or two 
cats. By contrast, mass-nouns are modified by adverbs like ‘much’, ‘little,’ or ‘enough’, and 
often designate homogenous stuffs, like water or air. Mass-nouns, that is, are quantified 
indeterminately by comparison along a scale, not by the enumeration of discrete units. To make 
the measurement more precise, one measures what is referred to by mass-nouns with count 
nouns: a cup of flour, a pinch of salt, and a dash of cinnamon. Event predications are thought to 
correspond to count nouns because only event predications are capable of being transformed in 
such a way as to be subject to a count. That is, for any event predication, the verb can be 
nominalized and then serve as the subject for an existential claim. Mourelatos gives as examples 
‘Vesuvius erupted three times<——> There were three eruptions of Vesuvius,’ and ‘Mary 
capsized the boat<——>There was a capsizing of the boat by Mary.’ By contrast, no such 
 Aristotle’s interest is perhaps most evident in the (in)famously difficult conclusion to Θ.6, already 66
mentioned, where he distinguishes between between energeiai and kinēseis. On ‘Aristotelian’ aspect 
theory, cf. Binnick (1991), ch 6. Beere (2009) resists, indeed rejects, the idea—endorsed by Graham—that 
in Θ.6 Aristotle gives us a linguistic ‘test’ or ‘model’ for determining whether a given action is an 
energeia or a kinēsis. He criticizes those who, perhaps like Mourelatos and Graham (he does not mention 
them), unduly assimilate Aristotle’s metaphysical concerns to the purely linguistic concerns of Ryle, who 
himself took interest in the chapter. Graham need not be taken to mean that Aristotle is offering a decision 
procedure, however: certain linguistic features can be said to correspond to certain categories of doings, 
without yet counting as a rule, just as examples of justice with a general characterization of justice do not 
provide a ‘test’ for classifying actions as just or unjust. Mourelatos himself is clear that in any given case, 
how something is to be classified is not necessarily determined solely by aspectual marking. Cf. his 
(1978), 421.
 Mourelatos (1978), 424; Taylor (1977), 210ff. ; Tenny (2000), 5. Graham (1999) suggests that Aristotle 67
at the end of Meta. Θ.7 recognizes the connection between mass-nouns and process predication verbs, for 
there Aristotle seems to say that progressive forms like ‘walking’ correspond to their countable instances 
(‘a walk’) as matter to some substance, some this. The linguistic literature on this topic has described the 
distinction between what is here called the process/event distinction as the ‘bounded/non-bounded’ 
distinction, the ‘telic/atelic’ distinction, or the ‘delimited/non-delimited’ distinction. Cf. Tenny (2000), 5.
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construction is available in the case of ‘Peter was painting the Nativity.’ ‘There was painting of 
the Nativity by Peter’ is rather more like ‘there was water in the basement.’ Similarly, if one says, 
‘Jon was writing his dissertation,’ we can ask how much of it he wrote, whether a lot or a little. 
But if it is said that ‘Jon wrote his dissertation’, though we might ask how long it was, we could 
not ask how much of it he wrote. 
Processes, then, would seem to have a character analogous to mass nouns, which is to say 
that they are subject to ‘the more and the less’. For that reason, they would seem to have the 
character of the apeiron, and this is consistent with Socrates’ remark in the Philebus, seen above. 
If the account of motion that Aristotle gives in Physics III.1 is an account of motion as a process, 
as a consequence of which it has the character of the apeiron, then given that the limits of archē, 
meson, and telos/teleutē traditionally furnish intelligibility to what would otherwise be 
unintelligible precisely because apeiros, we might expect that someone who understands motion 
in this way will understand the task of natural philosophy to consist, at least in part, of finding 
and discerning those limits in natural motion, i.e. its archē, meson, and telos.  68
But this is too quick. Because Aristotle denies that motion is in fact unlimited, it must be 
the case that every motion is limited. Aristotle says on a number of occasions that all motion is 
from something to something (Phys. V.1; 224b35-225a12; VI.5; 235b6-7, VI.10; 241a26-28; 
 The reconciliation between the two camps described above in §2 also of course depends on Aristotle’s 68
understanding of he act/potency distinction, which his predecessors lacked. Without that distinction, one 
is forced to assign motion unqualifiedly to either one or the other of the two columns of opposites, which 
Aristotle mentions in III. 2. But Aristotle’s ‘teleology’, as I understand it, simply would not have been 
available to earlier thinkers who did not subscribe to the Platonico-Pythagorean conception of limits, or 
understand motion as an extensive magnitude falling under the general category of ‘the More and the 
Less’. 
 On the analogies between process predications and spatial quantities, cf. Smollett (2005), and 
Jackendoff (1996). The analogy is of course clear at the very beginning of Aristotle’s discussion of 
motion, for as we noted, he says that motion belongs to the class of continuous things (Phys. III.1; 
200b16-20).
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Meta. K.12; 1068a23-25; Z.7; 1032a13-15), and he takes this to be a relatively common sense 
view of the matter. Indeed, he says the word, metabolē, indicates this since it just means 
‘something thrown in after another’ (Phys. V.1; 225a1-2). But he also takes this to be the reason 
why motion cannot actually be unlimited (Phys. VI.10; 241a26). All motion is between opposites 
and with an underlying subject: the child, previously uneducated, becomes educated, and the 
buildable, previously unbuilt, becomes built. The opposites fall under some one of the categories 
and they will, for that reason, consist in something predicable of the underlying subject. In other 
words, motion is circumscribed or limited by the possibilities of affirmation and denial because 
the something that comes to be or into what something changes must be something we can say of 
or deny of some subject. Thus, even though Aristotle takes motion itself to have the character of 
the apeiron and, consequently, to be ateles, we can see that what he must mean is simply that 
motion qua motion is incomplete because it constitutes the meson, as it were, lying between that 
from which it begins and that towards which it proceeds, where these can be described in simple 
categorical statements of the form ‘x is A’ and ‘x is B.’  It is in this sense that every motion must 69
be marked by limits (perasi) (Phys. VI.10; 241b11), and in the De Caelo, Aristotle says precisely 
this:  
"Change in general is a change from something to something, and these two states 
are different in form (eidei). Now every change is within fixed limits 
(peperasmene), e.g. for a patient who is being cured it is between sickness and 
health...This must also be true for that which is being moved locally...therefore 
fire and earth do not move to infinity (eis apeiron), but towards opposite points 
(eis antikeimena); and in speaking of place, the opposition is between top and 
bottom, so that these will be the limits (perata) of their movement (DC I.8; 
277a14-17, 19-20, 21-23). 
 Cf. Meta. α.2, 994a26-29: ‘something which has become comes from that which is becoming…For just 69
as becoming is alway in between (metaxu) being and non-being, so is that which is becoming between 
what is and what is not.’
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Motion is thus defined to the extent that it is bounded by limit and form (eidos), just as some 
quantity of bronze is defined by its shape and form. In the case of motion, shape and form are 
given by those values one provides for the the two ‘somethings’ in the formula ‘from something 
to something.’  70
 If the above is the sense in which motion is limited, it would be natural to suppose that 
the second of the two somethings is the telos, for that is where motion comes to an end. A thing 
is no longer whitening when it has become white, and a person is no longer learning when they 
have become learned. And this is indeed Aristotle’s thought. In the passage from De Caelo just 
quoted, he had said that all change is from something to something, and then argued that this is 
just as true of local motion: 
Fire and earth do not move to infinity (eis apeiron), but towards opposite points 
(eis antikeimena); and in speaking of place, the opposition is between top and 
bottom, so that these will be the limits (perata) of their movements…there must 
therefore be an end (telos), and motion cannot go on without limit (eis 
apeiron)’ (DC I.8; 277a21-23, 27-28).  
If the opposites are the limits, the telos is one of those opposites, and in particular that into which 
something changes. In the case of the elements, these opposites are their respective natural 
places, and they move to these as to their form (DC IV.3; 310a35-b1). And in the Parts of 
Animals he says the same: ‘everything coming to be is in passage from something to something, 
 Graham (1980) cites Ackrill (1965), who had said that ‘the whence and the whither [ek tinos eis ti, 70
presumably] constitute the form’ of a motion. The linguistics literature on the topic has often put forward 
a similar claim, arguing that the object of the verb determines the category into which it falls, whether 
process or event. In particular, quantized objects of verbs of motion yield ‘delimited’ or ‘telic’ readings of 
the actions involved, which is to say, actions for which there is a measure of completeness . Thus, to use 
the example Mourelatos gives on this point: ‘He played a Mozart sonata’ vs. ‘He played a little Mozart.’ 
The former is an event predication, the latter activity. On this, cf. Mourelatos (1978), Tenny (1994) ch.2, 
Smollett (2005). If this is right, then substance, which is most of all one and thus countable, would be the 
paradigm case of a limit and telos of motion, because it most of all would confer a measure of 
completeness on the motion. In other words, the primary telē would be natural organisms.
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from an origin…towards some shape or another such telos’ (PA II.1; 646a31-33). In finding the 
limits of motion, we have thus also found the telos: it is the outer bound of a motion given by the 
second ‘something’ in Aristotle’s formula, ‘from something to something.’ As we have already 
seen, ‘the end (telos) comes to be last (hustaton)’ (GA II.3 736b4-5),’ and only when it has come 
to be is the motion thereby complete—no longer ateles—for as we have also seen, ‘nothing is 
complete unless it has an end (telos), and the end is a limit (peras)’ (Phys. III.6; 207a12-14). It is 
because it has a telos that motion does not go on without limit (eis apeiron), and it is in virtue of 
this that motion is ultimately possible at all: ‘if generation and motion are to be, there must also 
be a limit (peras); for no motion is unlimited (apeiros), but every motion has an end 
(telos)’ (Meta. B. 4; 999b10-11). 
 To conclude this section, I want only to draw the reader’s attention to a point which will 
be essential in what follows. In the passage from De Caelo above, Aristotle says that motion is 
between two states differing in form, and in the schematic characterization I gave according to 
which in any given motion we move from ‘x is A’ to ‘x is B’, there was no indication of any 
internal complexity between the opposed predicates, A and B. The two terms of the opposition 
are not in fact on a par, however, even though nothing said thus far would indicate a difference 
between them. The opposites in question are just those identified in Book I of the Physics, which 
were there judged to be two of the necessary principles of motion, along with the underlying 
subject to which those opposites are said to belong (e.g Phys. I.7; 190b35ff). In particular, it is 
clear there that he understands this trio of principles to consist of form, matter, and privation, 
(Phys. I.7; 19b23-28), and Aristotle thinks of opposites in terms of form and privation quite 
generally. These are the same principles identified again in the early chapters of Metaphysics Λ, 
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in which he says that among the principles and causes of all things are form, privation, and 
matter, where the first two are the opposites, the last their subject. Thus in Meta. Λ.2, after 
discussing motion, he says that ‘the causes and principles, then, are three; two of them are 
contrary (enantiosis), of which one is the account or the form, and the other is the privation, and 
the third is the matter.’ In the passage from the De Caelo above, he can attribute ‘form’ to each of 
the two opposites, even if it applies strictly speaking to only one of them, since ‘we even say that 
nonbeing is nonbeing’ (Meta. Γ.2; 1003b11). And in Phys. I, Aristotle had talked about matter 
and privation being one in number, but different in ‘form,’ using the example of the uneducated 
person, where what it is be uneducated and what it is to be a person are each different. Clearly, 
the ‘form’ in question is a privation. 
2.4 SOME DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING GENERATION 
 In the above, I have been summarizing certain aspects of Aristotle’s account of motion in 
general, in accordance with his dictum that ‘the study of what is special to this or that kind of 
change is subsequent to the study of what is common to them all’ (Phys. III.1; 200b23-25). 
Nonetheless, one might think that there are unavoidable difficulties in assimilating generation or 
substantial change to change in the other categories, like place or quality. In particular, there is 
the difficulty is that nothing is opposite (enantion) to a substance, and so ‘there is no motion 
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(kinesis) with respect to substance’ (Meta. K.12; 1068a11-12).  Indeed, in the Generation of 71
Animals, Aristotle discusses the senses in which something can be said to come ‘from 
something,’ which is one half of the oft-repeated principle that change is ‘from something to 
something,’ and which I just tried to illuminate. We are given four possibilities: (1) as day comes 
‘from’ night; (2) as a statue is formed ‘from’ bronze; (3) as a person may become sick ‘from’ 
health; and (4) ‘cumulatively’, as from slander comes an abuse, and from an abuse a fight (GA I.
18; 724a18-35). In determining the appropriate sense in which natures arise ‘from’ semen, 
Aristotle immediately rejects both (1) and (3). The first sense of ‘from’ is merely that of ‘after.’ 
The third sense Aristotle understands in terms of destruction: what comes to be destroys that 
from which it comes to be, as sickness destroys health, and so Aristotle seems to think that 
coming ‘from’ an opposite is essentially destructive, which is clearly inadequate if we are talking 
about generation. Aristotle makes a similar distinction in Meta. α.2 (and in DA II.5), where he 
says that the changes ‘from’ air to water and vice versa are unlike changes from boy to man 
because the former are, again, destructive, while the latter completes what is in the process of 
being completed. One might think, therefore, that substantial change is really quite different from 
change between opposites. Not only do substances have no opposite (enantion) to come ‘from,’ 
 There is of course a further difficulty about the matter of generation in organized beings, which would 71
seem not to pre-exist the being in the way that bronze pre-exists the statue. This has received no little 
attention, but it would take us too far afield to discuss it here. Freeland (1987) argues that the persisting 
matter is the blood, present as the matter in the adult but also the matter of the embryo. Cf. for example, 
PA II.4: ‘blood is the matter of the entire body.’ Henry (2015) criticizes this claim, denying that the 
persistence or survival of an underlying subject throughout a change is a requirement on any and all 
changes. Though I am sympathetic with Freeland’s claim, my argument does not depend on it. Cf. also 
Gill (1991), ch. 3. Since my questions concern the metaphysical foundations of teleology, it is only 
important for my argument that Aristotle should think there is matter for generation, not any particular 
view about what that matter is, concretely. In other words, one could have a whole host of views about 
what the matter of generation is, so long as one held that there is some matter, and it would be compatible 
with the view put forward. Of course, what exactly that matter is supposed to be is interesting in its own 
right, but investigating it would take us too far afield from the project of this dissertation which, 
especially given the scope of the topic, must be selective.
N54
but given our interest in teleology, change from such opposites seems even to be the wrong sort 
of change to focus on, if the latter is essentially destructive. We want, that is, the sense of ‘from’ 
present in talk of ‘from a boy to a man.’ 
 Such an objection rests on an excessively narrow understanding of ‘opposite.’ We need to 
take ‘opposite’ in the broadest possible sense, i.e. antikemeinon, which we saw in the passage 
from De Caelo above and which includes not just those things admitting of intermediates, i.e. 
enantia such as hot and cold, but also contradictories, e.g. being a man and not being a man, 
between which there is no intermediate (Cf. Meta. Δ. 10). In Physics I, Aristotle uses the 
language of ‘enantia’, rather than what seems to be the broader ‘antikeimena.’ As a result, one 
might think that there is perhaps a tension between the claim in the Physics that all change is 
from enantia and what appears to be a denial of the same in GA (Phys. I.5; 188a19, 188b23, 
191a5; GA I.18; 724a14-b4)). There is, however, every reason to suspect he means to be more 
inclusive in his discussion in the Physics than the use of enantia might otherwise suggest. 
Indeed, it is clear in I.7 that his account is meant to apply to plants and animals, since he 
explicitly mentions them (190b3-5). The problem there is not whether or not substances have an 
enantion, but whether or not there is also some need for a substrate (there is): it seems not to be 
the case that something comes to be a substance, but rather that substances come to be 
simpliciter. Nonetheless, one still needs matter, he says. To that extent, Aristotle does wonder 
whether or not substances fall outside of his three-element schema, construed as matter plus 
opposites, but that wonder extends only to one of those elements, namely matter, not the 
contrary, and one might have thought that since he pauses to consider whether substantial change 
is an exception in the one respect, he would have considered the other as well. But he does not. 
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Furthermore, in Meta. K.12, for example, Aristotle says quite explicitly that both motion 
(kinēsis) and generation are change (metabole) ‘from something to something’ (ex allou eis allo) 
i.e. changes ‘into opposites (antikeimena),’ albeit each in their own way (1068a23-26). And in Λ.
2, he lists substantial generation with the other kinds of change, saying that they are all changes 
eis enantioseis (1069b14). Finally, the example Aristotle uses for ‘from’ in the sense of 
completion in Metaphysics α.2, ‘from the boy comes the man,’ is one of the examples he uses in 
GA for ‘from’ in the sense of ‘after’ (I.18; 724a23). As a result, we should not think that where an 
example is placed in the discussions exhausts the senses of ‘from’ relevant to understanding that 
example. More than one sense of ‘from’ can apply to a given example: changes outside the 
category of substance can be in some sense destructive of that ‘from’ which they come while at 
the same time completing that ‘from’ which they come, taken in another sense.  What I have 72
said above, then, would apply as much to substantial generation as to anything else. 
2.5 DEATH AND THE DIRECTION OF MOTION 
 I have been arguing that we might understand Aristotle’s teleology as a response to the 
problem of the apparently unlimited character of motion. As we have seen, the unlimited is as 
such unknowable, and Aristotle defines nature in terms of motion. If nature is to be knowable, 
then, motion must be limited in some way. It must, in other words, have limits. As I have shown, 
for Aristotle and for others, the telos was such a limit, and whatever was thought to be unlimited 
 Indeed, one might plausibly think that the destructive sense of ‘from’ characteristic of opposites is 72
applicable even in the case of a boy, e.g. Billy, becoming a man, for in becoming a man, Billy is to that 
extent ceasing to be boy until, at last, he is no longer a boy at all.
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was thought thereby to lack a telos. Motion could, therefore, be knowable if motion were to have 
a telos. I then explained the sense in which motion has limits, and argued that one of those limits 
was in fact the telos. Consequently, knowledge of natural motion is possible, and it is possible at 
least in part because it has a telos—a limit. This is the sense in which Aristotle’s understanding 
of motion is essentially teleological. 
 If we were to stop here, however, Aristotle’s account of motion would not be 
recognizably ‘teleological’ as we typically understand that term. Thus far, I have argued only that 
motion as Aristotle understands it is delimited by opposites and that the second opposite, that 
towards which motion proceeds, is the telos. On these grounds, there seems nothing to rule out 
dying as a teleological process, and it is anything but. If we were to understand Aristotle’s 
teleology as it traditionally has been, however, it would be easy to say why death is not a telos: it 
is not a goal for living things, i.e. not a skopos, and so not something at which they can be said to 
aim. Death plausibly is, however, a limit, for it is that beyond which something no longer exists. 
Thus, if the account I offer is to be recognizably teleological, in our sense of ‘teleological,’ I 
need to be able to rule out death as an end. In what follows, then, I explain why only motions 
toward being and form can be said to have ends, strictly speaking, and so why dying and decay 
cannot count as teleological processes on Aristotle’s view. 
 I said above that motion was defined by opposites. I said in addition that those opposites 
are not quite on a par, since the opposites by which we make the generic formula ‘from 
something to something’ concrete always consist of some form and its non-being, i.e. its 
privation: sickness and health, learned and unlearned, etc.. Their asymmetry is metaphysical. Of 
the two, Aristotle identifies the telos of a motion with the form in a wide variety of places: GA 
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715a5-6, Phys. 198a23-26, 199a31-33 and Meta. 1044b1-2.  In the GA passage, for instance, he 73
says of the hou heneka or telos and the substantial form (logos tēs ousias) that we ‘must suppose 
them to be nearly (schedon) one and the same thing.’ A few lines later he drops the ‘nearly’ and 
says simply that they are the same (tauton). In the Metaphysics passage mentioned, drawn from 
Η.4, he says of the telos and eidos that ‘these are perhaps both the same thing.’ Thus, if we think 
of the opposites between which change or motion occurs in terms of the contrast between form 
and privation, as Aristotle suggests, then it would seem that the telos is to be identified with the 
form, not the privation, since the form and the telos are the same.  There is, however, another 74
asymmetry. Of the two somethings, that toward which motion proceeds (as opposed to that from 
which it begins) determines the kind of motion it is, i.e. its genus and species and thus its form. 
Something becoming white is whitening, someone becoming learned is learning (Phys. V.4; 
227b3-10). Because a motion owes its identity—its specific form—to the second something 
 Rosen (2014) argues against this identification, concluding that when Aristotle makes it, he ‘was 73
speaking loosely, or was making a subtle mistake,’ (106). Interpretations leading to such conclusions 
warrant skepticism. Rosen distinguishes, sensibly enough, between having a task and exercising it, and 
argues that identity of form and ergon means just that something has a task in virtue of its form, not that 
form is identical with the exercise of the task, the true telos. That is to say, something has a function in 
virtue of its form, but does not necessarily thereby exercise it. I shall not engage the bulk of Rosen’s paper 
here, but suffice it to say that the transition from the possession of the task to its exercise does not seem to 
be a motion or generation for Aristotle, both of which are possessed of parts (NE X.4), and so no more 
needs to be done, nothing needs to be traversed, to exercise the ergon. As so often in Aristotle, there can 
be a conceptual distinction and nonetheless real unity. Rosen in fact entertains something like this near the 
end of his article, but he considers it overly subtle. He suggests that perhaps once having arrived at the 
form, e.g. the art of building, the transition to activity does not count as the acquisition of a new property, 
but something else—a transition into ‘another mode of being.’ He thinks it unlikely that Aristotle’s 
identification of formal and final causes, ‘made in an easy tone’, should rest on such a ‘subtle and 
difficult’ idea. If, however, we put aside the language of ‘property acquisition,’ which is not Aristotle’s, 
and speak instead of what is perhaps the nearest, genuinely Aristotelian approximation, i.e. alloiōsis or 
‘alteration’, then Aristotle does explicitly deny that the change from possession of an art to its exercise is 
an alloiōsis at DA II.5.
 As I noted above, there is of course a sense in which we can talk even of privation as form, since even 74
‘non-being is non-being.’ But this is derivative. Cf. Meta. Γ.2; 1003b5-11.
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rather than the first, this too is a metaphysical asymmetry. And this second something, we saw 
above, Aristotle also identifies with the telos. 
 These two asymmetries need not line up, however. If the telos is identified with the form, 
on the one hand, and the second ‘something,’ on the other, then in some cases we are forced to 
identify two quite different ends for one and the same motion. As it happens, the problematic 
cases are all instances of decay or degeneration: the learned can become unlearned again, and the 
healthy sick.  If we identify the telos with form in such cases, it is that from which the motion 75
begins rather than ends. If we identify it with the second something, then even things like 
sickness will be ends. But Aristotle is clear that privations, such as sickness, which is the 
privation of health, or death, which is the privation of life, are ends only metaphorically:  
‘since the end is something last (eschaton), by transferring the meaning even to 
bad things we use the expressions ‘‘a complete loss’’ and “complete destruction’’ 
when no thing escaped destruction or badness….Because of this, by a transfer of 
meaning (kata metaphoran), even death is called ‘the end’ in view of the fact that 
both are last (eschata)’ (Meta. Δ16; 1021b24-30).  
Privations are thus not really ends. If the telos is to be identified with form, as we have noted, 
then those motions ending in destruction will not have ends or telē, in the strict sense, because 
the end-state is not some form but precisely the opposite, i.e. the negation or privation of form. 
Being the second ‘something’ in the formula for change, ‘from something to something’, is 
therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being an end or telos. That something 
must also be a form, rather than a privation. But we should now like to know why nature should 
 I emphasize that all the problematic cases will be instances of decay because there are no neutral cases, 75
i.e. cases in which there is no metaphysical asymmetry between the opposing terms. As I noted, because 
all change is between form and privation, there will be some metaphysical asymmetry in every change. 
This is largely just a reflection of the fact that every motion or change is thought to be either a coming to 
be of something new or a passing away of something old or already existing, even if it is only coming to 
be in a new place. If nothing new came to be, or nothing old passed away, then you would have not 
change, but rest, because everything would remain the same.
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have a primary orientation towards form, what it is about form that draws nature toward itself, as 
it were: why might not nature be simply neutral with respect to coming to be and passing away, 
generation and degeneration? 
Perhaps we can make progress by returning to Aristotle’s claim that form is a limit.  In 
Meta. Δ, as we noted, he gives as a species of limit the what-it-is-to-be for a thing, and elsewhere 
he takes talk of limit to be talk of form. Matter, on the other hand, is taken to be unlimited or 
apeiron. But why should form be a limit, and matter unlimited? There are, it would seem, any 
number of ways not to be a tabby cat: something might be a car or a cupcake, a tree or a turtle. 
Being other-than-a-tabby-cat is in that sense indefinite. By contrast, being a tabby cat is some 
one way for something to be. Otherwise put, a question such as ‘what is Mittens?’ is answered or 
satisfied by ‘he is a cat’ in a way that it is not by ‘he is not a dog.’ The former completes the 
question while the latter leaves it open precisely what of an indefinite number of things Mittens 
might actually be. What it is to be a tabby cat, one might say, is well-defined. As that out of 
which something is generated, matter on the other hand is potentially but not yet actually what it 
will become. For this reason, motion is said to proceed from non-being: ‘a man is generated from 
what is not a man but what is potentially a man, and the white is generated from what is not 
white but is potentially white’ (Meta. N.2; 1089a29-31).  Matter and potentiality are to that 76
extent undefined or indefinite (a-oristos), while form is correspondingly well-defined 
(horismenos) (Meta. Μ.10; 1087a17-19).  Aristotle registers a similar thought in an ethical 77
 Here Aristotle seems to be eliding whatever the differences might be between substantial change and 76
alteration.
 Of course, all matter is in another sense some definite thing, as the matter of a statue is bronze, or of the 77
educated man the man. To that extent, all things pass away into something definite. But matter is as such 
a form of non-being, as Aristotle says, and so when the statue is destroyed it is reduced to mere clay or 
bronze, but precisely as matter it is now defined by a lack of the form once possessed.
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context when he notes that ‘failure [in action] is manifold, but success single—for what is bad 
belongs to the unlimited (apeiron), as the Pythagoreans supposed, but the good to the 
limited’ (NE II.6; 1106b29-33). 
 A form is a limit, then, because a form is some quite definite way for something to be—to 
have form is to be some quite definite sort of thing, and thus set apart from or distinguished from 
others.  On this basis, we can now understand why only motions towards form have telē and, 78
indeed, why only such motions are motions in strictest sense. If (i) motion is from something to 
something, where those two ‘somethings’ consist of form and privation, i.e. being and non-being, 
and if (ii) the name and form of a motion is taken from its end-state, i.e. that to which rather than 
that from which it proceeds, it follows that any motion leading to a privative end-state will itself 
be understood only in terms of non-being. Because motion is between form and privation, any 
given potential from which a motion proceeds will be a potential either for x or not-x, i.e. the 
privation of x. But in the case of a potency for not-x, what it is actually a potential for is 
undefined, as a result of which the potency itself is undefined. This is simply a function of the 
fact that potency is logically posterior to actuality: any given potency is only as well defined as 
its corresponding actuality. As a result, though, a potency can neither be nor be known any more 
 Indeed, one might think that therein lies the primordial importance of limits: they are that by which one 78
distinguishes one thing from another, e.g. your plot of land from another’s, or one kind from another. 
Limits, in other words, permit one to say that ‘S is P and not Q.’ Though it would surely be speculative, 
this might be why in some cases there is a temptation to translate ‘telos’ in, e.g. certain passages of the 
Protagoras, as ‘standard’ or ‘criterion.’ On this, cf. Allen (2014), 235-6. Allen argues that while ‘the 
function of ends of goods and evils is to serve as standards,’ nonetheless ‘standard’ is not the meaning of 
telos. 
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than its actuality.  Potencies for privations, for that reason, can scarcely be said to ‘be’ at all. 79
Consequently, those changes with a positive end-state will be privileged because (knowledge of) 
their termini will have greater definition and will, therefore, be prior to the corresponding 
instances of decay, the end-points of which are privations. Otherwise put, because decay is 
precisely change into non-being (to mē on) (Phys. V.1; 224b5-10), any motion leading to a 
privative end-state will itself be essentially privative, and only those motions that are motions 
toward form will themselves have form. And because it is with respect to form that we know 
each thing (Meta. Γ.5; 1010a25), only those changes leading to form relative to their matter will 
be strictly speaking knowable. Deprivative or degenerative motions are, as it were, the shadows 
of those motions which are most properly said to ‘be’ at all, and which are the primary objects of 
thought, namely generative motions towards some form. To be sure, knowledge is also 
accidentally of privation (Meta. Θ.2; 1046b7-16), just as there is an accidental sense (kata 
metaphoran) in which death or decay is a telos, but changes toward form will necessarily have 
primacy. This is why animals cannot be potentially dead or have the potency for decay, in the 
strict sense, because ‘destructions are accidental’ and there is no science of the accidental, which 
is apeiron and close to non-being (Meta. H.5, 1045a1; E.2). Death is, considered by itself, 
unknowable.  
 One can here see some of the similarities with Gotthelf’s view emerging, since his central idea is that of 79
an ‘irreducible potential for form.’ I agree with Gotthelf that a ‘potential for form’ is essential to 
Aristotle’s teleology, but I understand it to be essential to Aristotle’s account of change in general, and to 
that extent constitutive of nature. Irreducibility will be discussed in the next chapter, but suffice it to say 
that the potential is as such irreducible simply because, or to the extent that, the corresponding actuality 
is. If the actuality is irreducible, so is the potentiality, since the latter is defined in terms of the former. The 
point is simply a logical one. Cameron (2002) objects to Gotthelf on the grounds that his slogan ‘potential 
for form’ is illicit because the ‘for’ ‘is ambiguous between definitional priority and genuine teleological 
direction.’ For Aristotle, I suggest, this is a distinction without a difference.
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 On the basis of the foregoing, then, we might think that if something, some possible state 
or other, is to be a genuine limit for a certain x, then that state must somehow either make x to be 
truly what it already is, in some sense, or preserve it as the sort of thing that it is, because only 
being such as it is will be a limit relative to it. That is, if the ‘what it is to be’ is different for the 
many different sorts of things we find around us—if the ‘to be’ of each sort of thing is spoken of 
homonymously—then the ‘limit’ for each in the sense specified will be correspondingly 
different. In a word, not just any chance thing will be the limit of any chance thing. The actions 
of Mittens, for example, must in essence conduce either to his self-preservation—his continuing 
to be actually what he is—or at the very least to the propagation of more things of his type. 
Death, on the other hand, cannot be an end for Mittens because the end is a limit, and death, 
understood as non-Mittens, is as such unlimited precisely because it is a privation. All change is, 
in that sense, essentially generative in character with respect to its matter, which is potentially the 
actuality it is becoming.  But again, this is not to say that decay or death are simply inexplicable, 80
but that whatever being and intelligibility they do have is derived from the corresponding 
 This is a point made by Kelsey (2010), though not on quite the same grounds offered here: “[Aristotle] 80
thinks of the constructive side of change as in the business, not of taking the materials on which it 
operates and dislodging them from or leaving them in a condition they began by exemplifying perfectly 
well, but rather of moving them towards a condition they began by exemplifying only imperfectly”. 
Aristotle thinks of change, Kelsey says, “in fundamentally developmental terms.”
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instances of generation, in the same way that the moon shines not with its own light, but only 
reflects that of the sun.  81
 I want now to conclude this section with a tentative proposal, one which promises to 
reveal an underlying unity to Aristotle’s thought. I said above that motion was circumscribed by 
the possibilities of affirmation and negation. The limits of motion, we now know, are to be 
understood in terms of form and privation, not simply two different forms, i.e. two positive 
states. A privation is of course described by a negation (apophasis) (Meta. Δ. 22; 1022b33). The 
apeiron, for example, is precisely what is not limited or has no limit. Aristotle understands 
negation as a kind of separation (Meta. Θ.10; Ε.4).  In saying ‘Socrates was not a Spartan,’ I am 82
separating the subject, ‘Socrates,’ and the predicate, ‘Spartan.’ Affirmation, on the other hand, is 
a kind of combination: Socrates was an Athenian. This same basic thought is recapitulated in 
Aristotle’s understanding of generation and decay. Generation, Aristotle says, is the combination 
of some subject, i.e. matter, with some definite shape and form. What is generated is neither the 
 A corollary of this thought is that all motion in the sense discussed is towards some good. The causality 81
of the good is of course traditionally one of the defining features of teleology, and naturalist accounts of 
teleology have tried in various ways to make sense of this feature. Gotthelf has argued that goodness is to 
be understood in terms of form, actuality, and telos, not the other way around. I am generally quite 
sympathetic with his account, and without recapitulating his paper, I will only advert to Aristotle’s claims 
in GC II.10 that nature strives after the better (ton beltion) and that ‘being is better than non-being.’ 
Insofar as motion is, in the first instance, from privation toward form, i.e. from potentiality or non-being 
toward actuality or being, what moves moves towards the good. The account I’ve given captures this fact, 
and disallows the possibility of motion towards the worse, save in a derivative sense. 
 But I should also that on the view offered, we can make sense of the respect in which the good 
consists not just in arriving at the telos, but also in hitting the meson. If we accept the thesis defended by 
Lennox (1980) that species within a genus differ by the more and the less, then the telos of a process of 
generation of a particular species will also be the meson relative to it. That is to say, coming to the telos of 
generation will require that the process end with the meson between excess and deficiency in a number of 
its attributes, e.g. the sharpness of the beak, and this will be determined by the species kind. 
 Aristotle’s views on affirmation and negation, discussed in the chapters mentioned, are certainly 82
complex, but in both he talks of affirmation and denial as separation and combination: ‘in the case of 
truth, affirmation is of objects which are combined, and denial is of objects which are divided’ (Meta. E.
4). Conversely when one utters a falsehood, one combines in thought or speech what is divided in truth or 
divides in thought or speech what is combined in truth—affirms what is not or denies what is.
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matter nor the form, but the composite of both. And decay is the separation of the same, i.e. the 
separation of matter from its form. Thus, like affirmation and negation, underlying generation 
and decay are acts of combination and separation, where what is combined or separated is a 
subject and some form. For that reason, there exists a parallel between motion and assertion: 
generation stands to decay as affirmation to negation.  
 But we can also take the proposal one step further: Aristotle says on two occasions that 
pursuit and avoidance are to action what affirmation and negation are to speech (DA III.7, 
431a9-10; NE VI.2, 1139a21-23). In action, what is pursued is the good (itself a telos and peras), 
and what is avoided is the bad, which is as we saw unlimited or apeiron (NE 1066b). Like 
generation and decay, or affirmation and negation, then, we can understand action in terms of the 
relation between some subject and a pair of contraries, i.e. good and bad. If that is right, we can, 
on this basis, formulate two sets of columns thus:  
As we saw earlier, formulating such columns was part of the tradition with which Aristotle was 
familiar, and so the idea of such a table would hardly have been foreign to him. The two columns 
on the right would have been readily intelligible to Aristotle’s Platonist and Pythagorean 
predecessors, and the columns on the left are simply acts corresponding to them. Coming-to-be, 
pursuit, and affirmation all have as their objects some limit, while passing-away, avoidance, and 
negation all have as their objects something indefinite, apeiron or aoriston, some lack of shape, 
form, or definition.  
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Apeiron   Telos 
Bad   Good 
Privation  Form
Passing-Away             Coming-to-Be 
Avoidance            Pursuit  
Negation             Affirmation
 We might, then, cash out the metaphor in the teleological principle from the Generation 
of Animals with which we began in terms of acts of combination and separation. That is, we 
might think that nature ‘seeks’ a telos in the sense that pursuit is, like affirmation, a form of 
combination, for in seeking one closes the distance between oneself and the object sought.  83
Correspondingly, nature ‘flees’ the apeiron in the sense that fleeing is, like negation, a form of 
separation, for in fleeing one puts some distance between oneself and the object fled. If so, then 
our teleological principle might be considered a ‘logical’ principle, for its whole sense is 
animated by the contrasts between being and non-being, affirmation and negation. There could 
no more be a third form of motion, i.e. one which was neither a seeking nor a fleeing—a 
combination or separation of a subject with some form or privation—than there could be a form 
of assertoric speech which was neither affirmation (kataphasis) nor negation (apophasis). To that 
extent, the principle would be, by Aristotle’s lights, constitutive of nature and could only be 
overturned with some difficulty. It is, presumably, only recognized through reflection on one's 
prior experience with nature, but the principle has the marks of universality and necessity which 
 This is, perhaps, ultimately the way in which we should understand Aristotle’s occasional talk of matter 83
‘desiring’ form, a way of describing things which has caused headaches for quite some time (e.g. Hocutt 
(1974), p. 398). The point is not to anthropomorphize nature, or to attribute mental states to non-
conscious things, but to understand nature and change as essentially copulative, as it were: being is prior 
to non-being, affirmation to denial. (The vulgar half of that double entendre is not without point, 
especially for one for whom animals were the paradigmatic substances.)
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would make it more than a merely empirical generalization.  But if the above is right, there 84
would for Aristotle be a certain parallelism and unity across the domains of thought or speech, 
nature, and action, one which becomes apparent only when we give due attention to some unduly 
neglected concepts in ancient Greek philosophy.  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 There is then an important strand of Aristotle’s teleology that runs orthogonal to 
contemporary concerns with teleology. Beginning with the teleological principle found near the 
beginning of the Generation of Animals, I suggested that the contrast adduced therein makes 
little sense if the term telos is understood to mean ‘goal’. Once we look to Aristotle’s 
predecessors, we see that the contrast between apeiron and telos was a standard one, recognized 
by authors with quite diverse philosophic commitments. Seen against that background, it is clear 
 One concern—one among many perhaps—which may have arisen in the minds of some readers in the 84
course of this chapter: one of the damning features of at least late Scholastic natural philosophy was its 
alleged profligacy in the use of teleological explanation. Safer, one might think, to limit teleological 
explanation to the biological realm, where its application is less impugnable, which is not to say un-
impugned. Philosophers are much more amenable to teleological explanation there than anywhere else in 
the natural world, a fact which can lead a sympathetic interpreter to suppose that teleology in Aristotle is 
similarly restricted. Above I noted Scharle’s criticism of this line of thought in her (2008), but I do wish to 
say something about the scope of Aristotle’s natural teleology, for an implication of the account given 
above is that on Aristotle’s understanding, teleology is found in all (sublunary) motion. That is in fact my 
view, but the strength of the claim can be mitigated without changing anything above. Given the identity, 
rough or exact, between form and telos, natural motions will have telē just to the extent that they proceed 
to some form. But not all forms are created equal: one might have reason to think that biological 
organisms are those entities paradigmatically possessed of forms and most of all substances. In that case it 
would be permissible to say teleology belongs to such things most of all (cf. fn. 71 above). Those entities 
lower on Aristotle’s scala naturae (on which, cf. Morrison (1987)) could be said to imitate or 
approximate the higher things, and only be and be known to the extent that they do. Thus, the schema 
would still apply, but it would be less perfectly instantiated or met by, e.g., the elements. One need not 
therefore be worried about the apparent permissiveness of the account given, for it can be said to apply 
most perfectly to animal motion, while nonetheless extending to those things below the level of the living. 
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that the primary meaning of telos must be ‘end’ in the sense of ‘limit,’ and not ‘goal’ or ‘aim.’ If 
it meant ‘goal,’ we might expect Aristotle to gloss it as skopos, but in his scientific works he 
never does—not once. Instead, he repeatedly says that it is a peras or limit. This contrast 
between telos and apeiron or peras and apeiron is of course no part of contemporary concerns 
with teleology, and indeed has been noticeably absent even from contemporary accounts of 
Aristotle’s teleology, save for the occasional note made only in passing. This is by no means to 
deprive the telos of its philosophic importance, because the concept of limit was a central 
philosophic concept both for Aristotle himself and his predecessors, not least of all because the 
apeiron or unlimited was as such unknowable. Some scholars have therefore seen in some of 
those predecessors an approach to metaphysics that proceeds by way of epistemology: what must 
things be like if they are to be knowable? The simplest answer is that they have must have limits, 
and the three traditionally recognized limits appear to have been the archē, meson, and telos/
teleutē. Aristotle belongs to this tradition. It is through these that the world receives articulation 
in a quite robust sense, for these are the limits that cut nature at the joints and define that way or 
method by which nature becomes available to thought and speech. On this understanding, if 
things are to be known, we must search after their archai, mesa, and telē/teleutai. These are the 
points at which mind and world are in contact. 
 Limits have an essential role to play natural inquiry because nature is characterized by 
motion, a continuous magnitude, and it is principally in this context, Aristotle says, that we run 
into the problem of the apeiron. The first step in the delimitation of, and so the understanding of, 
motion is to be found in the recognition that every motion is ek tinos eis ti—from something to 
something. These somethings constitute the limits of motion, and it is to the second something in 
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particular that a motion owes its generic and specific identity. Speaking at the highest level of 
generality, these limits are given by privation and form, and Aristotle repeatedly identifies the 
form with the telos. Because a motion takes its identity from the latter of the two somethings, 
any given motion is only as intelligible as its end-state. As a result, primacy is naturally accorded 
to those motions proceeding to some positive end-state, some form and telos. Motions ending in 
privation—degenerative motions—will be known only derivatively, standing to generative 
motions as knowledge of privation in art stands to knowledge of form. And because Aristotle 
thinks ‘being is better than non-being,’ on the account offered, the primary and paradigmatic 
cases of motion are also all motions towards the better and thus the good: motion in the direction 
of the good is accorded ontological and epistemic primacy. 
 Finally, I have suggested that the teleological principle in GA is the natural philosophic 
correlate of the analogy adduced elsewhere between pursuit/avoidance and affirmation/denial. 
The resulting unity across the domains of action, nature, and thought is one of the virtues of the 
above account, and might help explain at least in part why Aristotle moves so comfortably 
between the different domains when he thinks it helpful. Limits are found in all three, and in 
each there is a corresponding contrast. Affirmation and denial are contradictories in assertoric 
speech, coming to be and passing away in motion, and pursuit and avoidance in action. Acts of 
combination and separation underlie all three, and the specific acts are defined by reference to 
their objects: the telos of coming-to-be, the agathon of pursuit, and the eidos of affirmation. For 
each contrary object, there is a contrary act. But it is the telos which ultimately accounts for the 
possibility of motion and thus a science of nature: ‘if generation and motion are to be, there must 
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also be a limit (peras); for no motion is unlimited (apeiros), but every motion has an end 
(telos)’ (Meta. B.4; 999b10-11).
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 3.0 FUNCTIONS AND  EFFICIENT CAUSES 
 In the previous chapter, I argued for a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the 
telos, its meaning and philosophical importance. ‘Telos,’ I argued, means primarily ‘end’ in the 
sense of ‘limit,’ and that it was of the profoundest philosophical significance for precisely that 
reason. Together with the archē and meson, it constituted one of three standardly recognized 
limits, the possession of which made something whole and complete. To lack limits meant to be 
unlimited and therefore unknowable. Consequently, identifying a thing’s limits constituted an 
essential philosophical task. Motion, in particular, was thought by some to be unlimited, and 
Aristotle defines nature in terms of motion. If nature is to be knowable, then, motion must have 
limits. The telos, I argued, was one such limit and that in virtue of which motion could be said to 
have form: the telos of any given motion grounds its generic and specific identity. I argued that 
for this reason only generative motions have ends. Because any given motion is only as 
intelligible as its end-state, only motions towards form will themselves have form. Those 
motions progressing toward privation will be and be known only accidentally or derivatively. 
And because privative states are as such unlimited, they cannot serve as limits of motion. Only 
form is a telos. 
 I argued further that the teleological principle in the Generation of Animals, according to 
which nature flees the unlimited and seeks an end, should ultimately be understood in light of 
Aristotle’s claim that pursuit and avoidance are to action what affirmation and denial are to 
speech: teleological motion is essentially generative, consisting in the combination of some form 
with matter, and it stands in opposition to decay, consisting in the separation of the same. That is 
!71
to say, like affirmation and denial, generation and decay consist in the combination or separation 
of a subject with some form, and on the basis of Aristotle’s explicit remarks, I suggested the 
same was true of action. Indeed, in accord with the practice of the tradition Aristotle was drawing 
upon, the aforementioned acts and their corresponding objects could be placed in parallel tables 
of opposites.  In the object table, one column consisted of terms designating a limit—telos/1
agathon/eidos—the other of terms designating some way of non-being or unlimitedness—
apeiron/kakon/sterēsis. They are to that extent marked by logical opposition, i.e. between some 
way of being and its corresponding non-being. It is for this reason that the principle in GA can be 
understood as a ‘logical’ principle. The priority of ends in nature is understood on strict analogy 
with the priority of affirmation over denial, being over non-being, limit over unlimited. 
Furthermore, because on Aristotle’s view ‘being is better than non-being,’ it was a consequence 
of the account articulated that all those motions deemed teleological, namely generative ones, 
count as motions in the direction of the good, with the consequence that nature has a primary 
orientation towards the same. 
 Nonetheless, one might worry that teleology as such has gone missing, for in the 
discussion of limits and their philosophic importance, nothing has been said about 
‘purposiveness,’ i.e. about the for-the-sake-of relation, and any alleged account of Aristotle's 
teleology certainly needs to say something not only about the telos, but also about to hou heneka. 
Surely, one might think, there is a richer sense of telos to be had than that delineated in the 
previous chapter: there is, on the one hand, telos understood as peras, and telos understood as 
that-for-the-sake-of-which. It is in the latter, one might think, that we are principally interested 
 In some places, Aristotle himself seems to employ just such tables, e.g. Met. Λ.7; 1072a35-36.1
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and that it is the latter which is most appropriately called a cause. No one disputed in the late 
scholastic period, for example, that natural motions proceeded toward natural termini. That was 
not the question. The difficulty was rather how the termini towards which they proceeded were 
causes of their so proceeding, how non-rational efficient causes might be ‘directed’ on ends, and 
precisely as ends. Without such an account, genuine purposiveness can seem to go missing. 
More is needed, therefore, to make sense of Aristotle’s teleology than the account of the telos 
already given  
 It is the aim of this chapter to remedy these deficiencies, and to understand efficient 
causation and the for-the-sake-of relation against the background already given. In §§1-3 I 
describe an interminable oscillation in the literature on Aristotle’s teleology, indeed an oscillation 
in discussions of teleology quite generally. In particular, without postulating efficient and 
material causal ‘gaps,’ it is hard to see what role final causes might play. That is to say, because it 
seems that there needs to be something for the final cause to ‘do’ or explain which cannot be 
done or explained by efficient and material causes, there must be efficient causal gaps of some 
sort or other. But if there are such gaps, it seems they must be filled by (allegedly) non-empirical 
entities like powers, the evidence for which is only the phenomena to be explained. Efforts to 
resolve the difficulty have generated a curious spectacle in the literature, namely the proliferation 
of accusations that one commentator or another is not in fact offering an account of final 
causation, but is in fact ‘reducing’ it to a special kind of efficient causation. The sheer number of 
accusations, I suggest, calls for diagnosis rather than adjudication. 
 In §§4-6, I turn to that diagnosis. I argue that for Aristotle efficient and final causes are 
essentially correlative, i.e. that one could no more have the one without the other than one could 
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have an up without a down, or a left without a right. This fact only comes to light, however, if we 
attend to the concrete meanings of the terms that Aristotle uses for each. In particular, 
commentators have not paid sufficient attention to Aristotle’s favored way of picking out the 
‘efficient’ cause, namely as the archē of motion. If we understand archē in the concrete sense of 
‘beginning,’ in much the same way that I suggested in the previous chapter that we understand 
telos in the concrete sense of ‘end,’ we can begin to see why Aristotle should think that archai 
are essentially related to telē. I argue for this not only on the basis of the semantic arguments in 
the previous chapter, but (i) on the basis of a novel understanding of chance and (ii) Aristotle’s 
account of analogy.  
 Discussions of Aristotle’s account of chance in Physics II have generally failed to take 
account of Aristotle’s use of ‘chance’ or to tuchon in other contexts. I argue in §5 that in each 
case, ‘chance’ designates a mismatch between two terms or things, e.g. form and matter, or the 
opposites between which change occurs. Not any chance form belongs to any chance body, and 
not any chance thing comes to be from any chance opposite. Similarly, I argue in §6 that when 
Aristotle is denying that nature is governed principally by chance in Physics II.8, he is arguing 
for an essential connection between two terms or things, and those are archē and telos. Like form 
and matter, or the contraries of change, these are antikeimena standing one to another like pale to 
dark. I then argue in §7 that this view is confirmed by a brief examination of Aristotle’s 
understanding of analogical terms. Terms such as ‘form’ or ‘potency’ cannot be defined, Aristotle 
thinks, but can only be explicated by analogies or proportions: A:B::C:D. To construct a 
proportion is, however, to exhibit the sense not only of one term, e.g. potency, but also its 
opposite, actuality. That is, constructing the analogy exhibiting the meaning of ‘potency’ is to 
!74
construct at the same time the analogy exhibiting the meaning of ‘actuality.’ ‘Cause’ is one of 
those terms Aristotle says is to be explicated by analogy, and I suggest that by looking at 
Aristotle’s examples, it is clear that to construct the analogy exhibiting the meaning of ‘efficient 
cause’ just is to construct the analogy exhibiting the meaning of ‘final cause.’ But this fact should 
be quite unsurprising if we understand those causes as I suggest we should, namely as the 
beginning and end of motion, respectively. 
 In §8, I then turn my attention to to hou heneka. As mentioned, I have until now said 
precious little about to hou heneka, focusing instead on the meaning of telos, and one might 
argue that it is the former notion which is truly essential to Aristotle’s teleology. I argue, 
however, that on the basis of what we have seen, the notion of telos as a limit can capture much 
of what is commonly thought essential to teleology and, further, that Aristotle in a number of 
places seems to understand the heneka relationship in terms of the telos, and the telos understood 
precisely and explicitly as limit. Finally, in §§9-11, I turn to functions. Hitherto, I have been 
concerned with telos-directed processes, rather than the functions of particular items, e.g. the 
liver. But that one thing should be for the sake of another is just as essential to teleology as the 
idea that one thing should happen for the sake of another. I argue that we can make sense of 
function ascriptions on the basis of the larger account so far developed. In particular, parts are for 
the sake of some activity insofar as they typically or customarily mediate between an agent and 
that activity. In that sense, parts constitute the mesa by which some archē achieves some telos. 
And not only is this consistent with the philosophic history and import of our trio of terms, 
archē, meson, and telos, but there is in addition textual evidence to support it. And that the tools 
are mesa explains their twofold relation, one to the archē and user and one to the telos, i.e. that 
!75
activity which it allows the user to perform.  Given the analytic or conceptual connection 2
between meson and telos, and given the nature of motion as a continuous magnitude, it will be an 
analytic or conceptual truth that nature is characterized by purposive relations.  In the most 3
concrete of senses, nature, according to Aristotle, consists of relations between means and ends. 
3.1 THE PROBLEM 
 One of the defining questions of teleology as a philosophical problem is how to 
understand its relation to efficient causation. This question is itself related to, but distinct from, 
the question of the causal contribution of the final cause, i.e. what the final cause ‘does’ or how it 
‘works.’ How exactly to answer the latter question has confounded many, even Aristotelians. 
Suárez, for example, thought its mode of action ‘obscure’ and Ockham, after describing the 
communis opinio of the other three causes, says of the final cause that ‘there is greater doubt.’  4
One source of obscurity is the common thought that final causation is ‘backwards’ causation, for 
it can seem that in order for an end to be a cause, what comes to be must be responsible for the 
very process bringing it into existence. A natural solution is to suppose that the end is causal only 
 It is, again, important to remember, for reasons given in the last chapter, that only positive end-states, 2
actualities, are genuine telē. Thus, the mesa in question will be the mesa on the way to some actuality and, 
since being is better than non-being, some good. This should, I hope, mitigate at least some of the 
incredulity to be had at the thought that purposiveness should come so cheaply.
 There is no need to put much weight on the descriptors ‘analytic’ and ‘conceptual,’ and I will surely not 3
try to define them. As far as I am concerned, their senses can simply be elucidated by examples, like those 
mentioned previously, i.e. up and down, left and right, etc.. Similarly, when I deny, as I have, that 
Aristotle’s teleology is ‘empirical,’ I mean the same as I would were I to deny that the relation between 
left and right is an empirical matter. Of course, what is to the left or right of what is an empirical matter.
 Cf. Schmaltz (2014) and Pasnau (2001) in Perler (ed.). 4
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insofar as it is incorporated into the thought or intention of the efficient cause. Thus, Thomas 
says in response to the objection that the end is not a cause precisely because it comes last, that 
although it is ‘last in execution, it is nonetheless first in the intention of the agent; and it is 
considered a cause in this way.’  Thus, one way of making the end ‘effective,’ as it were, is to 5
suppose that it has intentional existence in the agent. Of course, one might deny that a cause 
must ‘do’ something in order to be a cause, and so deny that there is any more to be said on the 
matter than that the end is a cause in the sense of ‘that for the sake of which.’  That is to say, 6
there is no ‘mode of action,’ no account of ‘how it works,’ because it need not do anything at all. 
But without an account of what the final cause ‘does’ or what difference it makes to the being of 
things, broadly speaking, we can be tempted to think of it as a merely explanatory principle at 
 ST I-II.1.1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod finis, etsi sit postremus in executione, est tamen primus in 5
intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causae. The same phrase, in intentione agentis, is also 
used by Scotus to explain how the final cause is a cause. cf. Pasnau (2001). Pasnau suggests that 
Avicenna’s conception, to which the above are related, became something like the standard conception by 
the end of the 13th century. Interestingly, though Ockham thinks his own understanding of final causality, 
which can in relevant respects be grouped with the standard conception, was held by Aristotle himself, he 
also finds in Aristotle another sense of ‘end’: “In another way, the end or the final cause is taken as that 
which follows from the operation of another according to the common course of nature, if not impeded—
following just as if it were foreknown or desired by an agent. It is in this way that an end is found in 
things without souls, even supposing that they were directed or moved by no cognitive being. This is how 
the Philosopher speaks about final causality, toward the end of Physics II” (Summula II.6), ed. Brown, 
quoted in Pasnau. Ockham takes this to be an improper way to think about ends, but as we will see, I 
actually take this thought to be much closer to Aristotle’s own than the the view of final causality Ockham 
actually endorses and also attributes to Aristotle. It is also interesting in its own right that this, thinner 
conception of final causality is the one Ockham finds in II.8, of all places. 
 Frede (1987) suggests that there is little to be gained from thinking of Aristotle’s causes in terms of what 6
they ‘do,’ but he also notes that the problem is an ancient one. I am quite sympathetic with Frede on this 
point, and given the fluctuations in the meanings and accounts of ‘cause’, it’s not clear how to answer the 
question, ‘how is the end a cause?,’ until one settles on some definite meaning of the latter term. If the 
telos is the source of a motion’s specific identity, i.e. its form, this should be enough on Aristotelian 
grounds to consider it a cause.
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best, leaving all the genuinely causal work to the efficient cause.  If we accept this suggestion, 7
however, we run the risk of ultimately reducing the final cause to a heuristic principle because if 
one thinks all explanation is causal explanation, then while we may perhaps find it useful or 
perhaps even necessary to treat things as if they were or acted for the sake of something, genuine 
explanation would come only with an efficient causal account of its being or behavior.  We can 8
seem therefore to be trapped between ‘the Scylla of denying the existence of teleological 
explanation, and the Charybdis of claiming that there are causal gaps’ to be filled by some kind 
of irreducibly teleological stuff.  In other words, if we can tell an adequate material and efficient 9
causal story, then there is nothing lacking for which we might need the final cause to ‘make the 
difference,’ even if it serves as a valuable heuristic. Purposiveness becomes superfluous, the 
ladder one throws away. But if something more is needed to fill out the causal story, then we 
need an account of the difference it makes, and this account has often involved the invocation of 
powers, which have long seemed unintelligible to many.  10
 In the scholarship on Aristotle’s literature, Wieland (1970), Nussbaum (1982), and Sorabji (1980) are 7
said to hold this view in one way or another. The view is also prevalent in the literature on Kant, which 
will be discussed in the next two chapters. Freeland (1991), 50, suggests that part of the motivation for 
understanding Aristotle’s aitiai as ‘explanatory factors’ is precisely the difficulty of making sense of 
matter, form, and end as ‘causes,’ as a consequence of which they are ‘interpreted as explanatory factors 
relative to this one ‘real’ (i.e. efficient) sort of causal relation that seems most to resemble our own.’ 
 One might resist the suggestion that all explanation is causal, and so insist that the end is a necessary 8
explanatory principle, but not a causal one. For my purposes, the primary reason to reject such a claim is 
that it introduces a distinction between causal and explanatory principles for which there is little evidence 
in Aristotle, at least when it comes to the final and efficient aitia.
 Berryman (2007).9
 The literature on this topic is vast. For a recent example, cf. Psillos (2006), but also a(n Aristotelian) 10
reply by Marmodoro (2009). Fara (2005) provides what I take to be an account very amenable to 
Aristotelians, but I shall say very little about powers in what follows.
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3.2 REDUCTIONISM 
 This dialectic, which has characterized the problem of teleology generally, has naturally 
found strong representation in the scholarship on Aristotle’s teleology as well. I quoted Berryman 
above, who comments not only on Aristotle but on ancient debates more generally. Though 
Aristotle can seem at times to a think a complete material explanation is available, at others his 
invocation of teleology can, Berryman says, seem to pre-empt just such an explanation. In the 
end, she thinks that though he wished to find a middle position, he ultimately fell prey to 
Charybdis.  The pull is strong, however, because the problem of explaining how blind or chance 11
processes might regularly produce complex beings with functional attributes is difficult indeed. 
For this reason, Aristotle very understandably felt the need to postulate ‘irreducibly’ teleological 
powers.  In countenancing such powers, however, one risks ‘deny[ing] that natural processes are 12
susceptible of meaningful investigation, or that we can understand how functions and goals are 
realized by material processes,’ for one is stuck with causes—certain powers—whose only 
evidence is the very phenomena they purport to explain.  Such a move can be tempting, even 13
persuasive, she says, given the inadequacies of materialist accounts of generation at the time. The 
 Berryman (2007), 360; 364. Berryman thinks ultimately that the question is not the material sufficiency 11
of individual outcomes, but the sufficiency of material interactions to explain the regularity or reliability 
of the processes in question. As we shall see, I do not think either is the correct way of framing the issue 
with which Aristotle is concerned.  
 Berryman thinks Aristotle’s introduction of pneuma in the explanation of generation essentially fore-12
closes the possibility of a complete material explanation, because ‘the prospects for a non-teleological 
account of pneuma’s capacities look bleak,’ 363. But pneuma is only a distinct kind of heat, and indeed a 
‘tool’ of the soul, just as the other elements in the process of generation. Cf. GA V. 8; 789b8-12. As such, 
it cannot be the inexplicable stuff governing the teleological process of generation, for it is rather one of 
the many things which is governed by another, namely soul. There is no indication that pneuma is 
endowed with any characteristics that would make it any more problematic than anything else. I am 
indebted to Jessica Gelber for drawing my attention to Aristotle’s extensive talk of ‘tools’ and its 
importance.
 Berryman (2007), 353.13
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postulation of powers in response to such inadequacies might still make good scientific sense, 
but it is a move of last resort, to be made only when the investigation into material-efficient 
causes peters out. 
 Naturally, not everyone agrees with the characterization of the problem Berryman gives, 
at least not as it confronted Aristotle. Gotthelf, for example, explicitly rejects Berryman’s 
characterization, insisting that Aristotle was attempting to navigate between Platonic ‘immaterial 
agency’ views of teleology and the reductionist views of his materialist predecessors.  14
Berryman, he charges, papers over the difference between Aristotle’s view and Platonic views. 
Aristotle did in fact successfully chart a middle ground, but it was a middle ground between a 
different set of alternatives. Organic development, Gotthelf says, is ‘actually directive without 
implying (as the ‘immaterial agency’ interpretation does) that it is directed.’ His protestations not 
withstanding, however, his account follows fairly well the dialectic Berryman lays out. The 
directiveness of organic development depends on the presence of an ‘irreducible potential for 
form,’ which means that the generation of an organism and its parts cannot be understood as a 
‘sum’ of elemental interactions.  The brutely teleological potential stands ‘over and above’ the 15
elemental powers operative in animal generation. A reductive account given simply in terms of 
those elemental interactions is unavailable because of the relative simplicity of Aristotle’s 
chemistry and the complexity of organic development.  In this way, the arguments for teleology 16
that Gotthelf ultimately attributes to Aristotle—and the kinds of arguments Berryman largely 
considers—are quite analogous to ‘God-of-the-gaps’ arguments in which the existence of God is 
 Gotthelf (1997; 2012), 82.14
 Gotthelf (1976/77; 2012), 82.15
 Gotthelf (1976/77; 2012), 24.16
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adduced on the basis of the explanatory short-comings of the sciences. In this case, when things 
cannot be explained on the basis of the interactions between material elements, we postulate an 
‘irreducible potential for form,’ which is to say a non-empirical efficient-causal power which is 
different in kind from those powers with which we are otherwise familiar.   17
 Any account of Aristotle’s teleology that follows the pattern just described cannot, 
however, be the right one because it makes teleological explanation not the default, but the last 
resort, and this seems to run contrary to Aristotle’s general habit of thought.  In other words, 18
Gotthelf’s account has it the wrong way around because any adequate account of Aristotle’s 
teleology must explain why we are licensed, indeed enjoined, to look for final causal 
explanations first.  What is more, the potential postulated to make an otherwise merely material 19
process purposive will seem to some positively occult, for it has the end as ‘a sort of intentional 
object.’  It is not enough simply to assert that generative processes are ‘directive’ rather than 20
‘directed’ because intentionality has long been thought to be the ‘mark of the mental,’ and so 
what is wanted is an account of how unintelligent subjects or processes can have intentional 
 Scaltsas (1989) objects to Gotthelf’s account on the grounds that, if teleology is understood in terms of 17
potentials for form, then teleology should be found throughout nature, and not just in that class of things 
to which Gotthelf wants to restrict it, namely organisms. This seems right, and so the restriction, perhaps 
to provide a more charitable interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology by contemporary lights, can seem 
somewhat ad hoc.
 Cf. Gotthelf (1997; 2012), 71: ‘the use of teleological explanation is sanctioned by the absence 18
[emphasis added]…of such a material level account.’ Cf. also Gotthelf (1988; 2012), 61: ‘explanation 
must start from there [the existence of element potentials], in the sense that in trying to determine what 
dunameis there are in the world, one must ask if there is anything one knows exists that cannot be 
explained by…elemental dunameis. If there is…that then establishes the existence of a dunamis—for just 
those features of organisms which cannot be explained by the organism’s constituent materials alone.’ The 
same objection would apply to one of the lines of argument for teleology that Cooper (1987) attributes to 
Aristotle.
 Cf. also the objections made by Charles in his (1988). Of course, if things are knowable in virtue of 19
their limits, and the telos is a standard limit, one will for that reason be on the lookout for telē.
 Gotthelf (1976; 2012), 32.20
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objects.  Gotthelf’s account can seem for that reason to fall prey to Charybdis, as Berryman 21
understands it. Those who, for reasons good or ill, are reluctant to attribute intentional objects to 
non-intelligent beings will find Gotthelf’s account to be of little help in making good, 
‘naturalistic’ sense of teleology. Indeed, it has been claimed that Gotthelf’s view succumbs to 
vitalism.  Gotthelf expressly denies that Aristotle’s teleology is vitalist, and so of course would 22
deny that his account attributes such a view to Aristotle. If it does not, however, then more is 
needed to say precisely why not.    23
 Not everyone, of course, is as troubled by the prospect that a ‘sum’ of material 
interactions might be sufficient for natural generation, whether of whole organisms or their parts. 
 There has, however, been a great deal on so-called ‘physical intentionality’ more recently, e.g. Molnar 21
(1999), Mumford (1999) and Place (1996). It is also worth recalling the objection raised by Cameron 
(2003), discussed in ch. 1, fn. 80.
 Pavlopoulos (2003), 148. Technically, Pavlopoulos says that ‘it is hard to see how his account does not 22
lead to vitalism.’ He attributes the problem to Gotthelf’s concern to show that Aristotle’s teleology is 
‘factual or empirical in character.’ I am inclined to agree. As I noted in the previous chapter, I share the 
concerns Broadie (1982), 91, articulates about Gotthelf’s excessively ‘empiric Aristotle.’
 Gotthelf (1976/77; 2012), 28. Matters are hardly helped by Gotthelf’s claim that ‘it would have taken 23
something like modern biochemistry and evolutionary theory to dislodge Aristotle’ from his conception of 
teleology. It is hard to see what difference biochemistry could make, unless one were conceiving of the 
potential in something approaching vitalistic terms, i.e. as some kind of para-empirical stuff—teleoplasm. 
Cf. Gotthelf (1997; 2012), 83. With the advent of modern science, Gotthelf thinks Aristotle would likely 
have retreated to a view of the kind developed by Larry Wright, which I shall discuss below.  
 Cooper (1987) makes an argument that is similar in many ways to Gotthelf’s, and Gotthelf 
thought so as well. Although we with hindsight might think that the atomists and materialists were closer 
to the truth, their positions lacked real empirical support. The matter theories then in existence could not 
plausibly be said to explain the order, precision, and regularity of organic development and so the 
invocation of teleological powers made good scientific sense. For Cooper, however, Aristotle’s account 
depends on the further fact of the eternity of the species. Cf. his (1987), 271-2. Whether the eternity of the 
species is in fact essential has been disputed, e.g. Gotthelf (1997; 2012), 71n14, and Code (1997). 
Gotthelf thinks the eternity of the species is not a premise but a consequence of the brute natural fact that 
organisms produce other beings like themselves. 
 Bradie and Miller (1984), by contrast, argue that Aristotle’s basic understanding is not imperiled 
by advances in biochemistry. The nature of the potential is simply left undetermined by Aristotle. It is still 
conceived empirically, for they suggest that the type of movement required by the potential for form is 
plausibly embodied in the DNA molecule. Thus, Aristotle’s account is not refuted, but indeed supported 
by modern biochemistry. I agree with the criticism of Bradie and Miller made by Bolton (2015), on which 
more below. At best, DNA would be but a ‘tool’ of the efficient cause.
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I mentioned Charles above, who argues that even if there is a set of sufficient conditions 
necessitating a given outcome—and he thinks there is—that still does not account for the essence 
and goodness of the outcome in question.  Charles argues that Aristotle was never in the 24
business of trying to show a complete physical account of generation in material terms could not 
be given. He argues instead that what such an account fails to give is the ti esti and the good for 
each of the things generated, e.g. blood, and that this is what constitutes the irreducibility of 
teleological explanation. The conditions sufficient for the presence of blood do not explain what 
it is to be blood because the answer to this is given only by a teleological account, i.e. what blood 
is for.  Perhaps material-efficient causes can explain why things come to be, but they cannot 25
explain why this organism comes to have just those parts that are good for it. If not because of 
the good, then the connection between the good they clearly serve and the story of their coming 
to be will inevitably seem fortuitous or marvelous.  Reductionism is still the point at issue, but 26
Charles and Cooper disagree with Gotthelf about what it is that can or cannot be reduced. It is, in 
particular, the normative or evaluative aspect of teleology that is necessarily lost from any 
 Charles (1988).24
 Charles (1988). Cooper in one of his other lines of argument makes a similar point. Cf. his (1987), 249. 25
I mention blood, but the point applies to whole organisms and indeed any process of at least organic 
generation. One might perhaps be able to give a material account of the generation of a beagle, but such 
an account would fail to account for what it is to be a beagle, and the proper ergon of the beagle, namely 
hunting.
 Ibid, 251. As I mentioned, Charles thinks material-efficient causes cannot explain what blood is, even 26
though they can explain how it comes to be. This presupposes that the ti esti is to be answered 
functionally, and not in terms of material composition. But given the way in which the issue is framed, 
presumably some justification needs to be given for precisely this. Otherwise, it seems as though Charles’ 
account merely begs the question. Aristotle’s opponents would deny just this fact.
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account of generation or motion couched simply in terms of material interactions.  Because 27
Gotthelf understands goodness in Aristotle in terms of telos and energeia, the same move is not 
available to him: goodness will not escape reduction if those features or concepts which explicate 
it do not.   28
 The thought expressed by Charles and Cooper, according to which it is precisely the 
normative element that escapes material-efficient accounts, has a palpable similarity to what is 
by now a very common and natural thought, namely that the normative and the merely 
descriptive come apart. That is to say, one can worry that the suggestion is really an expression 
of the fact/value distinction, for the suggestion is just that one could give a complete description 
of the elemental transformations leading to the presence of an organism and its parts—a 
complete material-efficient causal story—but nonetheless fail to account for why such processes 
or what they bring about are good, or why things can be said to have turned out badly when the 
process goes awry. For those wishing to avoid attributing to Aristotle a conception of teleology 
that does not involve efficient-causal gaps, this can be an intuitive way of preserving the 
importance and necessity of teleological explanation, one to which contemporary debates and 
distinctions have made us particularly receptive. But because ‘good’ is not a univocal term or sui 
generis property, but a homonymous term explicated in each case by reference to an individual’s 
 Code and Moravscik (1992) deny that reduction is at issue in any sense, arguing that Charles’ framing 27
of the problem is only possible on the basis of a number of anachronisms, e.g. the notions of ‘matter,’ ‘the 
physical,’ and ‘efficient causation’ employed. Matter itself, they argue, is understood teleologically or 
functionally, and so the conceptual space necessary in order to question whether or not ‘material’ 
explanation is sufficient is a non-starter. Though I will not undertake to criticize Charles on this score, I 
largely agree with their criticism, which could very well be said to apply to all those authors who take 
Aristotle to be concerned with reductionism, e.g. Gotthelf, Cooper, Charles, Berryman, etc..
 Naturally, given my agreement with Gotthelf about how goodness is to be understood, namely in terms 28
of the telos and form and actuality, another account of the relation between final cause and material-
efficient causes will need to be given.
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kind, the possibility of a ‘reductive’ explanation is much nearer to hand: a feature is good just 
insofar as it standardly belongs to the organism’s kind and is employed in the exercise of its 
specific life-capacities, generally in relation to nutrition and reproduction. It is hard to see why, 
on this understanding, the goodness of features or the processes leading to them could not be 
explained in material-efficient terms, or at least non-teleological ones.  The immediate 29
plausibility that it is specifically the good that is irreducible is, I fear, a function of the hold that 
the fact/value distinction continues to have, even on those who are otherwise by general 
inclination and habit of mind opposed to it. To the extent that one finds it unAristotelian, one is 
to that extent less likely to find the suggestion a persuasive one. But if one rejects that 
suggestion, one will need another account of just why material-efficient causes will not suffice 
for all of one’s explanatory projects.   
3.3 ELIMINATIVISM 
 There are, however, views which fit much less easily into the dialectic that Berryman 
describes and which can seem inescapable. In a very influential paper, Susan Meyer has argued 
that Aristotle opposes not the existence of sufficient material conditions necessitating a given 
outcome, but the thought that those natural things we call sheep or oxen lack intrinsic efficient 
 As we will see, Meyer (1992) also rejects the suggestion made by Cooper and Charles, for she does 29
think that, for Aristotle, certain efficient causal claims are sufficient to account for the goodness of an 
outcome. She asserts that the claim that an animal develops those parts that are good for it just is the 
claim that it develops its characteristic parts characteristically (805).
!85
causes.  In other words, Aristotle is concerned not with reductionism, but eliminativism.  30 31
Because natural things have in themselves a cause or source of motion and rest, the denial of 
such sources to, e.g., sheep is just to say that sheep do not have natures. Aristotle thus opposes 
the thought that the things we agree are natural come about accidentally, and the rejection of this 
thought, she argues, is sufficient for the truth of natural teleology.  Aristotle does or can accept 32
that the natural activities of the elements are ‘causally sufficient’ for the development of the parts 
of animals and plants, or to account for generative processes, and so he need not admit of an 
‘irreducible potential for form;’ rather, all Aristotle needs for final causal claims is that the end in 
question have a kath’ auto efficient cause, which amounts to an efficient cause exhibiting a 
certain degree of counter-factual robustness.  There must only be a ‘reliable mechanism’ for the 33
generation of natural ends. Given Aristotle's requirements on explanation, Meyer argues, no set 
of merely causally sufficient elements will enable us to explain a given phenomenon, even 
 It is interesting that Meyer is nowhere mentioned in Berryman’s article, perhaps because the account 30
given by the former does not fit easily into frame furnished by the latter.
 There is, it should be noted, a way of appreciating much of what Gotthelf has to say that minimizes the 31
difference thought to exist between his own account and Meyer’s. Whether organic generation can be 
reduced to a ‘sum’ of elemental interactions can be understood as the question of whether organisms and 
their parts issue from a motion, on the one hand, or from a mere aggregate or heap of many motions, on 
the other. One might, that is, characterize the problem roughly in terms of the one and many, mere heaps 
and true unities. If an animal is the result of a mere heap or aggregate of motions, then it is much less 
obvious that there could be any science of animal generation, for what is most knowable is most unified 
or unitary, and aggregates have only accidental unity. That is, given the intimate connection between 
being and unity in Aristotle, the supposition that animal generation consists of a mere heap or aggregate 
plausibly amounts to the denial that there is any such thing as the generation of a given animal, or 
generation per se. But if this is how one understands Gotthelf’s talk of a ‘sum’ of element interactions, the 
problem now becomes much more similar the problem as Meyer understands it, for this would mean that 
the animal that results is the accidental consequence of a mere aggregate of efficient causes (perhaps each 
teleologically directed toward another end), as opposed to a consequence essentially connected to some 
one efficient cause or efficient causal power. One might then wonder what confers unity on the causal 
actions which would otherwise constitute a mere heap. Part of the answer might be an intrinsic efficient 
cause, possessing a distinctive causal power. Of course, this does not yet explain why relation to an 
intrinsic efficient cause should, in Aristotle’s eyes, suffice for the truth of natural teleology.
 Depew (2008) argues for something very similar. 32
 A similar claim was also made by Scaltsas (1989), also contra Gotthelf.33
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though on other views of explanation, it would. It is the reliability or counter-factual robustness 
of the intrinsic cause or mechanism in bringing about its effect (by purely material means) which 
permits it to serve in explanations.  34
 Even if one accepts Meyer’s account of the nature of the dispute, the nature of final 
causality is unfortunately no clearer than it was before. To be fair, elucidating the latter was not 
her aim. She asserts only that intrinsic efficient causal claims are (at least sometimes) sufficient 
for the truth of final causal claims. On her view, Aristotle denies there can be a good outcome 
with an intrinsic efficient cause that did not come about because it was good, but says little about 
why that should be the case. The truth of the claim is adduced primarily on the basis of an 
argument by contrast, according to which, she thinks, it is clear that chance or accidental 
outcomes are good outcomes that do not happen because they are good. What makes something 
happen because it is good is something about its antecedent efficient cause.  Only in the case of 35
an intrinsic efficient cause does the cause do what it does for the sake of the end. She thinks, 
therefore, that Cooper’s (and Charles’) claim that an efficient causal story will not account for 
the goodness of the outcome is in error. But saying why it is that an intrinsic efficient causal 
claim suffices is difficult because, she says, Aristotle nowhere gives an account of what it is for 
something to happen because it is good.  She does, however, offer a possible explanation—a 36
very brief one—and that explanation is strikingly similar to contemporary ‘etiological’ accounts 
of purpose or function, though she does not mention them. If the parts of an organism, for 
 Meyer (2002), 800. Code and Moravscik (1992) argue that Aristotle’s dispute with his predecessors 34
hangs in part on ‘the need to introduce strongly modal notions of potentiality and actuality to account for 
self-initiating processes.’
 Meyer (1992), 810.35
 Ibidem.36
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example, were not good for it, it would not have survived and reproduced offspring like itself. 
The goodness of the parts in the offspring is a function of their past contribution to reproductive 
success: x is for the sake of some good, y, because x has the consequence y and y is precisely that 
consequence of x which in the past led to reproductive success.   37
 It is unclear that this will do, however, for others have argued that the standard etiological 
account gives us not a true final causal story, but an historical, efficient causal one about the 
explanandum. The heart, for example, is said to be for pumping blood because (i) pumping blood 
is a consequence of having a heart, and (ii) the heart is present because of what it does, i.e. pump 
blood. As Bolton (2015) notes, however, so much depends on the sense given ‘because’ in the 
second condition.  ‘Because’ cannot here mean ‘for the sake of,’ because that would make the 38
analysis vacuous. Instead, the ‘because’ is generally spelled out in terms of past reproductive or 
selective success, in which case the feature in question is present in us because of that for which 
it was causally responsible in the past, namely the survival of our ancestors.  To say that x is 39
present because of the end it serves, y, means in this context only that x is present because it was 
 The view offered is in many ways similar to remarks made by Furley (1996), 73, who explicitly 37
acknowledges the work of Larry Wright. Charles (2012) calls Meyer’s suggestion ‘adaptationist’ and 
charges that there is no direct textual evidence for the suggestion. Meyer agrees, offering it only as a 
possible explanation. Importantly (and as is often done in the literature) I am for the moment eliding 
whatever differences there might be between purposive happenings or events, and purposive parts or 
items, i.e. functions. The accounts to be given of each are, I think, ultimately the same, though of course 
there are some differences. On this, Cf. Wright (1976), ch 3, who quite consciously gives quite parallel 
treatments. My principal concern here, however, is with events or happenings, i.e. purposive motions.
 Cf. Bolton (2015), 137. He calls the approach in question ‘reductive.’ Cameron (2003) says the same. 38
He argues that Furley (1996) and Irwin (1988) both make this mistake precisely because they follow 
Wright.
 The notion of ‘selective success’ even seems to enter into Meyer’s proposal: ‘if such parts were not 39
good for a member of the species, they would not have been reproduced in the offsprings,’ 811. Wright’s 
original account is actually more subtle, for he explicitly denies that ‘X is there because in the past Xs 
have done Z,’ in part because this would fail to distinguish between functional and vestigial organs (89). 
Even so, he insists on the importance of natural selection to make sense of natural functions (84), on 
which, more below.
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the cause of y in the past, thanks to which progeny of the same kind now exist. The explanatory 
work is thus done by a back-reference to the efficient cause, not by a forward reference to the 
final cause. So when Meyer tries to explain why the parts of an animal come to be, the 
explanation is in terms of the good they did for the efficient cause (the parent) which produced 
that animal and its parts. 
3.4 AN IMPASSE AND A WAY THROUGH 
 The difficulty Meyer encounters when attempting to articulate just how the end might be 
a cause is but a single instance of a general problem afflicting the literature on Aristotle’s 
teleology, albeit an understandable one given the terms in which his teleology is frequently 
discussed. I claimed in the previous chapter that the language of limits provided Aristotle the 
vocabulary in terms of which the problem of teleology was both formulated and solved. I also 
claimed that once we come to understand this vocabulary, we will understand why the difficulties 
afflicting later attempts to account for final causation can seem so irresolvable: the terms in 
which it is generally discussed simply do not permit the kinds of inferences which were available 
to Aristotle. It is the failure to attend with adequate care to Aristotle’s language and its history 
that explains the problem of which the above is an instance: the literature is simply awash in 
accusations that someone has collapsed the distinction between final and efficient causes, or 
reduced the former to the latter. And even when no accusation has been made, there is often a 
pre-emptive disavowal of the charge. Gotthelf (1976) and Meyer (1992) both insist that they are 
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not collapsing the two.  Gotthelf (2012) accuses Lennox (1982) of doing so, noting that Lennox 40
would surely deny it, and Charles (2012) accuses Gotthelf of doing so.  But of course, Gotthelf 41
denies it. Cameron (2002) accuses Furley (1996) and Irwin (1988) of the mistake, and says that 
Meyer ‘stops short’ of it.  Most recently, Robert Bolton (2015) has accused a number of 42
commentators of the error: Sedley (2007; 2010), Cherniss (1944), Gotthelf (2012), Bradie and 
Miller (1984), and Johnson (2005).  The difficulty of keeping efficient and final causes separate 43
and the temptation to collapse them runs quite deep, and this fact is, I take it, one of the most 
salient features of the contemporary literature on Aristotle’s teleology, one demanding diagnosis 
rather than adjudication. The accusation is not simply that a given account is subject to 
difficulties, but that its author is mistaken about the kind of account he or she is offering. There 
 Gotthelf (1976/77; 2012), 32: ‘This is not a demand to collapse the final into the efficient cause. It is 40
the potential which is the efficient cause, while the final cause is the object of the potential.’ Of course, 
what the final cause ‘does’ is still a question, for if final causality is secured by an ‘irreducible potential 
for form’, and that potential is the efficient cause, it is not yet clear that we have an account of final 
causality. Meyer (1992), 810-11: ‘It is important to recognize that this result does not conflict with 
Aristotle’s very clear intention to distinguish between efficient and final causation…My conclusion is not 
that something’s efficient cause is its final cause…This conclusion does not violate Aristotle’s distinction 
between efficient and final causation.’
 Gotthelf, describing Lennox’  (1982) view: ‘the form at the end is responsible for the process which 41
leads to it because it is the form which initiates the process. But this, notwithstanding Lennox’ 
protestation, is to confuse efficient and final cause…What one needs to explain is not how the form at the 
end might serve to initiate the process…but how it is responsible as end,’ 144, n.5. Charles, describing 
Gotthelf’s view of a teleological cause: ‘it is a distinctive type of efficient cause, one which is, in its 
nature, goal-directed…[then objecting] but teleological causation cannot itself be a species of efficient 
causation.’
 Cameron (2003), 165: Furley and Irwin ‘read Aristotle’s teleology as an aspect of his commitment to 42
efficient causality…efficient causality is ontologically basic on this view.’ Cameron says Meyer ‘stops 
short’ because although she gives the same basic explanation that Furley does, she does not actually 
attribute it to Aristotle, offering it instead as a possible reason for thinking why things come to be because 
they are good.
 Leunissen (2010) is unmentioned, but insofar as she accepts Gotthelf’s account of the metaphysical 43
basis of teleology in Aristotle, she too will be subject to the same accusation; and while Bolton does not 
single out Meyer, he does think the etiological approach described above is also guilty of the charge. 
Thus, Depew (2008), who also ascribes a standard etiological model to Aristotle, would similarly be 
found guilty. On Bolton’s account, anyone who attributes to Aristotle that account of purpose most 
prominent in the contemporary literature is guilty of providing an efficient causal account, not a final 
causal one. I dare say he is correct.
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seems to be no clear notion of what an account of final causation would even look like. But the 
difficulty is a natural one, given the interminable oscillation between Scylla and Charybdis, 
outlined above. Commentators very generally and very naturally want to avoid the 
mysteriousness of causal ‘gaps’, and it is hard to avoid claiming that there are gaps if one denies 
the adequacy of an efficient-causal account. But if one in turn insists on the adequacy of efficient 
causal accounts, as Meyer does, the role or necessity of final causation seems difficult to 
maintain. How can both modes of causal explanation obtain without the one, somehow, doing the 
duty of the other, i.e. taking up some of the slack left by the other?  And if no slack is left to be 44
taken, why should we need both?     
 We can arrive at a happy resolution of the difficulty discussed above, a difficulty which 
has proven intractable in the literature on Aristotle’s teleology, only by appreciating again the 
philosophic and semantic background of Aristotle’s teleological vocabulary, articulated in the 
previous chapter. Meyer is correct that the truth of intrinsic efficient-causal claims are sufficient 
 On the apparent tension between and incompatibility of these explanations, cf. von Staden (1997), and 44
Barnes (1993).
!91
to guarantee the truth of final-causal claims.  Following Meyer, then, I think that at issue 45
between Aristotle and his predecessors is not the question of the ‘sufficiency’ of material-element 
potentials in accounting for the generation of animals or their parts, but the distinction between 
accidental and intrinsic efficient causation.  Though Aristotle begins in II.8 by speaking of those 46
who refer all things to necessity, most of the discussion centers around the opposition between 
 Gotthelf has responded to Meyer’s paper in print, but it would take us too far afield to consider that 45
response in detail. Briefly, Gotthelf argues that if Aristotle's predecessors are eliminativist, it is because 
they are reductionist. He concedes that on Aristotle’s view, they may very well be described as 
eliminativist, but on their own terms, they were reductionist. Aristotle’s defenses of teleology are aimed at 
their own self-understanding, and so at specifically reductionist theses. But on many views (including my 
own), teleology is simply writ into the nature of motion, and so there will be no non-teleological reductive 
base. In other words, reduction could only ever be local, specific to this or that phenomenon, never a 
reduction of teleology to something else absolutely speaking. More importantly, however, it is difficult to 
make sense of the reductionist views that Gotthelf describes, which, he says, are a matter of Aristotle’s 
understanding of the self-conception of his opponents. That is, what we are being asked to parse are two 
aspects of Aristotle’s own understanding: (i) his understanding of his opponents and (ii) his understanding 
of their self-understanding. Articulating the latter is a difficult project Gotthelf himself does not actually 
undertake in his original paper. There he describes the reductive base in terms of the ‘actualization of 
element-potentials,’ which is surely not a description of things that could be attributed to Aristotle’s 
opponents as they understood themselves, for it employs distinctly Aristotelian ideas. Gotthelf seems 
therefore not to respect in his own account the very distinction he invokes in order to criticize Meyer’s. 
The reductionist view presented by Gotthelf is thus the view of a distinctly Aristotelian reductionist. It is 
indeed difficult enough to explain why on Aristotle’s own understanding there could not be an adequate 
efficient-causal story of generation that would make teleology obsolete, without trying to distinguish the 
many different kinds of understanding Aristotle might have had of his opponents. One might even think 
that if the defense of teleology is built on the poverty of material-level accounts, it would be all the more 
necessary for Aristotle’s opponents than for Aristotle himself, because their accounts of the elements and 
motion quite generally are plausibly more impoverished than his. As a consequence, it would, again, be 
more difficult to explain why Aristotle needed teleology than why his opponents might have.
 Another way to articulate the point at issue is to say that Aristotle’s question is not ‘what is needed, in 46
addition to the physical, in order to generate biological and psychological phenomena?’ This is how Code 
and Moravscik (1995) formulate Charles’ approach, and it often seems an apt characterization of 
Gotthelf’s approach as well. I hasten to add that my agreement with Meyer should not be taken to mean 
that I believe teleological claims in Aristotle are or could be accounted for by a reliable, material 
mechanism. Meyer has been construed this way, but as we will see, I simply do not think that the presence 
or absence of a ‘mechanism’ was Aristotle’s concern or formed any part of his defense of teleology. The 
presence of an intrinsic efficient causes is essential, but this should in no way be taken to mean that there 
is or needs to be a ‘reliable mechanism.’
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chance and purposiveness.  He says, for example, that ‘if then it seems that these things are 47
either by accident or for the sake of something, given that they are neither from chance or the 
automatic, they must be for the sake of something’ (199a3-6) This remark will seem odd to many 
because we are accustomed to thinking that there can be non-teleological or non-purposive 
changes brought about by regular but nonetheless blind efficient causes.  Aristotle’s discussion 48
of chance in the preceding chapters does little to resolve the oddity. Of the different kinds of 
cause, he says that chance and the spontaneous belong to the efficient cause (198a2-3), and are 
defined specifically as accidental efficient causes. Thus, in chapter 5, he says that the intrinsic 
 More detailed discussion of chance would take me too far afield, but for further discussion, cf. Lennox 47
(1984), Judson (1991), and Allen (2015). I am quite sympathetic to Allen’s account, and nothing he says 
conflicts with what I shall go on to say. Just as I did in the previous chapter, Allen calls attention to certain 
features of verbal predication and verbal aspect, and uses these features to make sense of the idea that 
chance happenings can come to be for the sake of something. In particular, he discusses what linguists 
call generic propositions, which highlight characteristics of a kind. Allen uses as an example ‘trees burn’ 
as opposed to ‘trees are burning.’ The same aspectual sense can be given in relative clauses: ‘things that 
fly’ or ‘things that burn,’ and so also ‘things that come to be for the sake of something’. On his account, 
then, certain things are customarily done for the sake of certain results, but they can be done without 
being done for the sake of that for the sake of which they are customarily done. He draws a parallel with 
Aristotle’s discussion of the voluntary. Throwing goods overboard is not the sort of thing one does 
voluntarily, but it might be done voluntarily in a way in certain circumstances. Similarly, something done 
with a result other than that for which it is customarily done is done by chance (relative to the result) and 
the chance cause of what results. The emphasis on generics makes sense of Aristotle’s claim in II.8 that as 
things are done (prattetai), so are they by nature, for one of the uses of present aspect is in generics 
highlighting characteristics of a kind, i.e. what is essential. Cf. Prasada (2005). 
 Lennox (1984) distinguishes between causal and descriptive senses of ‘for the sake of,’ adverting 
to the work of Larry Wright and contemporary evolutionary biologists who are said to make a similar 
distinction between adaptations and merely useful features. I myself do not find such a distinction in 
Aristotle, though I can agree that Aristotle’s distinction ‘resembles’ it. The ‘causal sense,’ or the one 
which does the philosophical heavy lifting, is that one which occurs in the true generic describing for the 
sake of what that action is done, i.e. the universal, while the merely ‘descriptive sense’ is that one which 
used with an eye to the particular circumstances in which a thing was done. I take it that generics do 
describe, but they also give the universal and the form, and explain as a consequence of that fact.
 Gotthelf argues that this is not in fact odd. ‘Given the simplicity of Aristotle’s chemistry’—an 48
interesting phrase, since presumably if Aristotle’s arguments here are pitched at his opponents’ self-
understanding, then the point should be predicated on the simplicity of what he takes to be his opponents’ 
chemistry—it would be miraculous that the same things should be regularly produced. The neglected 
alternative is no alternative at all because the materials happened to be inadequate, and so incapable of 
plausibly providing a genuine alternative. On this view, it is in fact a trichotomy, but one of the 
possibilities can safely be ignored. But as we will see, I take it the point has nothing to do with the 
complexity or simplicity of the efficient causal processes. We can make sense of Aristotle’s point as a 
genuine disjunction, having nothing to do with the quality of his chemistry.
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cause of a house is house-building ability, but the accidental cause might be the educated or the 
pale. And later he says again of the house that the cause is the builder, but the accidental cause 
the flute-player. Accidentalness is in these chapters always attributed not to the outcome relative 
to the efficient cause, but to the efficient cause relative to the outcome.  The opposition in II.8 49
would therefore appear to be an opposition between accidental efficient causation and 
purposiveness, and because efficient causation kath' auto is the contradictory of efficient 
causation kata sumbebēkos, whether or not a given process is purposive will be a matter of 
whether or not it has an intrinsic efficient cause. When in Phys. II.8, then, Aristotle considers the 
question of whether things come to be by chance or for something, the answer is decided simply 
by the existence of intrinsic efficient causes of the substances in question. This is, in turn, a 
function of the regularity of the course of nature, i.e. how things customarily proceed. 
Consequently, the truth of claims describing the regular or customary course of nature, e.g., ’man 
begets man,’ seem like they do suffice for the truth of teleology, as Aristotle understands it. The 
difficulty, of course, is understanding why. 
 The difficulty is partly a result of thinking that Aristotle simply adds final causality to a 
more or less adequate understanding of efficient causality, i.e. that the problems encountered by 
his predecessors were not, in general, due to failures in their understanding of the efficient cause, 
but their refusal to recognize or inability to understand final causes.  But Aristotle also says that 50
 Cf. Meta. Ε.2, however, for cases in which it seems the end, rather than the efficient cause, is said to be 49
accidental. Cf. Freeland (1991), 56. As we shall see, this is perfectly compatible with the view I go on to 
give.
 This appears to be Meyer’s claim. It is, in a way, true, but as I go on to say, somewhat oversimplified. 50
But it should be remembered that a genuine understanding of efficient causation is hardly easier to come 
by than an understanding of final causation, and seems to have been subject to an equal amount of dispute 
throughout the ages. Cf. Schmaltz (2014). Even so, efficient causation is generally treated as though it 
were perfectly intelligible.
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his predecessors spoke of efficient causes ‘not at all clearly, but like those untrained in 
fights’ (Meta. A.4), that they grasped it ‘in a dreamlike way’ (GC II.9), or even that they ignored 
it altogether (said of Democritus and Leucippus) (Meta. A.4). One of our impediments to 
understanding the efficient cause (or at least Aristotle’s efficient cause), is precisely the tendency 
to describe it as the ‘efficient’ cause. On this understanding, it is quite natural to think that what 
corresponds to the causa efficiens is the effectum, not the end or aim of the process. But ‘efficient 
cause’ is not the preferred nomenclature. Although it certainly captures an important feature of 
the cause in question—that it is in some sense ‘productive’ of the motion—Aristotle generally 
describes the efficient cause either as that ‘from which’ motion comes (hothen) (e.g. DA 
415b22-23; Phys. 195a8), or as the source or origin of motion (archē tēs kinēseōs or metabolēs) 
(e.g. Phys. 195a10), or some combination of the two (e.g. 194b29-30; 243a33-34). And this 
might suggest that one of the more salient features of the efficient cause, in Aristotle’s eyes, is 
not that it is ‘productive’—though he does, to be sure, talk this way—but that it is the archē and 
origin of motion or change. As Tuozzo has noted, those features that seem particularly salient to 
Aristotle are the directional character of the cause: it is where the motion comes from, and it is 
first—motion begins with it.  Thus, in Meta. A.3, the description of the cause he uses, before he 51
sets out to determine the number and kinds of cause touched upon by his predecessors, is ‘the 
origin of motion from which’ (hothen hē archē tēs kinēseōs).  
 If Aristotle denies that his predecessors adequately understood either the efficient or the 
final cause, we might suspect that their failure to understand the one has something to do with 
their failure to understand the other. But if Aristotle thinks his opponents lacked an adequate 
 Tuozzo (2014).51
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grasp of the efficient cause, which seemingly depends on the distinction between intrinsic and 
accidental efficient causation, then it would seem that by Aristotle’s lights, at least, they thought 
nature governed by chance. Consequently, it seems anything and everything could be considered 
a cause of anything and everything: the cause of the house could be the pale, the 5 feet tall, the 
Welshman, etc.. The number of causes simply explodes. For this reason, Aristotle says that 
accidents and accidental causes are indefinite (aoriston), while intrinsic efficient causes are, by 
contrast, well-defined (hōrismenon) (Phys. II.5). More important still, the reason why 
coincidental causes are indefinite or undefined is that for any single event, the causes would be 
unlimited or apeira (Phys. II. 5; 196b29). This is a feature of accidents generally. In Meta. E. 2, 
Aristotle considers some of the senses of ‘being,’ one of which is accidental being. There is, he 
says, no science of accidental being because accidents are apeira. The example he gives is again 
that between a builder and a house built, but the point is supposed to be a perfectly general one 
about the nature of accidents: because accidents are apeira, and what is apeiron is as such 
unknowable, there can be no science of accidents as such. Trafficking in accidents as the sophists 
do is akin to trafficking in non-being (Met. E.2; 1026b16).  Having explained the unknowability 52
of accidental being in terms of the apeiron, the question of limits arises once again. 
 I presume accidents are close to non-being precisely because they are apeira. Given the tradition of 52
regarding peras and apeiron as the fundamental principles of all things, one of which is the negation or 
privation of the other, it would be natural to assimilate these principles to being and non-being, or to think 
that the former principles in some way approximate the latter. 
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3.5 NOT ANY CHANCE THING 
 Aristotle’s language in Phys. II.8 bears this out in a way that has been insufficiently 
appreciated. In particular, it has not been noticed that Aristotle’s discussion of chance bears 
interesting similarities to remarks on chance in other places, in particular in places having little to 
do with final causality. The strict opposition between purposiveness and chance has, as I 
mentioned above, seemed perplexing to commentators because it seems clear to us, they think, 
that there can be perfectly blind efficient causal relations having nothing to do with 
purposiveness. The problem then is to understand why Aristotle thought this opposition 
compelling, since to us it seems so very objectionable, and his remarks in other places shed some 
light on the issue. He concedes in Phys. II.8 that different ends do sometimes result from the 
same cause, but denies that it is just any chance end (199b15-17). He had earlier attributed to his 
opponents the view that ‘any chance thing comes to be from each seed’ (Phys II.4; 196a31-32), 
and the same claim is made in De Partibus I.1: ‘a given seed does not give rise to any chance 
living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each with a definite parent.’  On its face, the 53
point would seem to be simply that seeds are seeds of definite things, and not just anything will 
come from a given seed.  
 How such remarks might contribute to defending or understanding natural teleology, as 
we are inclined to understand it, is far from obvious. One can oppose the thought Aristotle 
attributes to his predecessors without endorsing purposiveness, for the objection only demands 
that seeds be relatively well-defined in terms of what they are seeds of. This is not a matter of 
 Phys. II.4: οὐ γὰρ ὃ τι ἒτυχεν ἐκ τοῦ σπέρµατος ἑκάστου γίγνεται; PA I.1: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὃ τι ἒτυχεν ἐξ 53
ἑκάστου γίνεται σπέρµατος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἐκ τοῦδε, οὐδὲ σπέρµα τὸ τυχὸν ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος σώµατος.
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teleology, but definition: there are seeds of certain kinds, understood in terms of what they 
customarily produce, never-mind how. The most hard-headed materialist need not give up on talk 
of sunflower seeds, and such talk certainly does not make one a teleologist, by contemporary 
lights. In other words, the disagreement between the mechanist and teleologist, as we might 
understand them, is one about that in virtue of which seeds produce what they do. They disagree, 
that is, on whether a reliable mechanism, like a genetic program, or something like an 
‘irreducible potential for form’ explains how it is that sunflowers come from sunflower seeds and 
oaks from acorns. They do not disagree over whether sunflower seeds produce sunflowers or 
acorns oaks, for no one in the contemporary debate thinks any chance thing comes from just any 
chance thing. For that reason, the insistence that not any chance thing comes from any chance 
seed should seem a positively strange claim to make if one’s goal is to defend the place of 
teleology in nature. Disagreement over how x gives rise to y depends on agreement about the fact 
to be explained, i.e. that x gives rise to y, and both parties to the dispute can (though perhaps they 
need not) continue see the other as genuinely engaged in natural investigation. Someone would, 
however, be undermining natural investigation as such if there were no constraints on what 
generated or gave rise to what, for it is incumbent upon anyone possessed of the science or 
knowledge of nature to be able to say what follows from what, to know how natural motions 
progress. Consequently, if we are to possess a logos of nature worthy of the name, there need to 
be some constraints on what follows from what—some rules or laws, as it were—for if there 
were no such constraints, one would not be able to come to or infer any definite conclusions 
about the natural things at all—any chance thing would follow from any chance thing. But if 
Aristotle’s opponents lack any real understanding of the efficient cause (by his lights), which 
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again depends on the distinction between intrinsic and accidental efficient causal relations, then 
it would seem that in fact this just is the view Aristotle thinks his opponents hold. This view does 
strike at the root of natural philosophy, for which reason Aristotle says that it is ‘impossible that 
this should be the true view’ (Phys. II.8). 
 But now let us turn to those other, neglected passages in which Aristotle also speaks of 
chance. In Phys I.5, when in the course of discussing the opposites and their nature, Aristotle 
says it is necessary to assume that not any chance thing is affected by or becomes just any chance 
thing (188a31ff).  He gives as an example the relationship between the pale and the educated, 54
wondering how anything could come to be pale from being educated unless it were an attribute 
of what was not pale. It is, he insists, from the not-pale that someone comes to be pale, strictly 
speaking, and the same goes for everything else as well. Even houses, he says, come to be in this 
way, for they come from some particular state of separation and end in some particular state of 
combination. In each case, there are well-defined opposites (enantia/antikeimena) for coming to 
be and passing away.  This stipulation introduces a certain kind of order into the possibilities of 55
motion, of generation and decay, for those possibilities are now severely constrained or delimited 
in a certain way. In De Anima II. 2, we see something similar. There Aristotle addresses among 
other things the separability of the soul from the body, whether in place or only in thought. Mind 
seems in this regard different from the other faculties of soul, e.g. sensation, but whatever we 
might say about that, Aristotle says it is clear that the non-noetic parts of soul are inseparable 
from the body, though they are different in account. The soul is, in fact, the form and actuality of 
 ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον ὃτι πάντων τῶν ὂντων οὐθὲν οὒτε ποιεῖν πέφυκεν οὒτε πάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ 54
τυχόντος.
 He here uses both enantia and antikeimena, apparently interchangeably. 55
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the body. This is not enough though, for his predecessors seemed to think that there were no 
constraints on what soul could be fitted with what body. Aristotle, however, says that it does not 
seem that any chance thing can receive any chance thing (tou tuchontos dechesthai to tuchon). 
He then claims that his own view explains this fact, because the relation between soul and body 
is the relation of act to potency (DA II.2; 414a26-28). These terms are, of course, correlative, for 
any concrete potency is defined in terms of some definite actuality. As a result, a given body, 
understood as matter and therefore potency, cannot be the subject of just any form or actuality, 
for the potency in question is defined in terms of some specific actuality.  
 More examples from the corpus could be adduced, but on the basis of the above, we can 
see that Aristotle is concerned in each case to define a relationship between certain terms or 
things, i.e. to establish that they stand in essential relationships to each other.  While it is true 56
that the educated may come to be from the pale, such a claim traffics in accidental being, and so 
it is true only in a way. Strictly speaking, the educated comes to be from the uneducated, i.e. not 
from just anything, but from some definite opposite or antikeimenon. Similarly, it is not the case 
that a horse soul can belong to a human body, or a human soul to a squirrel body. Instead, kinds 
of body and and kinds of soul have an intrinsic or essential relation to each other. Because, then, 
chance is at the most general level a way of speaking about the accidental, whether we are 
talking of motion between contraries, as in Phys. I.5, or the relation between form and matter, as 
in DA II.2, it is opposed, at the most general level, to the essential, intrinsic, or kath' auto. We 
might then understand the discussion in II.8 simply as another expression of this contrast. This is, 
in effect, Meyer’s claim, for as we have seen she insists that the disagreement between Aristotle 
 Cf. also Meta. A. 8 and Aristotle’s criticism of Anaxagoras, or A.9 and his criticism of Plato.56
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and his predecessors is to be understood, at least in part, as a disagreement about intrinsic as 
opposed to accidental efficient causation. Unfortunately, she offered no explanation as to why 
intrinsic efficient causal claims should be sufficient for the truth of final causal ones, or why the 
slogan ‘man begets man’ should suffice for the truth of teleology. We need then to ask about the 
terms or things which Aristotle thinks are supposed to stand in essential connection with one 
another. 
3.6 ARCHĒ KAI TELOS 
 Those terms are of course archē and telos. The difficulty highlighted, but not resolved, by 
Meyer only really becomes amenable to solution once the terms in which Aristotle himself 
understands these causes are made explicit and understood concretely. If, that is, we refuse to 
understand these terms as they so often are, e.g. as ‘principle’ or ‘efficient cause’ and ‘goal,’ then 
the uses to which they are put and the relations thought to obtain between them become far more 
transparent. In the previous chapter, we saw that when understood concretely as ‘beginning’ and 
‘end,’ the terms are two of a natural trio of terms designating limits, the absence of which was 
sufficient to make something apeiron. It is only when they are understood concretely in this 
sense that they come to have a conceptual connection one to the other, a connection the 
excessively abstract renderings only obscure, if not eliminate. It is only when they are 
understood in this sense that they can do the double duty of standing in an essential, correlative 
relationship with one another and ward off the specter of the apeiron that lurks in accidental 
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causation. A fragment of Democritus asserts that although the origin of action is courage, chance 
nonetheless has rule over the end: τόλµα πρήξιος ἀρχή, τύχη δὲ τέλεος κυρίη (DK 133). It is 
precisely the natural philosophic parallel to this remark that Aristotle is concerned to deny: the 
archē of generation is sperma, but it is certainly not the case that tuchē determines the telos, i.e. 
what the sperma becomes. Given Aristotle’s understanding of tuchē in terms of the accidental, 
and the accidental in terms of the apeiron, his concern to deny any role to tuchē to determine the 
outcome is only to be expected, for admitting such a role is as much as to judge that a science of 
nature is impossible. The problem lurking here is perfectly analogous to the problem one would 
confront if the educated could come to be from just anything. In the present case, intrinsic archai 
help to delimit the otherwise unlimited causes, i.e. the accidental causes. But just as Aristotle 
denies that any chance soul can belong to any chance body, or that just anything can be the 
contrary (antikeimenon) of just anything, we need another term which will be said to stand in 
essential connection with the first. That term, in accordance with the tradition which precedes 
him, is to telos, and Aristotle is concerned to deny that any chance telos can belong to any chance 
archē. The delimiting function of the archē is coordinate with the delimiting function of the 
telos. Thus, in Meta. A.3, when he begins to consider whether and what kinds of causes his 
predecessors touched on, after describing the efficient cause as the ‘ὃθεν ἡ ἀρχη τῆς κινήσεως’, 
he expressly says of the final cause that it is the contrary of (antikeimenon) the former. There is a 
complementarity between the two analogous to the pale and the dark, and the left and the right. 
So understood, motion from the archē is by that very fact motion toward the telos, just as motion 
from the left is by that very fact motion toward the right. 
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 We can articulate the difficulty in another way, one which brings out in particular the 
connection to the apeiron: if the sorts of things we would normally call ends or telē have not, 
really, any corresponding archai, then it becomes difficult to say in what sense they can be called 
telē, strictly speaking. They are, that is, telē of nothing in particular, for the coincidental causes 
are unlimited. Similarly with the archē of motion: any given archē will be the archē of nothing in 
particular, or of an unlimited number of things. But those things will in turn have an unlimited 
number of archai, and that is just to do away with archai in all but name. In the same way, 
saying that the educated can come from the pale, or just any chance thing, i.e. anything at all, is 
as much as to say that ‘educated’ does not really have a contrary (antikeimenon). What one may 
call the purely dialectical concession that an opposite is always opposite to its opposite is of little 
natural philosophic interest unless one can say concretely that this is opposite to that. In the same 
way, if one cannot say determinately that this is the archē or telos of that, the apeiron 
characteristic of accidental relations still threatens to undermine natural science. The merely 
dialectical point without concrete application is empty, but empirical investigation without the 
dialectical point is blind. If we are to speak of archai concretely at all, we need to fix their 
contraries as well, which, on the evidence of Met. A.3, just are their corresponding telē. This will 
be part of what is involved in the investigation of nature, and this is why questions about the 
archē and telos cannot come apart. As Aristotle says, those things are natural which, being 
moved continuously from some origin in themselves (apo tinos…archēs), arrive at some end (eis 
ti telos)’ (Phys. II. 8), or in PA I.1, in a discussion in which he calls the seed an archē and the 
resulting nature the telos, that it is not any chance thing that comes to be from any chance seed, 
but this from that (tode ek toude). It is one of Aristotle’s constant tasks is to delineate what 
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follows essentially from what, and to deny that there are real or essential telē in nature amounts 
to the denial that there are natural archai from which they could be said to follow, which is as 
much as to deny that there are natures at all. There would be, then, no natural inquiry and no 
natural science, for there would be no objects belonging to them. It is, indeed, impossible that 
this should be the true view of nature, and it is for the above reasons that Aristotle’s claim that 
‘man begets man’ should be sufficient for the truth of his teleology, which he clearly takes it to 
be. 
 The efficient cause, i.e. the archē of motion, will for this reason be ‘directed upon’ some 
telos, and aimed at it precisely qua telos. This thought should be no more problematic than the 
relation between causa efficiens and effectum or our ‘cause and effect’ (which, of course, is not 
to say that telos just means ‘effect’). Gavrilo Princip, for example, is related to World War I as 
cause to effect, but this is just a joint way of saying that Princip, qua causa efficiens, is related to 
World War I, qua effectum. Similarly, the action of Aristotle’s efficient cause is directed upon the 
end as an end because it is only in relation to the end as an end that the efficient cause can itself 
be properly designated as an efficient cause, i.e an archē. This has been one of the primary 
sticking points in understanding how the end could be a cause, for as I mentioned in the 
beginning, it was common for scholastics to admit that all natural motions tended toward termini 
or ends, but to deny the causality of the end, at least in its full sense, to the motions of non-
rational beings. Thus Suárez, in DM XXIII.10, says that non-rational animals have only an 
imperfect cognition of the end, and are moved by the end only ‘materially,’ not ‘formally,’ by 
which he means that they do not move to and are not moved by an end as an end.  On 57
 Suárez explicitly cites St. Thomas in defense of his account. Cf. ST I-II 1.2, 6.2.57
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Aristotle’s view, however, this issue simply does not arise, because something is an efficient 
cause only insofar as it is an archē, and precisely as such is it related to its antikeimenon, its 
opposite, the telos, qua telos.  A beaver, for example, builds a dam, and the dam is the beaver’s 58
end, though the beaver does not recognize the dam as an end. How could it? Insofar as the 
beaver is the archē of the dam, however, to just that extent is it related to the dam precisely as a 
telos. But again, this conceptual possibility will go missing if one understands the corresponding 
terms in excessively abstract ways, where the connections between them go missing.  59
3.7 CAUSES AND ANALOGICAL TERMS 
 Before moving on to to hou heneka, and the distinctive relations involved in that 
understanding of the telos, I want to offer just one final reason for thinking that the archē kai 
telos tēs kinēseōs are co-constitutive, quite apart from Aristotle’s statement that they are, 
mentioned above. In Meta. Θ, when discussing the nature of ‘potency’ (dunamis), Aristotle 
expressly counsels us not to look for a definition and says we should sometimes be content to 
 It is worth repeating the claim made by Ockham and which we saw earlier: “In another way, the end or 58
the final cause is taken as that which follows from the operation of another according to the common 
course of nature, if not impeded—following just as if it were foreknown or desired by an agent. It is in 
this way that an end is found in things without souls, even supposing that they were directed or moved by 
no cognitive being. This is how the Philosopher speaks about final causality, toward the end of Physics II” 
(Summula II.6), ed. Brown. I think Ockham is quite correct in this, especially if we take the ‘common 
course’ of nature to be articulated in terms of generics. But I deny that this is an ‘improper’ way to think 
about final causes, for this can be a very important point to make, depending on one’s opponents, and 
Aristotle was in fact concerned to make it.
 It is worth noting that the expression ‘telos hē telos’ or ‘qua telos’ never seems to occur in Aristotle, and 59
so one might wonder to what extent the insistence on this locution, which perhaps captures the distinction 
between mere terminus and genuine final cause, is an artifact of other assumptions and problems not 
shared by Aristotle. 
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grasp things by analogy (Meta. Θ. 6; 1048a36-1048b1). He then proceeds to give such an 
analogy: 
as that which is building to that which is capable of building, so is that 
which is the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which 
has its eyes shut but has sight....Let the term ‘actuality’ be defined by one 
member of this antithesis, and ‘potency’ by the other (1048b1-7). 
The content of the term ‘potency’ is thus given by this proportion and, indeed, seems to name 
one of the positions in the proportion: “let ‘potency’ be defined by one member….” That is, the 
term is grasped by constructing a proportion of the kind, ‘as A is to B, so C is to D,’ where each 
of the terms in the proportion is not itself grasped by proportion. The content of an analogical 
term is given by an analogy whose places are filled in by non-analogical terms, and in that sense 
one can say that the notion is essentially a comparative one, without any content of its own. 
Indeed, as the example makes clear, the terms supplied need not have any real relation with one 
another—that which is capable of seeing and that which is capable of building do not fall under 
any common genus, so described. To be sure, the things so compared really are analogous, but 
there is nothing that they actually have in common, and in that sense, the term ‘potency’ refers to 
nothing in particular save the relation or position in a certain relation which widely disparate or, 
more precisely, incommensurable things can occupy.    
 Other terms which Aristotle expressly describes as analogical are ‘form’ and ‘source of 
motion.’ In Meta. Λ, he says the causes and principles of different things are different, in a sense, 
but in another sense the same (1070a32-33). In particular, they are the same if one speaks 
‘universally and analogically.’ The reason he gives, couched in an example, is precisely the 
reason just mentioned: the elements of, e.g., substances and relations can only be the same 
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analogically because ‘there is nothing common’ between them. Aristotle will also speak of the 
‘elements’ of things, and this term too has rather broad application, used to refer not just to 
concrete things like air, but also ‘form’:  
all things have not the same elements, but analogically they have; i.e. one 
might say that there are three principles—form, privation, and matter.  But 
each of these is different for each class [genus] (1070b17-20). 
  
In one sense, then, we can say that all things have the same elements—form, privation, and 
matter—but in so doing, we are again not referring to anything in particular or even to any 
particular sort of thing. We are perhaps at best saying that the elements of all things can be fitted 
into a certain schema, since, if what was said about ‘potency’ is right, the content of the terms in 
question will be derived entirely from the construction of a proportion, where the terms name 
different places in that proportion and the values supplied for them have no real or independent 
connection with one other. Like ‘potency,’ the contents of the terms are largely derived from the 
contents of other, non-analogical terms and arise from a comparison of the latter.  
 What then of the telos? The discussion of analogical terms in Λ.4 is peculiar because it 
does not specifically mention the telos or final cause, but only the efficient cause and the three 
elements named above—form, matter, and privation. He says, e.g. ‘health, disease, body [are the 
elements], the moving cause is the medical art; form, disorder of some particular kind, bricks 
[are the elements], the moving cause is the building art’ (1070b29-28). There is, however, every 
reason to suppose that the telos is to be included among the analogical terms as well. First, 
Aristotle very frequently identifies the telos and the form, which is, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, that towards which (eis ti) a motion proceeds. Second, we might surmise that it would 
require an analogical sense on the same grounds that the other terms do: ‘telos’ has such wide 
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application that nothing common will be shared by all the things to which it is applied, and so 
there will be no genus to cover them all—no definition will be possible. Third, Aristotle does say 
quite explicitly that the causes are spoken of analogically, and so because the telos is a cause, the 
telos will be spoken of analogically. But if that is true, we need then to know what that analogy 
would look like. If you'll recall, ‘potency’ designated one place in the proportion giving it its 
sense, ‘actuality’ the other. One cannot construct the proportion elucidating the meaning of 
potency without simultaneously doing so for actuality, for constructing the proportion giving 
sense to the one term is at the same time to construct the proportion giving sense to the other. As 
a result, if telos is an analogical term whose content is given by an analogy, like potency, where 
‘telos' designates one of the positions in that analogy, we can ask, ‘what designates the other 
position?’ In the case of potency, the answer is actuality, and in the case of form, matter. In the 
case of the telos, it seems that the answer is the efficient cause: the archē. If we look at the 
examples given above, we can see that the forms specified are precisely the telē of their 
respective moving causes, i.e. medicine and the art of building. That is, the proportion one 
constructs in order to exhibit the telos is the following: as health is to the doctor, so the house is 
to the builder. The other term in the proportion is the efficient cause. They name complementary 
positions in the proportion that gives each its sense. If that is true, then in explaining the concept 
of the efficient cause, one will necessarily employ the concept of the final cause (and vice versa), 
at least for Aristotle. This may be surprising if, again, one understands telos primarily as ‘goal,’ 
or the efficient cause as that which is primarily ‘productive’ in some sense, but it is only to be 
expected if one understands the efficient and final causes as, again, the archai and telē of motion, 
in the most concrete senses of those terms. That ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ should be co-dependent in 
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sense is no surprise, but all of this will be simply mysterious if one insists on talking about 
efficient causes and goals, neglecting the concrete terms in which Aristotle generally describes 
them.    60
3.8 TO HOU HENEKA 
 On the view articulated, what makes the difference between whether or not something 
happens for an end depends on whether or not it comes from a non-accidental efficient cause or 
archē of motion. This much has been articulated elsewhere. ‘Chance’ in Aristotle is understood 
in terms of the accidental and the apeiron, and so has no necessary connection to motion. At 
issue generally is the intrinsic or essential relation between things or terms, e.g. that from which 
and to which motion occurs in Phys. I.5, or the relation between form and matter in DA II.2. In 
opposing chance in Phys. II.8, then, our question should be about the things or terms which 
Aristotle takes to stand in essential relation to each other. Those things are the archai and telē of 
motion. At the conceptual level, they are intrinsically related as opposites (antikeimena). But 
thinking of nature concretely and scientifically in terms of them means that not just any telos can 
belong to just any archē, just as thinking about nature in terms of enantia concretely and 
scientifically means not just any opposite can come from just any opposite, e.g. the pale from the 
 One might think that the allegedly co-constitutive character of the two concepts is merely an artifice of 60
the way the proportions have been set up. Surely something other than the efficient cause could occupy 
the corresponding place in the proportion. Filling the corresponding place with anything else, however, 
would mean that the place we are trying to fix with the telos becomes something else. Health/doctor is 
final/efficient, but health/sickness is form/privation. It is not unlike the fact that the quarter/quadruple is 
exhibited by 2:8::3:12, but the half/double is 4:8::6:12. Keeping the values fixed for one place but 
changing the others is to change both concepts exhibited.
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ignorant. Even if we appreciate the general conceptual point, failing to apply it in the concrete 
case threatens to undermine natural inquiry, for one then risks drowning in the apeiron. Thus, the 
interminable oscillation so often present in discussions of final causality and its relation to 
efficient causality simply does not exist for Aristotle.    
 Nonetheless, we might still wonder how ‘purposiveness’ gets into the picture. One might 
concede a thin or deflationary notion of the telos according to which (i) it is the limit of motion 
and the form towards which motion proceeds; (ii) it is that in virtue of which a motion has its 
formal unity or specific identity; (iii) it figures only in coming-to-be, not passing-away; (iv) it is 
that to which the efficient cause is essentially related, and then precisely as a telos; one might 
concede all the above and yet insist that this constitutes an essentially different notion than that 
notion truly animating Aristotle’s ‘teleology,’ namely to hou heneka, ‘the that for the sake of 
which.’ It is the telos in this latter sense which approximates ‘goal,’ and is essentially distinct 
from that which has been discussed hitherto.  It is this latter notion that still needs to be 61
accounted for, since for all that has been said, one might still think that the relations between the 
archē and telos, how we get from here to there, are to be accounted for merely in terms of a 
series of blind material interactions or some sort of ‘mechanism.’  That is to say, one can still 62
ask about the possibility of a ‘chain’ of material necessity beginning with the arche and ending 
with the telos. 
 Though it is worth noting that if Aristotle never uses skopos in the natural philosophical works or (in 61
any relevant discussion) in the Metaphysics, then a fortiori he never glosses to hou heneka with skopos in 
those works either.
 On the basis of the foregoing, however, even this possibility should be seriously in doubt. If the series 62
of interactions is not essentially related to some archē, then it will be a matter of chance that the telos 
results. But if so related, the series will to that extent be intrinsically related to the telos as such.
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 Though the above question is perhaps legitimate, there is nonetheless good reason to 
think, on the basis of what has been said, that purposiveness or telos in the sense of to hou 
heneka now comes rather cheaply, since Aristotle very often seems simply to understand to hou 
heneka in terms of the telos. Thus, in Phys. II.2, he says that ‘in any case of continuous change 
which comes to a telos, this concluding point is also to hou heneka’ (194a28-29).  In Phys. II.8 63
he says that ‘whenever there is a telos, the earlier sequence of things is done for the sake of 
this’ (199a9-9), and in De Partibus I.1, he says that ‘we say “this is for the sake of that” 
whenever there appears to be some telos towards which the change proceeds if nothing impedes 
it’ (641b24-25). As a simple matter of fact, then, I think that the above does license us to suppose 
that purposiveness enters the picture automatically once we have secured the place of the telos, 
for all three remarks give us a sufficient condition for inferring purposive relations: in any 
motion proceeding to a telos (no doubt from an intrinsic archē), what comes before is for the 
sake of the the telos. One might still object, however, that the sense of telos deployed here is not 
that of limit, but that of ‘goal’ or ‘aim,’ and thus that it is wrong to assimilate the telos here to all 
those other instances of telos which we have seen thus far, instances in which it means primarily 
‘limit’. Making this distinction between telos as peras and telos as goal or skopos (which, again, 
occurs exactly nowhere in any of Aristotle’s natural philosophic works) will be a tempting one, 
perhaps because of a lingering sense that the notion of limit could hardly do all theoretical work 
necessary, to say nothing of the habit of understanding telos as ‘goal.’ It is, however, difficult to 
maintain in light of the texts, for Aristotle in a number of places assimilates the telos as limit and 
telos as that-for-the-sake-of-which. In De Motu, for example, he says that ‘all animals both 
 Of course, death is not a telos, for reasons given in the previous chapter. Only good things will be telē, 63
i.e. only actualities and forms.
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impart movement and are moved for the sake of something, so that this is the limit (peras) of 
their movement, the thing for the sake of which’ (to hou heneka) (DM 6).  More compelling 64
still, however, is a lengthy remark in Meta. α.2: 
Moreover, that for the sake of which (to hou heneka) is an end (telos), and as such 
it does not exist for the sake of something else but others exist for its sake. Thus, 
if there is to be such one which is last (eschaton), the process will not be infinite 
(apeiron); but if there is no such [i.e. no last—eschaton], there will be no that for 
the sake of which (to hou heneka). But those who introduce the unlimited 
(apeiron) are unaware of the fact that they are eliminating the nature of the good, 
although no one would try to do anything if he did not intend to come to a limit 
(peras). Nor would there be intellect in the world; for, at any rate, he who has an 
intellect always acts for the sake of something, and this is a limit (peras), for the 
end (telos) is a limit (994b9-16). 
Aristotle here seems to have in mind principally action, but even in this case he is quite clear that 
to hou heneka of which he speaks is a peras and telos, which terms are adduced, as they so often 
are, both in Aristotle and in philosophic tradition prior to him, to ward off the specter of the 
apeiron, quite independently of any connection to ‘purposiveness.’ They should, for that reason, 
be taken in the very concrete senses to which I should hope we are by now becoming 
accustomed. But it should be clear that it is this very sense that is also to hou heneka. 
3.9 FUNCTIONS AND GENERICS 
It was customary among the scholastics to distinguish between the finis generationis and 
the finis rei genitae, i.e. the end of generation and the end of the thing generated.  The account 65
 Cf. also Meta. Δ. 17.64
 Cf. Des Chenes (2000), ch. 6; Thomas, Comm. Physica. Liber II, lectio 11.65
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offered thus far plausibly makes most sense of, and perhaps only applies to, the end of generation 
or motion: telos as the limit of coming to be. Nothing has been said of the end of the thing 
generated, and it is this sense of end that best captures the idea of a thing’s function.  One could 66
perhaps claim that the parts of a process are for the sake of the end of that process, without 
supposing that the parts of the final product were themselves for the sake of anything. One might 
think, in other words, that some further story needs to be told about the parts of the product of 
the process, since making sense of functions, the idea goes, is importantly different from making 
sense of the telos-directedness of actions or behaviors. This would still be the case even if, as 
Wright has argued, the accounts of functions and telos-directed motions are nonetheless quite 
similar.  Thus, even if we can understand (i) how the liver is the end of a particular process of 67
generation, we need to know more about (ii) the liver itself and the role it performs in the life of 
the organism, and (iii) the relation between the first and the second, for part of the dispute 
between Aristotle and his predecessors touched on precisely this. The view Aristotle ascribes to 
his opponents in II.8 can look like a proto-evolutionary view, according to which parts or 
features and conglomerations of them come to be and, mirabile visu, turn out to be useful for 
their possessors: ‘every part turned out to be just as it would have been if it had had some 
purpose [and] the creatures survived because, spontaneously, they happened to be put together in 
 Indeed, Gotthelf (2012), 43, even says that ‘Aristotle’s notion of what something is for the sake of is 66
pretty much equivalent to our notion of the function of something.’
 Wright (1976) speaks of the ‘enormous parallel that obtains between goals and functions’ (81), and 67
naturally his account of the two reflects this. Wright says of ‘goal’ directed behavior that ‘S does B for the 
sake of G iff (i) B tends to bring about G; (ii) B occurs because (i.e. is brought about by the fact that) it 
tends to bring about G.’ Of functions, he says ‘the function of X is Z iff: (i) Z is a consequence (result) of 
X’s being there; (ii) X is there because it does (results in) Z.’  
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a useful way’ (Phys. II.8; 198b26-30).  Those creatures not fortunate enough to develop useful 68
parts or harmonious collections of them perished. A similar thought is expressed in De Partibus, 
for there Aristotle describes a view of Empedocles according to which the spine is as it is 
because in the process of generation it happens to break as a result of twisting. It is a distinct 
fact, unrelated to the one just described, that the spine, now ‘broken,’ is actually quite beneficial 
to its possessor, for it can consequently bend and move in ways it would not have been able to 
otherwise.The difficulty then is one of explaining in what sense the parts of animals can be said 
to have functions, and what role those functions have in the generation of said parts. We need, in 
other words, to know why the items that come to be do not merely happen to be useful for 
various purposes, but that the purposes they serve are in fact their functions, and that they come 
to be for the sake of these.  
 Now, it has been argued by Allan Gotthelf that a thing only has a function or purpose if it 
came to be for that function. In other words, being-for-the-sake-of is dependent on coming-to-be-
for-the-sake-of. A spine, for example, is only for the sake of bending and compressing if it 
resulted from an irreducible potential directed on it. If, by contrast, something comes to be by a 
sum of material interactions, then whatever function the thing serves is not actually its function 
in the strict sense, for a thing’s function or purpose is supposed to explain its presence, and ex 
hypothesi, the presence of the thing in question is explained by the sum of material or elemental 
interactions, indifferent to the utility of what is produced. This has struck others as getting things 
 This is more or less Kant’s view: ‘So far as experience is concerned, there is no further knowledge than 68
what Epicurus granted it, namely that after Nature had formed eyes and ears, we use them for seeing and 
hearing, though that does not prove that the cause producing them must itself have had the intention of 
forming this structure in accordance with the purpose in question; for this we cannot perceive, but can 
only introduce by reasoning, in order merely to recognize a purposiveness in such objects’ (P 20: 293-4). 
This will be discussed in chapter 5.
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the wrong way around, for they take it to be characteristic of Aristotle that being, whether for-
the-sake-of or otherwise, is always prior to coming-to-be, and so we should understand a thing’s 
coming to be for the sake of something in terms of its being for the sake of that something.  But 69
for Gotthelf, the claim that something has a function only if it came to be for that function is 
intended to capture the distinction between genuine function and merely fortuitous utility. That 
is, of all the things that a given part might do, like make thumping noises in the chest, the 
genuine function of pumping blood is grounded in the fact that the heart came to be for that 
reason, and not to make thumping noises. This thought corresponds to the second clause in 
Wright’s account of functions, discussed above, and Gotthelf himself says as much.  Knowledge 70
to the effect that a thing in fact has a function depends on knowledge of its causal history, and if 
that causal history makes no reference to the product’s function, then it cannot be said that that 
product came to be because of what it does. The thing’s function will not, in that case, be causal 
or explanatory. An irreducible potential for form having the end as its intentional object is 
therefore necessary if the thing is to have a function. 
 Gotthelf’s account will be problematic for anyone who finds the potential for form 
mysterious, as was discussed above. But more importantly, because he is generally concerned 
with the conditions under which a function might be attributed to an individual, his account is 
also unacceptably nominalist, and this is a feature it shares with some portion of the 
contemporary literature on teleology. At the end of a postscript to his original essay, and after 
 Cf. e.g. Charles (2012).69
 Gotthelf (2012), 43. Cf. also Wright (1976), ch 3: ‘The etiological condition is what distinguishes 70
consequences that are functions from those that are not. The function of X is that particular consequence 
of its being where it is which explains why it is there.’
!115
drawing a parallel to the standard etiological account of function, Gotthelf says that ‘Since only 
individuals can come to be, the thesis defended in this section [‘a part, A, is for the sake of doing 
something, B, if, and only if, A in fact does B, and has come to be for the sake of doing B’] 
makes the individual prior to the species for purposes of explanation.’  Gotthelf’s remark 71
suggests that claims about the species kind are true in virtue of prior claims about individuals, 
which alone come to be. Indeed, the conditions he gives cannot be applied to anything taken 
generically, e.g., the liver, because the liver taken generically, as Gotthelf notes, does not come to 
be, and so the conditions pertain only to whether or not this liver might be said to have a 
function.  Indeed, note the tense of the second condition Gotthelf gives: ‘has come to be.’ It 72
must therefore be individuals to which it applies, since only individuals can be said to have come 
to be, except perhaps in the context of evolution.  Consequently, one could only ground a 73
general claim, e.g. ‘the liver is for processing blood’ on the fact that the criteria for the attribution 
of a function to an individual are met by the instances of that kind, at least in Aristotle’s world. 
But if one thinks that, for Aristotle, explanation always proceeds through the universal or 
essence, then while it may very well be the case that we apprehend the universal only through 
rigorous studies of individuals, in which case the individuals can be said to have a certain 
epistemic priority, it is nonetheless also the case that the general form and essence of the thing 
 Gotthelf (2012), 44.71
 Of course, there is a sense in which the liver, taken generically, comes to be, for it belongs to the class 72
of things that are generated, as opposed to, say, the heavenly bodies.
 This qualification is important, but again is only supposed to flag the fact that, plausibly, on an 73
evolutionary view, the kinds come to be. The form of purposive explanation would still remain the same.
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has a metaphysical priority in virtue of which the individual is said to possess the features that it 
does.   74
 It is in this sense that Gotthelf's account may be called nominalist, and it is this focus on 
the conditions for attributing functions to individuals that distinguishes a great deal of the 
contemporary literature on teleology, for contemporary accounts of purpose or function are 
frequently tested against intuitions about whether, e.g., Davidson’s Swampman or some variant 
thereof would possess biological functions.  Some will take it as a feature, others a bug, that the 75
standard etiological account of function entails that Swampman has no functional parts or 
organs, because he/it simply hasn’t the right etiological story to have functions. Similarly, others 
have imagined a scenario in which a stick, floating down a river, gets caught among some rocks 
and creates a backwash keeping the stick in place. In this scenario, it is thought, the stick should 
have the function of creating a backwash, because it meets the conditions set out by the standard 
etiological account, and yet most of us, it is thought, would not be willing to ascribe the stick a 
function. Aristotle’s concern, however, is not whether or not Swampman would have functions 
and why (or why not), for this is just an instance of that concern which Code and Moravscik 
(1992) have rightly denied was Aristotle’s: ‘what is needed, in addition to the physical, in order 
to generate biological and psychological phenomena?’ The answer, it is said, is a certain kind of 
efficient causal history, but whatever the extra condition might be, the preoccupation with such 
cases indicates that the criterion of adequacy for an account of function is how well they do or do 
 APo. I.24; 86a4-10; Meta. Γ. 5; Z.1074
 E.g. Perlman (2004), Lewens (2007), Cameron (2003), Millikan (1984). Cf. Davidson (1987) for the 75
original example, though something like it is presented by Boorse (1976) as a criticism of Wright’s 
account of functions. 
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not conform to what we might say about individual cases, and this is tested by imagining 
scenarios that could hardly be said to occur customarily, or to describe how things happen by and 
large. On Gotthelf’s account, supposing a token spine came to be by a sum of elemental 
interactions, its function would not explain why, in this case, it was there and so it would not 
actually have the function of bending and compressing. It would at best function as a spine and 
its possession of the features necessary for doing what a spine does would be merely fortuitous. 
In the absence of the appropriate history, any given item is merely ‘good for’ x but not simply 
‘for the sake of x.’  
 Wright says that this distinction, i.e. between being ‘for’ and merely ‘good for’ is ‘often 
ingeniously marked by ‘function as,’’ and the second condition in the standard account—the 
etiological condition—is supposed to distinguish between these, as we noted above.  But 76
lurking in the distinction itself is an important conceptual truth, not unlike that noticed by Sellars 
between ‘is’ and ‘looks’ talk. Sellars suggested in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind that 
the language of ‘looks φ’ is derivative of ‘is φ’, in the sense that one cannot engage in the former 
unless one has already grasped how to use the latter.  Similarly, ‘function as’ is derivative of 77
straightforward function talk. One can certainly talk of something functioning as a bookshelf or 
paperweight, but this depends on the prior understanding of what it is to be a bookshelf and so 
for something to do what it is that bookshelves characteristically do. More generally, such talk 
depends on a background of things unproblematically taken to function in certain ways, and so in 
a world without functions, nothing even functions as anything else. In other words, ‘function as 
 Wright (1976), 78-79.76
 Sellars (1956),  §3.77
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x’ depends upon a prior stock of ‘whats’ and what they usually do, i.e. the roles they typically 
serve or their characteristic activities, and these can be articulated in terms of generics. In fact, it 
has been insufficiently appreciated that the progenitor of the standard etiological account makes 
just this point.  Wright counsels ‘grammatical caution’ in understanding the account he offers, 78
for that account possesses a ‘misleading grammatical feature.’  In particular, Wright thinks one 79
will go wrong in supposing that the account of function he gives applies in the first instance to 
individuals. Thus, he says: 
 when we say ‘the spider (or, a spider) possesses the ability to spin a web because 
that allows it to catch food,’ ‘the’ and ‘a’ are seldom used to refer to a specific 
individual, and ‘that’ never does. ‘The spider’ is usually equivalent to 
‘spiders’ (like, ‘the American farmer’) and ‘that’ invariably refers to a property 
(e.g., an ability or propensity) of a certain type of thing, and logically cannot be 
limited to a specific instance of the type…So in the standard formulation, ‘X is 
there because it does Z,’ it is important to recognize that there is a sense in which 
X may refer to a specific instance, but Z may not.  80
The use of the definite or indefinite article is not generally intended to refer to an individual 
(though it may), but to a kind, for at least in the case of natural things, functions are generally 
ascribed to kinds, and to individuals in virtue of the kinds to which they belong.  This, it seems, 81
is what in part distinguishes natural from artificial functions, for Wright asserts that the 
conscious choice of an individual can ‘baptize’ a thing with a function, as it were.  In such a 82
 If teleological and functional claims in Aristotle are understood as generics, as I think they should be, 78
then the account will be quite harmonious with the account Allen gives of chance, discussed above (fn. 
47).
 Wright (1976), 87.79
 Ibid, 88.80
 There may, in certain strange cases, be some difficulty in determining whether or not a individual 81
belongs to a certain kind, but that is another matter.
 Wright (1976): ‘I think this is the major structural difference between conscious and natural functions, 82
and it is on this consideration that any talk of a difference in kind between the two must rest’ (89).
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case, an agent chooses one consequence of a thing among others as the essential one, whereas in 
the natural case if some consequence is to be responsible for a thing’s presence, that fact is 
determined by natural selection, which takes generations.   83
 This distinction between natural and artificial functions will go unnoticed if one focuses 
only on Wright’s schematic account of functions, common to both, according to which, as we 
have seen, ‘the function of X is Z iff: (i) Z is a consequence (result) of X’s being there; (ii) X is 
there because it does (results in) Z.’  And, indeed, the ‘grammatical’ distinction that Wright 84
called attention to has gone unnoticed, and so the primacy of the generic claim in function 
ascriptions has been neglected. But it is in precisely these terms, I propose, that we are to 
understand Aristotle’s teleology. To the extent that Aristotle is concerned to defend the place of 
teleology in nature, he is not concerned with the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
attributing a function to an individual, but the necessity of such generic functional descriptions in 
understanding natural phenomena quite generally. This necessity will become clear only when 
we understand the ‘form’ of such descriptions, and attempting to articulate that form is a quite 
different project from articulating necessary and sufficient conditions for ascribing a function to 
an individual. One might of course think that an account of function will involve criteria by 
which to distinguish between what things are for, as opposed to what they are merely ‘good for,’ 
and this is the role of natural selection in the standard account. But as Bolton argues, Aristotle 
very often (which is not to say always) takes the functions as given and attempts to explain why 
we are, in general, licensed to understand nature in terms of them, not to give a rule or rules for 
 Wright (1976), 89.83
 Note that, unlike Gotthelf’s, Wright’s second condition uses the present.84
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determining which if any among the given consequences of a thing is its function.  In other 85
words, Aristotle is not concerned to give us a criterion which might tell us which are the true 
generics, or how to apply the distinction, but to insist on the indispensability of the distinction 
itself and its use in natural philosophy. 
3.10 ‘WHY IS IT THERE?’ 
 On the standard account, y is the function of x only if x is there because it does y. At least 
in its original formulation by Wright, the possessor of the function is most often (at least in the 
case of natural functions) a generic subject, and the claim itself a generic in the linguistic sense. 
Wright, however, thinks that ‘establishing a functional explanation…indicates the presence of a 
selection background of some kind,’ and natural selection is to play just such a role in the case of 
natural functions.  So even if Wright thinks the natural function ascriptions in which we are 86
principally interested are generic claims, he thinks that they are underwritten by natural selection 
because functions themselves depend on some background of selection. That the heart is for 
pumping blood and not making thumping noises in the chest is something ‘decided’ by 
evolution. On the standard account, then, selection, whether natural or conscious, is supposed to 
explain why a given feature ‘is there,’ for selection determines which among the many 
consequences of a thing is its function, and it is, on the standard account, part of the nature of a 
 Bolton (2015), 142.85
 Wright (1976), 91. Cf. also his claim that ‘just as conscious functions provide a consequence-etiology 86
by virtue of conscious selection, natural functions provide the very same sort of etiology as a result of 
natural selection’ (84).
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function that it explain a thing’s presence, i.e. why it is there. Selection, in other words, 
determines what is a genuine as opposed to accidental function. As we have seen, however, this 
means that functions are explained by antecedent causal factors, most importantly past 
reproductive success in the natural case. That is, that consequence for the sake of which a feature 
is present is only explanatory because there are antecedent causes bringing about just this feature 
and selecting for just this consequence of that feature. For this reason, the account has often been 
thought to be reductionist. Gotthelf escapes this objection, if he does, only by endowing the 
efficient causal potential with a certain intentional object, namely the end. This will be 
satisfactory only for those who think good sense can be made of intentionality in non-sentient 
things, and indeed one of the principal critics of the standard etiological account has argued that 
the consequence of a feature can only be explanatory for things that come to be by art, i.e. in just 
those things that are products of forethought or design. In all other cases, the explanation of a 
thing’s presence or why it is there is due to antecedent, i.e. efficient, causes.  87
  It has, however, been denied that an account of function even needs to capture what the 
second clause in the standard etiological account attempts to capture, namely an explanation of 
why a certain part or feature is present. Robert Cummins, most notably, has denied the need for 
such an account and, as I noted, has suggested that an account insisting on the point will apply 
only to cases of intentional design. He argues that we should instead understand a thing’s 
function merely in terms of its causal contribution to the exercise of a certain capacity. Most 
often, this is understood mereologically, where the function of a part in a system is the causal 
 Cummins (1975). Cummins argues that natural selection cannot do the work that Wright wants it to do, 87
because it depends on a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. In any case, selection is no part of 
Aristotle’s theory, and so the account of ‘why something is there’ must be explained in other ways, if it 
needs to be explained at all.
!122
contribution to the exercise of the capacity of the containing system. Commentators have tended 
to attribute to Aristotle some form of the standard etiological account, and this is unsurprising, at 
least insofar as many have charged that Cummins’ account is in fact an eliminativist view of 
functions.  Buller (1999), for example, says that ‘Cummin's analysis of the concept of function 88
makes the function of an item merely its causal contribution to a complex analysis. While this 
certainly succeeds in avoiding appeals to anything other than efficient causation, it does so at the 
cost of emptying the concept of function of all its teleological content.’ Walsh (2008) describes 
Cummins’ as the ‘anti-teleological’ approach to functions and Pavlopoulos thinks Aristotle’s 
approach exactly the opposite of Cummins’, because, he says, Cummins ‘reduces functional 
explanations to part whole relations, whereas in his scientific practice, Aristotle very frequently 
explains the constitution of living beings by what we would call their function.’   89
 Commentators have therefore generally avoided Cummins’ account of functions because 
they think it eliminates functions in all but name, and that is surely a weighty objection. A given 
whole and its activity are explained in terms of the contribution of its parts, and this seems like 
the wrong way around, at least as far as Aristotle is concerned. We want rather for the parts and 
 Cf. e.g. Cameron (2004), Bigelow and Pargetter (1987), Buller (1999). Nussbaum (1978) is, as far as I 88
know, the only one to think Aristotle’s account of function is most similar to Cummins’. She thinks 
Aristotle’s question was something more like ‘How does x work?’ rather than ‘How did x get there?’
 Pavlopoulos (2003). The truth of the claim that Cummins’ account is ‘anti-teleological’ depends of 89
course a great deal on the definition of ‘teleological,’ for it has been argued that, in the 18th century, 
‘teleology’ was concerned precisely with the interrelationship among parts in an organic whole, i.e. the 
interdependence exhibited by parts in certain organic systems and their contributions to the maintenance 
of the whole. On this, cf. Toepfer (2011), who briefly distinguishes the mereological concerns of Kant and 
his contemporaries from Aristotle’s concern with the dispositions of things to achieve certain goals. 
Aristotle’s teleology, he says, centers around the model of an agent who uses tools. This is true, in a way, 
but the mereological aspect is, as we shall see, essential. In addition, Kant himself describes the parts of a 
natural end as tools, and so his account is not merely mereological. Kreines (2007) argues that Kant’s 
account of teleology, though couched largely in the language of wholes and parts, is not Cummins’ 
because Cummins’ is ‘non-teleological’ in the sense that a thing’s function does not explain its presence. 
This will be addressed in the following chapters.
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their presence to be explained by their contribution to the whole and its activity, or for that for 
the sake of which a part is present to explain its presence. Livers and teeth there are, to be sure, 
but on Cummins’ view they have no ‘functions’ in the sense that most seem to demand because 
their presence is not explained by their consequences. Perhaps they play certain characteristic 
roles in the lives of their possessors, even customarily or by and large, but these roles are not 
their ‘functions’ in the traditional sense, i.e. that for the sake of which they are there. Even so, 
and if we continue to speak in terms of generics, we can say that these parts have or perform 
certain characteristic activities, or have roles in a complex activity characteristic or typical of 
them. Such a suggestion would go beyond Cummins’ account only insofar as it claims that 
certain activities belong essentially to certain parts on the basis of the ordinary course of nature. 
But again, this need not mean anything more than that there are true generics to the effect of, e.g. 
‘the liver filters toxins from the blood.’ Claims about purpose have still been studiously avoided. 
The point is just that not any chance part plays any chance role. But if we can admit this we 
might then consider the roles or activities of these parts their erga, their proper work. As I noted 
above, Gotthelf claimed that ‘being for the sake of’ is ‘pretty much’ equivalent to the modern 
notion of function, which he then subtly distinguished from ergon, for he immediately follows 
the remark by saying ‘“is for the sake of’ does more theoretical work in the biology than ergon 
does, though the latter is certainly present.’  In asserting that not just any chance part performs 90
any chance role, then, and indeed in saying that the relationship between part and ergon can be 
an essential one, e.g. between the eye and seeing, nothing has yet been said about the sense in 
which the eye can be said to be ‘for’ seeing. At best, we are permitted only the thought that, e.g., 
 Gotthelf (2012), 43.90
!124
it is with its eyes that the beagle (taken generically) spies a fox, or that the porcupine fends off 
potential predators with its quills.  
3.11 PARTS, TOOLS, AND TA METAXU 
 In the previous sections, I have been discussing some of the common ways of 
understanding functions and how those ways of understanding have been thought to be present or 
absent in Aristotle. I suggested that Aristotle’s account of functions should not be construed as an 
effort to determine when a token of a type has a function, e.g. whether Swampman’s ‘liver’ in 
fact has any function at all. Rather, I suggested that Aristotle was concerned to defend the 
importance of generic function ascriptions in one’s account of nature and natural things. I then 
suggested that there were different ways of understanding precisely what a function was 
supposed to explain, e.g. the role of some part in a larger containing system, or the existence of 
whatever performs that function. But if I am right that Aristotle is interested primarily in generic 
function ascriptions, and only secondarily in individual ascriptions, then it cannot be the point of 
functions to explain why some token came to exist. And neither can it be the point of functions to 
explain why or how a kind came to possess some part, because kinds are neither generated nor 
destroyed. For these reasons, I do not think that Aristotelian functions explain why something ‘is 
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there.’  This leaves unexplained, however, the way in which or the reason why a part or tool can 91
be said to be ‘for the sake of’ whatever it does, and what exactly the function explains. And to 
that I now turn. 
 In De Partibus I.5, Aristotle ascribes to the animal body as a whole a complex or many-
parted activity (polumeros praxis). On this basis, one might provide a Cummins-style account of 
that activity by delineating the different bodily parts which contribute to it. Belonging to each of 
the parts there will be some ergon, i.e. some proper work, and the work it performs will belong 
as a part to the larger, complex activity of the animal or animal body as a whole, very plausibly 
its bios or way of life.  The parts in question are ‘tools’ to the extent that it is with these that the 92
animal does its work, as a bee stings with its abdomen.  And indeed Aristotle is clear that ‘there 93
is need of tools (organōn) for every work (ergasia), and the tools for physical capacities are the 
parts of the body’ (GA I.2; 716a23-25, PA I.5; 645b15-20). These parts are presumably one and 
the same as the parts which he had described earlier in GA as the matter of the animal body (GA 
I.1; 715a9-10). And in GA I.2, just after the remarks quoted above, Aristotle says that because 
animals engage in copulation and reproduction, there must be parts of the body in virtue of 
which they do these things, and that these parts are likely different in the male and female. From 
 To that extent, then, I agree with Nussbaum (1978) that the point is not to explain of a part ‘how it got 91
there.’ It is in that sense that I would deny that Aristotle is interested in the question, ‘why is it there?’ 
There is, however, a way of understanding that question which I think does speak to Aristotle’s interest, 
namely ‘what does it do?’ It seems that often the question ‘why is x there,’ asked of some part of a larger 
system, is looking for no more than ‘what does x do?’ Thus, looking at a particular animal, such as an 
eagle, someone might point to its beak and ask ‘why does it have a sharp beak?,’ by which they mean 
‘why do eagles have sharp beaks?’ And this is just to ask what they typically use them for, or do with 
them.
 Cf. Lennox (2010). 92
 Of course, in Greek organon and ergon have a clear etymological connection. English ‘tool’ is related 93
to a verb, taw, meaning to do, make, or cultivate.
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the particular activity, in other words, he supposes there to be a particular part responsible for it, 
and it is in virtue of this part that the animal is said to be possessed of the corresponding 
capacity. Thus, he says, ‘male’ and ‘female’ do not apply to an animal in respect of the whole, 
‘but only in respect of a particular capacity and part, just as with the visual and ambulatory 
capacities’ (GA I.2; 716a27-32). If from certain fundamental activities it follows that there are 
parts in virtue of which the organism performs its activities, then the activities would explain the 
presence of the parts. Thus, we might plausibly suppose that from a complex or many-parted 
activity it will generally follow that there are a variety of parts each of which contributes to that 
activity. To that extent, the complex activity of an animal explains the character of the body of 
that organism. Parts of a certain sort will be present in an animal because the activities 
corresponding to those parts or tools will belong to whole activity of the animal in question—
they are the parts of its mode or form of life.  
 In the above, ‘for the sake of’ has again been studiously avoided, the point being only 
that quite generally organisms perform certain actions or activities with certain parts of their 
bodies, and that from the performance of an action or activity of a certain type it generally 
follows that there is a part of a certain sort which performs it. Activities must inhere in a subject, 
and not just any thing can do just anything. We might then on this basis attribute Cummins-
functions to a given part according to its role or contribution to the larger activity of the whole, to 
the polumeros praxis. An immediate problem, however, is that the language of tools so 
frequently employed makes a Cummins’ style account of function impossible, for tools require a 
user, and no such agent is to be found in Cummins’ account. More troubling is that the demand 
for a tool-user can seem unpromising for a ‘naturalistic’ account of teleology. Tim Lewens, for 
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example, has said that ‘it is plausible to think that…the external facts which fix the functions of 
tools ultimately depend on intentions, which in turn depend on the goals of agents.’  Aristotle, in 94
his discussion of seed in GA, adverts as he so often does to the example of craft, saying of the 
carpenter that his ‘hands move his tools and his tools move the material; in a similar way to this, 
nature acting in the male of seed-emitting animals uses the seed as a tool’ (GA 730b). Aristotle’s 
discussions are in fact replete with the language of tools, and so some way of understanding such 
language is necessary if we are not to accuse Aristotle of an illicit analogy between craft and 
nature. 
 The solution is implicit in talk of that by which or with which an animal performs a given 
work, for it is easy enough to understand the ‘tools’ and parts as the means by which or with 
which some activity is performed. And this is precisely what Aristotle says. In a passage 
occurring both in the Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle says that  
as many thing as come to be between (metaxu) some mover and the end 
(kinēsantos allou...tou telous), as, e.g. fat-reducing, purging, drugs and 
instruments are causes of health…all these are for the sake of the end (tou telous 
heneka esti), differing in this, that some are tools (organa) and some are activities 
(erga) (Meta. Δ.2, 1013a36-1013b3; Phys. II.3, 194b34-195a3).  
Tools, it would seem, are for the sake of a telos because they stand between (metaxu) the mover 
or archē and the telos. This is then yet another characterization of the ‘for the sake of’ relation, in 
addition to those mentioned at the very beginning of §8. Here it would seem that being ‘between’ 
the beginning and end is enough for something to be ‘for the sake of’ the telos. Of course, it is 
not just any chance thing between the mover and the end that will be for the sake of the end, for 
each of the different crafts employs its particular tools in the service of its particular ends. In 
 Lewens (2007), 527.94
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other words, not just any chance craft can use just any chance tool, not just any chance tool does 
any chance thing, and not any chance craft produces any chance thing. All three—movers, tools, 
and products—depend on each other, and these mutual dependencies are ultimately understood 
in terms of the mutual dependencies between archē, meson, and telos. On the occasion that a tool 
or meson does give rise to some end or telos to which it is not generically or characteristically 
related, then the relation is an accidental one. As we saw above, Aristotle is insistent that not just 
any archē can belong to just any telos (and vice versa), just as he is in Phys. I.5 that not any 
antikeimenon can arise from any antikeimenon, just as he is in DA II.2 that not any form can 
belong to any body. Similarly, certain mesa belong to certain archai and telē, and the parts and 
tools employed are considered the mesa because a tool typically or customarily mediates 
between an agent and its agent’s activity. A hammer mediates between the hammerer and the 
hammering, and a sauté pan mediates between the chef and the sautéeing. To use Aristotle’s oft-
used example, the saw is for the sake of sawing (prisis) and not vice versa, for it could hardly be 
said that the sawing mediates between the user and the saw. Speaking very generally, then, we 
can say that to some agent A there belongs some activity C in virtue of some tool, B. The tool 
will be the meson between the archē and telos, and these, the extreme terms, will belong to or 
hold one of the other in virtue of the meson that connects them. In a very concrete sense, we can 
say that nature for Aristotle consists of means-end relations, for which reason it can be said to 
consist of purposive relations. 
 In the passage quoted above, Aristotle says that as many things as are ‘between’ the 
mover and the end are for the sake of the end. This claim, he suggests, applies equally to tools 
and activities, and it is worth remarking on this equality. A similar thought is articulated in PA I.
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5, for there Aristotle says that ‘if some actions are in fact prior to, and the end of, others, it will 
be the same way with each of the parts whose actions are of this sort’ (645b30-32). The 
suggestion would seem to be that the purposive relations obtaining between parts and the 
activities belonging to them run parallel, for if we see that some activities are for the sake of 
others, we can say as well that the parts performing the former are for the sake of the parts 
performing the latter. Aristotle is quite clear elsewhere that motions have parts. In NE X.4, e.g., 
he talks of the parts of the building of a temple, among which he mentions the fluting of the 
columns, the fitting of the stones together, the fitting of the triglyphs, etc.. Each of these parts, he 
says, is specifically different from the others and incomplete because each is only a part of the 
whole process. Like animals, then, motions are anhomoiomerous. And animal bodies, we might 
say, are anhomoiomerous because their motions are. It is in this sense that the presence of parts 
of the body are necessarily explained by what they are for. 
 If the above is right, then there is no need for an agent with intentions or goals to fix the 
functions of the things employed, as Lewens suggests. A function is ascribed to a sort of thing on 
the basis of how that sort of thing is generally ‘used’ by some archē in relation to some telos, i.e. 
how things go usually or for the most part. In this, the ascription of function goes beyond the 
account articulated by Cummins, because here the primary object of thought and knowledge is 
not the individual, but the form, essence, and universal. But if the function of a certain sort of 
thing, e.g. the liver, just is the role that it characteristically plays in the activity of those 
organisms possessing it, and if it plays that characteristic role—performs that activity—in virtue 
of certain of its characteristic features or parts, it can be no accident that it comes to have in 
generation just the features that it does. That is, if what it is to be a liver is to play a certain role 
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in the life of an organism, and it plays that role in virtue of certain of its features or parts, it can 
be no accident that it should have such parts. The generation of liver just is the generation of 
something with certain characteristic features by which it plays some characteristic role. Without 
them, it could not play the role it customarily does, and so would not be the thing that it is. Its 
coming to be is for the sake of what it does, then, insofar as what comes to be has certain 
characteristic parts in virtue of which it does what it does, which is that in virtue of which it is 
what it is. 
 Furthermore, a thing’s function is not merely the role played by a part in the exercise of a 
systemic capacity, e.g. the life-activity of an animal, as Cummins would have it, for it does 
depend on the archē of motion, the activity of which in turn depends on the activity of its tools. 
For that reason, function ascription does depend on a reference to the efficient cause, as the 
standard etiological account would have it, but the nature of that reference or dependence is very 
different, for the relevant efficient-causal reference in Aristotle’s account of functions does not 
come in reference to the question ‘how did it get there?’, as Nussbaum puts it. Rather, the 
efficient causal dependency is just that of the meson on its archē, for if these terms have the 
concrete meanings which I have argued that they do, then quite naturally the former is defined by 
its reference to the archē as well as the telos For this reason, what a part is for, that for the sake 
of which it is, explains why it ‘is there’ or ‘present’ just to the extent that any meson is 
determined by those things between which (metaxu) it stands. In other words, just as the 
‘efficient cause’ was intrinsically related to or directed upon the telos insofar as it is the archē, so 
also any given any part, to the extent that it is some meson, will necessarily be and be understood 
in relation to the telos.  
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 On the view articulated, then, teleological explanation simply cannot collapse into an 
efficient-causal story, because although functions do depend on efficient causes, the terms in 
which Aristotle understands these—the archē and meson—have an ineliminable dependence on 
the telos. Indeed, in this respect Aristotle’s teleology is mereological from beginning to end, as it 
were, for as we have seen, the archē, meson, and telos were traditionally the parts and limits 
without which nothing could be whole or complete. These latter, as we also saw, come to much 
the same thing, for Aristotle says in the Physics that ‘“whole” and “complete” are either utterly 
identical or very similar in nature, and nothing is complete unless it has an end (telos), and an 
end is a limit (peras)’ (Phys. III.6; 207a12-14). But the presence of an end as limit would not 
have been intelligible without its corresponding archē and meson. These relations are only 
available if, again, one insists on understanding the terms concretely, in accordance with the 
tradition of which Aristotle was a part. The end is not the ‘intentional object’ or ‘goal’ of the 
efficient cause or its tools, but is essentially related to them on the basis of the well-attested 
conceptual connections between archē, meson, and telos. These connections should be no more 
mysterious than that between up and down. If, however, we understand telos as goal and speak of 
the archē simply as the efficient cause, these connections simply vanish, and in their place 
emerge a whole host of problems which would not have otherwise existed. 
 I want to end this section by remarking on a certain consequence of the line of thought 
suggested. The purely conceptual point about the relations between archē, meson, and telos is an 
empty one unless it is made concrete through empirical investigation. I asserted as much when 
considering the archē and telos above, but it remains just as true when we consider the meson. 
The logical point is not meant to supplant the need for empirical investigation, but to give it a 
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certain form, as it were, just as house-builder, doctor, health, and house are given a certain form 
and order in certain proportions, in the sense described in §7 above and by Aristotle in Meta. Λ.
4-5. But it is because of the logical point that one can say that, if one is to know the end (as such) 
then one must also know what is for the end, i.e. the archē and meson, because these three terms 
form a unity or whole. In other words, if motion proceeds continuously towards an end or telos, 
it belongs to that science which studies the telos to know what comes before it, namely the archē 
and meson, for without these, proper knowledge of the telos will go missing. Consequently, a 
‘teleological’ investigation of nature will very simply require an investigation into material and 
efficient causes. Final causes do not take the place of or foreclose the possibility of efficient 
causal investigation, but absolutely demand it. Furthermore, if the parts of the body are taken to 
be the mesa, or the body itself the meson, and soul the archē, and these are non-accidentally 
related to each other, then precisely as such physical or natural things will be ‘teleologically’ 
organized. Natural things and the science which studies them will for that reason exhibit a unity 
not found in, for example, the mixed sciences, because the explanatory principles in question 
exhibit a distinctive co-dependence. Mathematical features can be realized in all different kinds 
of materials, and consequently exhibit an indifference to that in which they are instantiated. The 
relation, that is, between mathematical shape and the matter in which it inheres is an accidental 
one, for which reason the mathematician can safely ignore the qualities and capacities of the 
physical object taking the shape in which he is interested. This is not so for the natural scientist, 
for the natural scientist studies just this form as embodied in just this body capable of motion. 
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3.12 CONCLUSION 
 In the foregoing, I have argued that Aristotle understands efficient causation to be 
essentially correlated with final causation, and that this fact becomes quite apparent if one 
appreciates the terms in which Aristotle understands both concretely, i.e. as the beginning and 
end of motion. This claim was grounded not only on the semantic work of the previous chapter, 
according to which telos meant in the first instance ‘end’ in the sense of ‘limit’ or ‘terminus’, and 
which was just one of a trio of limits with archē and meson, together constituting the necessary 
parts of anything complete and whole, but on Aristotle’s understanding of chance as well. Given 
Aristotle’s other uses of the language of chance, it is clear that in each case he understands 
chance to be an accidental relationship between two terms. Thus, it is by chance that the 
educated comes to be from the pale, as opposed to the uneducated. In the same way, Aristotle’s 
argument in the latter half of Physics II is intended to show that not just any telos can belong to 
just any archē. Rather, they stand in an essential or intrinsic relationship to one another. 
 I argued further that the account on offer can make sense of functional ascriptions to 
organs. Those ascriptions are grounded in what those organs typically do, in ways described by 
generics akin to the claim that ‘hammers hammer nails.’ In this way, they mediate between the 
user and the activity. For that reason, an organ is a meson, and the body itself and its activity is 
the meson between the archē and telos of natural motion, starting from and returning to the same 
in the process of nutrition and generation. For Aristotle, these ascriptions always begin and end 
at the level of generics, and so Aristotle is no way concerned to provide criteria by which to 
determine, for any given token of some type, whether or it not it has some function. In that 
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respect, Aristotle’s concerns are quite different from those occupying most contemporary 
philosophers working on teleology.  
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APPENDIX: TELOS AND PERAS, CAUSE AND EFFECT AFTER ARISTOTLE 
 The account of Aristotle’s teleology that I have offered differs quite profoundly in many 
respects from those that have traditionally been on offer. The problems I have taken Aristotle to 
be addressing, and the meaning of the terms in which he addresses those problems, differ from 
what most commentators have taken them to be. As we have seen, this account is centered on the 
notion of ‘limit’ and the understanding of telos first and foremost as a limit, as an end in a very 
concrete sense. So understood, remarks and associations that had before seemed peripheral, and 
perhaps even at times awkward, to any understanding of Aristotle’s teleology become central, 
e.g. its connection to the unlimited and to the archē, now also understood concretely as 
‘beginning.’ I have steadfastly refused to understand telos to mean anything like ‘goal’ or ‘aim,’ 
and so I do not take Aristotle generally to be concerned to defend the importance of goals or aims 
in natural philosophy. What I have offered, one might say, is a teleology without purposiveness, 
for I have tried to suggest that there is no more interesting or illuminating an account to be 
offered about how the efficient cause is related to the end than there is about how a cause is 
related to its effect. Cause and effect are just a co-dependent pair, as are the archē and telos of 
motion. It makes just as little sense to wonder how telē fit into a world of ‘efficient’ causes—
archai—as it does to wonder how effects fit into a world of causes. But if what I say is true, and 
if Aristotle never actually faces or tries to resolve what we might now consider the standard 
difficulties besetting ‘final causation,’ one might wonder how this was missed for so long. In this 
appendix, I want just to sketch a possible genealogy, as it were, of a specific case of 
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philosophical forgetting: the route by which Aristotle’s conception of teleology was lost and, 
indeed, became almost impossible to see.  
 There are, it seems, three distinct changes that fundamentally altered the problem of 
teleology, giving it a shape much nearer to our own than to Aristotle’s. Two are more nearly 
semantic, constituting either a subtle shift in the meaning of a word, or a simple change in 
preferred vocabulary, while the third consists in a fundamental change in the ordering or 
relations among certain concepts essential to the account of Aristotle’s teleology. In some sense, 
semantic evolution can also amount to such a change in ordering. That said, how best to 
characterize the nature of these changes is less important than the changes themselves, which can 
be designated as follows: 
 (i) from telos to skopos 
 (ii) from archē kai telos to causa efficiens et effectum  
 (iii) from form as limit to form as limited 
 As I noted in the last chapter, the literary and philosophical tradition prior to Aristotle 
attests to an intimate connection between telos and peras from its earliest beginnings and, quite 
naturally, Aristotle’s use of the term was shaped by that association, even if it differed in certain 
important ways. That traditional sense would likely have impressed itself all the more upon 
someone as attuned to common ways of speaking as Aristotle. What we do not see prior to 
Aristotle, however, is any essential relation between telos and skopos. As we have seen, perhaps 
more than any other term, it most nearly approximates our ‘goal’ and therefore designates better 
than any other that concept or phenomenon with which teleology is thought to be concerned. 
Though evidently absent prior to Aristotle, the association between telos and skopos is certainly 
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present after him. It exists in the texts of Aristotle's later commentators, who all speak at some 
point or other—and often frequently—of the telos as a skopos, appearing at times to use them 
interchangeably, even when commenting on Aristotle’s scientific works. As I noted in the 
previous chapter, Aristotle does occasionally bring these terms into close proximity in the 
Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics, not to mention the Politics, but skopos is simply absent in 
his natural philosophic writings, which are, again, much more voluminous than those others, 
which fact makes said absence all the more striking. It would seem then, that later commentators 
came to understand telos to be far more synonymous with skopos than Aristotle himself ever did. 
It is worth considering in this context Thomas’ remark at the beginning of his own commentary 
on Physics II.8:  
[Aristotle] says, therefore, first that it must be pointed out that nature is among the 
number of causes which act for the sake of something. And this is important with 
reference to the problem of providence. For things which do not know the end do 
not tend toward the end unless they are directed by one who does know, as the 
arrow is directed by the archer. Hence if nature acts for an end, it is necessary that 
it be ordered by someone who is intelligent. This is the work of providence. 
The reference to the archer would seem to reveal the by then sedimented understanding of the 
telos as something like a goal or target.  
 Though the above is not, I don’t think, representative of the way in which Aristotle thinks 
about the issue, the thought that ‘end’ should mean something like ‘aim’ is hardly an aberration 
or a peculiarity of the development of a certain line of philosophical thought. As I noted in the 
last chapter, our own English ‘goal’ appears to derive from an original *gol, meaning ‘limit’ or 
‘boundary.’ Certain words for ‘limit’ in English and Greek seem, therefore, to have undergone 
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parallel developments. The conceptual connection is also evident in the German Ziel.  That a 1
goal should be a limit or boundary of a certain sort makes intuitive sense—when I reach my goal, 
my efforts come to an end. Nonetheless, this development seems not to have taken place by 
Aristotle’s time, and Aristotle’s own glosses on telos with the more ancient and traditional peras, 
as opposed to skopos, suggests as much. But once the meaning of telos shifted to something 
more like ‘aim,’ ‘target,’ or ‘goal,’ then its semantic relations to other terms, like ‘apeiron’ or 
unlimited, necessarily shifted as well. If that is right, then the problem of the unlimited and the 
problem of natural ends or telē would become two distinct problems, for ‘goal’ has only a 
tenuous connection, if any, to notions of the unlimited. One could then treat of Aristotle’s 
‘teleology’ without paying much attention to his remarks on the apeiron and its history, and 
relegate his remarks about limit to something of a tangential curiosity. 
 A second important shift in the history of the problem of teleology is naturally the 
language in which the efficient cause is described. As we have seen, the preferred language for 
Aristotle is that of archē of motion, i.e. the beginning or that from which motion proceeds. 
Corresponding to the archē is, as I have argued, the telos. But at some point, this stops being the 
preferred nomenclature and instead we get, at least in the Latin tradition, the language of the 
causa efficiens and its effectum. Thus, when paraphrasing an example found in the text of 
Physics II.2, Thomas says that the sculptor is the causa efficiens of the statue, where Aristotle 
had used archē or ‘beginning’ of motion. Ockham too understood the ‘efficient’ cause in 
productive or effective terms, characterizing it as that which ‘brings something about or does 
 Kluge (2011). This appears not to be the case, however, with Zweck, which of course Kant uses when 1
speaking of ‘ends’ or ‘purposes.’
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something.’  What it brings about is quite naturally the effectum, i.e. ‘the thing done.’ This 2
constitutes an alternative pair of terms or concepts by which to designate or understand the 
‘efficient’ cause and what corresponds to it. To be sure, this pair is not foreign to Aristotle, 
approximating his own to poioun and to poioumenon, the maker and made. But though Aristotle 
is quite familiar with this conceptual pairing, and indeed makes no small use of it, it is not, as we 
noted, his preferred way of understanding the ‘efficient’ cause. Once the favored pair becomes 
causa efficiens and effectum rather than archē and telos, however, the existence of ends or telē in 
nature becomes that much more obscure, for the first pair just is conceptually independent of the 
second. If one also believes that telos means ‘goal’ or ‘aim’, then, if one is an Aristotelian, one 
now has the task of understanding the place of goals or aims in nature, despite having the 
conceptually self-sufficient pair of causa efficiens and effectum ready to hand. One needs, in 
other words, to understand how a causa efficiens could be related to, directed on, or aimed at, a 
telos. And here we have the emergence of one of the characteristic problems of teleology: how is 
a cause related to or directed on something as an end, rather than a mere effectum. That is, even if 
we allow ourselves to consider a given effectum an ‘end’ in some exalted philosophical sense, we 
need now to understand how its cause is related to that effectum as an end. If, however, that 
problem proves insoluble because the conceptual connections that once existed are now lost or 
forgotten, then, rather than persist with the problem, it might be easier to give up on ends in 
nature altogether, making do simply with the causa efficiens and effectum.  
 Cf. also Aquinas’ commentary on Meta. Δ.5, or John Milton’s Ad Petri Rami Methodum Cincinnata, c. 2
4, or his Artis Logicae Plenior Institutio, c. 5. The Greek equivalent of causa efficiens and effectum, aition 
poiētikon and aitiaton, can be found in the ancient commentators. Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, 
uses aition poiētikon in his commentary on Book I of the Metaphysics when Aristotle begins his 
consideration of which and how many of the causes his predecessors had.
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 Finally, and just as importantly, the whole cluster of concepts of form, matter, limit, act, 
and potency, becomes transformed. I have argued that limit was for Aristotle and for his Platonic 
and Pythagorean predecessors a principle of the being and intelligibility of things, set over and 
against the apeiron as a principle of non-being and unintelligibility. Form and telos are both 
limits, and as we now know, Aristotle is quite explicit about this on a variety of occasions. Form 
limits matter, which is in itself unshaped or lacks boundary and limit. Aristotle never wavers 
from these associations. If one reads Thomas, however, one gets a very different idea. In 
particular, one gets the opposite idea, for it becomes an axiom among Thomists, not that form is 
a limit, and that what it limits is matter, but just the opposite: matter or potency limits form or 
act: ‘every act that is finite is limited by a potency receiving it.’  Scotus and Suárez, it seems, 3
deny that form or act is limited by matter, instead attributing such limitation to the efficient 
cause. But whatever the source of its limitation, form is now something requiring limitation, 
rather than something that itself limits. The basic thought seems to have its origin in disputes 
about the principle(s) of individuation, for the problem of individuation was conceived of as the 
problem of the ‘limitation,’ partitioning, or contraction, of the common form.  In other words, the 4
‘limitation’ of form is just a way of talking about the multiplication of form, which becomes 
something like a mass which is carved up into various individuals. So construed, however, the 
relations between form and limit become just the opposite of what they were in Aristotle. 
Furthermore, while it became a generally accepted metaphysical axiom that act or form is limited 
by potency, or requires some principle of limitation, this very axiom comes to be attributed to 
 Wuellner (1956).  Cf. also Feser (2014).3
 Cf. Pickavé (2007), 61.4
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Aristotle. In other words, an axiom which actually inverted Aristotle’s own ordering of these 
concepts—got them, we might say, exactly wrong—was nonetheless thought to be Aristotle’s 
own, and so scholars would remark on or deploy the principle, crediting it to Aristotle, without 
actually citing any passage in his work where such a principle might be thought to be 
enunciated.  So obviously Aristotelian was the principle that no citation need ever be given! 5
 The inversion of these concepts did not come from nowhere and, as it turns out, was not 
itself of scholastic origin. W. Norris Clarke has argued that it originates with certain mystery 
religions in the eastern part of the Roman Empire, and entered philosophy through Plotinus in the 
third century AD. Plotinus’ aim was to incorporate or at the very least accommodate what was 
good or appealing about these religions within the rationalist framework of Platonic metaphysics. 
Plotinus, Clarke argues, had aimed to preserve classical philosophy and Hellenic values from the 
encroachment of strange, new, and foreign religious cults. What this means, however, is that in 
Plotinus’ thought, the apeiron becomes the fecund first principle, the One, which contains all 
perfections in itself and of which everything is but a partial representation. Each ‘finite’ being 
derives its character through a limitation of the unlimited One, the plenitudinous principle which 
is carved up or limited in so many ways, giving us thereby the variety and kinds of beings we see 
around us: 
Forced to invent a new terminology, Plotinus for the first time in western thought 
uses the old Greek word for the infinite, apeiron, to express this radically new 
 Cf. Clarke (1995), ch. 4. Clarke notes that Thomas himself seems nowhere to attribute the principle to 5
Aristotle, and says that the principle appears to be absent from the ancient commentators. Clarke takes the 
limitation of act by potency to be a central Thomistic metaphysical principle, and so focuses principally 
on its history among Thomists, noting nonetheless that it finds acceptance among followers of Suarez as 
well. More important than this particular principle, however, is the felt need among scholastics of all 
stripes to find a limit or principle of limitation for form, in order to resolve the riddle of individuation. 
Regardless of what that principle is, the very formulation of the problem signals a profound 
transformation in some of those concepts that give shape to Aristotle’s teleology.
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content of indetermination as identified with the plenitude of perfection of an 
unparticipated source compared to the limited participations below it.  6
Thus, while the apeiron had before signified precisely what was incomplete or imperfect (ateles), 
it comes to signify just the opposite, that which possesses everything and lacks for nothing. 
Finitude is no longer a source of goodness, proportion, order, and form, but of lack, privation, 
short-coming, and even evil.  7
 Each of the three above mentioned changes would, on their own, make the account of 
Aristotle’s teleology that I have given more difficult to see, and one or the other of them may 
have exercised greater influence at different times, but taken together they have the effect of 
making the nature of Aristotle’s teleology almost impossible to see. Whatever their precise 
origins, the effects of of these changes have been operative for the greater part of the 
philosophical tradition, the transformations in vocabulary and conceptual scheme having receded 
into the background long ago.
 Clarke (1995), 77.6
 Interestingly, Clarke notes that the first school of Christian philosophers—Clement and Origen in 7
Alexandria—remained true to the Platonic tradition, insisting that ‘God’s will and power should not be 
called infinite because they would then be unintelligible even to himself.’ He reports that, to his 
knowledge, the earliest Christian text to consider God infinite dates to approximately 300 AD: ‘Lord of 
all power…who alone without limit puts limits to all.’
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4.0 TELEOLOGY, COMMUNITY, AND NATURAL FORM IN KANT 
 Kant mentions Aristotle in a number of places throughout his corpus, but never when 
discussing teleology. In his discussion of the antinomy of teleological judgment in the third 
Critique, he mentions Democritus and Epicurus, but not Aristotle. The closest we come is a 
reference to ‘the Aristotelian school’ in the unpublished First Introduction to that same work. 
Kant had been discussing the need for a principle of the power of judgment, given the possibility 
of a simply dizzying array of natural forms. The needed principle dictates that nature be thought 
to take the form of a system of laws, of genera and species. This is said to be a logical principle 
for the power of judgment because it makes possible ‘the application of logic to nature’ (EE 
20:212).  But the apparently static, merely logical point about relations between genera and 1
species is articulated in dynamic terms: ‘the genus (considered logically) is as it were the matter, 
or the raw substratum, which nature works up into particular species and subspecies’ (EE 
20:215). Nature, he then says, ‘specifies itself’ into a system, which is as much as to say that 
nature is self-specifying. And it is here that he registers his agreement with the Aristotelian 
school: it too understood the genus to be the matter, the specific difference the form. 
 The dynamic language with which Kant describes the necessity (for us) of a certain 
logical feature of nature—that it take the form of a system of genera and species—anticipates his 
description of natural ends in the latter half of the Critique of Judgment, the Critique of the 
 In one sense, the applicability of logic to nature was secured in the first Critique, which argued that the 1
possibility of experience was underwritten by the role of the logical functions of judgment in structuring 
experience. In the First Introduction, however, the question about the applicability of logic to nature 
pertains to the stability, regularity, and affinity between the individuals that we find there, and therewith 
their susceptibility to be classified into kinds. In a word, though the first Critique argued that our 
understanding structures our experience in ways demanded by its essentially discursive character, it is 
nonetheless the case that nature must do us some favors. The logical principle of the power of judgment 
in the third Critique is just the necessary supposition that nature will in fact do us those favors.
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Teleological Power of Judgment. Natural ends are also described as systems and they too exhibit 
self-activity. They could very well have been called ‘self-systematizing.’ Even though both the 
problem of logical systematicity and teleological judgment have been considered independently, 
few have treated the problems as running parallel to one another, and no one has identified what 
exactly the two problems have in common.  Because, however, the road to metaphysics in Kant’s 2
thought always runs through logic, greater attention to the logical background of his treatment of 
natural ends together with its Aristotelian provenance promises a better understanding of the 
precise nature of the metaphysical problem of natural teleology as Kant understood it.  3
 Notable, recent efforts to treat the Critique of Judgment as a whole are Zammito (1992) and Zuckert 2
(2007), though the two approach the work quite differently. On natural ends and natural systematicity, cf. 
Guyer (2007) and Watkins (2014), though their immediate interests and thus their approaches to the 
connections between them differ from mine.
 And there has, indeed, been disagreement about exactly what problem Kant was even addressing, let 3
alone his solution to it. McFarland (1970) thinks Kant was simply in the grips of an outmoded conception 
of design; McLaughlin (1990) takes the problem to be whole-to-part causality, and says in his later book 
on contemporary functions (2001) that ‘the problem has always been holism’; in a series of influential 
papers, Ginsborg identifies the problem with natural normativity; Teufel (2011) thinks the problem lies in 
the (efficient) causality of concepts; Kreines (2006) in backwards causation; and Zuckert (2007) identifies 
the problem as that of the ‘unity of the diverse.’ Each in their own way hits on something important 
(though I should be least likely to endorse MacFarland’s account), and I believe that what is important 
about each account can be accommodated by the view I lay out. Teufel (2011), it should be noted, denies 
that Kant’s account of purposiveness is teleological at all. Kant, he says, is concerned not with the way in 
which an event or process might be ‘directed on’ some future event or effect, e.g. by being for the sake of 
it, but with the causal lineage something must have if it is to be called an end or purpose. A similar view 
has been attributed to McLaughlin by Zammito (2006) for the reason that, for the former, the problem is 
at root a mereological one, having nothing to do with ‘intentionality’ or ‘directedness’ on something. 
Given the vagaries of the notion, I abstain from judgments about whether or not it is in fact ‘teleological.’ 
I am concerned only with determining what Kant takes natural teleology to be.
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 Progress can be made if we focus on the concept of community (Gemeinschaft), and it is 
this concept which has suffered neglect in the literature on Kant’s natural teleology.  I argue that 4
the structure of something like an oak, which Kant calls a natural end (Naturzweck), can only be 
understood with reference to its common or communal ground (gemeinschaftliche Grund). That 
ground is the activity of nutrition and reproduction, for it is just this activity which is common to 
or shared by all the parts of a natural end. The parts are purposive because they each exercise 
some distinct portion of their otherwise common or communal activity and owe their existence to 
it. What is more, the concept of community on which Kant relies belongs essentially to 
scholastic Aristotelianism. In particular, it belongs to the logical tradition according to which a 
genus was said to be divided into its species, which species were then said to stand ‘in 
community’ with one another under their genus, being common to them all. Kant himself was 
writing within a broadly scholastic tradition, and though his connection to it is frequently 
neglected, attending to that tradition can help to illuminate the terms in which he was thinking 
 Watkins (2011) suggests that Kant’s concept of community has suffered neglect quite generally. His is a 4
contribution to a volume attempting to correct for that neglect, Payne and Thorpe (2011). In the first 
pages of their introduction, the editors identify many of the places in which the concept of community is 
found in Kant’s work, but—tellingly—natural purposiveness goes unmentioned, and no paper in the 
volume addresses it: ‘There are many communities in Kant: the category of community introduced in the 
table of categories of the Critique of Pure Reason, the community of substances in the Third Analogy, the 
realm of ends as an ethical community, the state and the public sphere as political communities, the 
sensus communis of the Critique of Judgment, and the idea of the church as a religious community 
introduced in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.’
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and the problems he was addressing.  Thus, while Kant’s actual references to community in his 5
discussion of natural ends are rare indeed, if we examine more closely some of the other 
language he uses to describe natural ends—in particular, the language of ‘system’—and look to a 
wider historical context, we can see that community is often just below the surface.  By looking 6
to the concept of community in Kant’s discussions of natural ends, we can also better incorporate 
and better appreciate many of the views which have been offered of Kant’s teleology, for they 
often capture a part of what is at stake in the category of community. We can, in other words, 
achieve something of an ecumenical way of understanding Kant’s teleology which not only 
accommodates a number of recent interpretations but also situates it within a broader historical 
context. 
 In the following chapter, therefore, I argue for a unique account of the nature of the 
problem Kant took himself to be addressing in his discussions of natural teleology, deferring to 
the next chapter Kant’s reasons for thinking that teleological judgments can never be made 
strictly scientific, i.e. for thinking, as he says, that ‘we are far from being satisfied with an 
explanation of the products of nature by means of causality in accordance with ends’ (KU 5:408). 
 Of Kant’s influences, Leibniz’ debt to the scholastics is clear, having written a dissertation on the 5
principle of individuation in his youth in which he discusses the positions of various scholastic authors 
and ultimately defends a Suárezian position. He also returns to the scholastics time and again, insisting on 
their value and importance. But the German philosophy which formed the basis of Kant’s education in 
Königsberg was also heavily influenced by scholasticism. Cf. Mora (1953), Kuehn (2001), and Beck 
(1996). Watkins (2004) argues in essence that Kant’s response to Hume’s skeptical doubts about causality 
consists in offering a more or less scholastic alternative—Kant offers not a direct refutation of Hume’s 
doubts, but a different model of causality altogether, one which consists not in relations between events, 
but substances and the exercise of their powers. Finally, and perhaps somewhat amusingly, Schopenhauer 
says of the chapter on the Transcendental Ideal in the first Critique that it ‘takes us back to the rigid 
scholasticism of the Middle Ages. We think we are listening to Anselm himself.’
 That the category of community should have been ignored in the third Critique is less surprising if one 6
keeps in mind the rather sparse treatment it has received even in discussions of the first, noted above (fn. 
4).
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I begin in §1 and §2 with Kant’s favored ways of describing natural ends—as systems and in 
terms of part/whole relations—arguing that in fact they often come to much the same thing. In 
the second section I turn to Kant’s account of division, which he says gives the logical form of a 
system. His account follows the scholastic tradition in all its essentials and reveals deep and 
unappreciated parallels with his description of natural ends. Not only do both natural ends and 
logical divisions exhibit the same directions of mereological dependence but, like the parts of a 
natural end, the parts of a division also ‘produce one another reciprocally’ and constitute a self-
sufficient whole. Furthermore, those parts are said to stand ‘in community’ under their genus, 
and so we have good reason to suppose that what is at issue in a natural end is the ground of the 
community of its parts, i.e. the principle of the whole.  7
 I then argue in section §3 that this understanding situates Kant’s concerns within a much 
larger tradition.  As it was for Kant, ‘community’ was among the scholastics a standard way of 8
describing the logical relations between a genus and its species as well as between a species and 
its individuals. But its metaphysical status was hotly contested. There were a variety of opinions 
about the extent to which, or the way in which, the community among things was real, rather 
than a ‘mere’ consequence of the operation of the intellect. These opinions were intimately 
related to, or aspects of, the dispute about the reality of universals, for the latter was often 
conceived as a problem about the way in which a form could be divided or shared in common 
 This is not to say, however, that the community exhibited by natural ends will be explicable on the basis 7
of the schematized category of community, i.e. the category enriched with its spatio-temporal 
significance. As I argue in the next chapter, the ground of that community is a supersensible principle not 
to be met with in intuition. 
 While it is immediately apparent that there is a long history to the other two categories of relation with 8
which most possess some kind of passing familiarity—substance and accident, and cause and effect—the 
history of community is, I suspect, a great deal less familiar.
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among many individuals while remaining nonetheless whole in each of its parts. And while this 
dispute and the language in which it was conducted can be seen from Boethius to Suárez, it 
continues in Locke and Leibniz, who provide the more immediate background for Kant’s own 
consideration of the logical purposiveness of nature and, indeed, of the harmony between 
sensibility and understanding.  Even though both Locke and Leibniz accept broadly nominalist 9
ontologies, questions about the grounds, epistemic and metaphysical, for our classifications of 
things into genera and species, i.e. into communities of kinds, persist.  
 In §4-6, I then pursue the character of natural systematicity in three descending steps: 
first, the empirical systematicity of nature quite generally, followed by the systematicity of the 
human races more specifically, and finally natural ends, in light of what has come before.  The 10
systematicity of nature is a necessary ‘projection’ of the power of judgment, but because 
systematicity essentially involves community, it is just as true to say that the community of 
things in nature is, at least, a projection of the power of judgment. This transcendental 
presupposition, however, gives little guidance concerning how we are to discern the branches of 
nature’s system, i.e. how we are to mark out real genera and real species. It says little, in other 
words, about how to establish what (if anything) is in community with what. Locke had been 
 Cf. Allison (2003), reprinted in his (2012).9
 One could have chosen different levels or even kinds of generality than those that I will discuss, and 10
space constraints prevent discussion of them all. When I speak of the empirical systematicity of nature 
quite generally, though, I mean to refer to the notion that nature’s individuals are amenable to 
classification into genera and species, without yet talking about any particular genus or species. I 
elucidate the discussion of systematicity in the KU with some remarks from Kant’s logic lectures on 
merely logical systematicity and community. But I shall not discuss below the schematized category of 
community in part because doing so would, I fear, ultimately involve us in a discussion which goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter, namely the problems to be encountered in our efforts to understand 
natural ends, together with their mechanical irreducibility. Such issues will be discussed in chapter 4. My 
aim in what follows is principally to understand the structure of natural ends, quite independently of those 
problems, and so again focuses principally on (but is not limited to) remarks in Analytic of Teleological 
Judgment and the introductions to the KU as a whole.
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generally pessimistic about our capacity to do so, noting nonetheless the distinctive stability and 
similitude among ‘the Races of Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed’ (III.vi.30). Though 
more optimistic, Leibniz too considered chiefly living things when treating of our capacity to 
make divisions between species. In this context, Kant takes up a suggestion made by the 
naturalist George Louis-Leclerc, whom Kant studied closely, according to which species 
membership is determined not by merely external similarities, but by the capacity to produce 
fertile offspring. In other words, a set of living things together constitute a single species in 
virtue of their shared generative power. In generation, the ‘communicability’ of form—the power 
or ability of form to become common—is most in evidence. It is consequently the presence of a 
real, generative power that marks the difference between merely logical or possible divisions 
among species and real divisions. And this is the same as to say that the difference is decided by 
the presence of a real causal power. This, I argue, is borne out by Kant’s own biological writings 
on the human races and neglected passages in the Critique of Judgment. The complementary 
capacities among various organisms to produce fertile offspring provide the criterion for dividing 
species, and this generative faculty is the sought after communal cause which ‘divides itself’ 
amongst many individuals.  And as the generative power is the same, Kant thinks, as the 11
nutritive power, I suggest that the nutritive power is the ‘communal cause’ of the parts of a 
natural end, of which they are but limited or partial expressions. 
 As we shall see in the next chapter, there is a problem in describing the causal activity of natural ends, 11
one which is closely connected to certain problems in the conception of substantial form, where accidents 
were said to ‘flow’ from them. Such language creates problems not present, or not palpably felt, in what 
might be considered the more straightforward ‘logical’ case. There is, in other words, an important 
discontinuity in the parallels drawn, for the one involves a causal relationship not present in the other, and 
this discontinuity exists in Kant’s case as well. But the particular difficulties involved in that relationship 
can only be delineated precisely once the general or common parallels are articulated.
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 In §7, I argue that as a consequence of the foregoing, we should expand our expectations 
of what exactly might count as a natural end. Kant says the concept of a natural end may very 
well be an empty one, which is to say that we do not know what, if anything, answers to it and so 
what, if anything, actually counts as a natural end. ‘Natural end’ is not, therefore, simply co-
extensive with ‘organism,’ as we ordinarily understand that term. Consequently, although Kant 
uses the example of a tree to illustrate it, more could conceivably fall under the concept than we 
might at first be inclined to suppose. Whole species, for example, could conceivably count as 
natural ends, and in fact, the features characteristic of natural ends and by which an oak might 
count as one would seem to belong to species as well. Indeed, Kant’s claim that the distinction 
between generation and nutrition is a merely nominal one suggests that the distinction between 
the community of parts in a natural end and the community of individuals in single species might 
be—at the very least—a fine one. And Kant does say (in non-moral contexts) that the human 
species, at least, constitutes a whole, indeed a system as opposed to an aggregate of individuals. I 
conclude with a suggestion which lays the ground for the next chapter: knowledge of the true 
natural ends rests on a capacity to identify and distinguish individuals, and there are indeed 
serious questions in the philosophy of biology about the individuation of organisms.  But so 12
understood, Kant’s concerns are quite intimately related to questions of identity, individuation, 
and diversity which show up in Locke and Leibniz, and which are also essential to understanding 
why Kant thinks we cannot cognize things-in-themselves. Because we are incapable of cognizing 
the identity and diversity of noumenal grounds, we cannot say, for any given set of things, 
 Cf. Lidgard and Nyhart (eds.) (2017).12
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whether they all together issue from some one and therefore common noumenal ground, or from 
different ones. 
 I then end with some remarks on Kant’s use of the term Zweck. On the basis of the above, 
one might worry that purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) has gone missing because much of the 
traditional language in which purposiveness is often discussed has gone missing. I argue, 
however, that Kant very often understands by Zweck a particular determination of a more general 
principle, and this understanding is evident in his usage of the term throughout his works. 
Consequently, when Kant defines purposiveness as the causality of a concept with respect to its 
object, the salient feature of the concept is not, as has often been thought, its ‘intentionality’ but 
its generality.  A concept just is a general or common representation, and any object to which it 13
might be applied is but one, more particular determination of the same. Whenever a concept is a 
cause of one of its instances, it realizes itself in what are, as we will have seen, its parts, where 
those parts simultaneously constitute the concept. In its causality, the concept is self-constituting 
or self-creating. 
4.1 PARTS AND WHOLES, AGGREGATES AND SYSTEMS 
 Kant characterizes natural ends in a variety of ways. Very often, these characterizations 
are couched in non-teleological language. Indeed, most often he seems to characterize them in 
 That said, as we shall see, there is an important sense in which the genus was said to ‘contain’ its 13
subordinate species (its parts) ‘indeterminately,’ perhaps as a seed was said to contain (in potentia) what it 
would become.
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terms of the relation between parts and wholes.  After Kant elucidates the concept of a natural 14
end in §64 of the third Critique—describing the life processes of a tree—he identifies two 
conditions something must meet if it is to be a natural end (Naturzweck).  It is necessary, first, 15
that the parts of such a being be ‘possible only through their relation to the whole’ (KU 5:373). 
Since a part of an organism is possible only in relation to the whole, a part of this kind when 
abstracted from its whole is the same part in name only.  The unity of an organism is in this 16
respect similar to the unity of space or the unity of an inference, in which ‘no part can be 
 That purposiveness should be understood in mereological terms was hardly new to Kant, belonging to 14
early modern natural philosophy more generally. The Dutch botanist, Herman Boerhaave, for example, 
with whom Kant would have been familiar, conceived of organisms in terms of causal reciprocity and, 
indeed, cyclicity. On this, cf. Toepfer (2011). As we shall see, however, the mereological aspect of 
organisms comes to have a distinctive significance in the context of Kant’s system. It is also this 
particular aspect of Kant’s description of natural ends which has come to dominate much of the literature 
on Kant’s teleology, owing largely to Mclaughlin (1990). Naturally, if one emphasizes this aspect, it will 
color how one understands the contrast between purposiveness and mechanism, as is evident in those who 
have largely followed McLaughlin—cf. e.g. Allison (2003), Guyer (2005), Zammito (2006), who also 
calls it the ‘reigning wisdom’, and Zuckert (2007). I postpone until the next chapter the mechanical 
inexplicability of natural ends.
 As I noted, however, the concept of a natural end is not technically the same as that of an organism, or 15
indeed of a living thing. Natural ends require teleological explanation simply as a matter of definition. 
The same cannot be said for organisms, which might, for all we know, be mechanically explicable. Cf. 
McLaughlin (1990), 46 and Kreines (2005). 
 Ginsborg (2004) rightly draws attention in this context to Aristotle’s claims about hands, only 16
homonymously so-called when severed from the body. Ginsborg argues that the difference between Kant 
and Aristotle is that Kant ‘rejects the notion of an “inner principle” of change and staying the same, as do 
many other philosophers influenced by “the new science” of the seventeenth century.’ As I hope to show 
in the next chapter, Kant recognizes, the need for an inner principle, but thinks no such principle could be 
an object of scientific knowledge. Indeed, other philosophers influenced by ‘the new science’ recognized 
just such a need, but refused to countenance reference to it in scientific explanations, most notably 
Leibniz. Indeed, I shall suggest in the next chapter that the principle of community in Kant is, in essence, 
a substantial form, and that the causality of a natural end is its fundamental activity (which we know 
through its effects), apportioned to its organs as instruments. Indeed, one of the issues clouding 
discussions of Kant’s teleology has been a distinction between kinds of causality in Kant, on the 
assumption (first defended by McLaughlin (1990)) that ‘mechanism’ in the third Critique is different in 
essential respects from the notion of causality articulated and defended in the first. I follow Watkins 
(2004) and (2014) in thinking that causality is not a relation between events, but substances. 
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determined in it except in relation to the whole’ (EE 5:409; A24/B39).  Such wholes Kant 17
characterizes elsewhere as ‘ideal’ wholes or ‘formal composites,’ and these are to be contrasted 
with ‘real’ composites, for which the parts are given prior to their composition (ML2 28: 565).  18
These latter admit of mechanical explanation, and indeed this is the way that mechanical 
explanation proceeds, i.e. from part to whole (EE 20:236). Natural ends are problematic in part 
for this reason: they are real, material wholes which nonetheless exhibit the mereological 
structure of ideal wholes. They are, as it were, the ideal made real. But not only must the whole 
be prior to the parts, it also is necessary that, second, the parts of a natural end be ‘combined into 
 Naturally, all of these things will have very important differences. What is important here are just their 17
mereological similarities. Particularly interesting is a description of the unity of thought given by 
Engstrom (2009), 99: 
So far as [self-consciousness] contains distinguishable components within it, they are 
originally related as components belonging to a single whole. We may call this unity the 
unity of thought…The consciousness of the whole must accordingly precede the specific 
consciousness of the components, as the consciousness of the form of relation in which 
the latter stand to one another in the whole; and this consciousness in the form of relation, 
or form of the whole, must be in each of the conscious thinkings that make up the 
components, as what enables the latter to be conscious of themselves as component of the 
whole and indeed as components of the same whole. 
The unity of a thought thus exhibits the kind of composition characteristic of natural ends. It is 
noteworthy that those who emphasize the distinctive part-whole relations possessed by natural ends rarely 
identify anything else in Kant’s thought which has those same relations, tending instead to treat natural 
ends as sui generis in this regard. But those relations, in the case of thought, are grounded in the necessary 
features of discursive thought.
 One might say that with ideal wholes, the relations are prior to the relata, with real ones, the relata to 18
the relations. The relation between ‘form’ and whole is an important one, and it will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that Kant understands form as a ground of unity, and 
that in virtue of which something is made intelligible to us. Insofar as it grounds unity, it makes 
something whole. On this, Cf. Boyle (mss.), 16-19. The ‘to us’ bit is is of course essential, and Boyle 
suggests that we might understand Kant’s claim that we are ignorant of things in themselves as, in part, a 
claim that we are ignorant of what on the Aristotelian view are the primary objects of natural science, 
namely the forms or structuring principles of matter. We are thus ignorant of things as they are kath’ auto, 
knowing them only as they appear to us. But appearances have their own kind of form, such as space, 
which grounds community in its own distinctive way. As I argue in the following chapter and the 
conclusion, I think there is a great deal to this.
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a whole by being reciprocally (wechselseitig) the cause and effect of the form’ (KU 5:373).  The 19
form causes its parts, and the parts cause the form. This second condition is a causal condition, 
requiring that the organization described in the first condition have its source in the whole itself, 
which is to say, not in an external artisan (KU 5:373). Put very simply, all the parts have their 
ground in the very whole they compose.  20
 As I noted above, in addition to the language of parts and wholes, Kant also describes 
organisms as systems. Thus, in section §65 just discussed, Kant speaks of the ‘systematic unity 
 Thus, adopting scholastic terminology, McLaughlin argues that Kant’s concern is not with the causa 19
finalis or final cause, by which he means that for the sake of which something comes to be, e.g. a house in 
securing rent from future tenants, but with the causa formalis, e.g. the causal ground of the house 
considered in itself and independently of its possible uses. Cf. his (1990), 40, 49-51, and his (2001), 27; 
211. There is some truth to this claim, but to explain the problem of understanding natural ends 
McLaughlin never sees fit to draw on the growing criticism of the explanatory adequacy of formal 
explanations in early modern philosophy. Cf. also Teufel (2009), who suggests that the composition of 
parts into a whole is, in the first Critique, a matter of formal relations, not a causal one. It is only in the 
latter half of the third Critique, he thinks, that Kant opens up the possibility that composition might be 
subject to causal analysis. Cf. also Teufel (2011), 253. This again raises some question about the nature of 
form, on which cf. again Boyle (mss.), 18. Boyle there concedes that that form does not, on Kant’s view, 
make an object exist, even if it does actualize the objects in another way, namely as objects of cognition. 
This, I take it, points to the problem that natural ends really pose and which I mentioned above: they 
exhibit ‘real form,’ which in Kant is something of a contradictio in terminis.
 One might wonder just how distinct are these two essential characteristics of natural ends, i.e. the 20
mereological and the causal characteristics. One might think that to be a genuine whole just is to have an 
internal ground. But while it is not necessary for my purposes to insist on any real line between them, 
Kant himself enumerates them (‘erstlich’ and then ‘zweitens’). Locke makes similar distinctions in his 
chapter on identity and diversity (II.xvii), which I mention below and discuss in the next chapter. Merely 
material substances, unlike plants, depend for their identity on the ‘parcels of matter’ of which it is 
composed; the parts are wholly determinative of what they compose and a change in parts makes for a 
difference in individuals. The identity of an oak, on the other hand, is grounded in the ‘common life’ 
shared by all the parts, which belong to that whole only insofar as they share in that life. This life is 
‘communicated’ to new bits of matter which then shares in the organization proper to that type of plant. 
And the same is true of animals, which differ, he says, from machines in this: ‘in an animal the fitness of 
the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from within; but 
in machines the force, coming sensibly from without, is often away, when the organ is in order, and well 
fitted to receive it.’ The structure of his exposition suggests that he thinks the causal condition only really 
applies to animals, or perhaps chiefly and more apparently, for he introduces that characteristic only after 
quite explicitly transitioning to animals or ‘brutes’ at the beginning of §5. If that is right, Kant’s use of a 
plant as an example to illustrate natural ends should not be overlooked. It is perhaps why he says in §65 
that natural ends might best be understood on analogy with life. The latter Kant elsewhere (KpV 5:10) 
defines partially in terms of a capacity for representing, for which there is perhaps greater evidence in 
animals than there is in plants. A plant might be the nearest thing which seems clearly alive while also 
holding out the greatest hope for mechanical reducibility. 
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of the form’ of a natural end, and in the First Introduction he says that soils and stones, unlike 
organisms, fail to display ‘the form of a system in themselves,’ and he glosses the idea that 
nature might possess a ‘real purposiveness in its products’ in terms of the idea that nature might 
be capable of ‘producing individual things in the form of systems’ (EE 20:217). Soils, stones, 
and minerals, lacking the form of a system, are mere aggregates, and indeed Kant frequently 
opposes systematicity or the unity of a system to mere aggregation.  In the production of the 21
latter, nature proceeds mechanically. The natural production of systems requires something more, 
namely a concept as the causal ground. Thus, Kant says that the mechanics of nature ‘consists in 
its causality through the combination of the manifold without a concept lying at the ground of its 
manner of unification’ [emphasis added] (EE 20:217). Causality in accordance with a concept, 
precisely because of the nature of its ground, seems then to confer a distinctive kind of unity on 
its product because of the ‘manner of unification’ by which it proceeds. Because mechanical 
causality is aggregative and aggregation is opposed to systematicity, the unity conferred by the 
concept is systematic unity.  
 Natural ends, then, are said to exhibit quite definite part-whole dependencies and to 
possess the form of a system. As it turns out, however, possessing systematicity is to possess the 
mereological properties discussed above, for Kant understands the former in terms of the latter. 
Thus, in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method in the first Critique, he says that by ‘system’ he 
understands ‘the unity of the manifold of cognitions under one idea,’ and that this is ‘the rational 
 Leibniz makes a similar point when discussing the unity of animals as opposed to machines or 21
minerals: ‘there appear to be species which are not really unum per se (i.e. bodies endowed with genuine 
unity, or with an indivisible being which makes up their whole active principle) any more than a mill or a 
watch could be. Salts, minerals and metals could be of this nature’ (NE III.vi.318). He soon after describes 
salts, metals, and craft products as aggregates, considering only animate bodies to be true unities (328). 
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concept of the form of the whole,’ through which ‘the position of the parts with respect to each 
other is determined a priori’ (A832/B860). And in the First Introduction to the third, he says of 
cognitions possessing the form of a system that the whole is prior to the parts, whereas in an 
aggregate ‘the parts for such a possible whole’ are ‘already completely given’ (KU 20:247). 
Consequently, the consideration of natural ends as systems seems not to take us any further. To 
say that something has the form of a system is just to say something about the direction of 
mereological dependence between the parts and the whole.  
4.2 SYSTEMATICITY, LOGICAL DIVISION, AND DISJUNCTION 
 In the above, I suggested that two of Kant’s favored ways of characterizing natural ends 
come to much the same thing: they have the form of a system and they exhibit certain directions 
of mereological dependence. These two characterizations come to much the same thing because 
the notion of ‘system’ is itself often understood mereologically and in terms of the very same 
directions of dependence. In my discussion, I largely abstracted from any difference between real 
as opposed to merely logical systems, i.e. ordered unities of things as opposed to concepts or 
cognitions. These are, of course, very different things, and Kant quite stresses that nature might 
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exhibit logical but not real purposiveness.  We are not, in other words, compelled to think that 22
there are real things possessed of systematic form, i.e. natural ends, but we are compelled to 
approach nature as if its laws were possessed of systematic form, i.e. to suppose that it specifies 
its laws into the form of a system. All the world might be just salts and soils, metals and 
minerals. But regardless of the kind of purposiveness we consider, whether real or logical, 
systematicity is common to both and, as a consequence, systematicity would seem to belong to 
purposiveness as such. If that is right, and because Kant’s road to metaphysics always runs 
through logic, looking at systematicity in the domain of logic might reveal certain features 
common to systems as such. It is, moreover, quite plausible that logical systematicity is, within 
the broad confines of Kant’s philosophy, more intelligible to us. But it is at the very least less 
obviously beset with the same kinds of obscurities that beset teleology in general and Kant’s 
teleology in particular. And so by looking at logical systematicity we stand to learn something 
about purposiveness quite generally, for if we can better understand what belongs to systems as 
such, what they have in common and what distinguishes them from aggregates, we will likely be 
in a better position to understand what differentiates real, natural systems from natural 
aggregates, i.e. to know what makes the difference and the difference that it makes. For that 
reason, I now turn to logical systematicity. 
 By ‘logical purposiveness,’ Kant means the ‘fitness’ of things in experience ‘even in their great 22
multiplicity, for a logical system of empirical concepts’ (EE 20:216) and the ‘conformity [of nature] to the 
subjective conditions of the power of judgment with regard to the possible interconnection of empirical 
concepts in the whole of an experience’ (EE 20:217). Cf. also (EE 20:253). It is important to note that the 
purposiveness belonging to natural ends is a real, causal purposiveness, while the ‘logical’ purposiveness 
of nature—what Kant elsewhere calls ‘formal purposiveness’—is a subjective condition on the possibility 
of the coherent use of our understanding. As I go on to say, one could have logical purposiveness without 
real purposiveness because the world might be ordered into genera and species of salts, metals, and 
minerals, but completely devoid of living things. Only the latter are, presumably, possessed of real 
purposiveness.
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 The logical form of a system, Kant says, is ‘merely the division of given general 
concepts…by means of which one thinks the particular (here the empirical) with its variety as 
contained under the general’ (EE 20:214). Indeed, the first sections of both the published and 
unpublished introductions to the third Critique, which cover the same ground, are titled ‘On the 
Division of Philosophy’ and ‘On Philosophy as a System,’ respectively. This method—division 
(diairesis/divisio)—is of course an ancient one, developed at least by Plato in a number of 
dialogues and intended to help one understand the relations between the one and the many and to 
aid in formulating definitions.  Given its history, different authors naturally give slightly 23
different accounts of it, and indeed a number of different kinds of division were recognized by 
different authors. In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, for example, just after discussing definitions, 
Sextus identifies four forms of division—word/significations, whole/part, genus/species, species/
individuals—and undertakes to criticize the dogmatists’ use of each of them (II.213-227). Others 
give other lists, but that given by Boethius in his De Divisione seems to have been particularly 
influential in the Latin West.  Like Sextus, he distinguishes between genus/species and whole/24
part division, among others, giving as an example of the latter the division of a species into its 
individuals: the parts of ‘man’ are Cato, Vergil, Cicero, etc., and the whole, ‘man,’ is said to be 
composed of those individuals. And although he distinguishes between the division of a genus 
into its species and a whole into its parts, Boethius nonetheless discusses the former in the 
language of the latter, i.e. in terms of part and whole. To that extent, at least by the time of 
 Cf. e.g. Phaedrus 265e-266c and throughout the Sophist and Statesmen; cf. also Aristotle, e.g. De 23
Partibus, I.2-3, as well as the beginning of Porphyry’s Isagogē, or Buridan’s Summulae de Dialectica. 
The latter says that ‘the investigation of definitions benefits from the art of division,’ which is ‘a very 
important and ultimate part of logic’ (pars logicae magis notabilis et finalis).
 Magee (1998).24
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Boethius, division is frequently discussed in mereological terms, and this practice appears to 
continue long after him.  Buridan, for example, defines division quite generally in the language 25
of parts and wholes, and the the division of a genus into its species is just a special case (SD 
8.1.2). 
 This mereological understanding of conceptual relations pervades Kant’s treatment of 
them. Thus, in the Jäsche Logic Kant says that all concepts are marks, and that a mark is ‘that in 
a thing which makes up part of its cognition, or—which is the same—a partial representation so 
far as it is considered as cognitive ground of the whole representation’ (JL: 58).  There are, 26
however, different ways in which something can be a part—either as an intensional or an 
extensional part. The former are more general, the latter more specific (JL: 91).  ‘Metal’ is 27
common to ‘gold’ and ‘silver,’ belonging to each as a part, and the latter are in turn parts of the 
former. And ‘metal’ itself is both a (subordinate) part of and has as a (more general) part the 
concept ‘material.’ Thus, two concepts can be parts of one another, though to be sure in different 
respects.  The higher concepts are as such genera, the lower ones species, but no concept is ‘in 28
itself’ either a genus or a species because these terms are strictly comparative (JL: 97). The more 
general a concept, the fewer its intensional parts, which means that genera are, in one sense, 
 Cf. Magee (1998) on the differences between, e.g., Galen and Clement of Alexandria on this.25
 The same thought can be found throughout Kant’s logic lectures. He says in the Vienna Logic, for 26
example, that a concept is contained in things and ‘constitutes a part of their representation’ (VL: 910). Cf. 
also R 2282; 2286. In the former, Kant distinguishes marks as concepts from marks as things. Both are, 
nonetheless, parts. The hand, for example, is a mark of the human, having hands a mark of the concept of 
human.
 Elsewhere, he will say that, strictly speaking, it is the use of the concept that is common. I pass over 27
these nuances here.
 In Meta. Δ.25, Aristotle himself had said that in one sense, the species are parts of the genus, but that, in 28
another, the genus is a part of the species. Both are consequently wholes and parts, but in different 
respects.
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simple in comparison with their species. Furthermore, because there are no lowest species, and 
there are no next species, if we begin with any predicate in logical space, we can subdivide the 
space between the predicate and the subject to which it might be applied to infinity. For that 
reason, everything to be met with in logical space is a composite, and so we never meet with the 
truly simple, conceptually speaking. At the same time, because the higher stands to the lower as 
ground to consequence, we never meet with ultimate grounds or final consequences. 
 Like other conceptual relations, then, division too is understood mereologically. It is that 
process by which we move downward in logical space, from a (comparatively) simple genus to 
its species or from a ground to its consequences, and Kant’s account of it is true to the tradition 
in all its essentials.  Together, the subordinate species-parts of a division ‘form a complete 29
whole,’ i.e. the whole sphere of the divided concept, and they complement one another in the 
constitution of that whole (DW: 761). Because all of the subordinate parts, the species, have a 
share in one and the same divided concept, the genus, they do not constitute a mere heap or 
aggregate of random concepts, as would sock, star, and butterfly, for example, but rather stand 
‘in community’ (in Gemeinschaft) with one another (JL: 107). Furthermore, the parts of the 
division constitute genuinely exclusive disjunctions, either/or (VL: 926). In that sense, the 
subordinate parts of the whole are all ‘external’ to one another because no more than one of the 
species can be predicated of a given substance—nothing can occupy more than one position in 
the logical space given by the division. And finally, Kant distinguishes between logical and non-
logical division. The former is founded solely on the principle of non-contradiction, e.g. learned 
or unlearned, while the latter depends on a real difference among its members, and so no member 
 Kant’s account is actually somewhat simpler, omitting discussion of several of the kinds of division 29
found elsewhere.
!161
can be simply the negation of one of the others.  For this reason, non-logical division depends 30
essentially on intuition, which means that more than merely logical communities need to be 
grounded in experience.  
 Insofar as a division consists of the disjunction of the species of some genus (and sub-
species, since we can divide to infinity), it has the form of a disjunctive judgment. Indeed, 
disjunctive judgment is ‘nothing other than a logical division’ (VL: 935). Importantly, in 
disjunctive judgments—and so in logical division—one goes ‘from the whole to all parts taken 
together.’ All the parts of the judgment constitute the ‘matter’ of the judgment, the disjunction its 
form (JL: 106, §28). Indeed, the matter of the disjunction, its members or parts, are even said to 
‘produce’ or ‘generate’ one another (hervorbringen) since they each define the boundaries of the 
other, as putting up fences in the division of land defines not only the enclosed space but that 
outside of it as well (JL: 107).  The judgment is, furthermore, self-contained because there is 31
nothing outside of the division which ‘can be thought in a definite relation’ (JL: 107; cf. A74/
B99). Because all the members of the disjunctive judgment together exhaust the possibilities of 
the genus concept, there is nothing beyond its members of which it can be predicated. If 
something is to be an animal, it must be either a horse or a dog or a man, etc.. The division is to 
that extent a self-contained or self-containing whole in which the principle and common ground 
 In what is, as we shall see, an important nod to his own biological thinking, Kant gives the following 30
(quite unfortunate) example of an empirical division of the human races: red-brown, yellows, etc., but not 
‘white or non-white.’ (DW: 761).
 Cf. also the Port-Royal Logic, II.9: ‘The truth of these propositions [i.e. disjunctive judgments] depends 31
on the necessary opposition between the parts, which must not permit a middle term.’ In another edition, 
the sentence continues, ‘but each part taken separately need not be true.’ In chapter 15 of the same Part, 
Arnauld and Nicole say of classification that it divides a whole into what it contains. It consists of a 
common term and its ‘subjective parts,’ i.e. its extension. There are in turn four different kinds of 
classification, the first of which is the division of a genus into its species. The examples given for each 
classification are disjunctive judgments, save for the last, which gives a conjunction (II.15).
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of the parts of the division is both contained in all its subordinate members and is itself 
constituted by those members—it is a part of all its parts. And Kant expresses the same thought 
in his remarks on disjunctive judgment in the first Critique: ‘in a disjunctive judgment there is 
therefore a certain community of cognitions (Gemeinschaft der Erkentnnisse)’ in which those 
cognitions ‘reciprocally exclude one another (wechselseitig einander), [and] yet determine the 
true cognition in its entirety, since taken together they constitute the entire content of a particular 
given cognition’ (A74/B99).  32
 To conclude, I have been trying to articulate Kant’s account of division because division 
was said to constitute the logical form of systematicity. Because systematicity is common to both 
logical and real purposiveness, it would appear to belong to purposiveness as such. 
Consequently, understanding more about systems or systematicity promised to shed more light 
on the nature of purposiveness quite generally, and to that extent also of natural ends. The 
underlying thought was that studying the species of a genus can throw light on that genus, which 
can in turn illuminate one’s study of its other species. And we are now in a position to see that 
the structure of a logical division does run quite parallel to that of a natural end. Natural ends are 
systems, and division is the logical form of a system. As in a natural end, so too in a logical 
system or division the whole is prior to the parts. As in a natural end, so too in a logical division 
do the parts reciprocally generate one another and the whole. And finally, as in a natural end, so 
too in a logical system do the parts (species) stand ‘in community’ (in Gemeinschaft) with one 
 He had said just earlier that ‘disjunctive judgment contains the relations of two or more propositions to 32
one another, though not the relation of sequence, but rather that of logical opposition, insofar as the 
sphere of one judgment excludes that of the other, yet at the time the relation of community 
(Gemeinschaft), insofar as the the judgments together exhaust the sphere of cognition proper.’ Cf. also 
B112-113. 
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another. Because the genus under which they stand in community is their ground, the 
(comparatively simple) genus is rightly considered the communal ground (gemeinschaftliche 
Grund) of its species.  There are, then, strong parallels between logical systems and natural 33
ends, and so we have good reason to suppose that the metaphysical problem posed by a natural 
end is the nature of its communal ground, i.e. that in virtue of which its parts stand together in 
community and form a complete whole. 
4.3 AN HISTORICAL INTERLUDE IN TWO PARTS 
4.3.1 UNITY AND COMMUNITY IN SOME SCHOLASTICS 
 I noted in the introduction that Kant was writing in a broadly scholastic tradition and that 
attending to that tradition can help to illuminate the terms in which Kant was thinking and the 
problems he was concerned to address. He could presume on the part of his audience a certain 
prior familiarity with some of the basic concepts belonging to the tradition of which he was a 
part, but which have long since become foreign to us. Community is one such concept. As a 
category, Kant’s account of it has not generally worn well. Watkins laments that many have taken 
it to be a rather optional or indeed even ‘downright unfortunate’ element in Kant’s philosophy.  34
 As we shall see in the next chapter, Kant thinks the communal ground of natural ends is simple as well.33
 Watkins (2011). When discussing the Third Analogy, Strawson (1966) accuses Kant of equivocating. 34
Among other colorful remarks, Schopenhauer (1818; 1966) had said said that ‘the deduction of the 
category of community or reciprocal effect…is a really glaring example of the acts of violence on truth 
which Kant ventures to commit, merely in order to satisfy his love for architectonic symmetry,’ 459. Cf. 
also Longuenesse (2005) ch.7, who says that ‘the general view of Kant commentators…is that his defense 
[of the relation between the logical function of disjunctive judgment and the category of community] 
remains utterly unconvincing.’
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But community had played an important metaphysical role in the scholastic tradition, one 
corresponding to its logical role in division. Because the individuals of a species (oak) or the 
species of a genus (tree) were said to stand in community with one another by participating in 
something common, i.e. some shared form, community appeared in disputes about universals. 
The dispute about the reality of universals was thus also a dispute about the existence of real 
communities in nature and what accounted for them.  And so I want in what follows to 35
recapitulate, even if only briefly, some of the stages of that dispute in order to make more 
intelligible the problems with which Kant was ultimately concerned.  
 We can begin that recapitulation with Porphyry, who had used koinōnia in his Isagogē to 
describe genus/species relations, among others. In his translation of that work, Boethius used 
commune.  And while the former raised the issue of the existence or subsistence of genera and 36
species only to set it aside, the latter addresses it at some length in his commentary. Boethius 
attempts there to explain why the community of things is not simply illusory, i.e. why the 
apprehension of things through universals or common concepts involves no falsification of 
reality. A moderate realist, he thinks genera and species have no independent existence: what 
grounds the community among things is not independent of the very things whose community it 
 I note that this dispute generally pertained only to ‘empirical’ universals, rather than ‘logical’ 35
universals, such as ‘species.’ The latter was considered an intentio secunda, which is to say a concept of 
concepts or a sign of signs. ‘Horse,’ however, was an intentio prima, and so picked out real things, i.e. 
things which are not in turn signs or concepts of something else. Interestingly, one might take much of 
what goes on in the first Critique to be an argument about the role of certain intentiones secundae—e.g. 
causality, substance, community—in shaping our experience, together with the conditions of their use or 
application. The argument of the third Critique would then be something to effect that nature must 
provide relatively stable and recurring objects to ground intentiones primae, to which the intentiones 
secundae would then be applied and only in relation to which they would have significance.
 The precise character of the views held by the different thinkers discussed below is much less important 36
than the fact of dispute about the issue, couched in the same language and in relation to the same logical 
issues addressed by Kant, as we saw above.
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grounds. Just as a line only really exists in a body, so a species only really exists in the very 
particulars falling under it, but in each case we can conceive separately what does not in fact 
exist separately. Species, he says, are ‘nothing else than the thought gathered from the substantial 
likeness of individuals that are unlike in number.’  But this should in no way be thought to mean 37
that species are not really real: a species can be ‘real’ in the sense that particularity and 
universality can both belong to some form, relating to each other as the convex and the 
concave.  One and the same thing, Boethius says, can be particular in relation to sense, and 38
universal in relation to thought. And this accounts for a kind of unity or harmony between sense 
and understanding, for both sense and thought are related to the same thing—the nature or form
—though in different ways. Otherwise put, things similar in sense become the same in thought. 
 A similar line of thought is to be found in St. Thomas. Speaking of a genus, he says that it 
is one through the community (communitas) of the form it designates (De Ente §10).  A genus is 39
also said to ‘contain’ those species whose form it designates ‘indeterminately’ or ‘indistinctly.’ 
Indeed, it is precisely the indeterminate character of the genus which accounts for the 
aforementioned unity and community. The introduction of difference into the genus removes that 
indetermination, yielding the distinct species into which it is divided—where there was one, 
there is now many. But as in Boethius, the community conferred on the species in virtue of the 
genus, or on the individuals in virtue of the species, is brought about by the intellect, for in the 
De Ente, Thomas registers his agreement with Avicenna and Averroes that ‘it is the intellect 
which brings about universality in things,’ and elsewhere that ‘the unity or community of human 
 Cf. Second Commentary on Porphyry, in Spade (1994), 25 37
 Ibidem.38
 Cf. also ST I.30.4; 1 Sent. 25. 1. 3 c..39
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nature [for example] is not real, but only according to consideration [of the intellect]’ (De Ente 
§60).  Indeed, neither community nor particularity belong to a nature in its own right, acquiring 40
one or the other only insofar as it is contracted in individuals or made universal in the intellect. 
Understood universally in the intellect, the form of some man, Socrates, becomes a commune 
repraesentivum or common representation under which many men then stand in communitate 
(De Ente §2). 
 This language could be traced in detail, but I want to say something now only about 
Scotus and Suárez, for the former is often taken to have been a rather more committed realist, 
while the latter was both his critic and an important influence on other early modern thinkers, not 
least of all Leibniz.  Scotus had argued that community belongs to natures independently of the 41
operation of the intellect: ‘community belongs to the nature apart from the intellect…[and] in its 
own right.’  If all unity were numerical unity (i.e. the unity of Socrates, the unity of Plato, etc.), 42
then the unity of a genus or species would have no foundation in reality—because being and 
unity are convertible, as one goes, so goes the other—and so our general and specific concepts 
would derive entirely from the mind alone, being mere figments (figmenta) or fictions 
(fictiones).  Prior to the operation of the intellect, then, a plurality of things can have a real but 43
non-numerical unity, and that unity is the unity of the community of their (common) form. 
 ‘Intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus’; ‘Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non 40
est secundum rem, sed solum secundum considerationem'  ST. I.39.4. Cf. Edwards (1985), reprinted in 
Davies (2002). 
 On Leibniz’ nominalism cf. Ariew (2012), Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (2008), Rutherford (1998), 41
Barber and Gracia (1994), and McCullough (1996). The first and the last focus on Leibniz’ early thoughts 
on individuation in his Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui of 1663. There Leibniz argues 
against Scotistic realism and embraces Suarezian nominalism. 
 Ord. 2, d. 3, pars I, q. 1, n. 42. Quoted in Noone (2003) and Ross (1965).42
 Noone (2003), 108.43
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Suárez, on the other hand, opposes this thought, insisting that all that is real independently of the 
mind is singular and individual, and that there are in truth as many forms as there are individuals, 
the former being multiplied along with the latter. Consequently, real forms are not strictly 
common or communicable to anything else:  
It is one thing to speak of formal unity and another to speak of the community of 
that unity; for the unity is in the things, as has been said, however the community, 
properly and strictly speaking, is not in the things, since no unity found in reality is 
common…but there is in things a certain similarity in their formal unities, on which 
the community which the intellect can attribute to such as conceived by it, is based 
(DM VI, S1, N12). 
The community, then, that might be thought to exist among things of the same species is not in fact 
a real unity, since all real unity is numerical unity. Community is only a function of the similarities 
exhibited by different individuals on the basis of which the mind effects a common nature or 
community of form. But again, similarity is not true unity, and when we say two things are ‘of the 
same nature,’ this would be best understood as saying merely that they are alike. 
 The medievals, then, were quite exercised by the question of the community of form. This 
was, indeed, a metaphysical question interwoven with certain logical doctrines related to division. 
That individuals stood in community under a common form—whether a species or a genus—and 
that the latter was in each case divided into the former, seems to have been clear. Much less clear 
was the extent to which, or the way in which, those different communities might be real, and so too 
that form which was or was not thought to be common. What is more, because it was customary to 
understand division in the language of parts and wholes, where the individuals were said to be 
parts of the species, and the species parts of the genus, this question can be understood as a 
question about whether or not the inferiors in each case genuinely or really constitute a whole, or if 
such wholes are simply effected by the operation of the intellect and so mere fictions (fictiones). 
Consequently, even if community was not elevated to the level of a category by the scholastics, as 
it would later be by Kant, the connection between division and the metaphysical problem of 
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community was well attested. In the first Critique, the a priori community of things is grounded in 
a form, a form of intuition, namely space. What all real things available to us to know have in 
common is that they appear in (different parts of) one and the same space. It remains to be seen 
whether there are other forms grounding other kinds of community (and, indeed, whether they 
might be known by us).  44
4.3.2 LOCKE, LEIBNIZ, AND THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 
 The above debate persists into the early modern period, and in particular in Locke and 
Leibniz, who belong to the more immediate background of Kant’s third Critique. Indeed, Henry 
Allison has argued that Kant is there attempting to navigate between the two positions staked out 
in their respective Essays, i.e. between the view that all general ideas are the ‘workmanship of 
the understanding,’ on the one hand, and Leibniz’s realism about universals on the other.  But of 45
course, the notion that generality or universality is effected by the understanding rather than 
following upon a nature in its own right was hardly original, and hardly nominalist. Thus, when 
Locke says that ‘General and Universal belong not to the real existence of Things; but are the 
 It is worth noting again that it is not my intention in this chapter to explain why the community among 44
bodies in space is insufficient to explain the community of the parts of natural ends. It is, rather, to argue 
for the unnoticed importance of the concept of community in understanding them, and the way in which 
this thought coheres with some of the larger themes of the third Critique.
 The literature on Locke’s account of kinds, and real and nominal essences, is—like so many other 45
topics—vast indeed, and of course I have no intention of surveying it here. Pasnau (2004) and (2011) 
discusses Locke’s account in relation to the scholastics. cf. also Stuart (2011), Look (2009), Chappell 
(1989) and (1990), McCann (2008). While Allison considers Leibniz a realist about universals, others 
take him to be a nominalist (cf. Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (2008), mentioned above). Indeed, in his 
‘Preface to an Edition of Nizolius,’ Leibniz even claims that the ‘nominalist sect’ was ‘the most profound 
of all the scholastics, and the most consistent with the spirit of our modern philosophy’, quoted in 
McCullough (1996). This would seem to speak quite against Allison’s claim that Leibniz was a realist 
about universals.
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Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding…Ideas are general, when they are set up, as the 
Representatives of many particular Things,’ he does not yet go beyond what some of those 
traditionally regarded as realists had said (III.iii.11). The difficulty emerges rather with Locke’s 
claim that ‘all things, that exist, [are] particular’ and that ‘universality belongs not to things 
themselves, which are all of them particular in their Existence,’ for here Locke not only denies 
that there is anything in itself general, but positively asserts that everything is particular.  46
Despite the particularity of all things, however, people need general terms and general ideas for, 
among other things, communication and the ‘improvement of knowledge: which though founded 
in particular things, enlarges it self by general views’ (III.iii.4).  But those ideas are general only 47
through the role they play of signifying or representing many particulars, where that signification 
‘is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of Man is added to them’ (III.iii.11). These general 
ideas are ‘the medium that unites’ particular beings, and so furnish the unifying conceptual space 
which relates individuals to one another (III.iii.13). We are given the relata, but we make the 
 Recall, for example, that Aquinas denies that either community or particularity belong to a nature in its 46
own right, but possesses one or the other only insofar as it is contracted by matter or made universal in the 
intellect. That is, Aquinas could agree with Locke that ‘general and universal belong not to the real 
existence of things,’ but would deny the further claim, namely that all that is, is particular. As we have 
seen, Suárez asserts the latter claim as well.
 McCann cites a passage from Mill which effectively credits Locke with convincing philosophers that 47
there are no general entities corresponding to general terms, thereby freeing us of the scholastic doctrine 
of substantial forms or essences. Naturally, this is something of a misrepresentation of the scholastics, as 
even the cursory survey above should reveal. Pasnau (2004) and (2011) argues that Locke was more 
indebted to scholastic philosophy than he would have liked us to believe. It is by now a familiar thought 
that philosophical revolutionaries always owe a great deal to their predecessors.
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relations, and it is only through or by means of these relations that we can enlarge our knowledge 
or understanding of things.   48
 From the general ideas produced by the understanding we get ‘artificial’ genus/species 
divisions. Those divisions are artificial because of the artificiality of the genera and species 
which make them up.  To be sure, the things we encounter, ‘especially in the Races of animals, 49
and all Things propagated by Seed,’ exhibit similarities to one another, and to that extent, our 
general ideas do have a foundation in the similitude of things (III.iii.14).  But as a metaphysical 50
matter, this is to be attributed either to chance or the artifice of mind, for nothing is either itself 
common or communicable. If there were substantial forms grounding the distinctions between 
genera and species in the way the scholastics had thought, we would not see the kind of variation 
that we do. Some human beings wholly lack reason, some brutes possess it. The species shade 
into one another, and any feature someone might choose to mark a species will belong to other 
organisms which could just as reasonably be classified on the basis of other features. There is 
 Complicating Locke’s views is, to be sure, his (apparent) adherence to a mechanistic understanding of 48
nature, but the reality of genera and species and, with them, substantial forms or essences is impugned by 
Locke on grounds which can reasonably be dissociated from questions about the corpuscularian 
hypothesis. I say ‘apparent’ because there is some dispute about the way or extent to which Locke was 
committed to the corpuscularian hypothesis. Cf. Downing (1998), who suggests that Locke considers the 
aforementioned hypothesis merely one way of giving more robust sense to the notion of a substantial 
form or essence, more intelligible than anything offered by the scholastics. McCann (2008), by contrast, 
thinks Locke a much more committed mechanist.
 I pass over here Locke’s account of essences, which is intimately wrapped up in some of the issues 49
discussed. At III.iii.15, Locke distinguishes between two senses of ‘essence,’ the first of which he says 
constitutes the original meaning of the word, and refers to the real, internal, but unknown inner 
constitutions of particular things which makes them what they are. In this they play the role of something 
very like substantial forms, but they do not ground distinctions between genera and species. Real essences 
are then contrasted with nominal essences, which apply to ‘the artificial constitution of genus and 
species.’ It would seem then, that real essences belong to individuals and are independent of our 
classificatory schemes. Vienne (1993) makes a strong distinction between inner constitutions and real 
essences, however, thinking, like others (e.g. McCann (1987) and Ayers (1991)), that even real essences 
necessarily involve references to sorts, i.e. general species cooked up by the understanding. Cf. III.vi.6.
 Cf. Suárez again: ’there is in things a certain similarity in their formal unities, on which the community 50
which the intellect can attribute to such as conceived by it, is based’ .
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never a feature which all and only the members of a species possess, and it seems almost any set 
of features can end up together. Consequently, there are no general or specific forms which 
account for the properties of things. Locke contrasts the natural variety in nature’s particulars 
with the identity among the properties had by two circles or two equilateral triangles. Real 
divisions among species would require the kind of stability exhibited by geometric figures, 
which all exhibit all the properties proper to their kind; all right triangles have an angle of 90 
degrees, all squares have four equal sides, etc. (III.vi.8). Given constraints of time and energy, 
we simply content ourselves with some acquaintance of enough features to carry on and 
communicate (III.vi.30). And in this, Locke is much more pessimistic than the scholastics, 
impressed by the sheer variety of nature in a way that they seem not to have been.  It is almost 51
rather an accident that things agree when they do. 
 Characteristically, Leibniz is a great deal more optimistic about our capacity to delineate 
kinds, even while admitting many of Locke’s premises. In the New Essays, Leibniz grants 
Locke’s nominalist thesis that nothing exists but particular things and that general ideas are the 
result of the ‘workmanship of the understanding,’ i.e. that intellectum esse qui agat 
universalitatem in rebus, as Thomas had said. He also grants that many of our classifications are, 
to be sure, provisional or even at times conjectural. Empirical work is difficult, time-consuming, 
 He also, quite arguably, held to definitional or essential standards that they never thought necessary. 51
One might think that all one needs is to grasp what holds usually or for the most part, rather than always. 
Pasnau (2004) argues that Locke’s pessimism is one of the things that fundamentally distinguishes him 
from the scholastics. Though seemingly true, it need not be because the scholastics themselves were 
particularly optimistic. Pasnau himself registers a number of passages in a variety of leading scholastics 
which register a certain despair of our knowledge of substantial forms, e.g. Thomas’ remark that ‘in the 
case of sensible things, the essential differences themselves are not known; whence they are signified 
through accidental differences which rise out of the essential ones’ (De Ente 4.94). Oddly, however, 
Pasnau takes this and other passages to be referring to the obscurity of the metaphysical concept, 
‘substantial form,’ rather than particular substantial forms (cf. p.68). A more plausible suggestion seems to 
be that whereas the scholastics might have explained the obscurity of substantial forms by reference to 
our fallen state, Locke seems to think the problem rests not primarily with us, but with nature.
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and unpredictable, but ’whatever we truthfully distinguish or compare is also distinguished or 
made alike by nature’ (NE 309). The phenomena can be taken to be rooted in the inner principles 
of things, i.e. individual essences, even if they are known only as an observer knows the essence 
of the Strasbourg clock (NE 304). Not being the makers of natural things, we must proceed 
through an investigation of external marks. And two otherwise quite different things can of 
course resemble each other, e.g. gold and pyrite, but, Leibniz suggests, if they are different, then 
further investigation will reveal their differences, for ‘every outer appearance is grounded in the 
inner constitution’ (NE 309). 
 But Leibniz also thinks that, despite his empiricism, Locke has a fairly impoverished 
conception of how empirical investigation in the life sciences actually proceeds and the kinds of 
considerations that can enter into the the classification of different plants and animals. Even if 
someone should show no evidence of reason, that can likely be explained by other factors. Just 
because the kinds cannot simply be read off the surfaces of things, that need not mean that we 
cannot approximate or have quite good theoretical reasons for sorting things as we do: ‘a great 
deal of care and experience is needed if one is to mark out genera and species in a manner which 
comes fairly close to nature’ (NE 309). Referring to the work of modern botanists, Leibniz says 
that certain parts appear to be better for classificatory purposes than others—e.g. the forms of 
flowers—but that ‘it would be wise not to rest one’s comparisons and rankings entirely on a 
single foundation’ even if a system constructed only according to flower-form, say, is most 
suitable for memory (NE 310). Thus, the mere fact that there can be features that are missing 
here but present there need not spell doom for our capacity to classify things appropriately. 
Genera and species are admittedly partial representations of things, as Locke had said, but one 
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must then examine all the ways in a which a thing can be divided up, looking to a variety of parts 
and features. And while it is also true that no particular part, considered in itself, is definitive of 
something, e.g. yellow of gold, all the parts together are.   
 Even after the acceptance of broadly nominalist ontologies, then, questions about the 
reality of our classifications of things persist, i.e. our ordering of things into the higher and the 
lower, into genera and species. On a traditional understanding, this is the same as to ask 
questions about whether the community among things is real or artificial, for division and 
classification, genera and species, were, as we have seen, understood in terms of community. 
And the question of the logical purposiveness of nature in the third Critique is precisely one that 
concerns the natural community of things. Shortly we will see the same issues emerge, now 
transposed into the larger edifice of Kant’s critical philosophy. Rather than a direct engagement 
with ‘the problem of universals,’ Kant addresses the conditions necessary for those with 
discursive intellects such as ours to have empirical knowledge of nature. Making judgments 
about the things we experience requires subsuming them under common kinds or classifying 
them in some way or other. It is this aspect of our engagement with the world that Kant takes up 
in the Critique of Judgment, for there he considers nature’s empirical systematicity, i.e. its 
ordering into genera and species and thus into relations of community. 
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4.4 LOGICAL PURPOSIVENESS AND PROJECTED COMMUNITIES 
  It is possible to bracket the metaphysical issues involved in the above and take Locke and 
Leibniz to represent two quite different casts of mind. Where the former is preoccupied by 
difference, the other gravitates towards unity. So understood, one need not take sides, for they 
might quite reasonably be thought to constitute two complementary ways of approaching nature. 
Indeed, George Louis-Leclerc, the Comte de Buffon, whom Kant studied quite closely, had said 
in the Initial Discourse to his Natural History that the love of the study of nature requires two 
seemingly opposed qualities: one eye for the grand or general view, the other for the details.  52
One ought not miss the forest for the trees, the genus for the species, or vice versa. In that sense, 
the study of nature requires one to appreciate both sameness and difference, to search out more 
and more common classifications while also recognizing subtler and subtler distinctions among 
the sorts of things one investigates. Buffon had also suggested that the ‘great multiplicity’ and 
variety of objects encountered in nature constitutes an ‘apparently insurmountable obstacle to the 
advancement of our understanding.’  The variety and multiplicity of things puts us in awe of 53
nature, and indeed inspires respect for its Author. But regardless of the extent of that variety, we 
are naturally inclined to suppose that there is a certain ‘order and uniformity’ to be found, a 
 Translated and printed in Lyon and Sloan (1981), 98. The Initial Discourse reads in many places like 52
Kant’s Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, though in much less scholastic prose. It is worth noting 
that Buffon has been recorded as saying the following: ‘One day, when I had worked long and had 
discovered a very ingenious system to explain generation, I opened Aristotle and what do you think? I 
found all my ideas in that rascal Aristotle! Indeed, by God, that was Aristotle at his best,’ in Sloan (1981), 
368. Unfortunately, the remark is given in Herault’s Voyage to Montbard, the veracity of which is 
evidently a matter of some controversy. Regardless, Buffon does sing Aristotle’s praises in the Initial 
Discourse of his Natural History.
 Sloan (1981), 98. 53
!175
consequence of nature’s presumed tendency to work always with the same plan.  Human beings, 54
he says, have a penchant for wishing to find regularity and resemblance among natural things, 
and even if it should prove impossible to arrive at one general system, one perfect method for 
dividing genera into species and subspecies, naturalists nonetheless need ‘an imaginary goal in 
order to sustain them in their work.’  The idea of a single system of natural history serves for us 55
as a focus imaginarius, as it were, i.e. that point on which all our researches converge. 
 These thoughts will be familiar to any reader of the third Critique and indeed the 
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the first. In the latter, Kant says that an interest in 
manifoldness might be found more in this reasoner, an interest in unity more in that one. Ideally, 
they would be united, for an excessive emphasis on either proves an obstacle and delay to the 
discovery of truth. Two investigators who give opposite emphases will find themselves in 
conflict over whether various characteristics of human beings, for example, are based on 
‘decisive and hereditary distinctions between families, races, etc.’ or are due merely to ‘external 
contingency’ (A667/B695; cf. also A655/683). Despite the conflict, however, these interests of 
reason are but two sides of the same logical coin, two aspects of reason’s singular activity, and it 
is here that Buffon’s thought take on a characteristically Kantian shape. A discursive intellect is 
one which cognizes through concepts, i.e. through general or common representations—
repraesentationes communes. If those are to be of any use, there need to be less general 
representations to which they apply:  
we have an understanding only under the presupposition of varieties in nature, 
just as we have one only under the condition that nature's objects have in 
 Sloan (1981)., 100.54
 Ibid., 103.55
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themselves a sameness of kind, because it is just the manifoldness of what can be 
grasped together under a concept that constitutes use of this concept and the 
business of the understanding (A657/B685).  
There is, in other words, need of a higher and a lower, genera and species, and one’s 
understanding (in a non-technical sense) improves both as one moves upward in logical space 
and as one moves downward. A genus and its species, as was said above, are parts of one 
another, and so regardless of the direction in which one moves, one is thereby resolving a 
representation into its parts. And because a representation is indistinct when we are conscious of 
the whole but not the manifold belonging to it, a representation is made more distinct or known 
by resolving it into those parts. Consequently, a representation can be made more distinct both by 
subsuming it under more general classes and by specifying it into subordinate kinds (JL 8: 62).  56
The understandings achieved are complementary: division brings to fruition, as it were, what is 
contained only implicitly or potentially within the genus, and we better understand an individual, 
e.g. Bucephalus, by classifying it under ‘horse.’ There is, in other words, one sense in which the 
 Cf. also 8: 38-40, and 7:138 in Kant’s Anthropology. In the latter work, Kant says that distinctness in 56
cognition is achieved through division of representations. Recall also that Thomas had said the genus 
contains and signifies its species only indistinctly and indeterminately. Abelard before him, when 
commenting on Porphyry’s Isagogē, had said that ‘the understanding that goes with a universal name 
conceives a common and confused image of many things’ and further that ‘with the word “man,” the 
understanding of which depends on the common form of all men, that very community produces a 
“confusion” so that we do not understand any one form from among them all’ in Spade (2004), 102-3. 
And indeed Aristotle himself had said that we progress from the general, which is less clear in itself, to 
the particulars, which are clearer by nature, and that the former is a kind of whole which contains 
(periechon) the latter as its parts (merē) (Phys. I.1).
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universal is less known by nature, another more so, and one sense in which the particular is less 
known by nature, another more so.  57
 In this way, the two moods which one might take Locke and Leibniz to represent can be 
understood as reciprocally necessary features of inquiry, given the nature of our understanding. 
But if the upward and downward ascent have a certain complementarity, at least in the abstract, 
differing only as the road from Thebes to Athens and that from Athens to Thebes, there is 
nonetheless a certain asymmetry owing to the fact that we begin at the bottom, as it were, for it is 
our empirical predicament that we, who begin more or less in ignorance, must fill in the idea of a 
system of nature in general by means of experience of particulars in time and space. The 
systematic unity demanded by the nature of our intellects is thus what Kant calls in the Appendix 
‘only a projected unity’ (projectirte Einheit) for though we investigate nature on the supposition 
that it will take the form of a division into genera and species, we do not yet know how it will 
actually be divided, i.e. what the actual forms will be that we encounter in nature (A648/B676). 
Thus, we posit at the end of our investigation an outline of what it will look like from the top 
down, but filling it in requires that we go from the bottom up on the basis of experience. But this 
projected systematic unity also means projected communities (Gemeinschaften) of things under 
 As Guyer (1990) notes, these upward and downward movements can occur simultaneously. A toddler 57
may have acquired—or be acquiring—the concept ‘bird’ by frequent acquaintance with some of its 
instances. Upon seeing one such instance, he may ask ‘what is that?,’ to which his father might reply ‘a 
pelican,’ only to hear it said, ‘no, that’s a bird.’ If the father then responds by saying, ‘but a pelican is a 
bird,’ he is both making space for the intermediate universal by indicating that this is an instance of 
‘pelican’ and enriching the concept of ‘bird’ by dividing it into one of its subordinate parts. As it happens, 
exchanges of this sort are quite common.
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species and genera, i.e. common forms: mallards with pelicans under ‘bird,’ and birds with 
canines under ‘animal.’   58
 Insofar as reason and experience require systematicity and therefore community, the 
systematicity of nature is a transcendental presupposition. To that extent, it does not belong to the 
very possibility of nature that it should be ordered into common kinds, relations of genera and 
species amenable to our understanding. Nature could, conceivably, be characterized by such 
overwhelming diversity that ‘no coherent use of the understanding’ of it would be possible 
because it would ‘surpass all our power of comprehension’ (A651/B680; KU 5:187).  Kant asks 59
in a marginal note whether  
Linnaeus [could] have hoped to outline a system of nature if he had had to worry 
that if he found a stone that he called granite, this might differ in its internal 
constitution from every other stone which nevertheless looked just like it, and all 
he could hope to find were always individual things, as it were isolated for the 
understanding, and never a class of them that could be brought under concepts of 
genus and species.  
 Corresponding to the two directions in logical space are of course two modes of judgment: determining 58
and reflective. Because the latter ‘is under the obligation of ascending from the particular in nature to the 
universal,’ it belongs to reflective judgment to find or discover whatever communities of things there 
might be. Indeed, insofar as the kind, whether species or genus, is the principle of the community of 
whatever stands underneath it, it would be truer to say that what reflective judgment seeks is the ground 
of the community of things, i.e. that in virtue of which the things stand in community in the way that they 
do. If I am right that we should understand natural ends in terms of a communal ground, then it will 
belong properly to reflective judgment to think that ground. But, as I argue in the next chapter, because 
that ground is simple, and so never to be met with in space, it is incapable of figuring in a determining 
judgment.
 If among the appearances offering themselves to us there were such a great variety…that even the most 59
acute human understanding, through comparison of one with another, could not detect the least 
similarity…then the logical law of genera would not obtain at all, no concept of a genus, nor any other 
universal concept, indeed no understanding at all would obtain, since it is the understanding that has to do 
with such concepts. The logical principle of genera therefore presupposes a transcendental one if it is to 
be applied to nature…According to that principle, sameness of kind is necessarily presupposed in the 
manifold of possible experience (even though cannot determine its degree a priori) because without it no 
empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible’ (A653/B681-A654/B682).
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We must suppose, then, that nature does not consist simply of ‘isolated individuals.’ Any nature 
which we would understand must exhibit some amount of homogeneity through relations of 
logical subordination, and indeed be bound by affinity or ‘kinship’ in a hierarchy under a 
‘communal principle’ (gemeinschaftliche Princip) (EE 20:209). And so chemists, for example, in 
their investigations of the variety of earths, e.g. salts and metals, are led to conjecture that 
underlying the different varieties or species of earths there is perhaps a single genus or common 
principle (gemeinschaftliche Princip) (A653/B681). But this is, again, a supposition we must 
make, not something we can in fact dictate to nature. We must imagine that what we meet with in 
experience admits of enough sameness or similarity to allow for (inductive) generalizations and 
to classify individuals under common kinds. This is the logical purposiveness of nature for our 
understanding: we presume nature is determined quite specifically in a manner which is 
amenable to beings with a reason like ours. 
4.5  THE GENERATIVE CRITERION FOR SPECIES AND THE COMMUNAL 
CAUSE 
   
 If it is a transcendental presumption of the power of judgment that nature takes the form 
of a system, that presumption still leaves quite unsettled how we are to go about determining 
what kinds and communities, if any, actually populate nature. Locke had suggested that kinds are 
founded merely on the similarities of things, ‘especially in the Races of animals, and all Things 
propagated by Seed,’ and Leibniz had seemed to suggest likewise, though not taking from the 
fact the same lesson that Locke did. But Leibniz does indicate a further ground for delineating 
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species, not yet mentioned, and that is the shared generative capacity among things, the 
successful exercise of which results in fertile offspring.  Leibniz says that ‘in the case organic 60
bodies, i.e. the species of plants and animals, we define species by generation, so that two similar 
individuals belong to the same species if they did or could have come from the same origin or 
seed’ (NE 309).  Though he does admit that even assessments of pedigree are merely 61
provisional, rather than strictly criterial, he strongly suggests that further investigation will throw 
light on the matter: ‘the more deeply we study how species are generated, and the more 
thoroughly our rankings follow the necessary conditions of generation, the nearer we shall come 
to the natural order’ (NE 310).  62
 Kant follows suit, having written a course prospectus in 1777 which began with the claim 
that ‘the unity of the species is nothing other than the unity of the generative power that is 
 Naturally, this further criterion would seem to apply only to organisms, but it was chiefly among 60
organisms that Locke had thought similarities among individuals were to be found. Nonetheless, one 
might wonder how such divisions would proceed in the case of inorganic things. It would take me too far 
afield to discuss in detail here, and so I will only remark that it should not be presumed that the 
explanation of organisms is essentially different and so requires a different principle of categorization. 
Strictly speaking, it is rather only natural ends that do, and we cannot say that only organisms would be 
natural ends. To know whether any given thing is a natural end would require noumenal insight, which we 
do not have, though the idea of a natural end is surely suggested by some things rather than others. 
Regardless, I take it that in the absence of the noumenal causal ground which some natural beings might 
have, all divisions would proceed merely along the lines of ‘school species’ (discussed below), mere 
resemblances between one another, but that their causal relations would still be explained mechanically. 
There would be only natural description, and never natural history. And there is some reason to suppose 
that natural ends symbolize, as it were, the problem of empirical inquiry quite generally. The notion of 
‘affinity’ which Kant uses to describe the relations between the human races is said by him to pertain to 
chemistry (A 8:178), and the description he gives of chemical affinity is notably similar to reproduction. 
He uses the same term to describe genus/species relations more broadly.
 In other places, the claim is slightly weaker, with Leibniz saying only that generation creates a ‘strong 61
presumption (i.e. a provisional proof),’ and that our assessments of species membership are ‘very often 
conjectural’ (NE 315). Leibniz’ view, as I said, seems to concede in various places the difficulty and 
problems associated with taxonomy, but to deny that these entail the kind of conventionalist attitude that 
Locke can often seem to possess (but which is in some places more muted).
 He says shortly thereafter, of plants in particular, that ‘if we learned more about how plants are 62
generated, I have no doubt that the differences we observed amongst them would provide a foundation for 
very natural divisions.’
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universally valid for a certain manifoldness of animals’ (RM 2:429). This is, Kant says, ‘Buffon’s 
rule,’ for Buffon had insisted on the same, criticizing the construction of artificial systems. 
Systems of this sort exhibit only ‘arbitrary connections and differing points of view under which 
the objects of nature have been considered’ and they ‘judge a whole…on the basis of a single 
part, and by comparing the differences of such single parts.’  Such systems do, to be sure, have 63
a certain utility—e.g. for memory or mutual understanding—but they are no less artificial for all 
that. In this, artificial systems very much resemble the general and specific essences Locke 
thinks we construct. But Kant uses the generative criterion to make the same point Buffon had: 
The division of schools proceeds by classes according to likenesses; natural 
division proceeds by lineages and divides animals by affinities with reference to 
reproduction. The former produces a scholastic system for memory, the latter a 
natural system for the understanding: the former intends to bring created beings 
under labels, the latter under laws (RM 2:429). 
A real species is thus determined by a shared generative capacity, and the problem to which this 
is the solution is the problem of differentiating between merely artificial but useful divisions 
from natural and scientific ones. In other words, at issue is the ground of the true divisions 
among things, whether external similarities or something a bit more profound, and the same 
point is made again in ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,’ published just two 
years prior the third Critique. Kant again distinguishes been natural and artificial species, saying 
that those falling under the former ‘stand in connection through their generative faculty’ while 
those falling under the latter (which he again calls ‘school’ species) stand together only in virtue 
of shared marks or characteristics. A system of school species gives us only the discipline of 
 Sloan (1981), 108.63
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‘natural description,’ natural species the science of ‘natural history.’ Only the latter can rightly 
aspire to explanation through causes. 
 Kant’s language in the quote above makes explicit the logical issues discussed in §2. The 
generative criterion provides the basis for determining the true kinds or species, i.e. for 
distinguishing between real and artificial divisions. We might now expect that where division is 
found, community will not be far behind, and indeed it is not. Shortly after citing Buffon’s rule 
and distinguishing between natural and school divisions, Kant says of the human races that 
One can adduce only a single natural cause for this unity of the natural species, 
which unity is tantamount to the unity of the generative power that they have in 
common (gemeinschaftlich); namely, that they all belong to a single phylum, from 
which, notwithstanding, they originated’ (RM 2:430) 
The unity of the species is the unity and community of the generative power from which its 
subordinate kinds issue, which is the same as the phylum to which they belong. And this thought 
persists in the essay written shortly before the third Critique. All the human races possess the 
ability to produce fertile offspring with one another, and this very evident ability to unite to 
produce fertile offspring containing marks from both parents suggests, to Kant, the possibility of 
an original division from a single phylum (TP 8:165):  
[the concept of race] is well grounded in the reason of each observer of nature 
who infers, from a hereditary particularity of different interbreeding animals that 
does not at all lie in the concept of their species, a common cause (Gemeinschaft 
der Ursache), namely a cause that lies originally in the phylum of the species.  64
The general concept of ‘human’ or ‘human being in general’ cannot be divided up a priori, 
because apart from experience, one is acquainted with no determinate races of of humans that 
 Cf. also a few lines earlier: ‘Just as they can still unite through generation into a product that contains 64
characters of both, despite their diversity, so they were able to divide through generation out of one 
phylum.’
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would be contained under that concept. That human beings are divided into different races, i.e. 
the contingent fact of human biodiversity, can only be grounded in experience. But that those 
different races can produce fertile offspring with each other suggests to the observer the basis for 
an inference to the effect that they originate in a communal cause, which grounds the reality of 
the division. We, as observers of nature, are confronted only with the fact of the diversity of the 
species, not with their original, undifferentiated unity in an original phylum. 
 In natural (biological) investigation, then, we are inquiring after that cause which stands 
at the head of a real division having as its consequences more determinate, subordinate kinds—
kinds which stand in community in virtue of that communal cause. Real natural history is thus 
the search for communal causality, and it is because of this causality that the races do indeed 
stand in a natural ‘system of generation’ (Zeugungssystem) under a common species (TP 8:165). 
In the Dohna-Wundlacken Logik, Kant had even given as an example of division that of the 
human species into different races (DW: 761). In his race essays, however, what might otherwise 
have been considered a merely logical division is suggested to be a real or natural division. It is 
not because many individuals possess the marks ‘rational animal’ that they stand in community 
under a kind, but because they issue one and all from the same generative power, a single 
phylum. Quite naturally, then, in the absence of the communal cause evident in productive inter-
racial unions, Kant seems to think the different races would constitute different kinds (TP 8:165). 
As it stands, however, the subdivisions are but limitations of the manifold possibilities contained 
within a single, unified phylum, i.e. the communal cause of them all containing their 
manifoldness not just under itself, but in itself.  
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 One’s ambitions might, however, extend beyond the unity of the races. When speaking of 
the generative criterion, Leibniz had in the New Essays discussed the possibility of tracing dog 
breeds back to a common ancestor, saying that  
there are such great differences amongst dogs that mastiffs and lap-dogs can very 
well be said to be of different species; yet it is not impossible that they are remote 
descendants of the same or similar breeds, which we would find if we could go 
back a long way, and that their ancestors were similar or the same, but that after 
much change some of their descendants became very large and others very small 
(NE 325).  
As one moves upward in logical space to more and more general classes, and so to the heads of 
larger and more encompassing divisions, so also one might move back in time to more original 
breeds of dog from which more recents ones, e.g. the Beagle or the English Bulldog, issue. 
Though willing to entertain conjectures about the underlying unity of dog breeds, Leibniz seems 
quite unwilling to entertain the possibility of any such unity underlying dogs and elephants, and 
so is quite confident in rejecting the absurd suggestion that they might belong to the same 
species.  
 A similar idea can be found in the Appendix to the Critique of Teleological Judgment, 
this time expanded to all of animate nature. There Kant briefly entertains what he calls a ‘daring 
adventure of reason’ according to which the ‘manifold of species’ share a common schema, a 
basic design from which the others are derived, e.g. ‘by the shortening of one part and the 
elongation of another’ (KU 5:418). All animals can seem to have been ‘generated in accordance 
with a common prototype’ (gemeinschaftlichen Urbilde) (KU 5:418). The different animals are 
then just so many determinations or specifications of this common prototype, just as the different 
races are so many determinations or (sub)specifications of their original phylum. In each case, 
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the different determinations stand in community with one another in virtue of that from which 
they are derived. To that extent, the two cases run parallel. One case, however, has greater 
scientific merit: a genuinely causal community is plausibly thought to exist among the races 
because the different races produce fertile offspring, but nothing analogous is forthcoming once 
the question of community is expanded to all of animate nature.  This would seem, at least in 65
part, to be why Kant calls the suggestion a ‘daring adventure of reason.’  Though we should like 66
to ascend to higher and higher empirical genera, e.g. from the races to the human being, and 
from there perhaps to primates, etc., the more distant the goal, the more tenuous the hope. 
Nonetheless, the interest of reason in systematic unity remains, and so too therefore a certain 
temptation to a particular direction of inquiry: that even more diverse kinds will ultimately be 
grounded in some communal cause, however lost in time. 
   To conclude then, Kant asserts that fertile interbreeding is the defining criterion for 
species identification. He attributes this criterion to Buffon, though Leibniz had called attention 
to its importance as well. The shared generative power evident in fertile interbreeding is also, 
Kant says, the communal principle and cause of the racial subdivisions in the species, ‘human 
being,’ subdivisions which cannot be known a priori. The model Kant puts forward seems 
almost designed to account for the kind of variety Locke was worried about, for it purports to 
make sense of features of among individuals of a kind, no one of which any human being has to 
 It should be noted, however, that even with the races, the original, undifferentiated phylum is never 65
simply given, but is only supposed through a reflective judgment on its presumed effects in experience.
 Mclaughlin (2010) argues that Kant rejects this ‘adventure’ on other grounds as well. In particular, he 66
argues that Kant thought the enterprise could not ultimately settle the question it had set for itself, namely 
the origin of purposiveness of things. The project simply places purposiveness in a fecund mother nature, 
without explaining the spontaneous generation of organic form. I discuss this in greater detail in the next 
chapter.
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have, but some one of which every human being must have. The contingency of race is to that 
extent still governed by a certain kind of necessity, and the method, at least in idea, can 
accommodate variety while nonetheless accounting for unity.  
 We have, therefore, descended from a general, logical purposiveness of nature and the 
community of all things in it to the smaller, subordinate community of the human races in a 
single species. But I have yet to say anything about those particular beings which would seem to 
exhibit systematicity most concretely, namely living things like trees, and the problem here 
might be thought to be different from the relations that obtain between higher and lower orders 
of concepts or kinds. In other words, one might think the relation that obtains between genera 
and species is altogether different from the relations among the parts in a natural end, e.g. a tree. 
We must, then, descend again and show how even at the lower level of individual natural ends, 
the problem of community arises, and that that problem shares the same form as that discussed 
above. 
4.6 NATURAL ENDS: NUTRITION, GENERATION, AND SUBSTANTIAL FORM 
 I mentioned above (fn. 21) that Locke had noted the two essential characteristics Kant 
ascribes to natural ends—they are organized and they contain the principle of organization within 
themselves. Locke makes these points not when talking about teleology or purposiveness, 
however, but in a chapter devoted to personal identity (II.xxvii). If one takes a look at the life of 
a tree or a horse, he says, one sees an amazing diversity in their features. The horse is at first a 
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colt, but grows and matures, being variously fat and lean but all the while remaining the same 
horse. Similarly, an oak is at first a sapling, but grows and matures, now flowering, now not, but 
all the while remaining the same oak. The matter and qualities of each change, even constantly, 
and so considered simply materially, there is a succession of different individuals—at least 
according to Locke. But, he says, they are one and the same insofar as all the parts, both at any 
moment and through time, participate in ‘one Common Life,’ which is ‘communicated to new 
Particles of Matter,’ which it takes in as nourishment. That in virtue of which the organism 
ultimately communicates its life and organization to new matter is the inner power or force 
which distinguishes natural organisms from machines. And Leibniz, commenting on the same 
passage, insists on the importance of an ‘enduring principle of life’ (which, he says, he calls a 
monad) to account for the real unity of an organic body. Without that monad, without a ‘genuine, 
real, substantial unity,’ their identity is only apparent. 
 Now, we have been talking about the community of individuals under a kind. But there is 
a way in which we might understand the parts of a single substance as standing in community in 
virtue of their relation to one and the same subject. Thus, in the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic, after discussing the projected systematic unity of cognitions under common principles 
(gemeinschaftlichen Principien), Kant discusses the causality of a substance, which, he says, is 
called ‘power’ (A648/B676). He says that one and the same substance can appear to exhibit 
‘such diversity that one must assume almost as many powers as there are effects.’ What might 
otherwise be considered single substance, in other words, exhibits such diversity that one might 
almost imagine it to be a mere aggregate of diverse powers. One might, in other words, regard it 
simply as collection of causal powers, each belonging to different substances. Nonetheless, 
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reason bids us to try to reduce that diversity by discovering a ‘hidden identity’ between them or 
which they can be said to share—to treat the diverse powers as standing in a system. In 
particular, reason bids us to seek after a fundamental power uniting them all, for this is the 
problem ‘set by a systematic representation of the manifoldness of powers’ (A649/B677). In our 
case, that unity of the powers is the unity of reason itself, and Kant will elsewhere speak of the 
‘organic combination of all powers of knowledge under the supreme government of reason’ (P 
20:345). But quite generally, we can no more determine a priori that there is a fundamental 
power uniting these various effects any more than we can determine a priori that nature does fall 
into a recognizable order of genera and species. It is nonetheless reason’s task to act as if there 
were such a fundamental power belonging to the substance in question, which power 
systematically unites all others. And this is as much as to say that reason’s task is to act as if 
there were some common or communal power underlying the apparently diverse powers 
exhibited. 
 If the fundamental causal power of an individual substance grounds its systematic unity, 
then that same causal power should provide for the community of its diverse effects, just as the 
diverse races stood in a causal community in virtue of their common generative capacity or 
power. Kant’s description of natural ends bears this out. In the First Introduction, Kant says that 
we cannot judge the form of a natural end as possible strictly in accordance with mechanical 
laws, because the very concept of a natural end requires that we move from an ‘inner disposition’ 
as from a cause to its effects, and that we think all its parts have not each a separate ground, but 
that they all together have a ‘communal ground’ (gemeinschaftlichen Grund) (EE 20:235). And 
so it would seem that the parts of an natural end, like a tree, also stand in a real, as opposed to 
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merely logical or possible, community, much as the races did. The community in the latter case 
was grounded in the generative capacity. In what is the community of an individual natural end 
grounded? The nutritive capacity. For Kant, as for Buffon (and, indeed, for Aristotle) generation 
and nutrition are but different manifestations of one and the same power.  Kant says of a natural 67
end’s capacity to grow and nourish itself that it is ‘to be regarded as equivalent, although under 
another name, with generation’ (KU 5:371). The unity of the powers is simply a function of the 
unity of what they do: both are in the business of bringing about more of the same. The nutritive 
and generative capacities can, therefore, be said to be grounds of community for two reasons. 
First, both ‘communicate’ or make common a certain form or organization to matter, whether to 
matter taken in as nourishment or to offspring.  The generative and nutritive powers, in other 68
words, provide for the identity and continuity of form. And just as the races stand in a ‘system of 
generation’ (Zeugungssystem), the parts of an individual tree can be said to stand in a ‘system of 
nutrition.’ But second, all the parts of a natural end are related to the nutritive power as ways of 
carrying it out, their own activities being but parts of the exercise of this fundamental power. The 
causal unity of a natural end is thus grounded in the relation of its parts to the common, 
fundamental power of which they are each but a partial expression. Each part stands in the 
service of the whole insofar as each exercises some distinct portion of the whole’s activity, and 
what each has in common is the activity of the whole itself: bringing about more of the same. 
Natural ends, then, are substances exhibiting a fundamental causal power which is, as it were, 
 DA II.4; 416b23-25.67
 Of course, how they do so is still a question.68
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refracted into a spectrum of diverse powers nonetheless standing in community together under 
their common cause. 
 I want now to end this section by drawing a final connection to the scholastics. If for the 
scholastics community played an important role in the context of logical division, so too did it 
play a role in accounts of natural causality. When commenting on Book II of Aristotle’s Physics, 
Thomas distinguishes between proper and universal causes. And, speaking ‘in the species of 
efficient cause,’ he says that the doctor is the proper and posterior cause of health, but that the 
artisan is the more common and prior cause. Thomas accords thereby a certain efficient causal 
priority to the common cause, and after giving another example, says quite generally that ‘a 
cause which contains any cause in the community (communitate) of its extension is a prior 
cause.’  He then explains that  69
any power extends to certain things insofar as they share in one form, and the 
farther that that power extends, the more common that form must be. And since a 
power is proportioned to its object according to its form, it follows that a higher 
cause acts according to a form which is more universal and less contracted 
[modified]. 
A causal power can thus radiate, as it were, downwards to things standing under it and which are 
limitations or contractions of that original power. The more universal the power, the more it 
radiates that power to those things below it. And this seems to be a participation relation, for 
elsewhere Thomas says that to participate is to receive in a partial way what belongs to another 
in a universal way. And he gives the following examples:  
man is said to participate animal, because he does not possess the intelligible ratio 
of animal according to the latter’s total community (totam communitatem); and 
 Comm. Phys. Book II, lectio 6. 69
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for the same reason Socrates participates man…and matter form…and similarly 
the effect is said to participate its cause.  70
What is partial or less common participates in what is more common or whole, the tota 
communitas. This applies not just to instances of division like those we have already seen, e.g. 
Socrates in relationship to ‘man’, but to the relation between matter and form and, indeed, cause 
and effect. And we see this thought in his commentary on the De Anima, for he says that living 
things have a material aspect and (predictably) an immaterial one. In virtue of the latter they are 
akin to ‘higher substances,’ and that ‘everything pre-exists, somehow, in the higher immaterial 
substances, as in universal causes.’  Matter participates in its form, and an effect in its cause as 71
man in animal. All are, as it were, contained (somehow) in that in which they participate. 
Consequently, the thought that things otherwise diverse might stand in a causal community in 
virtue of whatever it is that they ‘participate’ in and from which they derive their causality, was 
hardly new with Kant.  72
 De Hebd., quoted in Clarke (1952).70
 Comm. De Anima. lectio 5. The higher causes contain the lower ones ‘virtually’, and one finds in neo-71
scholastic textbooks claims of the following sort: ‘In material and living bodies we find an ascending 
order of perfections in which the higher beings have their own perfections as well as those of the lower 
level of being. In the unity of the higher being the multiplicity of the lower beings is virtually present,’ in 
Wuellner (1956). Thomas himself says, e.g. at ST I.76.4, that the intellective soul contains the sensitive 
and nutritive souls ‘virtually’ (virtute), and the sensitive the nutritive in the same way. It should be noted 
that the cause of the diversity of things, seemingly in much the same way that the common ground of a 
natural end is the cause of its parts, or the original phylum the cause of the different human races, was a 
topic in medieval philosophy. Thus, in Summa Contra Gentiles II.45, Thomas discusses whether the cause 
of the distinction among things is to be found in the order of ‘secondary agents.’ Ultimately—and as one 
might expect—he argues that the distinction among natural things is to due to God. Some had thought that 
the unity and simplicity of God made it impossible for him to be the source of the differences among 
things, but Thomas argues that because the cause exceeds the effect, what is in the cause simply and 
unitedly (simpliciter et unite) exists in the effect in a multiple and composite way. 
 Similar thoughts can also be found in Leibniz, who seems to have been quite influenced by 72
Neoplatonism. Cf. Mercer (2012) and Rutherford (1998).
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4.7 BIOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALITY 
 I have been arguing that according to Kant, the parts of a natural end are grounded in a 
common cause and that that cause is the power of nutrition. The parts stand in the service of the 
complete activity of their ground in the sense that they are but partial expressions of it. That 
activity is responsible for the continued existence of those self-same parts. I further suggested 
that those parts constituted a whole in a ‘system of nutrition’ in much the same way that the 
individuals of the human species constituted a ‘system of generation’ or Zeugungssystem. The 
presence of a common cause uniting the different human races suggested that they together 
constituted one real species, as opposed to a mere aggregate of distinct species possessed only of 
similar marks or characteristics. But although I adduced a number of parallels between them, one 
might think that there is an essential dissimilarity between the unity of an individual organism 
and the unity of a species because, presumably, species are not themselves living things. I have, 
in other words, been treating as essentially parallel the system constituted by a species and the 
system constituted a living thing. But one might worry that the question of the reality of 
universals or the grounds for making real divisions among species belongs (at least) to a different 
order or level of abstraction than the question of the explicability of certain concrete things, such 
as oak trees, by final causes. If that is right, then any account which makes them run essentially 
parallel will miss what is distinctive to the latter, the essential difference between them. In this 
section and the next, then, I want to address these worries. I first suggest, with a nod to the next 
chapter, that the very parallel between these two problems contains the seed or germ of an 
explanation as to why we cannot, in fact, cognize natural ends as such. And I do this by 
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suggesting that Kant’s conception of a natural end should not be artificially limited in its 
application to what we should like to call ‘individual’ organisms. We should instead broaden the 
class of things to which the concept ‘natural end’ might be said to apply. In the following section, 
I suggest that many of Kant’s uses of Zweck are consistent with, and suggested by, the picture 
that I have painted in the preceding sections. 
 Though we distinguish between individual living things and species as a matter of course, 
it should not for that reason be supposed that the notion of biological individuality is simply 
transparent from a philosophical perspective, any more than individuality itself is. Thus, the 
transition from prokaryote to eukaryote was a consequence of symbiotic relationships between 
prokaryotes.  Two formerly distinct living things came to possess such a unity that we consider 73
them now one. At the same time, some species of starfish can regenerate an entire body from a 
severed arm—the whole from a part—and so what was formerly one becomes two. There is also 
a species of aspen instances of which can look to the casual observer like a forest of individual 
trees, each with its own main trunk. Those trees are, however, united in a common root system, 
and on some criteria count together as just the parts of a single, massive individual.  In light of 74
facts like these, there has arisen a significant literature on the criteria by which we do or should 
demarcate one living thing from another.  And while it is generally presumed that Kant’s 75
account of natural ends applies only to what we would pre-reflectively understand by ‘individual’ 
organisms, it is open to question whether or not the criteria he lays out might apply to other 
things as well, such as whole species. Kant himself says that the concept of a natural end is not a 
 Sterner (2017), 84. 73
 Bouchard (2008), 562-563.74
 Cf. e.g. Lidgard and Nyhart (eds.) (2017), Clarke (2010), Leuken (1951)75
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concept that can be abstracted from experience, and suggests that it might for all we know be 
empty—it might be the case that there are no natural ends (KU 5:396). But if a species is a 
natural end, one might wonder how an individual can be both an integral, autonomous whole in 
its own right while also being essentially a part of something else, namely of its species, now 
conceived as real whole in its own right. If to be a part just is as such to depend in some way on 
the whole and, therefore, to be incomplete of itself, then it will be hard to see how something 
could be both an integral whole in its own right while also belonging non-accidentally to a larger 
one. The thought might perhaps be most familiar in its social or political form: how can an 
individual person be both independent and autonomous while also belonging essentially to a 
community? And in the natural case, we might feel forced to suppose that to treat an ‘individual’ 
organism as essentially a part of something else is thereby to demote or qualify its unity and 
integrity.  
 There is, however, a way in which the seemingly interminable oscillation between 
‘individualism’ and ‘collectivism,’ broadly speaking, might be brought to an end. In particular, 
something could be both a part of some whole and itself a true, autonomous whole if it contains 
in itself the principle of the whole to which it belongs. Thus, while the arm of a given starfish is 
in one sense the means by which that starfish carries out its life activities, it is not merely a 
means, but possesses the principle of the whole in itself. And in some places, Kant seems to have 
just this in mind, for in §64 of the KU, after describing generation, nutrition, and the relationship 
between them, Kant refers to the practice of grafting one plant onto another, from which he takes 
the lesson that ‘one can regard every twig or leaf of one tree…as a tree existing in itself which 
only depends on the other and nourishes itself parasitically’ (KU 5:371-2). Each part of a tree not 
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only serves the tree, but is a tree unto itself, one which the other parts serve. It is a tree unto itself 
because the practice of grafting suggests that the nutritive or generative capacity is to be found in 
each and every part. Each part would then use the rest of the tree (‘parasitically’) to nourish itself 
while being used in turn by every other. And in §65, he says of a natural end that it is not 
sufficient that each part exist ‘for the sake of the others and on account of the whole;’ rather, each 
part ‘must be thought of as an organ that produces the other parts’ (KU 5:374).  This thought 76
was influenced in no small measure by experiments on polyps or hydra, known for their 
incredible regenerative capacities, and it was, in fact, the study of these which led the naturalist 
Hans Blumenbach to postulate his famous Bildungstrieb or formative force, which Kant refers to 
quite positively (KU 5:424). On the basis of his study, Blumenbach argued that one and the same 
power is responsible not only for nutrition and generation, but also for the restoration of parts, 
i.e. regeneration.  And this is to say that he identifies as belonging to organisms just those three 77
characteristics which Kant attributes to natural ends in §64. 
 Cf. also Groundwork 4:433. There Kant defines a ‘kingdom’ as a ‘systematic union of different rational 76
beings under common laws.’ Each person is simultaneously subject to common laws and the source of 
them. Each, he says, is simultaneously end and means, sovereign and subject. In that respect, the 
community of persons in a moral kingdom is quite analogous to the relations between the parts of a 
natural end. Just as each person is the source of law governing the whole, so each part has the generative 
faculty of the whole in itself, and just as each person is subject to the law, so also each part is a means 
which exists in the service of the whole. But it is precisely because each contains the source or generative 
principle of the whole that it is not merely a means, a mere thing, in Kant’s technical sense.
 Richards (2002), 18. But cf. also Buffon’s remarks on the generation of animals in Lyon and Sloan 77
(eds.) (1981). After discussing nutrition, he asks ‘is it not by a similar power [that] the internal mould 
itself is reproduced? It appears, that it is not only a similar but the same power which causes 
[development] and reproduction, for in an organized body which [develops], if there is some particle like 
the whole, it is sufficient for that particle to become one day an organized body itself, perfectly similar to 
that of which it made a part. This particle will not at first present a figure striking enough for us to 
compare with the whole body; but when separated from that body, and receiving proper nourishment, it 
will begin to expand, and in a short time present a similar being, both externally and internally, as the 
body from which it had been separated: thus a willow or polyp, which contain more organic particles 
similar to the whole than most other substances, if cut into ever such a number of pieces, from each piece 
will spring a body similar to that from whence it was divided’ (183).
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 If thought about in this way, then although Kant illustrates the concept of a natural end 
with a tree, it could perhaps be extended to the human species, e.g., or humanity itself. 
Humanity, in other words, might itself be a natural end or end of nature. If so, each individual 
would have to possess the principle of the species in itself, and indeed it does, for each possesses 
the generative power.  We have already seen Kant say that the human species constitutes a 78
Zeugungssystem, and that systematicity was characteristic of natural ends. Because of the 
generative power, they constitute not just a ‘logical’ system, but a real, causal one. To that extent, 
it does constitute a genuine whole, as opposed to a mere aggregate, and Kant says as much in his 
review of Herder’s Ideas. Herder had ridiculed the notion that the human race itself might be 
educated, since ‘kind and species are only general concepts, except insofar as they exist in 
individual beings’ (RH 8:65). It is, in other words, nonsense to speak of the education of the 
human race or species because that is not a real, educable thing. And Kant concedes that some 
such uses of species concepts are absurd, e.g. if one were to say that no individual horse is 
horned, but the species is. Nonetheless, he argues that there is a sense in which ‘“the human 
species” signifies the whole of a series of generations going (indeterminably) into the infinite’ 
and that such a meaning is ‘entirely customary’ (RH 8:65). In this customary sense, Kant thinks, 
we can indeed speak of the educability of humanity, and so he will speak in the Anthropology of 
‘the education of the human race, taking its species as a whole, that is, collectively 
(universorum), not all of the individuals (singulorum), where the multitude does not yield a 
 There is of course a question about the self-sufficiency of each individual human being since human 78
reproduction requires male and female participants. Perhaps it would be better to say that each of the 
races contains the principle of the whole, since each race includes both males and females, which contain 
in themselves the original, undifferentiated phylum from which each of the races sprung, the possession 
of which makes it possible for interracial unions to produce fertile offspring. As we shall see shortly, there 
is reason to think that Kant did consider the human species to constitute a genuine whole.
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system but only an aggregate’ (A 7:328). To that extent, then, we can say that the human species 
does come into possession of attributes we would ordinarily speak of only individually, e.g. 
education. And indeed, in his Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, he argues 
that humanity has a plan and unfolding, i.e. that ‘those predispositions whose goal is the use of 
his reason were to develop completely only in the species, but not in individual’ (I 8:18). The 
human species itself, therefore, is to be understood teleologically, and the lives of individuals and 
individual peoples all subserve its end, even though unaware of it (I 8:17). It is only in the life, as 
it were, of the species that humanity realizes its full potential. 
 Kant’s remarks about the unity of the human species and their progression could 
plausibly be said to apply to other species as well. If something can be both a part and an integral 
whole in its own right if it contains the principle of the larger whole to which it belongs, and if 
species membership is defined by the possession of a common or shared generative capacity, 
then any given species would likewise constitute a genuine whole. The species would nourish/
generate itself in virtue of its parts, i.e. its members, which would together exhaustively express 
all the manifoldness that lies in the original phylum of that species. In that sense, each individual 
would stand in the service of the common phylum as but a partial expression of it or way of 
carrying it out. And Kant does ascribe to nature the aim of developing all the manifoldness that 
lies in the phylum of a given species, which suggests that we should understand natural species 
teleologically as well. But if we are to understand species as themselves natural ends, and if in a 
natural end the whole or the ground of a whole is prior to any of its parts, then knowledge of a 
species would be prior to knowledge of any of its instances, in the same way that knowledge of 
the whole life activity of an organism would be prior to knowledge of the role of any of its 
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parts.  Only on the basis of such knowledge could we identify what truly belonged to an 79
individual as an instance of a particular sort, and which of its features were merely accidents of 
circumstance. And this would further connect one of the central themes of the third Critique with 
the discussion of real purposiveness in the latter half of the same. Because the common causal 
principle at the root of a natural end such as a tree is one and the same as a capacity to generate 
more instances of itself, knowledge of that principle would amount to knowledge of real kinds, 
since it was just this principle that was supposed to make the difference between artificial or 
school divisions and real, causal divisions among things. In that sense, knowledge of natural 
ends amounts to knowledge of real divisions among kinds. 
 If that is right, we can perhaps make sense of Kant’s remark that the concept of a natural 
end ‘necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system in accordance with the rule 
of ends’ and that ‘by means of the example that nature gives in its organic products, one is 
justified, indeed called upon to expect nothing in nature and its laws but what is purposive in the 
whole’ (KU 5:379).  That the presumed existence of natural ends might suggest that nature more 80
broadly is purposive seems reasonable enough, but that it would necessarily lead to such an idea 
and that we should be called upon to expect more extensive natural purposiveness can seem to 
 Cf. Thompson (2008), 59: ‘We are wrong to think of the concepts of the various life-forms [species] as 79
reached through abstraction from features of their particular bearers. That notion takes for granted a 
picture of the terrestrial biosphere as offering us a magazine of living individuals, which we then carve up 
in accordance with certain principles. The error is not overcome, but only complicated, by the Realist 
notion that, after all, we “carve at the joints.” What is wrongly called carving is already a part of thinking 
of individual things as alive, as organisms available for classification.’ Thompson is arguing against an 
unacceptably nominalist construal of living things, according to which it would make sense to say, of an 
isolated individual, that it was alive. Rather, the identification of something as alive—or, indeed, as a 
natural end—depends on a reference to a ‘wider context,’ its life-form or species.
 On claims such as these, cf. Watkins (2014a), who thinks they have been quite generally neglected. 80
Watkins asks (rhetorically) ‘Why not be a biologist who is committed to understanding (the functioning 
of) organisms and leave it at that?’ 
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overshoot what the evidence really allows. But if individual natural ends, such as trees, are 
intrinsically related to some common kind, then the strength of Kant’s claim becomes more 
intelligible. If a tree is a natural end, then any adequate idea of it necessarily involves the idea of 
a system of other things quite like it, some species. If that species is itself a systematic whole 
which produces itself—if it is a natural end in turn—then it would stand in community with other 
species wholes under some genus.  But what is more, the very same cognitive act which makes 81
available the presumed causal unity of a natural end makes available the causal unity of the 
species, namely reflective judgment. It belongs to judgment of this kind to ascend ‘from the 
particular in nature to the universal,’ which is to say that it belongs to reflective judgment to find 
or discover the distinctly common ground—if any there be—of any given set of parts, whether a 
set of parts of a body in some one space or a set of individuals in different geographic locations 
(KU 5:180-1). And just as we do not know whether or not there are any natural ends, i.e. whether 
the concept of a natural end has objective reality, so neither can we know that nature is ordered 
into empirical kinds, and these two facts would seem now to be quite intimately related. As we 
will see in the next chapter, to have such knowledge would require knowledge of their noumenal 
grounds, which we lack. Our ignorance of noumena is at least in part an ignorance of their 
numerical identity and diversity—we cannot know whether the noumenal ground of my 
experiences of Mittens and the noumenal ground of my experiences of Whiskers are in fact the 
same.  We cannot know, in other words, whether they share a common or communal ground. 82
 And Kant entertains something like this thought in the chapter on the Methodology of the Teleological 81
Power of Judgment (§80), but calls it a ‘daring adventure of reason.’ I discussed it above, 40-1, and as I 
noted there, the actual evidence for any such unity is sparse indeed, for the generative criterion of species 
has no clear analogue at the level of genera or between species. 
 Cf. Schafer (forthcoming) in Schafer and Stang (eds.).82
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Similarly, we cannot know that the noumenal ground of cats more broadly (if there is one such 
ground) is the same as the noumenal ground of dogs (if there is one such ground). 
4.8 KANT’S USE OF ZWECK 
 In the foregoing, I have tried to give an account of the structure of natural ends 
(Naturzwecke) and to identify the metaphysical principles at work in Kant’s account of them. 
That effort consisted largely in exploring Kant’s two favored ways of describing natural ends, i.e. 
mereologically and as systems. But although I have tried to articulate what I take to be the 
primary metaphysical principle at work in Kant’s understanding of natural ends, namely 
community, one might still wonder how the above pertains to teleology, for I have said nothing 
about goal-directedness, functions, or the like, and these would seem to be the bread and butter 
of any discussion of teleology or final causality. The above account can, I believe, capture some 
of the essential features of teleology, as it is often understood, even if many of the problems to 
which that account addressed itself were not obviously or straightforwardly ‘teleological’ 
problems. For this reason, I want to say something about Kant’s use of Zweck, for it exhibits a 
certain peculiarity which makes it, as a philosophical concept, somewhat distinct from the notion 
of ‘end’ or ‘goal’ as it occurs in much of the literature on teleology. I will then say why I think 
the above account can capture Kant’s explicit definitions of ends in the third Critique. 
 It would be too much to undertake here a complete investigation of Kant’s use of Zweck, 
but we can notice certain relevant features from a quick glance at just some of the passages in 
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which he uses it. In the introduction to the doctrine of virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals, for 
example, Kant says of an end that it is an object of the choice of rational being, and that while 
others can make me perform particular actions in the service of something, I can only be said to 
have an end to the extent to which I have determined for myself—rationally—to pursue a 
particular course of action (MS 6: 381; 6:385). That is, for any particular course of action to 
count as an end for me, it must be something my reason determines itself to do. Coercing 
someone to adopt an end would be like coercing someone to be free (MS 6:381). In his Lectures 
on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, Kant distinguishes between skill, prudence, and 
wisdom, saying of the latter that it constitutes the perfection of cognition (LR 28:1057). A wise 
human being is one whose ends all together stand in harmony with the general dictates of 
morality, for ‘morals has as its object precisely to consider how each end can stand together with 
the idea of a whole of all ends.’ Indeed, Kant says that we have from morality an example of a 
highest understanding which can proceed from the whole to the particular, because in morality 
one can determine the worth of any given end on the basis of an idea of a whole of all ends. On 
the basis of such remarks, it would seem that some ends, at least, are particular determinations of 
a more general capacity, namely reason or the capacity for choice, where these more particular 
determinations would, ideally, stand together in a system. As parts of a system, ends count as the 
matter of that system, and indeed in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant glosses ends as matter. 
Distinguishing between duties of virtue and duties of right, he says of the former that they have 
to do with what is formal in the moral determination of the will, not ‘with a certain end (matter, 
object of choice)’ (MS 6: 383).  
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 In those places in which Kant most clearly explicates the concept of Zweck in the third 
Critique, its relation to choice is suppressed, as is its material role with respect to a more general 
principle. An end, he says, is ‘the object of a concept insofar as the latter is regarded as the cause 
of the former,’ where the existence of the object, as an effect, is possible only through a concept 
of it. The same chord is struck in other places (KU 5:220; EE 20: 232; KU 5:408), and so just as 
the parts of a tree are possible only in relation to their common cause, so an end is possible only 
through a concept of it. But if a concept is, as Kant thinks, a repraesentatio communis, then an 
end or Zweck would again seem to be a more particular determination of a something general or 
common. That is to say, in the case of an end, a concept or repraesentatio communis is the causal 
ground of the existence of an object falling under the self-same concept. And in virtue its 
connection to that ground—the common representation—the object brought into being (the end) 
stands in community with other ends, possible or real. That is, ends by their very nature stand in 
a system with each other under a common principle or idea in the same way that diverse 
individuals stand under a common species. All manifoldness of ends is then only so many 
different ways of limiting the concept or idea, which is, as a general representation, their 
common substratum and in virtue of which they stand in a system. In this way, each end gives 
the concept from which it issues more determinate form, but necessarily excludes other possible 
ways of embodying that same concept. At the same time, a concept is also only a partial 
representation of each of the things to which it applies for the simple reason that there is always 
more contained in the individual than is contained in the species (or in a species than is in its 
genus). That it is a castle is only one of many things to be said about Hearst Castle. 
Consequently, though an end is said to be caused by a general representation, it is also true that 
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the individual which issues from the concept issues from or is generated by some part of itself. 
Just as nature in general is thought to ‘specify’ itself, so also a concept as a general 
representation ‘particularizes itself’ in its products, which are its ends, the totality of which in 
turn constitute the concept. The principle of unity ‘diversifies’ itself into many particulars each of 
which partially mirrors or represents that original unity in its own way.   
  
4.9 CONCLUSION 
 I want now to return to Kant’s only reference to Aristotle or Aristotelianism in any of his 
discussions of teleology, that reference with which we began. Just after saying that ‘the genus 
(considered logically) is as it were the matter, or the raw substratum, which nature works up into 
particular species and subspecies,’ he refers to the Aristotelian principle that the genus is the 
matter, the species the form. It is not just the principle that is Aristotelian, however; so too is 
Kant’s articulation of the point in dynamic terms, for Boethius had said that ‘the genus is broken 
up…in a kind of creation, as it were, from itself (in quadam a se quodammodo creatione), and a 
genus is always a whole in relation to its proper species’ (878d). To that extent, the ‘self-creation’ 
of a common principle by means of its own division or even refraction into a multitude of 
diverse but nonetheless unified parts belonged to the Aristotelian tradition to which Kant refers. 
Whether the above is thought to be merely a colorful way of describing the logical relation 
between a common principle and its parts or a description of a causal relation between them 
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naturally depends on the extent to which, or the way in which, the community in which those 
parts stand is real or merely ideal, i.e. something the intellect brings about. 
 Against this background, I have argued that the problem of teleology which Kant took 
himself to be addressing should be understood in relation to community. Kant describes natural 
ends as systems the parts of which reciprocally produce one another and the whole. The parts of 
a logical system, the form of which is division, stand in the same relations. In both cases, the 
parts stand in community with each other under a common principle. Because ours is a 
discursive intellect, i.e. an intellect which cognizes through concepts, it requires as material 
conditions for its activity, as it were, both diversity and unity in its representations. It requires, in 
other words, the possibility of ordering its representations into a system of the higher and the 
lower, genera and species. But, given the connection, both historically and in Kant’s own texts, 
between genera and species and the concept of community, this just means that the intellect 
requires for its exercise relations of community among things. The task of discovering those 
genera and species and, therefore, those communities, belongs to reflective judgment. And 
though the intellect cannot dictate to nature that in fact there be such communities of things, it 
will have a coherent use only if there are. 
 But if it belongs to the discursive intellect to divide nature into genera and species and so 
into different communities, this is not yet to saying anything about how best to do it, and there 
was disagreement among both among philosophers (e.g. Locke and Leibniz) and natural 
historians (Linnaeus and Leclerc) about what the proper criteria should be for the construction of 
classes of things, even barring disputes about the metaphysical reality of the communities 
posited. And here Kant follows Leibniz and Buffon in insisting on the importance of generation, 
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for it is generation which differentiates between a division based merely on morphological 
affinities and one based on causal affinity. Generation, in other words, would seem to reveal a 
real causal ground of the community of things: those things that can produce fertile offspring 
with one another stand together in a causal community under one and the same generative power, 
i.e. in a Zeugungssystem.   
 Finally, I argued that natural ends, which exhibit the kind of unity which Leibniz had 
thought required a monad or substantial form, should also be understood in terms of community, 
for Kant says that a natural end not only has the form of a system but also that all the parts have a 
communal ground. It is this communal ground which accounts for the systematic unity of the 
end. And if the generative power is the communal principle of the unity of the human species, I 
argued that the nutritive power is the communal principle of the unity of a natural end. This 
power is the causality of a substance and that in virtue of which all the other parts of the 
substance stand in community with one another. The causality manifested by those parts are but 
partial expressions of the single but nonetheless common nutritive power. In that sense, the 
causal power of a natural end is common to its parts while also communicating itself to new 
matter by means of those very same parts. And this is the sense in which natural ends are self-
generating. None of the above, however, explains why we can understand natural ends only by 
analogy, and why, as Kant says, ‘a real whole of nature is to be regarded only as the effect of the 
concurrent moving forces of the parts’ (KU 5:407). It is to this problem that I now turn.
!206
If we are to judge at least in accordance 
with what it is granted to us to understand 
through our own nature…we absolutely cannot 
base the possibility of natural ends on anything 
except an intelligent being. 
—KU 5:400. 
Just as each nation judges coinage against 
that which it knows best, so we must do in 
other things; and of all the animals, the human 
being is by necessity best known to us. 
—HA I.6; 491a20-23. 
5.0 PERSONS, PURPOSES, AND PARALOGISMS 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that central to Kant’s understanding of a natural end or 
purpose, such as an oak, is the concept of community. The parts of a natural end stand in 
community with one another under their common or communal ground. That ground is the 
power of a natural substance for the activities of nutrition and reproduction, for it is just these 
activities (which are in fact one and the same activity under different names (KU 5:371)) which 
are common to or shared by all the parts of a natural end.  The parts are purposive because they 1
each exercise some distinct portion of their otherwise common or communal activity and owe 
their existence to it. That is to say, the activity of each part is a limited or partial expression of 
the complete activity of the substance and in that sense stands in service to it. But because Kant 
only rarely mentions a gemeinschaftliche Grund when discussing natural ends, this claim was 
grounded largely (but by no means completely) on an analogy between the parts of a logical 
system and those of a natural end, which Kant describes as a system. The logical form of a 
 I use ‘substance’ here in the traditional (Aristotelian) sense, and not simply as ‘stuff’ (as Locke 1
sometimes uses it). More will be said to justify this sense in what follows, but it is also connected with 
Kant’s remarks in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.
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system consisted in the division of a general or common concept into its subordinate species. As 
in a logical system, so too in a natural end is the whole prior to its parts. As in a logical system, 
so too in natural end do the parts reciprocally ‘generate’ one another and the whole. As in a 
logical system, so too in a natural end do the parts stand ‘in community’ (in Gemeinschaft) with 
one another. 
 Understood in this way, the latter half of the third Critique is notably continuous with one 
of the primary themes of the introductions to that work, namely ‘the possibility of the application 
of logic to nature’ (EE 20:212).  Kant argues that the unity of experience requires more than 2
what is provided by the transcendental laws outlined in the first Critique, which leave quite open 
what the empirical world actually looks like. Indeed, nature might have been characterized by 
such overwhelming diversity that ‘no coherent use of the understanding’ would have been 
possible (A651/B680; KU 5:187). Consequently, we must at least suppose that nature is 
amenable to beings with intellects like ours, which means we must suppose it takes the form of a 
system, i.e. a division into genera and species. We must, in other words, treat nature as if it were 
divided into different species standing together in community under genera, even if we can never 
know that in fact it is. In this way, Kant side-steps the traditional debate about universals, which 
itself arose out of metaphysical questions quite intimately connected to the practice of dividing 
genera into species. And ‘community’ often played a central role in the formulation of those 
questions: do the individuals standing under a species or the species under a genus constitute a 
real community, or is the thought that they do merely something effected by the intellect?  
 Of course, in one sense the first Critique already secured the applicability of logic to nature insofar as 2
the manifold of intuition is synthesized through the different forms of judgment, but there is a further 
problem about the regularity and order of distinctly empirical kinds. Cf. EE 20: 216; chapter 1, fn.1.
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 The essential question about natural ends and their characteristic unity was then argued to 
run parallel to the question about the unity of experience: do the parts of something like an oak 
constitute a real community, or is the thought that they do merely something effected by the 
intellect? But if Kant side-steps the question about the reality of universals, insisting only that we 
must approach nature as if it were grouped hierarchically into kinds, he similarly side-steps the 
question about the reality of purposiveness in living things, insisting only that we must approach 
them as if they were purposive. Our task now is to understand more precisely why, for (at first 
glance) this constitutes precisely the difference between Aristotle and Kant on the question of 
natural teleology: for the former, living things are in fact purposive, both in respect of their parts 
and their activities, but for the latter, although they might indeed appear that way, we can never 
know that in fact they are. Whatever we might ultimately think of this way of stating the 
difference between Aristotle and Kant, however, it remains to be seen both (i) why the communal 
ground of natural organisms remains, in Kant’s eyes, essentially unavailable to us, and so why, as 
a consequence, mechanism remains the scientifically preferred method of explanation, as well as 
(ii) why organisms can only be explained by reference to or on analogy with rational action.  
 My aim in what follows is to answer both questions. I argue that according to Kant we 
cannot cognize the communal ground of a natural end because we cannot cognize simples, and 
we cannot cognize simples because everything to be met with in outer intuition is extended. The 
closest we come to any such grasp, I argue, is the grasp we have of ourselves in self-
consciousness. Consequently, we understand the ground of the vital unity of a natural end only 
on analogy with the different modes of self-consciousness. Finding the principle of teleological 
analogy in self-consciousness comports well with its centrality in Kant’s thought quite generally. 
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But what is more, the parallel between organic unity and the unity of (self-)consciousness can be 
seen in some of Kant’s most influential predecessors, including Locke and Leibniz. For both, 
what makes the difference between a mere aggregate of things and genuine unity is something 
akin to a substantial form, a soul, or the I present in self-consciousness.  This same thought is 3
central to Kant’s account of teleology, though shaped in distinctive ways by its transposition into 
the broader context of the critical philosophy. 
 The plan then is this. I begin in §1 by recapitulating a problem discussed towards the end 
of the previous chapter, namely the identification and individuation of living things. That 
problem arises because although Kant elucidates the concept of a natural end with the example 
of a single oak, its characteristic features might plausibly be said to belong to whole species as 
well. Like a natural end, the members of a species share in a common causal ground and stand in 
a system. They are, to that extent, no mere aggregate. And Kant quite explicitly considers 
humanity, at least, to constitute a genuine whole. The problem is also made more pressing by 
Kant’s claim that we do not know whether or not there in fact are any natural ends at all—for any 
given thing, we cannot know whether or not it is a natural end. But what is more, it would also 
be consistent with the suggestion made by some that part of what we do not know about 
noumena is how to individuate them. Consequently, to the extent that natural ends depend on a 
 To be sure, this claim requires some nuance, particularly in Locke’s case, but the general point remains. 3
Guyer (2001a) argues that the kind of thought I am attributing to Kant in the third Critique does not 
appear until the Opus Postumum. That is, only in the latter work does Kant argue organic beings must be 
understood as designed because they have a distinctive unity which the infinitely composite and divisible 
nature of matter never has: only the indivisible unity of thought could explain the unity of such a material 
being. As we have seen, however, and indeed as we shall continue to see, the real unity of a natural end 
arises time and again in the third Critique and is consistent with traditional questions about the role and 
nature of the form or soul of natural substances. Thus, to say of natural ends that they have the form of a 
system and are therefore to be distinguished from mere aggregates just is to say that they possess a 
distinctive kind of unity. Such language is pervasive. 
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noumenal ground, it simply will not be available to us to distinguish one from another. We do not 
know whether Mittens’ noumenal causal ground is the same as Whiskers’—they might both 
share in a common ground, together with others of their putative kind, but they might not. 
 On this basis, I then turn in §2 to Locke’s treatment of identity and diversity in Essay 
II.xxvii, as well as Leibniz’ reaction to it, both of which were mentioned very briefly in the 
previous chapter. There Locke gives an account of persons and their persistence conditions 
which builds off of and is continuous with his account of the identity and continuity of (i) 
material wholes or aggregates and (ii) plants and animals. That account is often couched in 
mereological terms, such that the continuity and identity of matter and living things are defined 
by different part-whole priority relations, together with what accounts for those differences. 
Locke attempts to articulate, in other words, in virtue of what all the changing parts and 
properties of a putatively single thing in fact constitute a genuine unity. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, this is precisely what is so often at stake in Kant’s discussions in the CTJ. 
These same issues are naturally at work in Leibniz’ response to Locke, but are now couched 
more explicitly and indeed more favorably in the Aristotelian language of soul and substance. 
But the relation between person, natural substance, and substantial unity was an old one. Though 
in a sense just one kind of substance among others, persons were regarded as substances in the 
highest and most paradigmatic sense. And so as in the previous chapter, and using St. Thomas as 
an exemplar, I suggest that the epistemic and metaphysical priority of persons over natural, non-
rational substances can be found in scholastic Aristotelianism, to which Locke, Leibniz, and Kant 
were each in their own ways indebted. According to that tradition, the notion of a person served 
as a model for understanding individual substance quite generally. At the same time, the form of 
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an individual substance could be and was conceived as the efficient cause of many of its 
accidents, accidents which could not be said to belong to its species. Thus, an individual 
substance was thought to determine itself in ways left undetermined by the species to which it 
belonged. Otherwise put, the individual form was the efficient causal ground of what was not 
analytically contained in the concept of its species or genus.   
 Given the close, traditional connection between persons and natural substances, I turn 
then in §3 to Kant’s understanding of persons and what we know of them. In particular, I argue 
that we can have no theoretical knowledge of persons. I briefly discuss Kant’s critique of rational 
psychology in the Paralogisms chapter of the first Critique, in which Kant denies some of the 
traditional claims made about the rational soul, e.g. that it is imperishable and immortal. Because 
those features have an essentially temporal significance, they could be ascribed to the soul only if 
it appeared in intuition. But, Kant argues, because the soul is simple, it cannot so appear, and so 
we cannot know that it has the features traditionally said to belong to it. Indeed, Kant argues that 
thinking beings as such never appear in intuition, given the essential unity and simplicity of 
thought. Consequently, the representation of anything outside ourselves as a thinking being—and 
so, therefore, as a person—requires a ‘transference’ of our own consciousness to it. In that sense, 
we can have no theoretical knowledge of persons.  
 But if persons are as such unavailable to theoretical reason, they figure centrally in 
practical reason, and so I turn in §4 to three important features of persons or rational substances 
made available from the practical standpoint, namely their persistence, freedom, and community. 
In virtue of our consciousness of the moral law, we are conscious of ourselves as (or necessarily 
take ourselves to be) free agents, i.e. beings possessed of a kind of causality which is 
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independent of nature. But what is more, the moral law on the basis of which we conceive of 
ourselves as free also requires us to suppose that we exist and persist as numerically one and the 
same rational being through all sensible and material changes, including death. That is to say, 
practical reason postulates the immortality of our souls as a necessary condition for the 
satisfaction of the moral law. And third, the moral law grounds a noumenal community of 
individuals which cannot be secured through theoretical reason. That is, the theoretical category 
of community only has significance for objects in space, and so the only way the thought of a 
noumenal community becomes available to us is through practical reason’s understanding of a 
moral community of persons.  
 I then turn in §5 to our consciousness of ourselves in aesthetic experience or the 
experience of beauty. I do so because in §6 I shall argue that what we are conscious of in 
aesthetic experience is precisely what we ‘transfer’ to natural ends in our consideration of them. 
That is, just as the consideration of anything as a rational being or person required a 
‘transference’ of our own thinking to it, so the consideration of anything as a natural end will 
require the ‘transference’ of what we are conscious of in aesthetic experience. Because natural 
ends are not persons, they are not objects of practical reason. As natural, they are instead objects 
of theoretical reason. But natural ends are remarkable precisely because they are theoretical 
objects which nonetheless evince some of the features thought to belong to persons and so 
familiar only from self-consciousness. In particular, they exhibit a degree of unity and 
persistence which would seem to outstrip what belongs to any merely material aggregate, as 
(apparently) self-organizing beings they would also seem to initiate action under their own 
power, and they would seem to stand together in a more than merely spatial community. As 
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theoretical objects which would seem nonetheless to be quite similar to persons, then, they stand 
uncomfortably between theoretical and practical reason.  
 Our consciousness of ourselves in the experience of beauty fills this gap because essential 
to that experience is what Kant calls the ‘feeling of life.’ What we ‘transfer’ to natural ends 
becomes available to us in the conscious exercise of that power which Kant says ‘mediates’ 
between theoretical and practical reason: the power of judgment. The feeling of life which 
belongs to our judgments of beauty arises out of the free and spontaneous activity of our powers 
and is characterized by a unity and reciprocity among them. It is a felt unity of our subject, and 
indeed that in virtue of which we are conscious of our animality, i.e. the unity of our rational and 
sensible faculties. At the same time, the experience of beauty depends on what Kant calls a 
common sense (Gemeinsinn), by means of which we put ourselves ‘into the position of everyone 
else’ (KU 5:294). And that is just to say that the feeling of life to be had in aesthetic experience 
constitutively involves reference to others with that same feeling, i.e. a community of others 
animated by the same feeling of life. While not yet the moral community of persons which is the 
object of practical reason, neither is it merely the community of bodies in one and the same 
space. 
 As noted then, I argue in §6 that this feeling of life is precisely what we ‘transfer’ to 
natural ends and that at issue for Kant in the explicability of natural ends is the presence or 
absence of an ‘inner’ principle of change—a principle of life. This inner principle grounds the 
unity, community, and causality of the parts of a natural end, at least if we take what we 
understand of ourselves in self-consciousness as the model. And so, in the Analytic of 
Teleological Judgment, Kant says that we should understand natural ends on analogy with life, 
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which he elsewhere defines as the faculty of a substance to determine itself to act from an 
internal principle. But, he says, the only internal principle we know of is desire, and the only 
internal activity, thinking. Natural ends, then, are not mechanically explicable because the cause 
of their changes is not external to them, and so not to be met with in intuition. This fact becomes 
explicit in one of Kant’s rare references to Hume in the third Critique, which touches on a point 
the latter makes in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and which touches on precisely 
the (alleged) difference between the systematicity of thought and the systematicity of a material 
being. If they are to be genuine systems, natural ends must therefore depend on a noumenal 
ground, the model for which can only be given by features available to us in our consciousness 
of ourselves. If in fact they lacked a noumenal ground, they would be mere aggregates, beings 
whose unity was merely a function of the collocation of their parts in space. They would have 
something like the status of rainbows—merely apparent unities.  
 The simple principle of life, then, plays the role of form or soul on the traditional 
Aristotelian model of composite substances. As we have seen, this was essential to Leibniz’ 
conception of living things, and it was no less true for Kant. Given some of the commitments of 
the critical philosophy, that principle is unavailable to us. But by understanding Kant’s concerns 
in relation to traditional doctrines about the role and function of soul or form in natural 
composites, we can see how the simple principle of a natural end can underwrite a variety of its 
features. On this basis, we can then reconcile number of different proposals concerning how to 
understand the contrast between mechanism and purposiveness.  
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5.1 INDIVIDUUM EST INEFFABILE 
 Towards the end of the previous chapter, I discussed the possibility that on Kant’s view 
whole species might constitute natural ends. This is not of course to say that they do, but that 
they might—Kant does not say one way or the other. The suggestion was premised on the 
thought that the characteristics Kant ascribes to something like an oak belong just as well to 
species.  A natural end has the form of a system and so is no mere aggregate. Its unity—its 4
community—is grounded in its nutritive causal power, which unites the parts into a whole. That 
causal power is (somehow) found whole and entire in each of its parts, and so Kant says that 
‘one can regard every twig or leaf of one tree…as a tree existing in itself which only depends on 
the other and nourishes itself parasitically’ (KU 5:371-2). In the same way, the different human 
races stand in a system and so are no mere aggregate. The unity of the races—their community—
is grounded in a common cause, the generative power, which Kant says is in fact one and the 
same as the nutritive power, albeit under a different name (KU 5:371). And the generative power 
is found whole and entire in each of its parts in much the same way that the nutritive power is 
found in each of the parts of an oak. That is, each contains the original human phylum in itself, 
for even if no race expresses everything contained in that phylum, the different races can produce 
fertile offspring with one another, and so they are not in virtue of their diversity closed off from 
the original unity of that phylum. But if there is reason to suppose that the human species itself is 
a natural end, and reason to suppose that each of its members is as well, we might wonder how 
one natural end can be a part of another and yet distinct from it.  
 I am here ignoring the subtlety that Kant does not in fact say that an oak is a natural end, but merely 4
illuminates the concept with the oak as an example. Again, Kant insists that we cannot in fact know 
whether there are any natural ends.
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 I will not undertake to address that question now. I suggested a possible answer in the 
previous chapter. But for the above reasons, there is quite generally a puzzle about just what is to 
count as an ‘individual’ organism or, in Kant’s case, a natural end. Thus, I also mentioned in the 
last chapter a species of aspen instances of which look to the casual observer like a whole forest, 
but share a common root system and so by one criterion count as a single individual. Similarly, 
some starfish can regenerate an entire body from a single arm. It was precisely phenomena of 
this sort which led Blumenbach to postulate his famous ‘formative force’ or Bildungstrieb, which 
Kant refers to positively in the CTJ (KU 5:424). In this case, the questions that arise are not 
unlike those that arise from considering, e.g., the famous Ship of Theseus puzzle. Take a starfish, 
cut it in half, and watch each half grow anew—which if either is the original starfish? And while 
the body of the original was split in two, was the regenerative power residing in it divided as 
well? Or are the regenerative powers now residing in the two, spatially distinct halves still one 
and the same regenerative power? They are at least the same in kind, if not in number. But given 
the capacity of an individual starfish to divide in this way, the regenerative power of an 
individual would seem not to be distinct from—and so identical with—the power which unites 
many different starfish into some one kind, at least potentially. The animating principle of this 
individual could not then be grasped by itself alone, itself by itself, but only by means of a 
common representation, or a representation which contains in potentia other individuals which 
might fall under it. The living is, as it were, made for concepts: essentially communicable, if not 
in fact communicated, further division is always possible, and we never arrive at truly isolated 
individuals. 
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 In light of these questions, I want now to turn to considerations of the unity and identity 
of living things in some of Kant’s predecessors, for as we shall see, those considerations were 
often intimately interwoven with a certain conception of persons. Indeed, our model for the unity 
and identity of non-rational living things was often taken from the conception we have of 
ourselves as persons and, as a consequence, what we take ourselves to know (or not) about 
ourselves promises to shed light on what we can (or cannot) know about the unity and identity of 
living things. 
5.2 SAMENESS, SELF, AND SUBSTANCE 
 The notion of identity, Locke says, is borne of the comparison of a thing at a given time 
and place with itself at another (II.xxvii.1). The attempt to come to an adequate account of 
identity, he thinks, has been frustrated by an insufficient appreciation of the different sorts of 
things to which the notion of identity is applied, and identity is always applied to some sort. 
Thus, what it is for a mass of matter at different times and places to be the same mass, and what 
it is for an organism at different times and places to be the same organism, are quite different 
because masses of matter and organisms are quite different things. And so when discussing their 
identity conditions, Locke sees fit to single out two characteristic features of living things: they 
are organized and they contain the principle of organization within themselves. The organization 
among the parts of an oak, for example, is responsible for its own continuance or persistence, 
and the parts of the oak are said to constitute a living whole only insofar as they share in a 
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common life—the life of the oak. In that sense, what is whole or shared among the parts is prior 
to them, for nothing gets to count as a part of the whole unless it shares in the life of that to 
which it belongs, i.e. the life of the oak.  
 Merely material substances, by contrast, constitute some one thing or whole not in virtue 
of a common life but the ‘parcels of matter’ which make them up; their parts are wholly 
determinative of what they compose and a change in parts makes for a difference in individuals. 
Speaking of a mass of atoms, Locke says that ‘if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new 
one added, it is no longer the same mass, or the same body’ (II.xxvii.3). A living thing can lose or 
gain matter while remaining one and the same living thing, for as we saw, it was precisely the 
common life which grounds continuity and identity, binding the many parts into one. Thus, the 
horse is at first a colt, but grows and matures, being variously fat and lean but all the while 
remaining the same horse. Similarly, an oak is at first a sapling, but grows and matures, now 
flowering, now not, but all the while remaining the same oak. The matter and qualities of each 
change, even constantly, and so considered simply materially, there is a succession of different 
individuals:  
truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, though they truly be 
one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is 
that in these two cases of a Mass of Matter, and a living Body, Identity is not 
applied to the same thing (II.xxvii.3).  
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‘Identity’ in a living thing is applied to something common, namely its life. ‘Identity’ in a mass 
of matter designates only some quite definite aggregate of parts in some definite time and space. 
And while the material passes away, the living persists.  5
 Though Locke and Kant are ostensibly concerned with two quite different topics—
identity and diversity on the one hand, and mechanism and purposiveness, on the other—Kant’s 
own discussion tracks many of Locke’s distinctions. We saw many of the details in the last 
chapter, but it will be helpful to recapitulate some of them here. Kant’s discussion of natural ends 
or purposes is intended to identify and to understand what sets them apart from other products of 
nature. Like Locke’s merely material substances, Kant’s non-purposive products of nature are 
mere material aggregates or assemblages of pre-existing parts. Indeed, Kant often understands 
the essential character of mechanism in just this way. When speaking of a logical division, for 
example, he says that ‘if one regards the parts for such a possible whole as already completely 
given, then the division proceeds mechanically…and the whole becomes an aggregate’ (EE 
20:247). Similarly, he says that ‘with regard to its products as aggregates, nature proceeds 
mechanically, as mere nature’ (EE 20:217). And because they are no more than aggregates, 
mechanically generated composites are simply products of their parts (KU 5:408). Otherwise put, 
it is the whole that it is simply because of its parts, and so a different set of parts will mean a 
 Cf. Chappell (1989) and (1990). Locke seems to think that the life of an oak consists of a succession of 5
different masses of matter possessing the same organization. They are, in other words, coincident objects. 
An oak therefore consists of a series of otherwise merely material individuals said on the basis of 
comparison or on reflection to be the same in virtue of their organization. In that sense, what persists 
through change is precisely not the matter, and what grounds the identity of a single oak over time is quite 
analogous to the identity shared by different individuals of a species. Yaffe (2007) argues that for Locke, 
the difference in identity conditions for masses or aggregates of matter and organisms should not be taken 
to reflect a real difference in their ‘mind-independent natures’ but only a difference in our ideas of them 
(205). But since Locke thinks ‘General and Universal belong not to the real existence of Things; but are 
the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding,’ he would seem to think that organisms are in fact 
nothing but aggregates or assemblages of matter.
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different whole. By contrast, natural ends have the unity of a system; they are ‘organized and 
self-organizing’ (KU 5:374). Their parts share in a common ground and exhibit as a consequence 
a more profound unity—systematic unity. They compose, in other words, a genuine whole in 
which each part is possible only in relation to that whole. And the whole itself, rather than 
something outside or external to it, is responsible for the organization of its parts (KU 5:373). 
Consequently, if some natural (and thus also material) whole is thought to be a product of the 
whole itself and thus the cause of its parts, then according to Kant we represent a purposive kind 
of generation.  Much of the content of the notions of mechanism and purposiveness would seem 6
therefore to be captured by the contrast between an aggregate and genuine unity, where the latter 
is for both Kant and Locke secured by the participation of parts in something common.  7
 But famously, Locke is concerned not simply with the identity of masses of matter and 
organisms, but with persons, and so to determine in what personal identity consists, Locke 
judges it necessary to determine what a person is, or at least what idea the term stands for.  A 8
person, Locke says, is a ‘thinking intelligent being’ able to consider ‘it self as it self’ (III.xxvii.9). 
 This suggests that mechanical and purposive causality are not in fact equally capable of producing one 6
and the same product, the one by necessity, the other intentionally. Rather, what each produces is 
categorically different from what the other produces, i.e. aggregates and real wholes, respectively.
 McLaughlin (1991) focuses simply on the different directions of mereological dependence between 7
mechanical and purposive products of nature, making little of the difference between aggregates and true 
unities. As we saw in the last chapter, Teufel (2011) argues that a difference merely in the direction of 
mereological dependence should not amount to a different kind of causality, and understood abstractly 
and simply as a difference in dependence of this kind, the criticism has some merit. In part for this reason, 
McLaughlin himself is at a loss to explain why whole-to-part causality should be problematic. If however 
we allow ourselves the language of aggregates and true unities, and understand what it was that 
traditionally made the difference between them to be something like a soul or form, then an explanation 
starts to come into view. As we shall see, because soul or form is an unextended simple, it cannot be given 
in intuition, and that makes all the difference in the world.
 Cf. Chappell (1990), who says that ‘Locke’s treatment of persons is parallel, in many respects, to his 8
treatment of organisms.’ And just as Locke took organisms to be compounded of both atoms and masses 
of matter, so too will he take persons to be compounded of things which are not persons (27). It is 
noteworthy that Chappell goes on to argue that Locke thinks of persons as substances, even though Locke 
never says that they are. As we shall see, traditionally persons just were substances. 
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It is able to do so in virtue of that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and which 
‘makes every one to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things’ (III.xxvii.9). Personal identity is then a function of the extent of that 
consciousness: as far as a person’s consciousness reaches, whether spatially in sensation or 
temporally in memory, so too its identity. Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, Locke says 
in particular that the self is sensible, i.e. conscious of pleasure and pain.  As a consequence, my 9
body only extends as far as I am conscious of pleasure and pain:  
thus the Limbs of his Body is to every one a part of himself: He sympathizes and 
is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby separate it from that 
consciousness, we had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections; and it is then no 
longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the remotest part of Matter. 
Thus we see the Substance, whereof personal self consisted at one time, may be 
varied at another, without the change of personal Identity (III.xxvii.11). 
The unity of the physical self is therefore rooted in the consciousness of sensation, for which 
reason a severed finger is no longer a part one’s self. If I were to be conscious of sensation in my 
desk, the desk wold then be part of myself, together with my arms and legs. In this respect, 
Locke’s treatment of persons runs parallel to his treatment of masses of matter and organisms: as 
different atoms constitute a single body by being collocated in space, and different material 
bodies constitute a single organism by their participation in a common life, so also are different 
material bodies united into the same person if they participate in a common consciousness.  And 10
 Cf. Yaffe (2007), 24. Susceptibility to pleasure and pain was an essential part of consciousness for 9
Locke, and the extension of personality forwards and backwards in time is founded in a concern for 
happiness (xxvii.26). That is to say, the unity of a person, as a composite substance, is grounded in its 
concern for well-being and its consciousness of pleasure and pain.
 Cf. Chappell (1990). He argues that Locke’s opinion appears to be that ‘the self is not identical with, 10
but is in part constituted by, a single immaterial substance, which has as its fellow constituents various 
parts of a living animal body’ (29). Citing II.xxvii.10, Chappell suggests that it is consciousness which 
confers unity on all of its other parts: ‘whenever two or more entities do share in the same 
consciousness…these entities are united by that consciousness, and so united go to make up the person 
whose consciousness it is’ (30). 
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like an organism, someone might undergo any number of variations in their material composition 
while nonetheless remaining one and the same person. The consciousness characteristic of 
persons is the source of a ‘vital union’:  
the same continued consciousness, in which several substances may have been 
united, and again separated from it, which, whilst they continued in a vital union 
with that, wherein this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same self. 
Thus any part of our Bodies vitally united to that, which is conscious in us, makes 
a part of our selves: But upon separation from the vital union, by which that 
consciousness is communicated, that, which a moment since was part of our 
selves, is no more so, than a part of another Man’s self is a part of me (III.xxvii.
25). 
Quite naturally, Locke had also spoken of a ‘vital union’ of the parts of an oak, and so a common 
consciousness plays the same role played by a ‘common life’ in the unity and identity of non-
rational living things.  
 In his detailed response to Locke, however, Leibniz denies that the organization of an 
otherwise merely material being is sufficient to ground genuine unity. Rather, what is needed is 
an ‘enduring principle of life,’ which, he says, he calls a ‘monad’ (NE 231). Because organic 
bodies, like all other material bodies, are changing as swiftly as the waters of a river (Leibniz’ 
example), one needs such a principle if one is to make sense of individual and not just specific 
identity. Leibniz is, in other words, arguing that despite his intention to capture what makes for 
individual identity, Locke can only capture the continuity of kind: many individual masses are 
called the same because they have specifically identical forms of organization. And this, Leibniz 
thinks, is a far cry from what makes for a numerically single organism. For this, one needs a soul 
or spirit, and so Leibniz says that  
as for substances which possess in themselves a genuine, real, substantial unity, 
and which are capable of actions which can properly be called ‘vital’; and as for 
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substantial beings…one can rightly say that they remain perfectly ‘the same 
individual’ in virtue of this soul or spirit which makes the I in substances which 
think (NE 232). 
There cannot in fact be an individual life or vital unity without a soul, and Leibniz cites again 
and again the fact that material bodies are constantly changing. One needs therefore a 
numerically identical individual persisting through the successive, otherwise merely material 
individuals sharing specifically the same organization. And an analogous criticism is made of 
Locke’s account of personal identity. Just as the continuity of organization will not suffice for the 
numerical continuity of an organism, so neither does Leibniz think mere continuity of memory 
will secure real, individual continuity. This is, in fact, only apparent identity, and any apparent 
identity ‘presupposes a real identity…accompanied by reflection, or by the sense of I’ (NE 236). 
This ‘self’ which makes for real identity and which is known with certainty by ‘present and 
immediate reflection’ serves the same function in grounding personal identity that the soul or 
substantial form does in grounding real physical identity in other, non-rational beings.  
 Leibniz’ appeal to soul or substantial form is of course one of the most enduring features 
of his thought. He exhibits his appreciation for Aristotelianism and scholasticism very nearly 
throughout his works, and this is well known. But just as constant is the connection or conceptual 
proximity he sees between the notion of substantial form and the self-awareness belonging to 
persons. Thus, in a letter to Arnauld from the 1680s, Leibniz remarks that 
a substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible 
being, since its notion includes everything that will happen to it, something which 
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can be found neither in shape nor in motion…but which can be found in a soul or 
substantial form, on the model of what is called ‘me.’  [emphasis added] 11
Without the indivisible being grounding substantial unity, Leibniz thinks organisms would be 
only aggregates, and so would be called ‘substances’ only in an improper sense.  And as the 12
passage indicates, our conception of that indivisible being grounding substantial unity is taken 
from the I or the me which is present on reflection or in self-consciousness. For that reason, 
Leibniz will sometimes treat the I almost generically, i.e. as the ground of the unity of substances 
without differentiation. Introducing a thought a few lines later, he says ‘the aforementioned I, or 
that which corresponds to it in each individual substance, can neither be made nor destroyed by 
the bringing together or separation of parts, which is a thing entirely external to what constitutes 
a substance.’  Thus, what corresponds in non-rational beings to the I present upon reflection or 13
in self-consciousness for rational beings makes them to be more than a mere aggregate or 
 PE, 79. In this regard, it is worth recalling the passage from the Historia Animalium, quoted at the head 11
of this chapter. Though a medievalist and Thomist, Etienne Gilson appears to have given a a curiously 
Leibnizian reading of that passage, one which comports well with what we have just seen:  
‘the knowledge which man has of himself, imperfect as it may be, is by nature 
privileged. In knowing himself man knows nature in a unique way, because in this 
unique case the nature that he knows, he is. In and through the knowledge which man 
has of himself nature knows herself directly; she becomes conscious of herself in him, 
self-conscious one might say, and there is strictly nothing else that man can hope to 
know in this way…Since then there is no other knowledge for each of us other than our 
own knowledge, things known exist for us only in relation to ourselves, and among 
these things there is only one that we can apprehend directly in itself, and that is what 
we are and what each calls “I”, “me,”’ in Gilson (1984), 7.  
Gilson then suggests that for Aristotle, ‘the problem of the “end” in nature is for him only one more 
occasion for applying this method, which he holds to be universally valid.’ I do not mean here to endorse 
Gilson’s reading of the passage in question, but only note it as a possible reading. As we have seen in the 
previous chapters, I do not think there is any interesting sense in which Aristotle’s teleology is modeled 
on our conception of ourselves in any way.
 Ibidem, 78: ‘Our body in itself or the cadaver, setting the soul apart, can be called a substance only in 12
an improper sense, just as in the case of a machine or a pile of stones, which are only being by 
aggregation.’
 Cf. also New System, ‘By means of soul or form there is a true unity corresponding to what is called the 13
self in us,’ (PE, 142).
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collection of parts, i.e. real substances. It also grounds individual persistence through time and 
indeed through all its myriad changes. Thus, even if a caterpillar loses every one of its properties 
after it has transformed into a butterfly, it remains one and the same individual throughout—the 
two stages are united in the common life of one and the same lepidopteron. From this, Leibniz 
takes the lesson that complete qualitative and quantitative difference from one moment to the 
next is not any indication that the same individual no longer persists. But what grounds that 
persistence is the same as what grounds the unity of the individual at each moment—the simple, 
indestructible soul or form modeled on the I, which cannot be obtained simply by the 
aggregation or decomposition of material parts. 
 But not only does the soul or form ground the unity of a substance, it is also in every case 
a ‘first subject of activity,’ or ‘a certain urge [nisus] or primitive force of acting.’  Because 14
‘actions pertain to supposita’ or individuals, the force or entelechy said to be a substantial form is 
precisely the form or force of an individual.  But, Leibniz says, ‘the clearest idea of active 15
power comes to us from the mind. So active power occurs only in things which are analogous to 
minds, that is, in entelechies’ (NE 172).  Consequently, the paradigm for activity quite generally 16
is our conception of ourselves in thinking. And in this, Leibniz is in express agreement with 
Locke: ‘if we will consider attentively, Bodies, by our Senses, do not afford us so clear and 
distinct an Idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the Operations of our 
Minds’ (II.xxi.4). Collisions between bodies really only involve the passive loss or acquisition of 
motion. By contrast, ‘to be able to bring into view Ideas out of sight, at one’s own choice, and to 
 PE, 159.14
 PE, 160. 15
 Cf. also NE 210; PE, 161.16
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compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an Active Power’ (II.xxi.72). And choice is here 
essential, for he emphasizes the point again just a few lines later: ‘because of my own choice, by 
a power within myself, I put myself into that motion. Such an Action is the product of Active 
Power.’ The power within myself and which grounds my choice is nothing other than the will 
and that in virtue of which we are free (II.xxi.5). Consequently, our notion of an active power is, 
for Locke, ultimately a function of the sense we have of our own freedom. But this means that 
when Locke contrasts machines with organisms, saying of the latter that their motion originates 
from a force within, the clearest idea we have of such a force ultimately originates in the idea we 
have of our own freedom. 
 The connections we have just seen between persons, substantial unity, and self-activity 
were not, however, new ones. They belonged to the long tradition of scholastic reflection on 
some central metaphysical issues. Being Latin, the word itself, ‘persona’ is not to be found in 
Plato or Aristotle, and indeed has an uncertain etymological history, but it later played a central 
role in discussions of substance and, of course, the Trinity.  Boethius had defined it as ‘an 17
individual substance of a rational nature,’ and in his discussion of the Trinity in the Summa, 
Thomas begins the first objection with that definition. That objection contends that there can in 
fact be no definition of ‘person’ because it signifies a singularis, and there can be no definition 
of singulars.  Thomas’ reply, predictably, is that while no person can be given a definition, the 18
general term ‘person’ can be, and in his respondeo, he elaborates on that definition. He says that 
while universal and particular (particulare) belong to every genus, the individual (individuum) 
 Its Greek counterpart, prosopon, does occur in Aristotle, but with the meaning of ‘face.’ Cf. PA III.1. It 17
is worth noting that ‘person’ and persona are absent from Long and Sedley’s collections of texts from the 
Hellenistic schools, both from the glossary and indices. 
 ST I.29.118
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belongs to substance in a special way because substance is individuated through itself (per 
seipsam). For that reason, he says, it is fitting that individuals belonging to the genus substance 
should have a special name: hypostases. But, he continues, in a still more special and complete 
way, the particular and individual are found in rational substances, which have dominion over 
their action, and can act of themselves (per se agunt). Consequently, it is fitting that individual 
substances of a rational nature should have a special name to set them apart from individual 
substances more generally, and that name is ‘person.’ This species of substance is, Thomas says, 
‘the most perfect in all of nature,’ and precisely because personality is a perfection, it is rightly 
said to belong to God, who contains all perfections.  For that reason, we might expect persons to 19
be uniquely intelligible, being that which other, non-rational substances only approximate. 
Indeed, we might expect persons to exhibit the essential features of substance—e.g. unity, 
persistence, and self-motion—in an especially robust way. And in fact, Thomas does suggest that 
in the strictest sense, only persons are efficient causes at all. He says in particular that those 
things possessing the faculty of will and reason determine their own actions and move 
themselves (seipsa movent), while everything else is moved by another or something external to 
it (ab alio mota).  20
 I want now to end this section by drawing attention to a final feature in the accounts of 
Thomas, Locke, and Leibniz, namely the unknowability of individuals. In the Prima Pars, 
Thomas asks whether God has ‘proper’ knowledge of things other than himself, where proper 
knowledge is knowledge of things not in general or insofar as they share some common feature, 
 ST I.29.3.19
 ST. I-II.1.220
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but in their distinctness from other things. A merely general knowledge, he says, is imperfect, 
and so it follows that God, who has every perfection, must have proper knowledge. We, on the 
other hand, are not so fortunate, for ‘directly and primarily, our intellect cannot know individuals 
among material things.’  Only ‘indirectly,’ and ‘as it were by a kind of reflection’ is knowledge 21
of the singular given to us.  Leibniz too denies us knowledge of individuals on the grounds that 22
‘individuality involves infinity.’  Complete knowledge of an individual substance requires 23
grasping its complete concept or notion, but this belongs only to God. And finally, Locke too 
would seem to deny any real knowledge of individuals. Though everything that is, is particular, 
people need general terms and general ideas not only for the sake of communication but for the 
‘improvement of knowledge: which though founded in particular things, enlarges it self by 
general views’ (III.iii.4). But insofar as they involve essential reference to kinds or sorts, which 
are nothing but the workmanship of the understanding, the individual, real essences of things 
escape us. 
 Cf. Pasnau (2004), 36-37; ST I.14.6; I.86.1  21
 Cf. also De Veritate q.10a.5: ‘From this it is clear that our mind is not able directly to know singulars, 22
for we know singulars directly through our sensitive powers which receive forms from things into a 
bodily organ…Thus, the mind knows singulars through a certain kind of reflection, as when the mind, in 
knowing its object, which is some universal nature, returns to knowledge of its own act, then to the 
species which is the principle of its act, and, finally, to the phantasm from which it has abstracted the 
species. In this way, it attains to some knowledge about singulars.’
 NE 290; PE, 100.23
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5.3 PERSONS AND PARALOGISMS 
 In the previous section, I tried to suggest that prior to Kant individual, non-rational 
substances could be considered together with persons because persons just were substances of a 
specifically rational nature. For that reason, persons and organisms were of a kind, even if 
persons were thought to be individual substances par excellence—the most perfect and complete 
substances. As a consequence, individual, non-rational substances could be viewed as but partial 
or incomplete approximations of persons. Indeed, despite their differences, ‘person’ could even 
on occasion be used to signify individual substance quite generally, whether rational or not.  But 24
regardless, because persons were thought to be substances in the primary or paradigmatic sense, 
what was thought to be characteristic of substances belonged to persons in the primary and 
paradigmatic sense. Consequently, an individual, rational substance could be said to exhibit 
unity, persistence through change, and self-motion in a distinctively robust way. Indeed, for both 
Locke and Leibniz, the idea of active power which we might attribute to various things outside 
of us comes from our awareness of ourselves in thinking, and for Aquinas only rational beings 
are self-movers in the strictest sense.  But if our knowledge of rational substances or persons 25
should turn out to be hampered in one way or another, then we might expect our knowledge of 
natural, non-rational substances to be similarly hampered. Kant, as it happens, thinks our 
knowledge is so hampered. In particular, Kant thinks some of the central rationalist claims about 
the rational soul cannot be maintained, and so in what follows I aim to describe some of the 
 Spade (1994), 233.24
 I would venture that there is also a sense in which Thomas could say that activity in the highest sense is 25
to be found in thinking, and thus that our clearest idea or example of activity is that which we find in 
thought.
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features thought to belong to the self or soul in virtue of self-consciousness, and why Kant thinks 
the rationalists were led to overstep the the limits of our understanding. 
 For those rationalists following in Leibniz’ footsteps, the soul both of persons and living 
things was essentially one because without parts and therefore simple.  There can be no real 26
beings without them, Leibniz thought, because there can be no multitudes without unities, no 
many without a one, and so only something simple or without parts can ground the real unity of 
extended substances. At the same time, and precisely because it was said to be simple, the soul or 
form could not come to be or pass away—it could not be assembled or fall apart because it had 
no parts.  Indeed, Leibniz thinks a soul or form can start or cease to exist at all only through a 27
miracle, and he criticizes the Peripatetics for holding otherwise.  Indeed, by allowing for 28
substantial generation and corruption, he thinks the Peripatetics essentially do away with the 
notion of substance. But regardless, the simplicity of the soul or form was thought to ground both 
the real unity of living things and their persistence through time, indeed, their imperishability. 
And this is just as true of non-rational substances as it is of persons, and so despite however 
much they might change, animals are every bit as immortal as we are, persisting as one and the 
same individual through any and every sensible change.  The transformation of the caterpillar 29
 Cf. Wolff, Rational Thoughts, §742: ‘The soul is a simple thing. Because a body cannot think according 26
to its essence and its nature, and because neither a body nor matter can be given the power to think, the 
soul cannot be anything corporeal and cannot consist of matter. And since it is clear from the proofs of the 
stated grounds that thoughts cannot be attributed to a composite thing, the soul must be a simple thing.’ 
Or Baumgarten, Metaphysica, §404: ‘Every substance is a monad. Every spirit is a substance. Therefore, 
every monad is also a simple thing,’ in Watkins (2009b).
 Cf. Knutzen, Philosophical Treatise on the Immaterial Nature of the Soul, §4: ‘That which is 27
completely devoid of all parts is typically called immaterial or a simple thing,’ in Watkins (2009b).
 PE 140, 204.28
 Cf. e.g. NE 72: ‘The best possible basis for our natural immortality is the view that all souls are 29
immortal.’ 
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into a butterfly, in which no sensible property remains the same, was one example Leibniz used 
to illustrate the persistence he had in mind, and which we saw above. If it were the case that 
there was no such form or soul which persists through the caterpillar’s transformation, then there 
would be no individual persistence—no identity—but only changing aggregates of matter. 
 Kant, however, denies that we can know these things about the soul, i.e. that they are 
permanent, incorruptible, etc., and argues that the rationalists try to derive too much from too 
little. In particular, they hope to derive all their conclusions exclusively from the I or I think, 
which as we saw also served as the model for non-rational substances. But for Kant, this is rather 
too meager to support the conclusions that they wanted to draw. He does agree that the self or 
rational soul is a simple substance; he simply denies that we can have theoretical knowledge of 
this fact.  The soul is simple because thought itself is incompatible with a composite subject: 30
thought is ‘possible only in one substance, which is not an aggregate of many’ (A352).  Because 31
the soul is simple, however, it does not belong to outer intuition, and it would have to if we were 
to be able to know that it persists. ‘Persistence’ has an essentially temporal significance, and so 
to conclude that a substance persists one would need to go outside of one’s concept to experience 
and so to intuition. Consequently, we can say that the soul is substance only in the sense that it is 
the subject in which thoughts inhere as accidents and which is not in turn a subject of anything 
 Cf. Wuerth (2010), 222. Extended discussing of the paralogisms would take us too far afield, but the 30
remarks given here are most informed by Wuerth (2010) and Allison (2004). But cf. also Longuenesse 
(2017).
 Cf. e.g. Crusius, Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason, §473: ‘Every spirit is a simple substance. 31
For assume that it were composite. Then either thinking and willing would be something that was 
possible through composition, or the fundamental powers would have to lie in every particular part of the 
composite whole. If the former were the case, then thinking and willing would have to be a motion or an 
effect of it, which is contradictory. If the latter were the case, then the whole that one represented would 
not be a single spirit, but rather a number of spirits insofar as each one would have the essence of a spirit 
individually and without the help of the others. Consequently, a spirit must be a simple substance.’
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else. From that fact alone, however, we cannot conclude that it persists, and so we are left only 
with the logical simplicity of the subject, the I.  But the simplicity of the representation of the 32
thinking subject should not be mistaken for an experience of the simplicity of the subject itself 
(A355). 
 Naturally, the limitations on our self-knowledge from a theoretical standpoint has 
implications for our knowledge of other thinking beings or, indeed, for anything possessed of the 
marks characteristic of them. In particular, the unity and simplicity of the I which marks thought 
or thinking as such means that other thinking beings are never given in experience:  
I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being through external 
experience, but only through self-consciousness. Thus such objects are nothing 
further than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things, which 
can be represented as thinking beings only in this way (A347).  33
A thinking subject cannot as such appear in space because everything in space is divisible and 
thus composed of parts, and thought is essentially one and simple. Consequently, if an object in 
 Cf. What Real Progress (20:273): ‘Of the self in the first sense (the subject of apperception), the logical 32
self as a priori representation, it is absolutely impossible to know anything further as to what sort of thing 
it is, or what its natural constitution may be; it is like the substantial, which remains behind after I have 
taken away all the accidents that inhere in it, but absolutely cannot be known any further at all, since the 
accidents were precisely that whereby I was able to know its nature…the logical self does indeed point to 
the subject as it is in itself, in pure consciousness, not as receptivity, but as pure spontaneity, but beyond 
that is also is incapable of knowing anything of its nature.’
 Cf. Also A353: ‘Thinking beings, as such, can never come before us among outer appearances;’ and 33
A357, ‘if one wants to represent a thinking being, one must put oneself in its place, and thus substitute 
one’s own subject for the object one wants to consider.’ There is therefore something of a question about 
our knowledge of other minds, which question seems hardly vexing to Kant. Fichte, however, would 
show much greater interest, and thought Kant came closest to dealing with the problem in the third 
Critique, which of course addresses itself to the question of how to ascribe purposiveness to things in 
experience:  
‘The most striking demonstration of the incompleteness of Kant’s Critical philosophy is 
that Kant has never provided an explanation of this point, that is, how I come to assume 
that there are rational beings outside of me….He came very close to answering this 
question in the Critique of Judgment, for it would be on the basis of the principle of 
reflective judgment that this assumption could be explained’ Wissenschaftlehre §13, 142.  
To that extent, Fichte too saw a connection between our theoretical knowledge of persons and of 
organisms. Cf. also Beiser (2002), 335. 
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outer intuition is a thinking subject, we can only represent it as such by projecting or transferring 
our own consciousness to it. This projection or transference is not simply a gross falsification, 
however, because the properties accruing to a thing in virtue of its appearance in space—its 
extension, impenetrability, etc.—are merely phenomenal. It remains possible, therefore, that the 
noumenal ground of some phenomenon is ‘the subject of thoughts, even though we receive no 
intuition of representations, volitions, etc., in the way we are affected through outer sense, but 
rather receive merely intuitions of space and its determinations’ (A358). Consequently, ‘the very 
same thing that is called a body in one relation would at the same time be a thinking being in 
another, whose thoughts, of course, we could not intuit, but only their signs in 
appearance’ (A360). If space were not merely a form of intuition for beings with intellects like 
ours, but real in itself, then the unity of a thinking subject would be quite incompatible with 
anything in sense experience. But as it stands, thinking beings are never as such give to us 
because they exhibit a distinctive unity and simplicity which is inconsistent with any appearance 
in space, and so the attribution of thought to phenomenal substances consists in the ‘transference’ 
or projection of our own. Importantly, anything else possessing such unity and simplicity would 
likewise be incapable of appearing in outer intuition and its representation would presumably 
require an analogous ‘transference’ or projection. 
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5.4 PERSONS AND PRACTICAL REASON 
 From the standpoint of the critical philosophy, then, the rationalist doctrine of soul is 
comprised of illicit attempts to derive metaphysical content from what is merely a formal feature 
of consciousness. The simplicity of the rational soul or self means that it cannot appear in 
intuition, and so it cannot be understood through the categories in their spatio-temporal 
significance. Consequently, persons cannot be objects of the understanding, i.e. objects of 
theoretical knowledge. Our relation to persons must therefore be otherwise than theoretical. It is, 
indeed, practical, and in practical reason we find another set of categories, one which runs 
parallel to the categories of nature (KpV 5:66).  Corresponding to substance in the categories of 34
nature is the category of personality, and here we get that permanence and persistence which 
necessarily went missing in the theoretical consideration of soul. Understanding an appearance 
as an action means understanding it as issuing from a will, i.e. from a being possessed of reason 
and thus a person, and we understand the person as persisting through the action. But what is 
more, pure practical reason ultimately presumes the persistence of the soul or self not simply 
through the course of its actions, but, indeed, for all time. Its immortality is not, to be sure, 
demonstrable, but it is nonetheless presupposed in our understanding of what the moral law 
demands—it is a postulate of pure practical reason (KpV 5:122). As a postulate, it ‘give[s] 
objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general,’ even if our theoretical cognition is 
not extended thereby (KpV 5:132). Thus, when discussing the postulates of practical reason in 
the second Critique, Kant expressly refers to the paralogisms just discussed, remarking that 
speculative reason  
 On the categories of freedom, cf. Bader (2009) and Bobzien (2013).34
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lacked the mark of permanence by which to supplement the psychological concept 
of an ultimate subject necessarily ascribed to the soul in self-consciousness, so as 
to make it the real representation of a substance; this mark practical reason 
furnishes by the postulate of a duration required for conformity with the moral 
law’(KpV 5:133).  
Pure practical reason postulates the immortality of the soul because only so, Kant thinks, can the 
highest good be achieved. But insofar as the super-sensible persistence which we attribute to the 
soul or self from a practical standpoint is grounded in a certain kind of thinking, namely practical 
thinking, the same persistence could only be attributed to things in outer experience by a similar 
kind of ‘transference’ which allowed us to represent things as thinking at all. 
 In addition to the immortality of the soul, of course, pure practical reason also postulates 
its own freedom, another traditional characteristic of persons. Thomas, for example, had said that 
‘the whole root of freedom is constituted by reason’ (totius libertatis radix est ratione constituta) 
and that ‘free will is defined as the faculty of will and reason’ (liberum arbitrium esse dicitur 
facultas voluntatis et rationis).  Freedom thus belongs characteristically to rational substances, 35
and so to persons. But Thomas also says the free man is cause of himself (liber est causa sui), by 
which he means (among other things) what we have already seen, namely that persons are 
efficient causes of their own actions—they act ex or a se.  They are not, in other words, moved 36
by another, i.e. by something outside themselves or by alien causes, because to be moved by an 
alien cause just is to be unfree. They are to that extent self-movers.  And Kant understands 37
‘person’ in much the same way, sometimes saying simply that persons are rational beings (e.g. G 
 De Veritate 24.2; ST I-II.1.135
 On Thomas’ understanding of the phrase, ‘liber est causa sui,’ cf. Spiering (2011).36
 ST I.83.3; SCG II.48. I.II.1,2; Lectura Super Ioannem, c. 15, l. 3.37
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4:428), but elsewhere that persons are beings possessed of distinctly practical reason.  To be 38
bound by the laws of one’s own rational nature is to be free, and so Kant glosses ‘person’ as ‘a 
being endowed with practical reason and consciousness of freedom of his power of choice’ (A 
7:324). In the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique, Kant describes freedom as ‘self-
activity’ and as the capacity to initiate causal sequences, i.e. to be the first in a causal series. But 
of course, free causality is not something we can understand from a theoretical perspective, and 
so the freedom characteristic of personality means that persons are not to be numbered among 
phenomena—personality is ‘my invisible self’ which belongs to the noumenal world (KpV 
5:162). 
 In much the same way, then, that the immortality of the soul acquired ‘objective reality’ 
through pure practical reason, so too does freedom, without thereby extending theoretical reason. 
Indeed, to the extent that freedom even shows up as a concern for theoretical reason, it is only 
because practical reason poses it as a problem, ‘since nothing in appearances can be explained by 
the concept of freedom and there the mechanism of nature must instead constitute the only guide’ 
(KpV 5:30). And the contrast between freedom or persons and the mechanism of nature is 
something of a refrain. Thus, Kant glosses ‘personality’ as ‘freedom and independence from the 
mechanism of the whole of nature’ (KpV 5:87), and after defining ‘transcendental freedom’ as 
‘independence from everything empirical and so from nature generally,’ Kant draws an 
immediate contrast: ‘all necessity of events in time in accordance with the natural law of 
 Cf. also A 7:127: ‘The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representation raises him 38
infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity 
of consciousness through all the changes that happen to him, one and the same person.’ 
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causality can be called the mechanism of nature’ [emphasis original] (KpV 5:97).  But it means 39
as a consequence that we cannot actually understand the free causality of a rational being, can 
point to no example of it anywhere in experience, and so we can only make sense of a sensible 
being acting freely by simultaneously regarding it ‘on the other side as a noumenon’: 
in the explanation of events in the world and so too of the actions of rational 
beings, I grant the mechanism of natural necessity the justice of going back from 
the conditioned to the condition ad infinitum, while on the other side I keep open 
for speculative reason the place which for it is vacant, namely the intelligible 
(KpV 5:48). 
The free causality of persons is then only a postulate of pure reason, a necessary supposition 
made by practical reason on its own behalf as part and parcel of its engagement in deliberation, 
and an idea by which I cognize nothing at all in experience.  
 Finally, I want to highlight one last feature of persons which I mentioned in the previous 
chapter and which also occurs in the categories of freedom listed in the second Critique: their 
community with one another. From the standpoint of theoretical reason, the community among 
things is grounded in space as the form of outer intuition which secures a causal reciprocity 
between the bodies occurring in it. But because persons are as such noumena, if they are to stand 
 McLaughlin (1991) and (2014) argues against the relevance of the concept of freedom for 39
understanding purposiveness in the third Critique, but it is difficult to see how this can be maintained. He 
is concerned principally with a reading of the antinomy in the Dialectic of Teleological judgment, 
according to which that antinomy is essentially a repetition of the third in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Nonetheless, he denies that freedom is in any way at issue in the CTJ. But the frequency with which Kant 
contrasts freedom and mechanism in the KpV, published just two years before the KU, makes it difficult 
to believe that he would have so easily dispensed with that association. In addition, ‘end’ is defined in 
terms of freedom in the later Metaphysics of Morals (6:385). There Kant contrasts an effect of nature with 
an end, saying that the latter is a chosen effect of a freely acting subject. What is more, in the CTJ, Kant 
just says that to understand natural ends, there must be added to mechanism ‘the spontaneity of a cause 
(which thus cannot be matter) without which no ground of those forms could be given’ (5:411). 
McLaughlin takes it as significant that when Kant does speak of ‘mechanism’ in the KpV, mereological 
relations play no role. But if, as I should like to argue, that in virtue of which a substance is capable of 
initiating causal sequences (of self-motion) is also that in virtue of which something is not a mere 
aggregate of parts but a genuine whole—if both are grounded in one and the same thing, namely soul or 
form—then we need not pick and choose between these different uses of ‘mechanism.’ 
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in community with one another, it must be in virtue of something else. That something else is the 
moral law. Moral-practical thinking necessarily involves considering the consistency of practical 
maxims with the simultaneous willing of those same maxims by everyone else. Thus the 
category of reciprocity is ultimately intended to secure the kingdom of ends.  In such a 40
kingdom, each person is simultaneously subject to common laws and the source of them, both 
sovereign and subject. Together, they form a systematic whole and, in that respect, the 
community of persons in a moral kingdom is quite analogous to the relations between the parts 
of a natural end. But again, because persons are not as such objects of theoretical cognition, the 
only mode by which we might think such a community—a community grounded in something 
other than space—is practical, wherein each part or member of the community is coordinated 
into a whole precisely because each, as a rational being, has the principle of the self-same whole 
in itself.   
 Three features of persons, then, are given reality only through practical reason: their 
super-sensible duration, freedom or self-motion, and their community. These correspond 
practically to the theoretical categories of substance, causality, and community, which are 
inapplicable to noumena. They are secured only on the basis of a certain kind or mode of thought 
or consciousness, namely thought or consciousness of the moral law and the conditions for its 
fulfillment. The duration exhibited by persons is distinctive insofar as they are thought, from the 
practical standpoint, to persist through complete qualitative change and, therefore, to be 
immortal. Their causality is distinctive insofar as they are free and so act independently of the 
mechanism of nature. And their community is distinctive insofar as it is a causal community 
 Bader (2009), 15.40
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grounded not in space but in the consideration of the universalizability of any given maxim—its 
coherence and consistency with the causality of each of the other parts. Because these features 
are secured only by self-consciousness, and because thinking beings never come before us in 
outer intuition, they cannot be known to belong to anything found in outer intuition. Their 
attribution can therefore be grounded only by a ‘transference’ of our own consciousness or an 
analogy with it. If I want, that is, to attribute to a phenomenon a duration and a causality which 
outstrips the continuity of anything that comes to be or passes away in the phenomenon itself, as 
I might to a lepidopteron as it transforms from a caterpillar into a butterfly, it can only be as a 
consequence of transferring to it my conception of my own duration and my own causality from 
a practical standpoint.  
5.5 THE FEELING OF LIFE 
 I want to turn now to the peculiar self-consciousness that belongs to aesthetic experience 
or judgments of beauty. In particular, in aesthetic judgments of reflection we find what Kant calls 
the ‘feeling of life,’ and it is on analogy with life that Kant says we should perhaps understand 
natural ends (KU 5:376). As natural, natural ends are objects of theoretical reason. As I noted in 
the beginning, however, they exhibit many of the features which would seem to be peculiar to 
persons and so made available only by practical reason. For that reason, they stand 
uncomfortably between theoretical and practical reason. We might then look at judgments of 
beauty because the same faculty is involved in both judgments of beauty and of natural 
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purposiveness, and this same faculty is said to ‘mediate’ between theoretical and practical reason, 
i.e. between nature and freedom (KU 5:196).  Thus, by looking to aesthetic judgment, we might 41
be able to see how we are to understand natural ends in a way which is analogous to, but 
nonetheless different from, our own moral-practical conception of ourselves. Before turning to 
natural ends, then, I want to suggest that in aesthetic experience, a spontaneity and causal unity 
among our powers is felt, though to be sure not cognized. In particular, one feels the harmony 
and reciprocal interplay of the different faculties or powers belonging to one’s substance. 
Consciousness of the harmony of one’s own state and the reciprocity of one’s powers also 
possesses an ‘internal causality’ for the preservation of that state which mirrors the nutritive and 
generative activities of natural ends. And finally, judgments of beauty presuppose the 
communicability of that feeling, and so presuppose the existence of a common sense 
(Gemeinsinn). That is, the feeling of life found in aesthetic judgment also involves a necessary 
reference to others similarly constituted, i.e. to a possible community of others animated by that 
self-same feeling. 
 In the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, Kant distinguishes between aesthetic judgments of 
sense and those of reflection, saying that the determining ground of each is a sensation connected 
with pleasure or displeasure. In the case of the former, that sensation is produced immediately by 
the empirical intuition of the object and is therefore merely agreeable. In the latter, that sensation 
is produced by the ‘harmonious play’ of imagination and understanding, in which the two are 
‘reciprocally expeditious’ (EE 20:224). The pleasure to be had in the latter is consequent upon 
 Cf. also EE 20:246, where Kant says that the critique of the power of judgment effects a ‘transition’ 41
between nature and freedom, connecting ‘the two parts [of philosophy] through its own special principle, 
namely from the sensible substratum of the first part of philosophy to the intelligible substratum of the 
second.’
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the act of reflection by which one feels the harmonious play of one’s faculties, which is to say 
that the pleasure is mediated by the activity of a cognitive faculty, the power of judgment (EE 
20:229). And elsewhere Kant remarks that the pleasure associated with aesthetic judgments of 
reflection is ‘a state of the mind in which a representation is in agreement with itself…for 
preserving this state itself (for the state of the powers of the mind reciprocally promoting each 
other in a representation preserves itself)’ (EE 20:231). In such judgments, then, the different 
powers of mind exhibit the reciprocity characteristic of the members of a community quite 
generally, for as we saw, the species in community under a genus were said to produce one 
another ‘reciprocally,’ just as the parts in a natural end were said to produce one another 
‘reciprocally.’ But if the powers of the human mind are to stand in community with one another, 
reciprocally promoting one another, we might suppose that in aesthetic judgments of reflection, 
what we feel is the unity of our powers in our own persons, even if we cannot cognize that unity. 
That is to say, in a way consistent with what we have seen, there is a mode of self-consciousness 
through which we apprehend what we cannot otherwise know or cognize in the strict sense that 
belongs to reason in its theoretical employ. 
 If that is right, then the pleasure one feels in labeling an object ‘beautiful’ is intimately 
bound up with the self-feeling of the unity of one’s own sensory and cognitive powers.  But 42
unlike the grasp we had of ourselves in theoretical self-consciousness, which was only that of an 
existent substantiale, we have in aesthetic experience a distinctive bodily apprehension of 
ourselves by means of the feelings of pleasure and pain, which means as a consequence that we 
have some apprehension of our physical well-being:  
 Porter (2017), 7.42
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Apart from any feeling of the bodily organ life would be merely a consciousness 
of one’s own existence, and could not include any feeling of well-being or the 
reverse, i.e. of the furtherance or hindrance of the vital forces. For of itself alone, 
the mind is all life (the life-principle itself), and hindrance or furtherance has to be 
sought outside it, and yet in the man himself, consequently in the connection with 
his body (KU 5:277-78). 
The feeling of pleasure or well-being which we have in aesthetic appreciation is the feeling of 
the furtherance of our ‘vital forces.’ It is therefore a ‘feeling of life,’ and Kant will speak of the 
‘animation’ (Belebung) of our faculties in aesthetic judgment into a unified activity (KU 5:204; 
5:219, 5:238). And so because aesthetic appreciation is constituted by the harmonious interplay 
of our cognitive and sensitive faculties, we feel the unity of our composite, as it were, which is to 
say that we feel the unity of the cognitive and material aspects of our humanity.  But what is 43
more, the pleasure one feels in an aesthetic judgment of reflection Kant elsewhere describes as a 
kind of consciousness, one which ‘contains a determining ground of the activity of the subject 
with regard to the animation of its cognitive powers, thus an internal causality’ (KU 5:222). This 
consciousness of pleasure in aesthetic reflection has the causality of ‘maintaining the state of the 
representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without a further aim’ and 
so the consideration of the beautiful ‘strengthens and reproduces itself.’ Because consciousness 
of the beautiful constitutively involves the ‘feeling of life,’ that consciousness also constitutively 
involves the maintenance and reproduction of that self-same feeling. The sense we have of our 
organic unity in aesthetic judgment is thus also the sense of an internal causality for preserving 
that very unity. 
 Cf. also KU 5:210: ‘Beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, i.e. for beings at once 43
animal and rational, but not merely for them as rational beings (e.g. as intelligent minds), but as at once 
animal and rational.’
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 It is worth noticing now some of the ways in which the experience of beauty and 
therewith the feeling of life approximates the standpoint of practical reason. First, like the 
causality which belongs to practical reason, the activity of our faculties in aesthetic judgment is 
free and spontaneous. At the same time, the feeling of life precedes any pleasure to be found in 
our subject, much like what Kant calls the moral feeling or respect (KU 5: 217; KpV 5:73). In 
this way, both stand opposed to and are to be distinguished from what is merely subjective, 
individual, or singular, and what Kant calls the pathological. They stand so opposed because both 
practical reason and the power of judgment in aesthetic experience put us in touch with or point 
towards something common. For practical reason, it is the community of persons in a moral 
kingdom. For the power of judgment, it is the supersensible substratum of humanity. Thus, Kant 
says that judgments of taste are grounded in a ‘a concept that cannot be determined by intuition, 
by which nothing can be cognized,’ and says that ‘a concept of this kind…is the mere pure 
rational concept of the supersensible’ (KU 5:340). And in particular, aesthetic judgments are 
grounded in ‘the concept of that which can be regarded as the supersensible substratum of 
humanity’ (KU 5:340). Aesthetic judgments, then, are not merely subjective, but grounded in a 
conception of a shared humanity. For this reason, they are said to be universally communicable 
to those similarly constituted. This communicability is essential to such judgments, and so, Kant 
thinks, a necessary presupposition of the possibility of aesthetic judgments is the existence of a 
common sense (Gemeinsinn) or sensus communis (KU 5:238). To judge in the light of this 
common sense is to hold our judgment up to ‘human reason as whole,’ and in so judging one 
puts oneself ‘into the position of everyone else’ (KU 5:294). But this means that the feeling of 
life we experience in aesthetic judgment constitutively or essentially involves a reference to 
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others with that same feeling of life, at least potentially. In this way, our feeling of life is 
analogous to our judgment of a living thing which, as I suggested in §1, essentially involves 
reference to others of its kind, at least potentially. 
 Aesthetic experience, then, makes possible a distinctive kind of self-consciousness, one 
which outstrips whatever we might know about ourselves in theoretical reason. The latter gives 
us only the fact that we are substantialia, existing substances in which thoughts inhere as 
accidents. Practical reason, in its consciousness of the moral law and those conditions necessary 
for its satisfaction, secures what theoretical reason could not, e.g. our duration through any and 
every phenomenal change together with a causality independent of the mechanism of nature, i.e. 
our freedom. Now, in aesthetic experience, we have self-consciousness of the interplay between 
our rational and sensitive faculties and, therewith, of ourselves as embodied minds. This 
consciousness of our embodiment includes as a constitutive part an implicit reference to others of 
the same kind. But our own embodiment is not a theoretical cognition we have of ourselves. It is 
rather something given in the consciousness of aesthetic pleasure and the reciprocity or 
community of our different faculties. The consciousness of this pleasure is itself the causal 
ground of the maintenance and reproduction of the same. It will be recalled that Locke had 
identified the self with consciousness of pleasure and pain, and the dimensions of one’s body as 
the extent of one’s sensations. Kant thinks similarly, and so there is a sense in which the real 
unity of my rational and animal self extends as far as my consciousness of pleasure and pain. 
And this can, perhaps, provide us with materials for understanding the unity of the organic body. 
In lectures delivered in the early 1780s, Kant says that 
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wherever my body is, there is my thinking I as well, for only through it can I 
know the position of myself. But I myself do not occupy any particular space in 
the body, since I cannot be intuited according to the form of space. The body 
determines only my relation of place with respect to other things (namely that I 
am in it), but not with respect to myself or where I am in it (MMr 29:879).  
The thinking I pervades the body, furnishing as it were the space within which everything is to be 
 counted as my body. The body is, as it were, the sensorium of the I, and its parts are the different  
places in which the I is to be found. With this account in hand, we turn now to natural ends. 
5.6 FROM PERSONS TO PURPOSES 
 In the foregoing, I have been suggesting that persons and living things were often treated 
together for the simple reason that both were substances, the former rational, the latter not. Locke 
treats them together in his chapter on identity and diversity, and Leibniz treats them together as 
well, claiming even that his account of living things is is modeled on his understanding of 
rational substances. Thomas says that persons are the most perfect and complete individual 
substances in all of nature; they are individual substances par excellence. To whatever extent, 
then, that persons were thought to be substances in the highest or most paradigmatic sense, and 
so to exhibit the features characteristic of substances in the highest or most paradigmatic way, I 
suggested that if our theoretical knowledge of those features should be problematic in the case of 
persons, then our theoretical knowledge of non-rational substances might be similarly 
problematic. In particular, substances were thought to be essentially one, rather than an 
aggregate, to persist through change rather than to change and thus to inhere in something else, 
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and to move themselves or to be ‘free’ causes. By Kant’s lights, however, those features cannot 
be ascertained through a theoretical exercise of reason, as the rationalists prior to him had 
thought. The unity and simplicity of the thinking self or soul makes it incapable of appearing in 
intuition, and so we cannot properly apply the concepts of persistence and causality to it. We can, 
indeed, have no cognition of it at all. As a consequence, attributing thought to things in outer 
intuition is a projection or transference of our own self-consciousness to them.  
 In what follows, I want to argue that the same holds true of natural ends. The persistence 
of organisms through all qualitative change, their self-causality, and the unity or community of 
their parts are all understood only on the basis of a ‘transference’ of features of our own self-
consciousness to them. Because none of these features are available in any kind of sensible 
intuition, they can only be attributed to natural ends on the basis of an analogy with the features 
we find in our own self-consciousness. Like the thinking soul or self, the principle of a natural 
end is simple, and so is not to be met with in space. Consequently, one and the same individual 
organism may persist through every sensible variation, as a lepidopteron appears to, though we 
cannot know that it does. Furthermore, an individual organism may exercise a causality 
independently of the mechanism of nature, though we cannot know that it does. And finally, an 
individual organism may possess a unity among its parts which outstrips the merely material 
reciprocity of its parts in space, but we cannot know that it does.. Insofar as a natural end 
possesses an ‘inner’ principle of motion and rest, it is to just that extent beyond the boundaries of 
natural science. This fact allows us to unify a number of different remarks that Kant makes about 
natural ends, because the soul or form of a natural substance traditionally performed a number of 
different theoretical functions. And the plurality of roles played by the soul or form in the 
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traditional doctrine of substance enables us to reconcile a number of competing interpretations of 
why exactly natural ends are beyond the reach of theoretical reason. 
 The notion of a person has for Kant a quite intimate relation to purposiveness for the 
simple reason that persons are ends in themselves (e.g. G 4:428; 4:43). They are distinguished in 
the Groundwork from mere things, which Kant defines as those beings whose existence depends 
on nature and which are only ever means. The value of things derives from what they might 
contribute to the existence of persons, and they can command a person’s (non-theoretical) 
attention only thus far. Consequently, to the extent that someone makes the existence of a thing 
an end, it is only relative to other ends that she sets for herself. By contrast, persons command 
attention or consideration in a way that other beings do not because their existence has value or 
worth in itself, and not simply in relation to whatever my wants and needs might happen to be. 
Having non-relative worth, persons are non-relative ends; they are ends in themselves. But 
formulated in this way, Kant’s distinction suggests that if there were to be (non-rational) natural 
beings which were not merely means, they would not be merely things. They would instead be 
something quite like persons, lacking only reason. And so the question, whether there are natural 
‘things’ which are in fact ends-in-themselves, amounts to asking whether there might be, 
paradoxically, something like ‘natural persons.’ This concatenation of terms is, in Kant’s 
vocabulary, about as paradoxical as ‘non-rational persons’ would be in scholastic vocabulary, but 
they point to a common question: how are to understand the continuity—if there is continuity—
between ourselves and certain other natural beings we find around us, which are nonetheless 
quite manifestly different. 
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 And it would seem that natural ends do stand to the rest of nature as persons stand to us 
in our own moral-practical deliberations. In the Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment, 
Kant takes note of advantageous or useful relations between certain natural beings. Thus, sand 
deposits are advantageous for the growth of pines and grass is advantageous to the sheep that eat 
it (KU 5:367). This is what Kant calls relative or external purposiveness, suggesting that to 
whatever extent nature might ‘take an interest’ in the existence of sand or grass—to whatever 
extent they might be called ‘ends’ of nature—it is only in relation to some other end that they 
subserve. They get to be called ends only insofar as they serve as means to something outside 
themselves, and for that reason such purposive relations are external to them. But if sand is to be 
an end of nature insofar as it serves the growth of pines, or the grass insofar as it serves the 
nourishment of sheep, Kant argues that there must ultimately be things which are ends of nature 
not for some further advantage, but which are ends in themselves (KU 5:369). In other words, 
relative purposiveness presupposes intrinsic purposiveness, i.e. individuals which are not 
(merely) means for and thus advantageous to others, but beings the existence of which is not 
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relative to or conditioned by anything else. And so, like persons in the practical domain, natural 
ends serve as a kind of limit on purposive relations in the natural domain.  44
 If it is right to say that natural ends are—paradoxically—something like ‘natural persons,’ 
then the limitations placed on our knowledge of persons should similarly constrain our 
knowledge of natural ends, and indeed Kant’s reasons for thinking that natural ends are 
essentially inexplicable are consistent with what we have seen. In particular, Kant is clear that 
the ultimate ground of a natural end is simple, and so not to be met with in space. Thus, in a 
reflection from the 1780s, Kant says that 
simple beings (as such) can never be parts of the sensible world. For in that case 
they would be parts of the object of outer sense, i.e. of that which is extended; but 
that which is extended does not consist of simple parts. Hence any principle of 
life must be counted among the intelligibilia, thus the soul as well…This is also 
the ground of our ignorance with regard to all organized beings and beings that 
organize matter, the possibility of which, since it rests on a principle of life, 
cannot be understood. Simple beings have no place in the world’ (R 4534). 
Much like the rational soul or self, then, the principle of organized beings is simple, and so not to 
be met with in space. It is, for that reason, a noumenon of which we can have no cognition. As 
we have seen, Leibniz had also insisted on the simplicity of the ‘enduring principle of life,’ 
 It is noteworthy that relatively little attention is given to understanding means-ends relations in natural 44
ends. Zuckert (2007), 112 remarks that what is essential to natural ends is that their parts are instruments, 
and so denies that the contrast between mechanical and teleological explanation are to be construed 
simply in terms of part/whole relations, as McLaughlin and those who follow him do. Thus, Zuckert says 
that despite Kant’s frequent invocation of part-whole relations, his ‘analysis of purposive relations 
suggests that the dependence of part upon whole, the unity of the purposive object, is instantiated in, and 
made possible by reciprocal relations between past causes and future effects,’ which relations she had 
glossed earlier as ‘means to future ends.’ The description of the parts of a living body as ‘tools’ (organa) 
is of course pervasive in Aristotle, but as we have seen, what the ‘means-ends’ relationship entails there is 
not exactly what is commonly meant by it. Though this issue can be handled in detail only in the next 
chapter, I should like to say that Kant’s understanding of means-end relations among the parts of an 
organism is similar to Aristotle’s, where this means that the parts and their activities are but limitations or 
partial expressions of single activity. Precisely as partial expressions of it, they stand in service to that 
activity exist for its sake. That activity just is nutrition and reproduction of the animal to which it belongs
—its βίος.
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which principle accounted for the real unity of an organic body, making it a real whole rather 
than a mere aggregate. Thomas had likewise insisted on the simplicity of the soul and of course 
its role in grounding the unity of an organism.  And so what we see Kant articulating in the 45
reflection above is no different: a soul or something like it is the ultimate principle of a naturally 
organized and organizing being, and that soul is simple. Thus, Kant’s understanding of what 
would have to be known in order to have knowledge of organized substances is really quite 
traditional. But the simplicity of the soul is also what makes a natural end quite inexplicable 
from the standpoint of natural philosophy, since ‘simple beings have no place in the world.’  46
Because the categories have objective significance only in relation to what can be met with in 
intuition, and because the simple never can be, we can never be assured of the objective reality 
of the simple, supersensible principle (KU 5:396).  
 If the principle of life and of organized beings is simple and so beyond the reach of any 
knowledge we might ever come to possess, then natural philosophy proper is concerned with the 
lifeless, or with natural things only insofar as they are lifeless. In the Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science, after articulating his second law of mechanics according to which ‘every 
 ST I.75.1.45
 For that reason, I think Ginsborg (2004) is importantly mistaken, for she says ‘Kant rejects the 46
Aristotelian ontology of a multiplicity of individual substances endowed with specific natures. Saying 
that plants and animals are natural products does not commit him to saying that they have Aristotelian 
inner principles of change; instead it appears to imply only that they are not brought into existence by the 
will of an intelligent agent.’ Of course, saying that plants and animals are natural products does not 
commit him to saying that they have Aristotelian inner principles of change, but saying of them that they 
are natural ends most certainly does. And so, when Ginsborg says that Kant ‘rejects the notion of an 
‘inner principle’ of change and staying the same, as do many other philosophers influenced by ‘the new 
science’ of the seventeenth century,’ she is quite right, but only in a more limited sense than she herself 
realizes. For while Kant rejects such principles for any proper science, he recognizes a metaphysical need 
for such principles to make sense of the peculiar features of natural ends (if any there be).
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change in matter has an external cause,’ Kant explains why life is beyond the scope of natural 
philosophy: 
Life is the faculty of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal 
principle, of a finite substance to change, of a material substance to motion or rest, 
as change of its state. Now we know of no other internal principle in a substance 
for changing its state except desiring, and no other internal activity at all except 
thinking, together with that which depends on it, the feeling of pleasure or 
displeasure, and desire or willing. But these actions and grounds of determination 
in no way belong to representations of the outer senses, and so neither to the 
determinations of matter as matter. Hence all matter, as such, is lifeless…If we seek 
the cause of any change of matter in life, we will have to seek it forthwith in 
another substance, different from matter, yet combined with it’ (MAN 4:544). 
The introduction of inner principles of matter into the explanation of bodily motion amounts to 
‘hylozoism,’ which Kant identifies in the Critique of Teleological Judgment as one way in which 
someone might be a realist about natural purposiveness. Hylozoism is, however, ‘the death of all 
natural philosophy.’ Indeed, its very concept is said to contain a contradiction since matter as 
such just is lifeless (MAN 4:544; KU 5:394). This means, however, that it belongs to natural 
philosophy to be concerned specifically with matter in space, and so with causal relations among 
things external to one another.  But for precisely that reason, natural philosophy is concerned 47
with causal relations among aggregates, for Kant says of matter that it is constituted by ‘the mere 
aggregate of the movable’ and that it ‘has no other magnitude than that consisting in the 
 Teufel (2009), (2011) highlights the importance of the second law of mechanics for understanding the 47
contrast between mechanism and purposiveness. As I have mentioned, he argues against McLaughlin that 
whole-to-part to causality fails to make for a difference between mechanism and purposiveness, and 
proposes looking at Kant’s definitions of ‘end’ in the CJ, which invoke the causality of concepts. Because 
concepts are not the right sort of thing to be located in space, saying of something that it is an end, natural 
or otherwise, just is to say that it is mechanically inexplicable, in light of the second law of mechanics. 
This fails to make adequate sense, however, of the many passages in which Kant surely seems to think a 
difference in the mereological direction of causality constitutes an essential difference in kind. For a 
criticism of Teufel on this score, cf. McLaughlin (2014). McLaughlin also charges that it fails to make 
sense of the regulative status of mechanism in the third Critique, when the mechanical principle is 
presumably constitutive of experience. On this, cf. fn.54 below.
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aggregate of manifold [elements] external to one another’ (MAN 4:540). Thus, anything 
appearing in space and forming a proper object for natural philosophy is, considered as matter, a 
lifeless aggregate.  
 We find confirmation of this view in the Critique of Teleological Judgment. There Kant 
criticizes Hume for failing to see what, exactly, is the problem with judging organisms 
teleologically. Hume had suggested that the ordering of faculties and properties in a divine 
understanding is no more explicable than the ordering of matter and the community of its parts in 
a natural end, and so invoking the former to explain the latter gets us nowhere. But, Kant says, 
this is to misunderstand the problem, for  
the whole difficulty surrounding the question about the initial generation of a 
thing that contains purposes in itself and is comprehensible only through them 
rests on the further question concerning the unity of the ground of the 
combination in this product of the manifold of elements external to one 
another…if the cause is sought merely in matter, as an aggregate of numerous 
substances external to one another, the unity of the principle of the intrinsically 
purposive form of its formation is entirely lacking (KU 5:420-1).  
Thus, the problem to be encountered in understanding a natural end is again the unity of its 
ground, which ground cannot be found in matter because matter is as such an aggregate of 
things, all external to one another.  The unity of ground could be satisfied by a simple, 48
 What is more, this passage suggests that McLaughlin (1991) and (2014) is wrong to think that the 48
second law of mechanics is not at work in Kant’s understanding of mechanism in the CJ. McLaughlin 
argues that that mechanistic principle is constitutive of experience, and so one would have to explain why 
it becomes merely regulative in the CJ, since ‘in the study of organisms we are dealing only with bodies.’ 
And this has been one of the central issues governing discussion of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment 
in the third Critique, on which there is no small literature. I have not made the antinomy the central piece 
of my approach to Kant’s teleology in part because it has been so worked over that I think a better 
strategy is to let it lie fallow while hoping to derive fruits on other grounds. It is not unlike Aristotle’s 
Physics II.8 in this regard. But I shall say, first, that Kant says of the analogies that they are ‘regulative’ as 
opposed to constitutive just prior to introducing them (A180/B222), and so extensive discussion of his 
uses of those two terms would be needed before one could say that the antinomy in the CJ ‘demotes’ 
mechanism from its prior, lofty status. And the presumed demotion of mechanism must be coupled with 
Kant’s simultaneous insistence on the primacy of mechanism for those with intellects like ours, if we are 
to have any genuine explanations (e.g. KU 5:410).
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supersensible principle, but again, to invoke such a principle as a causal ground is the ‘death of 
all natural science’ because it would be to invoke something to which we have no cognitive 
access, and for which the categories have no objective significance.  49
 But how exactly would the supersensible principle ground a unity that extends between 
the collocation of material parts in space? That is impossible to say except on analogy with the 
unity of our own bodies. In the passage from MAN above, Kant says that the only inner activity 
we know of is thinking, and that desire and pleasure both depend on thinking. We also saw 
earlier that the pleasure found in judgments of beauty and characteristic of the ‘feeling of life’ 
was a kind of consciousness, indeed a consciousness of the reciprocity and community of powers 
in one’s subject, as well as an ‘inner causality’ for strengthening and maintaining that very same 
reciprocity and community. As a consciousness which unites both sensitive and rational faculties, 
judgments of beauty ‘have purport and significance only for human beings, i.e. for beings at once 
animal and rational’ (KU 5:210). They have purport, in other words, only for embodied minds, 
and the presence to mind of the rest of one’s body confers a kind of unity which outstrips 
anything found only in space. This was the lesson of Locke’s remarks about the ‘physical 
extension’ of the self, and it was in evidence in Kant’s remark that ‘wherever my body is, there is 
my thinking I as well.’ Our organic body is more than a mere aggregate in virtue of the felt (but 
 I mentioned above (fn.3) that Guyer (2001a) had argued that in the Opus Postumum, Kant argues for 49
the necessity of design because only thought has the kind of unity characteristic of organized things. 
Because matter as such is a mere aggregate, matter itself could never be the cause of such unity. Guyer 
argues that this argument runs afoul of the parameters set by the first Critique because it runs afoul of the 
paralogisms of pure reason, seen above: it confuses the logical simplicity of a thought with the real 
simplicity of the subject. But that would only be the case if in fact Kant were to assert that in fact there 
are natural ends which do have genuinely simple grounds. But he does not. Rather, the concept of a 
natural end is a concept constructed on the basis of our experience of certain natural products, and which 
has certain defining features. We do not in fact know whether or not the concept is an empty one. Just as 
the ideality of space and time leaves open the possibility that we ourselves are truly persistent, free 
beings, so does it leave open that organisms have at their ground a genuinely simple principle which is the 
source of their motions and alterations.
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not cognized) unity and simplicity of consciousness. But without any genuine cognitive access to 
the simple ground of a natural end, the only way to make sense of it as a living subject of 
pleasures and pains would be to ‘transfer’ or project our own self-conception to it, in much the 
same way that we transfer our own consciousness to any phenomenon we might represent as  a 
thinking being. And as I have noted, Kant in fact suggests that we understand natural ends on 
analogy with life in the CTJ, but says this would mean either subscribing to hylozoism, or 
postulating a soul, and neither gets us any nearer to scientific knowledge of nature.  
 If a simple, supersensible ground could confer the kind of unity which is necessary to 
purposiveness, making what is otherwise a mere aggregate into a genuine whole, Kant is 
nonetheless clear that such a principle is not sufficient to make sense of a natural end (KU 
5:393). The unity of the ground is only a pre-requisite for purposiveness, satisfied even by 
Spinozism, and Spinozism (as Kant understands it) in fact denies all purposiveness. It is 
therefore necessary that in addition the simple ground be a cause of what it grounds, i.e. the 
alterations and actions or motions of the material composite. We saw that this was a feature of 
substantial form or soul as it was conceived prior to Kant. But if natural ends are capable of self-
motion—of moving and altering themselves—in virtue of an inner principle of life, i.e. a simple 
supersensible ground, they are to that extent capable of free causality, for the causes of their 
motions are not external to them.  As we saw, Kant had said that we can only make sense of a 50
sensible being acting freely by simultaneously regarding it ‘on the other side as a noumenon,’ 
 Cf. Zumbach (1981). Zumbach does not focus on the traditional role of soul or form natural beings and 50
the notion of self-motion, but he does argue that Kant’s conception of teleology is essentially that of free 
causality. That claim, he says, is essentially negative, meaning only that mechanical causality is 
insufficient for characterizing living systems. Hegel had argued essentially the same, saying that ‘the 
natural products of organic life…make known to us the unity of the Notion, of nature and the notion of 
freedom.’ Cf. Lectures on Modern Philosophy, (2009).
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and this seems to be precisely what natural ends demand. And so if the principle of life and of 
organized beings is an intelligibile or noumenon, the possibility that they act freely is thereby 
opened up. Thus, when commenting on the definition of soul attributed at the time to Pythagoras, 
according to which soul is a self-moving number, Kant says that it ‘can perhaps be made 
intelligible, and to some extent justified, if it be assumed that by this power of self-movement he 
wished to point out its difference from matter, as the intrinsically lifeless that is movable only 
through something external, and thus to allude to freedom’ (P 8:393).  But as we also saw, Kant 51
suggests that to whatever extent freedom even shows up as a concern for theoretical reason, it is 
only because practical reason poses it as a problem (KpV 5:30), and so the idea of a supersensible 
causality is something borrowed from practical reason. We can only make sense of the free 
causality natural ends by reference to our consciousness of ourselves as free.  52
5.7 SAMENESS, SELF, AND SUBSTANCE (RENEWED) 
 If the above is right, then I suggest that natural ends are only to be understood by a 
‘transference’ of the feeling of life we experience in aesthetic appreciation in much the same way 
that phenomena can be represented as persons only by the transference of our own thinking to 
them. In the case of both persons and natural ends, the ultimate ground is simple and so not to be 
 This definition appears without attribution in De Anima I.2.51
 Guyer (2001) ultimately argues that Kant should have taken a position like the one just articulated, but 52
never did. That is, he argues that Kant should have said that it is the consciousness of the freedom of our 
own purposiveness that leads us to suppose that organic life is different in kind from other products of 
nature, which are explicable on strictly mechanical grounds. But again, self-motion was a characteristic 
feature of substances, organisms chief among them. This self-activity is prominent in the CJ, as we have 
just seen, and Kant explicitly connects the ideas of soul, life, and freedom.
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met with in space. They are for precisely that reason beyond the reach of theoretical reason. The 
true unity of something like an oak—or even a blade of grass—is not something that we can 
apprehend, given the nature of the object to be known and the constitution of our faculties. The 
simple principle grounds its persistence and thus identity through change, together with its free 
or spontaneous causality. Apart from that simple principle, all that is given to us phenomenally 
are aggregates of matter, every bit external to every other, and no more to be singled out as a 
single, discrete object than any other aggregate of things. In the absence of a grasp of its simple 
principle, there is a real sense in which one does not know where the oak begins and ends. 
Otherwise put, an apprehension of the limits of an oak’s body would require an apprehension of 
the simple principle which animates it, in the absence of which the oak is not to be picked out as 
a single entity rather than aggregate of random parcels of matter. But precisely because it is 
grounded in a simple principle outside of space and time, i.e. because it is nowhere in particular, 
it can—for all we know—be found whole and entire in each of its parts. This makes it possible to 
‘regard every twig or leaf of one tree…as a tree existing in itself’ in much the same way that 
‘wherever my body is, there is my thinking I as well’—if in fact a tree is a natural end (KU 
5:371-2; MMr 29:879). 
 But this also makes it possible that the oak species itself constitutes a natural end, or the 
human species, each being united in one and the same supersensible principle. I suggested in §1 
that living things can be grasped only through a common representation precisely for the reason 
that if it belongs to living things to reproduce, then any conception of a thing as living will 
involve an implicit reference to the possibility at least of a plurality of instances of its kind. 
Something analogous is, as we have seen, essential to the appreciation of beauty, which 
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presupposes a common sense (Gemeinsinn) and thus an implicit reference to a community of 
others, at least potentially. The transference of the feeling of life had in aesthetic appreciation to 
certain natural products—natural ends—involves the same. On the basis of this transference, the 
individual and the common are, in the case of the living, quite inextricably intertwined, and it is 
for precisely this reason that the living is, as it were, made for concepts. Indeed, the living speaks 
precisely to the purposiveness of nature for beings with intellects like ours, who think of 
individuals given in intuition only through common representations. But the unity of the 
individual and the common—the universal and the particular—means as a consequence that 
questions about individuation become irresolvable. Or rather, given Kant’s claim that the 
individual, itself by itself, is unknowable, an understanding of nature on the model of the living 
means we need not seek an understanding of isolated individuals; it quite absolves us from doing 
so. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
 I have been arguing that Kant understands the grounds of natural ends to be simple and, 
for that reason, to be beyond the reach of reason. In this, natural ends are like persons or rational 
substances. That one should look at our knowledge of persons to understand the problems and 
prospects for our knowledge of organisms was justified on the basis of the claim that there 
existed a history of treating them both together. That common treatment could itself be justified 
on the grounds that both organisms and persons were individual substances, and so they were 
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both of a kind. Though persons were distinctly rational substances, they were viewed by some, 
e.g. Aquinas, as substances in the most perfect and complete way. As a consequence, all other 
substances could be viewed as but approximations of rational ones, exhibiting only incompletely 
or imperfectly the characteristics belonging to persons, e.g. unity, persistence, and self-motion. 
And though Locke and Leibniz do not define the commonalities between them quite as explicitly 
as Aquinas sometimes does, both give persons and non-rational living beings parallel treatments. 
They both attribute to living things persistence conditions that outstrip any merely material 
beings, and they both attribute to living things a certain inner active force or power. And for both, 
the clearest idea we have of such forces or powers is the idea we have of ourselves in thinking. 
 I then argued that for Kant, our knowledge is constrained by the nature of our 
understanding. In particular, because we can cognize only what appears to us in intuition, and 
because the simple never does, we can never cognize or have knowledge of simple principles. 
Thus, although Kant agrees that the rational soul or self is a simple substance, he denies that the 
standard claims rationalists had wanted to draw from this fact can be maintained. Those claims 
can only be secured by practical reason as necessary conditions for the deployment of practical 
reason in the highest sense, i.e. in the service of morality. But because of the simplicity of the 
thinking self, Kant denies that thinking beings as such ever appear to us in outer intuition. 
Consequently, the representation of anything as thinking requires a transference or projection of 
our own consciousness to what we represent. Our only ground for attributing whatever is 
presupposed by thought or consciousness in its different modes to phenomena would then be the 
transference or projection of our consciousness to those phenomena, or something analogous to 
it.  
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 And so, it was argued, this explains our ignorance of natural ends. Natural ends exhibit a 
unity which outstrips merely material unity and a causality which is independent of the 
mechanism of nature and therefore free. Though natural, they exhibit the features of persons and 
so stand uncomfortably between theoretical and practical reason. I then turned to our 
consciousness of ourselves in aesthetic experience or in our experience of beauty, suggesting that 
this might provide us with a model by which to understand natural ends. Essential to aesthetic 
experience is a consciousness of the unity and harmony of our powers, which reciprocally 
promote one another in that experience. This harmony and reciprocity constitutes the feeling of 
life, and the activity of our powers in which that feeling is found is free and spontaneous, 
exhibiting an ‘internal causality’ for preserving that very activity. The tendency or disposition 
towards self-maintenance in our experience of beauty is analogous to the self-maintaining 
character of natural ends. But the feeling of life belonging to aesthetic experience also 
necessarily involves a reference to others with that same feeling, and this reference is mediated 
by a common sense or Gemeinsinn. In this sense, aesthetic experience involves reference to a 
community of individuals animated by the same feeling of life.  
 Natural ends, then, are to be understood on analogy with this same feeling. Much like 
thinking beings, living things depend on a simple principle, which means that as living things, 
they are unavailable to theoretical reason. Only by transferring or projecting our feeling onto 
them can we hope to make sense of the thought that the reciprocity of their parts is more than 
just the reciprocity belonging to matter in space—as more than a mere aggregate of matter. There 
is, indeed, an inner ground of community and reciprocity and so one which is not to be found in 
space. Similarly, the self-motion exhibited by organisms (if they do in fact exhibit it) is made 
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possible only on the supposition that there is an inner causal ground which is independent of the 
influence of things outside of it, one which is free and spontaneous.
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6.0 TO HOU HENEKA 
 In the beginning, I said that this study was essentially an exercise in comparative 
philosophical anatomy. The previous chapters, which consisted of individual examinations of 
Aristotle and Kant on natural teleology, were preparatory work for the sake of that exercise. The 
aim of those chapters was to explain why Aristotle and Kant did or did not ultimately accord 
teleology a genuinely scientific status. Having done that, we are now in a position to carry out 
the comparative exercise mentioned at the beginning and to identify those prior commitments 
which make them diverge as they do. We are now, in other words, prepared to isolate the relevant 
philosophical differences between them and to understand what differences they make.  
 So stated, however, it might seem as if this exercise presupposes that there is some one 
thing, ‘teleology,’ of which they might be giving different accounts. This could neither be 
confirmed nor denied at the outset, and so it was also an aim of this study to determine whether 
there was any such thing, i.e. a well-defined topic, ‘teleology,’ which occupied them both. As I 
noted in the introduction and as is by now familiar, there is no perennial mind-body problem, and 
so we might be skeptical of any mention of ‘the problem’ of teleology. Indeed, I also noted that 
some, at least, have denied that what counts as teleology today, particularly the work done in the 
spirit of Larry Wright, would have counted as such for the medievals. We might then suppose 
that the same will be true of ‘teleology’ in Aristotle and Kant. But only by reflecting on each and 
comparing the one with the other can this be determined, which is to say that it belongs to one 
and the same exercise both to assess the similarities and differences between them and to 
determine the extent to which they are addressing the same topic. 
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  In what follows, then, I suggest that while in some respects Aristotle and Kant are 
concerned with quite different issues, there are others in which they are addressing quite similar 
ones. That is, if the question is ‘is there some one thing, teleology, of which Aristotle and Kant 
are offering different accounts,’ then the answer is, in true Aristotelian fashion, ‘in some respects 
yes, in others, no.’ I begin in §1 with a discussion of some of their teleological vocabulary, telos 
and Zweck, arguing that they do not in fact mean or pick out the same thing. They are not, in 
other words, inter-translatable without remainder, and so it would be misleading to say of one 
that he is a realist about ends in nature, the other an anti-realist, because they mean different 
things by ‘end.’ In particular, Aristotle means by ‘telos’ ‘end’ in the concrete sense of a limit, but 
for Kant, Zweck means something more like skopos.  
 I then turn in §2 to a way of understanding their accounts of teleology which suggests 
that they are, in fact, concerned with quite similar problems. They are, in particular, concerned 
with the grounds for ascribing functions to the parts of a living thing, e.g. seeing or sight to the 
eye, but differ on the status of such ascriptions. The differences between them on this score is 
largely a matter of their differing stances on our knowledge of natural kinds. Aristotle is far more 
confident than Kant about what belongs essentially or characteristically to a thing and in our 
knowledge of life forms or bioi more generally. Part of their difference on this score can, I argue, 
be traced to their differing views on induction. Kant thinks inductive generalizations are merely 
presumptions that we make on the basis of limited evidence which we can never know to be true. 
In other words, Kant seems to think that induction is beset by one of the problems traditionally 
thought to belong to it. Aristotle, however, shows no such concern. This is not of course to say 
that Aristotle was naive about induction, making inductions willy-nilly, but that a certain 
!263
problem long thought to beset inductive generalizations seems not to be a matter with which 
Aristotle was particularly concerned. 
 I turn then in §3 to suggest that abstracting out a conception of ‘teleology’ from either 
Aristotle or Kant does no small violence to their larger philosophical projects. The stances that 
they end up taking cannot, in other words, be easily divorced from the problem contexts in which 
they were thinking. Aristotle’s teleology is essentially connected with the possibility of motion 
and the relations between to peras and to apeiron. Kant’s teleology is essentially concerned with 
questions about the classification of natural kinds, and it is shaped by certain larger philosophical 
aims, e.g. the rejection of Spinozism. To treat Kant’s teleology in isolation from the prior 
commitments of the critical philosophy more generally is to miss why Kant ultimately thinks 
teleology cannot be accorded scientific status.  
6.1 TELOS AND ZWECK 
 I want to begin by noting what is perhaps a telling fact but which has thus far gone 
unmentioned. At one point in the Critique of Judgment, Kant glosses ‘final purpose’ (Endzweck) 
with the Latin ‘scopus,’ meaning aim or target (KU 5:378). He says there that judging a thing to 
be internally purposive on account of its form is quite different from judging the existence of that 
thing to be a final purpose of nature, which is just to say that while the parts of a thing might play 
purposive roles in the life of a thing, that thing itself might not play any essential role in the 
course of nature more broadly. But Kant’s gloss makes clear that he understands by ‘teleologie’ 
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the science of nature’s aims or goals. And though Zweck is used to translate telos, this is in stark 
contrast to Aristotle. The Latin scopus is of course cousin to the Greek skopos, which as we now 
know Aristotle uses in a number of places in the ethical and political treatises, but not once in 
any of his natural philosophical works. Neither does he use it in the Metaphysics in any context 
touching on natural teleology. And so while a telos might on occasion be a skopos—namely in 
the human sphere—it is not explanatory or philosophically important in virtue of that fact. 
Rather, as we now know, Aristotle’s far more common gloss on telos is peras or limit, and 
understood as such it constituted one of a trio of terms, together with archē and meson, each with 
its own distinctive significance and each understood in the concrete sense of ‘beginning,’ 
‘middle’, and ‘end.’ These facts would suggest that Aristotle and Kant are concerned with quite 
different things when they talk of telē and Zwecke, respectively. And so when it is said that 
Aristotle was a realist about teleology, and Kant an anti-realist, this is arguably quite misleading, 
for what the one affirms and the other denies are quite different. 
 This is not, however, the only difference between telos and Zweck. We saw in the third 
chapter that Kant very frequently uses Zweck to describe things that stand in a systematic 
relationship with one another. Thus, in his Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, 
Kant distinguishes between skill, prudence, and wisdom. He defines the latter as the ‘perfection 
of cognition in the derivation of every end from the system of all ends’ (LR 28:1057). Someone 
with wisdom is someone whose ends all stand together in harmony with the general dictates of 
morality, for ‘morals has as its object precisely to consider how each end can stand together with 
the idea of a whole of all ends.’ Indeed, Kant says that we have in morality an example of a 
highest understanding which can proceed from the whole to the particular, because in morality 
!265
one can determine the worth of any given end on the basis of an idea of a whole of all ends. In 
this as in a natural end, what grounds the unity of parts is some idea under which they are 
subsumed. But the language of a ‘system of ends’ recurs in other places as well (e.g. 
28:1099-1103). As we have seen, as parts of a system, ends count as the matter of that system, 
and indeed in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant glosses ends precisely as such: distinguishing 
between duties of virtue and duties of right, he says of the former that they have to do with what 
is formal in the moral determination of the will, not ‘with a certain end (matter, object of choice)’ 
(MS 6:383). Thus, ‘end’ for Kant often picks out a particular determination of a more general 
principle which, together with other such determinations, counts as a part of a larger whole. 
 For Aristotle, by contrast, the telos and that of which it is the telos stand at the same level 
of generality. Thus, the slogan that Aristotle often uses to defend his teleology is just that man 
begets man, and horse horse. This is a feature of his understanding of teleology quite generally, 
for while in one sense the builder is the efficient cause of the house, in the strictest sense it is the 
form of the house in the mind of the builder which is to count as the efficient cause. 
Consequently, to speak of a ‘system of ends’ or of ends as the ‘matter’ of anything at all is really 
quite foreign to Aristotle’s way of thinking, and indeed telos is never glossed in the entirety of 
Aristotle’s works as matter, but only ever form. It is a source of form precisely because it is a 
limit. And the same is to be said about to hou heneka, which we saw in chapter 2 is often 
understood in terms of the telos. Thus in Phys. II.8, Aristotle says that ‘whenever there is an end 
(telos) the earlier sequence of things is done for the sake of this’ (199a9-9), and in De Partibus I.
1, that ‘we say “this is for the sake of that” whenever there appears to be some end (telos) 
towards which the change proceeds if nothing impedes it’ (641b24-25). And in Meta. α.2, 
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Aristotle is again quite explicit, glossing to hou heneka as a telos kai peras. Consequently, not 
just telos, but his teleological vocabulary quite generally would appear to function quite 
differently than Kant’s, playing quite distinct conceptual roles. 
 If that is right, then perhaps we do a real disservice to our understanding of Aristotle and 
Kant by supposing that some of their principal terms for talking about ‘purposiveness,’ i.e. ‘telos’ 
or ‘to hou heneka’ and ‘Zweck’ mean more or less the same thing. Nonetheless, one might object 
that the differences just described need not reflect any interesting philosophical differences in 
their underlying conceptions of what teleology is and what it is trying to explain, for although 
Aristotle never talks of ends as matter, and typically describes the end at the same level of 
generality as the efficient cause from which it issues, any number of ends I set myself, such as 
going to the market to collect a debt, do stand—at least ideally—under a larger end, namely my 
own flourishing, to which my other ends would be but means. The same would be just as true of 
non-rational living things: the construction of the damn is the end of a certain set of the beaver’s 
actions, but this end itself stands under a more inclusive end, namely the preservation and 
propagation of the beaver itself. This would be the common end, i.e. that in which all its other 
actions share and in the service of which they stand. One could say the same about certain 
processes of generation. The coming to be of the liver has as its end the existence of the liver, but 
that process is itself embedded in a larger context, namely the coming to be of the organism of 
which it is a part. 
 But it must be said in response that to whatever extent some telos is pursued for the sake 
of some further end, then by Aristotle’s lights, it is to just that extent not an end or telos, but a 
meson. We can only really say the same things about telē that Kant sometimes says of Zwecke by 
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a kind semantic slight of hand or equivocation. Aristotle does not speak of ends or telē in some 
of the ways that Kant does, e.g. as matter, because telē confer form on other things and do not 
have form conferred on them in virtue of something else. That is to say, it would be quite 
nonsensical for Aristotle to talk of a ‘system of ends’ because it is the telos that binds things 
together into anything like a system or whole, and ends can themselves be bound together only 
insofar as they are precisely not ends, but mesa. For this reason, the relations among the different 
concepts, telos and Zweck, remain essentially distinct, even if we can identify a certain family 
resemblance between them. One can only make the terms congruent by neglecting the precise 
meaning Aristotle gives to telos, or Kant to Zweck. And if philosophical problems cannot be 
understood independently of the vocabulary in which they are articulated, then Aristotle and 
Kant would appear to be talking about subtly different things.  
6.2 FUNCTIONS AND NATURAL KINDS 
 If telos and Zweck cannot be said to be simply interchangeable, with the consequence 
perhaps that what Aristotle affirms and Kant denies of nature are subtly different things, we can 
nonetheless identify a common problem faced by both Aristotle and Kant: what, if anything, 
grounds quite ordinary claims such as ‘an eagle’s talons are for grasping its prey’ or ‘the giant 
panda’s thumb is for stripping bamboo.’ That Aristotle is concerned with such claims is clear. 
They are essential to any science of living things, and the Empedoclean view, according to which 
parts come to be and simply turn out to be useful, is to be rejected. We saw why in chapter 2. The 
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function of a thing just is the role that it characteristically plays in the life of the thing possessing 
it. Thus, the thumb of the giant panda is for stripping bamboo because the giant panda strips 
bamboo with its thumb—it is that by means of which the giant panda does what it does, the 
meson by which it typically brings about some telos. For that reason it is for the sake of what it 
does. It typically or customarily mediates between the panda and some particular activity and so 
it is, in the most concrete of senses, the means to some end. 
 Kant’s view is quite otherwise. He says quite clearly in his What Real Progress essay that  
So far as experience is concerned, there is no further knowledge than what Epicurus 
granted it, namely that after nature had formed eyes and ears, we use them for 
seeing and hearing, though that does not prove that the cause producing them must 
itself have had the intention of forming this structure in accordance with the 
purpose in question; for this we cannot perceive, but can only introduce by 
reasoning, in order merely to recognize a purposiveness in such objects’ (P 20: 
293-4) 
Thus, Kant stakes out a position which is quite immediately contrary to the position taken by 
Aristotle, claiming that we cannot have any insight into the connection between some part or 
organ and the useful role that it eventually plays in the life of some organism. That the parts of an 
organism should have an essential relation to the role they come to play in its life is, as far as we 
can tell, entirely accidental. And though not as explicit in most of his discussion of natural 
purposiveness in the third Critique, the basic thought is at work in his brief discussion of relative 
purposiveness in the Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment in the same. As we saw in 
chapter 5, relative purposive relations are such as those between certain sand deposits and the 
pines which later come to grow in them, or the grass and the sheep which then feed on it. These 
are relations of purposiveness insofar as the one serves or is used by the other, but they are not 
purposive ‘in themselves’ because the existence of the grass is perfectly conceivable without the 
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existence of the sheep, and the sand without the pines (KU 5:368). If that is right, then in the the 
Progress essay Kant is simply extending that thought to the parts of a living thing. All relations 
of purposiveness which we might apprehend in the world around us are, apparently, relative or, 
as Aristotle might say, merely accidental relations, and that includes the benefits conferred by an 
animal’s eyes, ears, mouth, and nose. 
 How then are we to explain this opposition? Why do Aristotle and Kant take such 
diametrically opposed positions? Kant takes the view that he does because he takes us to be 
ignorant of the principle of a natural end. As we have learned, the common or communal 
principle belonging to a natural end and of which we are ignorant is what binds into a real whole 
what would otherwise be a mere aggregate of parts, i.e. parcels of matter simply collocated in 
some shared space. It is in virtue of this principle that the parts of a natural end are possible only 
in relation to the whole of which they are part, and this makes them non-relatively or intrinsically 
purposive. That is, what distinguishes the relations between the parts of a sparrow and the 
relations between sand deposits and the pines that grow in them is the (supposed) presence of a 
noumenal principle common to the former, but not to the latter. The parts of a sparrow which 
(seem to) belong to it essentially are conceivable only in relation to the sparrow, but the sand 
deposits are perfectly conceivable quite independently of any relation to to the pines. But this 
difference only obtains if in fact the sparrow is a natural end, and the conjunction of sand-
deposits and pines is not. And though the former certainly suggests to us the idea of natural end, 
whereas the latter does not, Kant thinks we cannot in fact know whether the sparrow is a natural 
end. To know that it was a natural end, and so to know that its parts were possible only in 
relation to the whole, we would have to have insight into its noumenal ground (if there is one). In 
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the absence of such insight, all that experience gives us is an aggregate of things exhibiting 
relative but not intrinsic relations of purposiveness. 
  But our ignorance with respect to the noumenal ground of a natural end is intimately 
related to our ignorance of natural kinds, and for both Aristotle and Kant, our knowledge of 
natural kinds is essential to our knowledge of natural teleology—if in fact we have any. Thus, a 
telos for Aristotle is typically or standardly some species form, e.g. horse. As a telos, it confers 
form on what would otherwise be regarded as a mere heap of motions or changes, and ignorance 
of natural forms entails ignorance of natural motions, i.e. how to demarcate one from another, or 
where one ends and another begins. Similarly, for Kant the nutritive power animating a natural 
end is the same as the generative power which unites otherwise distinct individuals into some 
one kind. Consequently, the noumenal ground which secures the unity of the parts of natural end 
also secures the unity of its kind. It is this noumenal ground which makes the difference between 
merely scholastic divisions, which are based on nothing more than external similarities, and real 
(causal) divisions among kinds. For that reason, knowledge of natural ends essentially involves 
knowledge of natural kinds, and our ignorance of natural ends is also ignorance of natural kinds, 
i.e. of the sorts of things that populate nature and their essential characteristics. And so it will be 
good to say something about the different stances taken by Aristotle and Kant on our knowledge 
of kinds.  
 Aristotle begins with the presumption that the world is sorted into kinds, and there is no 
evidence he thought a world without kinds even possible, as Kant did. Though the precise 
boundaries between them or how best to classify things may occasionally be in doubt, the fact 
that there are kinds with which we are more or less in touch is not. Confident in the truth of 
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certain claims about kinds, e.g. ‘man begets man,’ Aristotle could be similarly confident in the 
truth of teleology, since such claims are, in fact, sufficient for it.  As we have seen, simple facts 1
such as these underwrite Aristotle’s analysis of natural motion and change more broadly—they 
provide the data on which to reflect—and so his teleology is simply writ into his account of 
motion and change more broadly. That is to say, the identity of kinds grounds the identity of 
motion, and it is the interplay of these two facts which constitutes Aristotle’s teleology. Because 
all motion is between some form and its corresponding privation, and because the form of a 
motion—the genus and species to which it belongs—is determined by what is coming to be, any 
motion with a privative end-state is and is known only accidentally, as the doctor has knowledge 
of sickness only virtue of her knowledge of health. And because Aristotle understands the matter-
form relation in terms of potency and act, and because any given potency is only as well defined 
as its corresponding actuality, strictly speaking there cannot be any potencies for privations. 
Deprivative motions are therefore essentially derivative. But this means that the standard by 
which we evaluate the doings of a horse or the things that might happen to it is the role they have 
in propagating the horse kind itself, its perpetuation through nutrition and generation, and this is 
famously the way in which things partake of the eternal and divine. 
 Natural species forms cannot serve this same role in Kant, however, for the simple reason 
that Kant abjures any real knowledge of what those species forms are. Indeed, there is even a 
sense in which it would be out of place to say that there are species forms for Kant, insofar as 
they depend simply on the demands of our discursive intellects. As we saw in the fourth chapter, 
one of the principle themes of the third Critique is the ordering of nature into a system, where 
 Cf. Meyer (1992); chapter 3.1
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this just means the ordering of nature into relations of genus and species. The problem arose not 
only out of philosophical disputes between Locke and Leibniz, but out of disputes internal to the 
practice of natural history at the time. Buffon had suggested that the ‘great multiplicity’ and 
variety of objects encountered in nature constitutes an ‘apparently insurmountable obstacle to the 
advancement of our understanding.’  But regardless of the extent of that variety, we are naturally 2
inclined to suppose that there is a certain ‘order and uniformity’ to be found.  Human beings, 3
Buffon says, have a penchant for wishing to find regularity and resemblance among natural 
things, and even if it should prove impossible to arrive at one general system, one perfect method 
for dividing genera into species and subspecies, naturalists nonetheless need ‘an imaginary goal 
in order to sustain them in their work.’  
 Kant picked up on Buffon’s idea of an imaginary goal, and makes the systematicity of 
nature a regulative idea of reason, a focus imaginarius. And so while Aristotle just took it as a 
basic feature of the world from which to begin one’s reflections—an initial datum, as it were—
Kant argues that regardless of what one might think about the ‘existence’ of kinds, they 
constitute a necessary part of the coherent use of our understanding. It is, he thinks, quite 
possible that nature should be but a dizzying array of individuals incapable of being sorted into 
higher kinds. Nonetheless, the discursive nature of our understanding bids us to try, at least, to 
classify what we see into kinds. For that reason, though, it is possible that any and every ordering 
of nature into genera and species reflects more about us than it does about nature. Classificatory 
mistakes are of course a risk that any natural investigator runs, and the disagreement between 
 Sloan (1981), 98. 2
 Ibid. 100.3
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Locke and Leibniz was in some measure a difference in mood between the two of them, i.e. a 
difference between pessimism and optimism, respectively. But Kant’s insistence on the needs of 
our essentially discursive understanding means that any putative form to which we might advert 
in explaining phenomena runs the risk of not being just empirically off the mark, as though one 
thought that caterpillars and butterflies (or moths) constituted two quite different classes of 
insects, but as being from a transcendental perspective something which is, as it were, ‘projected’ 
onto the phenomena (A647/B675). At issue, in other words, is not the veracity of this or that 
classification, but classification itself, for an intuitive intellect would apprehend things quite 
independently of common kinds. That things are to be classified at all is, in other words, a 
contingent feature of our own intellects, rather than anything about the things themselves. And so 
the very idea that there is a ‘common ground,’ either of the individual or of the members of a 
species is something that could only arise for beings with intellects like ours. 
 But even without adverting to issues of the transcendental status of kinds and the peculiar 
demands of our discursive intellects, there would seem to be a different, but no less important, 
reason why Aristotle and Kant differ as they do on the epistemic status of natural kinds, and that 
is the nature of induction. For Kant, in our delineation of a species, we proceed part by part—
individual by individual—and we can never be certain that we have all the parts that would 
constitute the complete whole of the species. Indeed, we have every reason to suppose we do not 
and this, it seems, is the problem with induction. Deductive inference yields necessity, and 
(deductive) logic has been, in Kant’s eyes, more or less complete since the time of Aristotle. The 
reason for its success is that reason has to do only with itself and ‘proves nothing but the formal 
rules of all thinking’ (Bix). Induction, on the other hand, is in a slightly different position for ‘no 
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logician has yet developed…induction properly; this field still lies open’ (DW: 772). 
Unfortunately, Kant himself actually says little about induction, even in the third Critique, where 
induction and the possibility of induction comes to center stage.  His most sustained remarks are 4
found in his logic lectures and reflections. In the latter he says that inductive judgments or 
inferences of the power of judgment, which go from the particular to the universal, are merely 
‘provisional’ (vorläufigen), being mere ‘presumptions’ (praesumtionen) (R 3200; R 3276). What 
we presume in induction quite generally (which he in some places calls ‘a crutch for the human 
understanding’) is that ‘many things are not to be found in agreement without a common ground 
(gemeinschaftlichen Grund), thus that what pertains to them in this fashion will necessarily exist 
on the basis of a common ground’ (gemeinschaftlichen Grund) (R 2300). As in a natural end, that 
common ground is never itself given, but something presumed on the basis of an acquaintance 
with a handful of individuals of a presumed species—some of the ‘parts’ of that species—which 
will, one hopes, go together to constitute a complete division of the species or genus concept: 
’who can be acquainted with all the things that belong under a certain genus?’ (HL 109). Never 
being acquainted with all the parts, I can never come to the whole: ‘there cannot [in induction] be 
an inference from part of a whole concept to the rest’ (R 3277). It is worth quoting Kant in full 
here: ‘induction is the inference where I take to be true, as if it belonged to all, what belongs to 
many things under a universal inference and concept’ (BL 287). In induction one presumes that 
what belongs to many belongs to the rest and thus to the whole. One proceeds as if all yellow 
4 Cf. especially McFarland (1970), ch. 1; Allison (2003). Kant’s discussion in the introductions is also 
relevant to Hume’s discussions of the relations between matters of fact in the First Enquiry, where 
Hume discusses what is broadly similar to ‘the problem of induction,’ though he does not use that 
phrase. That the future will be like the past, and so that past experience of objects is any guide to future 
experience, is taken to be a mere unreasoned presumption grounded in habit or custom (§4-5). 
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bellied warblers have yellow bellies, but one cannot know this be true in advance, and so for 
Kant, all inductive inferences, all empirical generalizations, are merely als ob, as if judgments 
that we must make on the basis of fragmentary, partial, or incomplete acquaintance with things in 
experience. 
If the above is right, then ‘as if’ judgments in the conduct of natural inquiry have nothing 
in particular to do with organisms themselves, or with analogy, but with induction. Indeed, in the 
lectures just quoted, in which Kant says that all inductions are merely as if, Kant also says that 
analogy, i.e. that by which we are often urged to understand natural ends, ‘is nothing other than 
an induction’ (BL: 287). And so, in the shifting sands of empirical inquiry, we must take to be 
true what is not in fact known to be true. Unlike concepts which I make arbitrarily (e.g. 
mathematical concepts), empirical concepts are made gradually through experience and their 
synthesis can never be completed. And neither can they be defined. As a result, empirical 
concepts are capable only of ‘description,’ for our experience can only ever yield materials for 
definition, and definition remains only as ‘the idea of a logical perfection that we must seek to 
attain’ (JL §105). We are, Kant says, only ever acquainted with what is to be the matter of a 
definition, which is to say that we shall never be able to proceed from the whole to the parts, as 
we do with disjunctive judgments in a logical division, because the whole species is never 
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actually given to us—only a handful of instances are. Biology, like other merely empirical 
sciences, is capable of providing only ‘descriptions’.  5
It is, however, quite otherwise for Aristotle, and while a full defense of the thesis is far 
beyond the scope of this concluding chapter, I would like to suggest that Aristotle does not 
consider induction to be problematic in the same way that Kant does because for Aristotle, what 
we know by way of induction is articulated in generic propositions, e.g. ‘the adult human being 
has thirty-two teeth.’ I have argued in chapter 3 that we should understand function ascriptions in 
Aristotle in terms of generics, i.e. what some part or organ customarily or typically does. This 
was, in fact, a point made by Wright in his highly influential treatment of functions, and others 
have called upon the peculiar features of generics in an effort to explain certain other aspects of 
Aristotle’s thought.  They have of course been accorded a special place in recent contributions to 6
Aristotelian ethical thought as well.  But apart from whatever light they might throw on those 7
issues, they might also help us to understand why Aristotle seems not to have thought induction 
quite the problem that many would later take it to be. A clear exposition of the problem can be 
found in Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism: 
It is also easy, I think, to find fault with the inductive mode of inference. For 
when the Dogmatists attempt to lend credence to a universal by induction from 
5 I cannot here go into the conditions Kant thinks any inquiry must be to be counted properly scientific, 
but the difficulties encountered by biology and organic explanation are little discussed with reference to 
the other sciences Kant demotes, like chemistry and psychology. Cf. McNulty (2014), Carrier (2001), and 
Friedman (1992). In chemistry, we do not experience substances like ‘pure earth, pure water, pure air, 
etc.’ but we must nonetheless make use of the idea of such substances (A646/B674). These ideas ‘are not 
created by nature, rather we question nature according to [them]’ (ibid.). Chemistry can be nothing but a 
‘systematic art’ and ‘never a proper science’, because all of its principles are ‘merely empirical’, at least at 
the time of the writing of MAN (4: 471).
 Cf. Wright (1976), Allen (2015). Wright received extended discussion in chapter 3, for some discussion 6
of Allen, cf. ch.2, fn. 47.  
 Cf. Foot (2001), Thompson (2008). 7
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the particulars, in doing this they will consider either all the particulars or only 
some of them. But if they consider only some, the induction will not be firm, 
since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may refute the universal; 
while if they consider all, they will be working at an impossible task, since the 
particulars are infinite in number and unbounded. So that either way, I think, the 
induction turns out to be shaky (PH II.204). 
The same or similar criticisms have been made elsewhere and at different times, but such 
concerns are are quite absent from Aristotle, who never addresses an objection to induction or 
epagōgē of this sort. And the reason, I suggest, is that Aristotle understood inductive 
generalizations in terms of generics. Because the truth-conditions of generic claims are thought 
to be non-quantifiable, then whatever problems there might be in coming to know such claims, 
they will be quite different from the problem of induction as normally understood, since it is no 
longer a numbers game.  Generics are thought to be non-quantifiable because they are taken to 8
describe what is typical or customary for some subject—what is normal—without saying that it 
is true in every or even most instances. And it has been suggested that this thought lies behind 
Aristotle’s use of the phrase, hōs epi to polu, i.e. as things stand usually or for the most part.  9
Thus, ‘Helen drinks a glass of wine after work’ is not falsified simply because she is, 
periodically, out of wine, or even because on some days she chooses to abstain for the sake of her 
health. It certainly does not mean, ‘for any given day, it is the case that Helen has a glass of wine 
after work on that day.’ And the same is true for claims like ‘the adult human being has thirty-
two teeth’ or ‘acorns become oak trees.’ This, it seems, is the standard we should adopt for 
accounting for sublunary causal connections. Acorns do not turn into oak trees with the same 
kind of necessity with which the planets move in their orbits because an acorn might fall on the 
 Cf. Leslie (2012), Thompson (2008), or Fara (2005). 8
 Thompson (2008), 69. Allen (2015).9
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road or be eaten by a squirrel. But an acorn will turn into an oak tree if otherwise unimpeded, but 
it is simply the case that there are a lot of impediments in our sublunary realm.   10
If Aristotle’s and Kant’s differing conceptions of the (epistemic and ontological) status of 
teleological explanation are then quite intimately connected to their differing conceptions of the 
(epistemic and ontological) status of natural kinds or forms, and if the latter are to be known by 
induction, then their differing conceptions of induction and the nature of what results from it will 
play no small role in their conceptions of teleology. As we have seen, Kant thinks every 
induction is merely an as if judgment reaching towards a common or communal ground, in much 
the same way that our judgments of natural ends are. For Aristotle however, the numerical whole 
of the species need not be given to us because the object or result of an induction is not made 
true or false by the agreement of every or even of the majority of instances.  
6.3 PROBLEM CONTEXTS 
In the above, I have tried to suggest one way in which Aristotle and Kant might be said to 
be addressing the same topic in their discussions of ‘teleology,’ though coming to quite different 
conclusions. In particular, both were concerned to identify what in the case of natural things 
makes the difference between a mere aggregate of parts and a genuine whole. For both, it is 
something like a kind or form, but they differ as to the epistemic and ontological status any such 
10 Again, this is by no means to deny that there are serious questions about induction, or to give an 
account of what Aristotle is thinking in, e.g., APo. II.19, or APr. II.23. It is only to say that if Aristotle is 
thinking about induction or the progression from particulars to universals in these terms, then one of the 
common objections to the ‘validity’ or ‘certainty’ of induction will no longer have the same force, if 
indeed it retains any force at all, because induction is, again, simply not a numbers game. 
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kind or form might have. Thus, Aristotle takes it simply as a datum that the world is sorted into 
kinds, the rough outlines of which are more or less apparent. What is more, Aristotle thinks 
robust, scientific knowledge of those forms through induction or epagōgē is quite achievable, 
and I suggested that Aristotle’s relative optimism on this score might be grounded in the fact that 
he thinks of inductive generalizations in terms of generics, i.e. claims the truth-conditions of 
which are non-quantifiable. Kant, however, thinks it quite possible that the world could, in 
theory, fail to exhibit any stable kinds at all, and he has a far less rosy picture of induction and 
the kind of knowledge it secures.  Induction, by which we presume that what holds for many 11
holds for all, is always only provisional, and the adoption of that common ground in explanation 
is only ever a kind of presumption, never completely justified or secured. We take what we have 
seen in a few and extrapolate to many which we have not. Absent any knowledge of forms, we 
cannot ascribe real functions to things in nature because we cannot know that a part which plays 
some role in the life of an organism is possible only in relation to that organism. 
The thought then would be that although both are concerned to address what makes a 
true, natural whole, as opposed to an aggregate, they differ on the epistemic and ontological 
status of what might play that role. But there is another way of thinking about their approach to 
‘teleology’ which suggests that, in fact, the problems and questions they were facing possess 
only—and so no more than—a certain family resemblance. I have already suggested as much on 
the basis of the apparently different meanings of telos and Zweck. But there are further reasons 
for thinking so. In particular, by the time Kant comes to address the status of teleological 
11 In this, Kant’s starting point is any many ways similar to Hume’s skeptical problem, mentioned 
above (fn. 4), according to which nothing demands that the future be like the past. Of course, Kant 
ultimately answers this problem in a very different way.
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explanation in the context of the critical philosophy, many claims which will later serve as 
constraints on the status of teleology have already been established. These claims were the 
consequence of Kant’s engagement with other problems which have no obvious parallel in 
Aristotle. And the same is to be said of Aristotle: much of what he says about ‘teleology’ is 
constrained or shaped by his responses to other issues whose relation to ‘teleology’ is hardly 
clear. This is not quite to say that for both or even for either that teleology lies downstream of 
other issues, but that only an implausible atomism about philosophical problems could make us 
suppose that there is an isolable ‘problem of teleology’ which stands quite free of a host of other 
issues, especially for thinkers such as Aristotle and Kant.  
 We can begin by looking at some of the issues Kant was concerned to address. Famously, 
he says in the first Critique that at least part of his goal is to limit the pretensions of (theoretical) 
reason in order to make room for faith or belief (Bxxx). Doing so means preserving the place of 
God, freedom, and immortality. As I discussed in chapter 5, freedom also seemed to be a 
property of natural ends—they posses an apparently spontaneous or free causality, and Kant 
regularly contrasts freedom with mechanical causality or mechanism in the second Critique. The 
‘self-organizing’ character of natural ends certainly suggests freedom—‘self-activity’ is glossed 
with ‘freedom’ in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first (A418/B446). But Kant thinks we can 
understand ourselves as free only from the standpoint of practical reason, in which we regard 
ourselves as noumena and so not constrained by what holds true of things in space and time, 
particularly causal determinism. And that means our freedom depends on the ideality of space 
and time, i.e. on the claim that space and time do not belong to things in themselves: 
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I do not see how those who insist on regarding time and space as determinations 
belonging to the existence of things in themselves would avoid fatalism of actions 
(KpV 5:101). 
Kant then goes on to say that the ideality of space and time allows us to avoid Spinozism. But  if 
the ideality of space and time, together with the limitation of theoretical reason to what appears 
in them makes it possible to preserve freedom and morality from the ravages of dogmatic 
metaphysics, it also makes it impossible for us to cognize natural ends. In particular, because the 
ground of a natural end is simple, and because nothing simple appears in space, we cannot 
cognize the ground of a natural end. The free or spontaneous causal character of natural ends was 
foreclosed by the developmental path Kant took in preserving moral freedom from a lens grinder. 
That is to say, one of the central pieces in the philosophical architecture, as it were, of Kant’s 
teleology was originally crafted for other ends, namely the preservation of morality and religious 
belief. In that sense, Kant’s teleological anti-realism is not simply a function of his worries about 
‘teleological explanation’ generically construed, but of prior commitments central to his critical 
philosophy as a whole.  
 Related to this is one of Kant’s central reasons for thinking a science of life impossible. 
We saw in the previous chapter that living things depend on inner principles of change, which is 
to say principles which do not appear in space and thus are not subject to the second law of 
mechanics, according to which everything must have a cause external to it. But there Kant also 
articulates the thought that we know of no other ‘internal’ activity than thinking, and no other 
internal principle for change than desiring, which depends on it. This was itself broadly in line 
with or in the spirit of remarks made by both Locke and Leibniz. But it meant as a consequence 
that living things are essentially removed from the province of genuine natural philosophy. 
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Aristotle, however, would seem not to hold any such thesis. He famously defines natural things 
in terms of their possession of an archē of motion and rest in themselves. They are for that 
reason the sources or origins of their own motions, and thus self-movers. That there are such 
things Aristotle thinks indisputable, and so in Physics II.1, after giving his definition of nature, 
he says that  
it would be absurd to try to prove that nature exists, since it is evident that there 
do exist many of things of this sort. To rely on the non-obvious to establish the 
obvious is a sign of being incapable of distinguishing between what is and what is 
not intelligible in itself (193a2-6). 
To demand proof of the manifest is, Aristotle thinks, to be in a poor position indeed, and even if 
some would not call this particular fact manifest, Aristotle clearly does. He does not, in other 
words, seem to think the inner activity of non-rational natural things any more opaque than our 
own, and so would deny that we know of no other internal activity than thinking. But what is 
more, Aristotle’s understanding of nature and natural science does not rule out beings possessed 
of ‘inner’ activities and principles; rather, he makes them absolutely central. 
 By contrast, we have seen that Aristotle’s concern with teleology is part and parcel of of 
his concern with a larger problem in Greek philosophy, namely the possibility of motion. 
Because motion is a continuous magnitude and thus divisible without limit, it might seem to be 
unlimited and therefore unknowable. Aristotle introduces his definition of motion in Phys. III 
with just this thought. And as we have seen, the importance of the telos is precisely that it serves 
as a limit of motion, thereby conferring on motion form and intelligibility: ‘if generation and 
motion are to be, there must also be a limit (peras); for no motion is unlimited (apeiros), but 
every motion has an end (telos)’ (Meta. B.4; 999b10-11). By itself, of course, this does not 
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suffice for teleology. As I noted above, it depends in addition on a certain conception of act and 
potency, in terms of which motion is defined, such that the subject of every motion—the matter
—is primarily and in the first instance directed to some form rather than its privation. Combined 
with the thought that ‘being is better than non-being,’ it means that all motion is directed 
primarily and in the first instance towards the good of its subject. But for Kant, teleology does 
not simply fall out of his account of motion or change, in part for reasons already discussed—he 
seems to think it perfectly coherent to imagine a world without any stable kinds at all. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 And so, mirabile dictu, this study comes to its end. It was the aim of this study to 
compare and contrast the views of Aristotle and Kant on the status of natural teleology, i.e. the 
thought that nature or natural things do what they do with an eye towards some end or goal. 
Aristotle was a realist about natural teleology, Kant an anti-realist, and the aim of this 
dissertation was to explain why each accorded it the epistemic and ontological status that he did. 
As I noted in the introduction, one might explain the difference between them by highlighting the 
role of the changing conception of nature in the 17th century, when the tide turned against 
Aristotelianism. That story is by now familiar and some reference to it is very nearly standard in 
introductions to the topic of natural teleology. 
 But though there is no small truth in such an explanation, I hope to have shown that the 
differences that exist between them are not reducible to however we might describe the 
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conceptual transformation(s) that occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Each was 
concerned in particular ways with quite distinct problems for which there is no obvious analogue 
in the other. Kant was concerned to defend the possibility of freedom, and his distinction 
between phenomena and noumena, together with the ideality of space and time, were part of that 
defense. Limiting theoretical knowledge to the objects of space and time meant as a consequence 
that the principle in virtue of which traditional Aristotelian substances such as plants and animals 
were real wholes and capable of self-motion—their soul or form—were no longer objects of such 
knowledge. Aristotle was, by contrast, concerned with the possibility of motion, and took from 
his Pythagorean and Platonic predecessors the thought that the beginning, middle, and end give 
the parts of the whole, and that this is, as it were, a law of nature. These are limits and it is in 
virtue of these that nature is knowable. 
 The differences in their concerns is perhaps reflected in the different uses to which their 
teleological vocabulary is put. Though Zweck often translates telos, the two terms as used by 
Kant and Aristotle respectively have subtly different conceptual roles, describing subtly different 
things, and so are possessed of subtly different meanings. The first means more nearly an aim or 
goal, the latter an ‘end’ in the concrete sense of limit, and so when one denies, and the other 
affirms that there are ends in nature, they must be taken to be affirming and denying different 
things. For Aristotle, ends do not constitute the matter of anything, but rather bind matter into 
some whole. For Kant, ends are not the source of form but are bound together by form, being but 
partial or limited expressions of that form.  
 Nonetheless, there is another sense in which both are concerned with the same problem, 
namely, the question of how we are to understand the peculiar or distinctive character of living 
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things. Both Aristotle and Kant appreciate this distinctive character, and both think that 
understanding living things essentially involves reference to the kinds to which they belong. 
They differ, however, on the prospects for a real knowledge of natural kinds, which difference is 
grounded among other things on the different ways in which they understand the nature and 
epistemic status of inductive generalizations. Kant thinks our knowledge of the empirical world 
hopelessly dependent on an impoverished and under-developed kind of logic. Whether rightly or 
wrongly, Aristotle exhibits no such concern, and I have tried to suggest one reason why. But in 
either case, it suggests that for both the status of teleology cannot be reduced to a simple, 
isolable, and generic question about ‘teleology’, but depends instead on a host of other issues, all 
reciprocally informing one another. The holistic character of the thought of each resists any easy 
reduction into independent parts.
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